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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl70
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl6
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl22
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl87
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl98
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl5
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl95
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl51
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl126
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl105
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl11
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl15
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl6
15 files changed, 556 insertions, 147 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
index e8cfbbe2e3..ff3e69bae5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
select_sni_extension/1]).
%% Alert and close handling
--export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5]).
+-export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]).
%% Data handling
@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) ->
getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) ->
dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag).
+protocol_name() ->
+ "DTLS".
+
%%====================================================================
%% tls_connection_sup API
%%====================================================================
@@ -273,7 +276,9 @@ init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server, transport_cb = gen_udp} = St
Result = ssl_connection:init(Type, Event,
State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT},
protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(),
- previous_cookie_secret => <<>>}},
+ previous_cookie_secret => <<>>,
+ ignored_alerts => 0,
+ max_ignored_alerts => 10}},
?MODULE),
erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret),
Result;
@@ -371,7 +376,7 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello,
ssl_options = SslOptions} = State) ->
case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOptions, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of
#alert{} = Alert ->
- ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State);
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, ReqVersion, hello, State);
{Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} ->
ssl_connection:handle_session(Hello,
Version, NewId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol, State)
@@ -543,7 +548,7 @@ handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) ->
handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName,
#state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) ->
- ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State);
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State);
%%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages
handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE,
fragment = Data},
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE,
State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events}
end
catch throw:#alert{} = Alert ->
- ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0)
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0)
end;
%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages
handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) ->
@@ -577,7 +582,7 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, Sta
Alerts = [_|_] ->
handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State});
#alert{} = Alert ->
- ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State)
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State)
end;
%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages
handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) ->
@@ -629,7 +634,7 @@ handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello,
case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb,
ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of
#alert{} = Alert ->
- ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0);
+ handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0);
{Version, {Type, Session},
ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} ->
Protocol = case Protocol0 of
@@ -964,3 +969,54 @@ unprocessed_events(Events) ->
%% process more TLS-records received on the socket.
erlang:length(Events)-1.
+handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = gen_udp,
+ role = Role,
+ ssl_options = Options} = State0) ->
+ case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of
+ {true, State} ->
+ log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role),
+ {next_state, StateName, State};
+ {false, State} ->
+ ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State)
+ end;
+handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) ->
+ ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State).
+
+
+ignore_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL}, #state{protocol_specific = #{ignored_alerts := N,
+ max_ignored_alerts := N}} = State) ->
+ {false, State};
+ignore_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert,
+ #state{protocol_specific = #{ignored_alerts := N} = PS} = State) ->
+ case is_ignore_alert(Alert) of
+ true ->
+ {true, State#state{protocol_specific = PS#{ignored_alerts => N+1}}};
+ false ->
+ {false, State}
+ end;
+ignore_alert(_, State) ->
+ {false, State}.
+
+%% RFC 6347 4.1.2.7. Handling Invalid Records
+%% recommends to silently ignore invalid DTLS records when
+%% upd is the transport. Note we do not support compression so no need
+%% include ?DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
+is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC}) ->
+ true;
+is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?RECORD_OVERFLOW}) ->
+ true;
+is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?DECODE_ERROR}) ->
+ true;
+is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR}) ->
+ true;
+is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER}) ->
+ true;
+is_ignore_alert(_) ->
+ false.
+
+log_ignore_alert(true, StateName, Alert, Role) ->
+ Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert),
+ error_logger:format("DTLS over UDP ~p: In state ~p ignored to send ALERT ~s as DoS-attack mitigation \n",
+ [Role, StateName, Txt]);
+log_ignore_alert(false, _, _,_) ->
+ ok.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl
index fbbd479428..5f854fbb4b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_socket.erl
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ internal_inet_values() ->
[{active, false}, {mode,binary}].
default_inet_values() ->
- [{active, true}, {mode, list}].
+ [{active, true}, {mode, list}, {packet, 0}, {packet_size, 0}].
default_cb_info() ->
{gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error}.
@@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ get_emulated_opts(EmOpts, EmOptNames) ->
emulated_socket_options(InetValues, #socket_options{
mode = Mode,
+ packet = Packet,
+ packet_size = PacketSize,
active = Active}) ->
#socket_options{
mode = proplists:get_value(mode, InetValues, Mode),
+ packet = proplists:get_value(packet, InetValues, Packet),
+ packet_size = proplists:get_value(packet_size, InetValues, PacketSize),
active = proplists:get_value(active, InetValues, Active)
}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl
index c789a32087..c9e04767aa 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
-record(state,
{port,
- listner,
+ listener,
dtls_options,
emulated_options,
dtls_msq_queues = kv_new(),
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ init([Port, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSOptions]) ->
first = true,
dtls_options = DTLSOptions,
emulated_options = EmOpts,
- listner = Socket,
+ listener = Socket,
close = false}}
catch _:_ ->
{error, closed}
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ handle_call({accept, _}, _, #state{close = true} = State) ->
handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{first = true,
accepters = Accepters,
- listner = Socket} = State0) ->
+ listener = Socket} = State0) ->
next_datagram(Socket),
State = State0#state{first = false,
accepters = queue:in({Accepter, From}, Accepters)},
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{first = true,
handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{accepters = Accepters} = State0) ->
State = State0#state{accepters = queue:in({Accepter, From}, Accepters)},
{noreply, State};
-handle_call(sockname, _, #state{listner = Socket} = State) ->
+handle_call(sockname, _, #state{listener = Socket} = State) ->
Reply = inet:sockname(Socket),
{reply, Reply, State};
handle_call(close, _, #state{dtls_processes = Processes,
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ handle_call(close, _, #state{dtls_processes = Processes,
end, queue:to_list(Accepters)),
{reply, ok, State#state{close = true, accepters = queue:new()}}
end;
-handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listner = Socket,
+handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listener = Socket,
emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) ->
case get_socket_opts(Socket, SocketOptNames) of
{ok, Opts} ->
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listner = S
handle_call(get_all_opts, _, #state{dtls_options = DTLSOptions,
emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) ->
{reply, {ok, EmOpts, DTLSOptions}, State};
-handle_call({set_sock_opts, {SocketOpts, NewEmOpts}}, _, #state{listner = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts0} = State) ->
+handle_call({set_sock_opts, {SocketOpts, NewEmOpts}}, _, #state{listener = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts0} = State) ->
set_socket_opts(Socket, SocketOpts),
EmOpts = do_set_emulated_opts(NewEmOpts, EmOpts0),
{reply, ok, State#state{emulated_options = EmOpts}}.
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ handle_cast({active_once, Client, Pid}, State0) ->
State = handle_active_once(Client, Pid, State0),
{noreply, State}.
-handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listner = Socket} = State0) ->
+handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket} = State0) ->
State = handle_datagram({IP, InPortNo}, Msg, State0),
next_datagram(Socket),
{noreply, State};
@@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listner = Socket} = Sta
%% UDP socket does not have a connection and should not receive an econnreset
%% This does however happens on on some windows versions. Just ignoring it
%% appears to make things work as expected!
-handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listner = Socket} = State) ->
+handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket} = State) ->
Report = io_lib:format("Ignore SSL UDP Listener: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]),
error_logger:info_report(Report),
{noreply, State};
-handle_info({udp_error, Socket, Error}, #state{listner = Socket} = State) ->
+handle_info({udp_error, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket} = State) ->
Report = io_lib:format("SSL UDP Listener shutdown: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]),
error_logger:info_report(Report),
{noreply, State#state{close=true}};
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ setup_new_connection(User, From, Client, Msg, #state{dtls_processes = Processes,
dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues,
dtls_options = DTLSOpts,
port = Port,
- listner = Socket,
+ listener = Socket,
emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) ->
ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, {self(), {Client, Socket}},
- {DTLSOpts, EmOpts, udp_listner}, User, dtls_socket:default_cb_info()],
+ {DTLSOpts, EmOpts, udp_listener}, User, dtls_socket:default_cb_info()],
case dtls_connection_sup:start_child(ConnArgs) of
{ok, Pid} ->
erlang:monitor(process, Pid),
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index 75eb308ba5..4e592c02ec 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ renegotiate(#sslsocket{pid = {Listen,_}}) when is_port(Listen) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec prf(#sslsocket{}, binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
- binary() | prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
+ [binary() | prf_random()], non_neg_integer()) ->
{ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}.
%%
%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
@@ -713,6 +713,13 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) ->
Protocol = handle_option(protocol, Opts, tls),
+ case Versions of
+ [{3, 0}] ->
+ reject_alpn_next_prot_options(Opts);
+ _ ->
+ ok
+ end,
+
SSLOptions = #ssl_options{
versions = Versions,
verify = validate_option(verify, Verify),
@@ -809,7 +816,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) ->
ConnetionCb = connection_cb(Opts),
{ok, #config{ssl = SSLOptions, emulated = Emulated, inet_ssl = Sock,
- inet_user = SockOpts, transport_info = CbInfo, connection_cb = ConnetionCb
+ inet_user = Sock, transport_info = CbInfo, connection_cb = ConnetionCb
}}.
@@ -956,55 +963,32 @@ validate_option(hibernate_after, Value) when is_integer(Value), Value >= 0 ->
validate_option(erl_dist,Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
Value;
-validate_option(Opt, Value)
- when Opt =:= alpn_advertised_protocols orelse Opt =:= alpn_preferred_protocols,
- is_list(Value) ->
- case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
- {3,0} ->
- throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
- _ ->
- validate_binary_list(Opt, Value),
- Value
- end;
+validate_option(Opt, Value) when Opt =:= alpn_advertised_protocols orelse Opt =:= alpn_preferred_protocols,
+ is_list(Value) ->
+ validate_binary_list(Opt, Value),
+ Value;
validate_option(Opt, Value)
when Opt =:= alpn_advertised_protocols orelse Opt =:= alpn_preferred_protocols,
Value =:= undefined ->
undefined;
-validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols} = Value)
+validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols})
when is_list(PreferredProtocols) ->
- case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
- {3,0} ->
- throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
- _ ->
- validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
- validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
- {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, ?NO_PROTOCOL}
- end;
-validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols = Opt, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, Default} = Value)
- when is_list(PreferredProtocols), is_binary(Default),
- byte_size(Default) > 0, byte_size(Default) < 256 ->
- case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
- {3,0} ->
- throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
- _ ->
- validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
- validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
- Value
- end;
-
+ validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
+ validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
+ {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, ?NO_PROTOCOL};
+validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols, Default} = Value)
+ when is_list(PreferredProtocols), is_binary(Default),
+ byte_size(Default) > 0, byte_size(Default) < 256 ->
+ validate_binary_list(client_preferred_next_protocols, PreferredProtocols),
+ validate_npn_ordering(Precedence),
+ Value;
validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, undefined) ->
undefined;
validate_option(log_alert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
Value;
-validate_option(next_protocols_advertised = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
- case tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]) of
- {3,0} ->
- throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
- _ ->
- validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value),
- Value
- end;
-
+validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
+ validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value),
+ Value;
validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) ->
undefined;
validate_option(server_name_indication = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) ->
@@ -1483,3 +1467,22 @@ server_name_indication_default(Host) when is_list(Host) ->
Host;
server_name_indication_default(_) ->
undefined.
+
+
+reject_alpn_next_prot_options(Opts) ->
+ AlpnNextOpts = [alpn_advertised_protocols,
+ alpn_preferred_protocols,
+ next_protocols_advertised,
+ next_protocol_selector,
+ client_preferred_next_protocols],
+ reject_alpn_next_prot_options(AlpnNextOpts, Opts).
+
+reject_alpn_next_prot_options([], _) ->
+ ok;
+reject_alpn_next_prot_options([Opt| AlpnNextOpts], Opts) ->
+ case lists:keyfind(Opt, 1, Opts) of
+ {Opt, Value} ->
+ throw({error, {options, {not_supported_in_sslv3, {Opt, Value}}}});
+ false ->
+ reject_alpn_next_prot_options(AlpnNextOpts, Opts)
+ end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
index 696a55e4b9..db415a3666 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
-include("ssl_record.hrl").
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
--export([decode/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]).
+-export([decode/1, own_alert_txt/1, alert_txt/1, reason_code/2]).
%%====================================================================
%% Internal application API
@@ -57,16 +57,32 @@ decode(Bin) ->
reason_code(#alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, _) ->
closed;
reason_code(#alert{description = Description}, _) ->
- {tls_alert, description_txt(Description)}.
+ {tls_alert, string:to_lower(description_txt(Description))}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec own_alert_txt(#alert{}) -> string().
+%%
+%% Description: Returns the error string for given alert generated
+%% by the erlang implementation.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+own_alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}, reason = undefined, role = Role}) ->
+ "at " ++ Mod ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Line) ++ " generated " ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Role)) ++ " ALERT: " ++
+ level_txt(Level) ++ description_txt(Description);
+own_alert_txt(#alert{reason = Reason} = Alert) ->
+ BaseTxt = own_alert_txt(Alert#alert{reason = undefined}),
+ FormatDepth = 9, % Some limit on printed representation of an error
+ ReasonTxt = lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~P", [Reason, FormatDepth])),
+ BaseTxt ++ " - " ++ ReasonTxt.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec alert_txt(#alert{}) -> string().
%%
-%% Description: Returns the error string for given alert.
+%% Description: Returns the error string for given alert received from
+%% the peer.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, where = {Mod,Line}, reason = undefined}) ->
- Mod ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Line) ++ ":" ++
- level_txt(Level) ++" "++ description_txt(Description);
+alert_txt(#alert{level = Level, description = Description, reason = undefined, role = Role}) ->
+ "received " ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Role)) ++ " ALERT: " ++
+ level_txt(Level) ++ description_txt(Description);
alert_txt(#alert{reason = Reason} = Alert) ->
BaseTxt = alert_txt(Alert#alert{reason = undefined}),
FormatDepth = 9, % Some limit on printed representation of an error
@@ -93,73 +109,73 @@ decode(<<>>, Acc, _) ->
lists:reverse(Acc, []).
level_txt(?WARNING) ->
- "Warning:";
+ "Warning - ";
level_txt(?FATAL) ->
- "Fatal error:".
+ "Fatal - ".
description_txt(?CLOSE_NOTIFY) ->
- "close notify";
+ "Close Notify";
description_txt(?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) ->
- "unexpected message";
+ "Unexpected Message";
description_txt(?BAD_RECORD_MAC) ->
- "bad record mac";
-description_txt(?DECRYPTION_FAILED) ->
- "decryption failed";
+ "Bad Record MAC";
+description_txt(?DECRYPTION_FAILED_RESERVED) ->
+ "Decryption Failed Reserved";
description_txt(?RECORD_OVERFLOW) ->
- "record overflow";
+ "Record Overflow";
description_txt(?DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE) ->
- "decompression failure";
+ "Decompression Failure";
description_txt(?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) ->
- "handshake failure";
+ "Handshake Failure";
description_txt(?NO_CERTIFICATE_RESERVED) ->
- "No certificate reserved";
+ "No Certificate Reserved";
description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE) ->
- "bad certificate";
+ "Bad Certificate";
description_txt(?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE) ->
- "unsupported certificate";
+ "Unsupported Certificate";
description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED) ->
- "certificate revoked";
+ "Certificate Revoked";
description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED) ->
- "certificate expired";
+ "Certificate Expired";
description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN) ->
- "certificate unknown";
+ "Certificate Unknown";
description_txt(?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) ->
- "illegal parameter";
+ "Illegal Parameter";
description_txt(?UNKNOWN_CA) ->
- "unknown ca";
+ "Unknown CA";
description_txt(?ACCESS_DENIED) ->
- "access denied";
+ "Access Denied";
description_txt(?DECODE_ERROR) ->
- "decode error";
+ "Decode Error";
description_txt(?DECRYPT_ERROR) ->
- "decrypt error";
+ "Decrypt Error";
description_txt(?EXPORT_RESTRICTION) ->
- "export restriction";
+ "Export Restriction";
description_txt(?PROTOCOL_VERSION) ->
- "protocol version";
+ "Protocol Version";
description_txt(?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY) ->
- "insufficient security";
+ "Insufficient Security";
description_txt(?INTERNAL_ERROR) ->
- "internal error";
+ "Internal Error";
description_txt(?USER_CANCELED) ->
- "user canceled";
+ "User Canceled";
description_txt(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) ->
- "no renegotiation";
+ "No Renegotiation";
description_txt(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) ->
- "unsupported extension";
+ "Unsupported Extension";
description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) ->
- "certificate unobtainable";
+ "Certificate Unobtainable";
description_txt(?UNRECOGNISED_NAME) ->
- "unrecognised name";
+ "Unrecognised Name";
description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE) ->
- "bad certificate status response";
+ "Bad Certificate Status Response";
description_txt(?BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE) ->
- "bad certificate hash value";
+ "Bad Certificate Hash Value";
description_txt(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) ->
- "unknown psk identity";
+ "Unknown Psk Identity";
description_txt(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) ->
- "inappropriate fallback";
+ "Inappropriate Fallback";
description_txt(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) ->
- "no application protocol";
+ "No application protocol";
description_txt(Enum) ->
lists:flatten(io_lib:format("unsupported/unknown alert: ~p", [Enum])).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
index f3743ba0f0..35670edea5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
%% close_notify(0),
%% unexpected_message(10),
%% bad_record_mac(20),
-%% decryption_failed(21),
+%% decryption_failed_reserved(21),
%% record_overflow(22),
%% decompression_failure(30),
%% handshake_failure(40),
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
-define(CLOSE_NOTIFY, 0).
-define(UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 10).
-define(BAD_RECORD_MAC, 20).
--define(DECRYPTION_FAILED, 21).
+-define(DECRYPTION_FAILED_RESERVED, 21).
-define(RECORD_OVERFLOW, 22).
-define(DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, 30).
-define(HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 40).
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
level,
description,
where = {?FILE, ?LINE},
+ role,
reason
}).
-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_alert).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index bd60197c88..b6cd22dd13 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -335,7 +335,9 @@ all_suites(Version) ->
anonymous_suites({3, N}) ->
anonymous_suites(N);
-
+anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) ->
+ anonymous_suites(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version))
+ -- [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5];
anonymous_suites(N)
when N >= 3 ->
[?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
@@ -373,30 +375,38 @@ psk_suites({3, N}) ->
psk_suites(N)
when N >= 3 ->
[
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
] ++ psk_suites(0);
psk_suites(_) ->
- [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ [?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
@@ -563,6 +573,15 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) ->
suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
{rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf};
+%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785
+
+suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) ->
+ {psk, null, sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) ->
+ {dhe_psk, null, sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) ->
+ {rsa_psk, null, sha, default_prf};
+
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
@@ -604,6 +623,36 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) ->
suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) ->
{rsa_psk, null, sha384, default_prf};
+%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489
+
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf};
+
+%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05
+
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) ->
+%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256};
+%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) ->
+%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256};
+
%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054
suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) ->
@@ -865,6 +914,15 @@ suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) ->
suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) ->
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
+%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785
+
+suite({psk, null, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA;
+suite({dhe_psk, null, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA;
+suite({rsa_psk, null, sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA;
+
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
@@ -906,6 +964,36 @@ suite({rsa_psk, null, sha256}) ->
suite({rsa_psk, null, sha384}) ->
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384;
+%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489
+
+suite({ecdhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha256}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha384}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384;
+
+%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05
+
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256}) ->
+%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256;
+%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256}) ->
+%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256;
+
%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054
suite({srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) ->
@@ -1465,7 +1553,8 @@ is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_dss, Algos) ->
is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_rsa, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos);
-is_acceptable_keyexchange(ecdh_anon, Algos) ->
+is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk ->
proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
index 8e8f3d9c67..e5462d8402 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
@@ -399,6 +399,17 @@
%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x95 };
-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#95)>>).
+%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785
+
+%% TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2C };
+-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2C)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2D };
+-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2D)>>).
+
+%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2E };
+-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2E)>>).
+
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
@@ -455,6 +466,46 @@
%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9};
-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#B9)>>).
+%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = {0xC0,0x33};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#33)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x34};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#34)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x35};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#35)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x36};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#36)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x37};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#37)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x38};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#38)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x3A};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#3A)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x3B};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#3B)>>).
+
+%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#01)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#02)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#03)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#05)>>).
+
%%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054
%% TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A };
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index fb87662c7b..5d48325719 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport) ->
-spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom(), pid()| undefined) ->
{ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, udp_listner) ->
- %% dtls listner process must have the socket control
+socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, udp_listener) ->
+ %% dtls listener process must have the socket control
{ok, Connection:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, undefined)};
socket_control(tls_connection = Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, ListenTracker) ->
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ renegotiation(ConnectionPid) ->
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(),
- binary() | ssl:prf_random(), non_neg_integer()) ->
+ [binary() | ssl:prf_random()], non_neg_integer()) ->
{ok, binary()} | {error, reason()} | {'EXIT', term()}.
%%
%% Description: use a ssl sessions TLS PRF to generate key material
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa;
Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa;
Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
- Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
+ Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, Alg, ssl:tls_version(Version)),
@@ -542,6 +542,15 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys},
end
end;
+certify(internal, #certificate_request{},
+ #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version,
+ key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _)
+ when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
+ Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
+ Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
+ handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE),
+ Version, certify, State);
+
certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest,
#state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert},
role = client,
@@ -673,10 +682,11 @@ cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature,
tls_handshake_history = Handshake
} = State0, Connection) ->
+ TLSVersion = ssl:tls_version(Version),
%% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default
- HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PublicKeyInfo, Version),
+ HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PublicKeyInfo, TLSVersion),
case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo,
- ssl:tls_version(Version), HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
+ TLSVersion, HashSign, MasterSecret, Handshake) of
valid ->
{Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0),
Connection:next_event(cipher, Record,
@@ -1143,7 +1153,8 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName,
port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid},
role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) ->
invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session),
- log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+ log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(),
+ StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}),
alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection),
{stop, normal};
@@ -1153,15 +1164,18 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert,
{stop, {shutdown, peer_close}};
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
- #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
- log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+ #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) ->
+ log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role,
+ Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}),
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State),
{stop, {shutdown, peer_close}};
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName,
- #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From},
+ #state{role = Role,
+ ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From},
protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) ->
- log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+ log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role,
+ Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}),
gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}),
{Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0),
%% Go back to connection!
@@ -1169,8 +1183,9 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert,
%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts
handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName,
- #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) ->
- log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+ #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) ->
+ log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role,
+ Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}),
{Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0),
Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State).
@@ -1393,6 +1408,16 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
PremasterSecret =
ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup),
calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
+certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
+ #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey,
+ ssl_options =
+ #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State,
+ Connection) ->
+ PremasterSecret =
+ ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerEcDhPrivateKey, PSKLookup),
+ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher);
+
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey,
#state{private_key = Key,
ssl_options =
@@ -1412,6 +1437,7 @@ certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon;
Algo == ecdh_anon;
Algo == psk;
Algo == dhe_psk;
+ Algo == ecdhe_psk;
Algo == srp_anon ->
State;
@@ -1518,6 +1544,28 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk,
State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys};
+key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk,
+ ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint},
+ hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo,
+ private_key = PrivateKey,
+ session = #session{ecc = ECCCurve},
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
+ negotiated_version = Version
+ } = State0, Connection) ->
+ ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCCurve),
+ #{security_parameters := SecParams} =
+ ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read),
+ #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom,
+ server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams,
+ Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, ssl:tls_version(Version),
+ {ecdhe_psk,
+ PskIdentityHint, ECDHKeys,
+ HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom,
+ ServerRandom,
+ PrivateKey}),
+ State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0),
+ State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys};
+
key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) ->
State;
@@ -1616,6 +1664,17 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client,
{dhe_psk,
SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}),
Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
+key_exchange(#state{role = client,
+ ssl_options = SslOpts,
+ key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk,
+ negotiated_version = Version,
+ diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys} = State0, Connection) ->
+ Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version),
+ {ecdhe_psk,
+ SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, ECDHKeys}),
+ Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0);
+
key_exchange(#state{role = client,
ssl_options = SslOpts,
key_algorithm = rsa_psk,
@@ -1671,6 +1730,12 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret,
rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) ->
throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)).
+request_client_cert(#state{key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _)
+ when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon;
+ Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk;
+ Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon ->
+ State;
+
request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer,
signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns},
connection_states = ConnectionStates0,
@@ -1792,6 +1857,18 @@ calculate_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys},
Connection, certify, certify);
+calculate_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{
+ dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve}} = ServerKey,
+ #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} =
+ State=#state{session=Session}, Connection) ->
+ ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve),
+
+ PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, ECDHKeys, PSKLookup),
+ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret,
+ State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys,
+ session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}},
+ Connection, certify, certify);
+
calculate_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator} = ServerKey,
#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{srp_identity = SRPId}} = State,
Connection) ->
@@ -1876,6 +1953,7 @@ is_anonymous(Algo) when Algo == dh_anon;
Algo == ecdh_anon;
Algo == psk;
Algo == dhe_psk;
+ Algo == ecdhe_psk;
Algo == rsa_psk;
Algo == srp_anon ->
true;
@@ -2370,18 +2448,22 @@ alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connectio
Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), ReasonCode})
end.
-log_alert(true, Info, Alert) ->
+log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) ->
+ Txt = ssl_alert:own_alert_txt(Alert),
+ error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]));
+log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) ->
Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert),
- error_logger:format("SSL: ~p: ~s\n", [Info, Txt]);
-log_alert(false, _, _) ->
+ error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]));
+log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) ->
ok.
handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName,
- #state{transport_cb = Transport,
- socket = Socket,
- protocol_cb = Connection,
- connection_states = ConnectionStates,
- ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
+ #state{role = Role,
+ transport_cb = Transport,
+ socket = Socket,
+ protocol_cb = Connection,
+ connection_states = ConnectionStates,
+ ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) ->
try %% Try to tell the other side
{BinMsg, _} =
Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates),
@@ -2390,7 +2472,7 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName,
ignore
end,
try %% Try to tell the local user
- log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert),
+ log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}),
handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State)
catch _:_ ->
ok
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 3cf466e78f..fc4181a760 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) ->
{ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
{psk, binary()} |
{dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} |
+ {ecdhe_psk, binary(), #'ECPrivateKey'{}} |
{srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()},
binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()}) ->
#client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}.
@@ -264,6 +265,13 @@ key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) ->
dh_public = PublicKey}
};
+key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdhe_psk, Identity, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey}}) ->
+ #client_key_exchange{
+ exchange_keys = #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{
+ identity = Identity,
+ dh_public = ECPublicKey}
+ };
+
key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) ->
EncPremasterSecret =
encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey),
@@ -310,6 +318,16 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _},
enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams,
HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdhe_psk, PskIdentityHint,
+ #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey,
+ parameters = ECCurve},
+ HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) ->
+ ServerECDHEPSKParams = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{
+ hint = PskIdentityHint,
+ dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey}},
+ enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECDHEPSKParams, HashSign,
+ ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey);
+
key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _},
#srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime,
salt = Salt},
@@ -415,9 +433,11 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
path_validation_alert(Reason)
end
catch
- error:_ ->
+ error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} ->
%% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, failed_to_decode_certificate)
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason});
+ error:OtherReason ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason})
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -530,14 +550,31 @@ premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{
LookupFun) ->
PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params),
psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
+
+premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{
+ hint = IdentityHint,
+ dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{
+ public = ECServerPubKey}},
+ PrivateEcDhKey,
+ LookupFun) ->
+ PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey),
+ psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret);
+
premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) ->
- psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret).
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret);
+
+premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{
+ identity = PSKIdentity,
+ dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) ->
+ PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey),
+ psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{
identity = PSKIdentity,
dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) ->
PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params),
psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret).
+
premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup);
premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) ->
@@ -885,6 +922,7 @@ enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo},
| #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{}
| #client_psk_identity{}
| #client_dhe_psk_identity{}
+ | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{}
| #client_rsa_psk_identity{}
| #client_srp_public{}.
%%
@@ -1046,6 +1084,7 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruc
params_bin = BinMsg,
hashsign = HashSign,
signature = Signature};
+
dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary,
?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
@@ -1060,6 +1099,22 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
params_bin = BinMsg,
hashsign = HashSign,
signature = Signature};
+dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary,
+ ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID),
+ ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary,
+ _/binary>> = KeyStruct,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) ->
+ DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{
+ curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)},
+ public = ECPoint},
+ Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{
+ hint = IdentityHint,
+ dh_params = DHParams},
+ {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version),
+ #server_key_params{params = Params,
+ params_bin = BinMsg,
+ hashsign = HashSign,
+ signature = Signature};
dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary,
?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary,
?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary,
@@ -1130,7 +1185,8 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc
KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
KeyExchange == srp_anon;
KeyExchange == psk;
- KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
+ KeyExchange == dhe_psk;
+ KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk ->
%% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous
filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]).
@@ -1494,6 +1550,8 @@ advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) ->
true;
advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) ->
true;
+advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) ->
+ true;
advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) ->
advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest).
@@ -1611,8 +1669,11 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_critical_extension}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revoked, _}}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-path_validation_alert({bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}) ->
- ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+%%path_validation_alert({bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}) ->
+%% ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+path_validation_alert({bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, Details}}) ->
+ Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE),
+ Alert#alert{reason = Details};
path_validation_alert({bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}) ->
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE);
path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) ->
@@ -1785,6 +1846,18 @@ encode_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{
YLen = byte_size(Y),
<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>;
+encode_server_key(Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) ->
+ encode_server_key(Params#server_ecdhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>});
+encode_server_key(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{
+ hint = PskIdentityHint,
+ dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{
+ curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}}) ->
+ %%TODO: support arbitrary keys
+ Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint),
+ KLen = size(ECPubKey),
+ <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary,
+ ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16((tls_v1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))),
+ ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>;
encode_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) ->
NLen = byte_size(N),
GLen = byte_size(G),
@@ -1817,6 +1890,12 @@ encode_client_key(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic},
Len = byte_size(Id),
DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
<<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
+encode_client_key(Identity = #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
+ encode_client_key(Identity#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
+encode_client_key(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) ->
+ Len = byte_size(Id),
+ DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic),
+ <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?BYTE(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>;
encode_client_key(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) ->
encode_client_key(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version);
encode_client_key(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) ->
@@ -1868,6 +1947,10 @@ dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) ->
#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
+dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary,
+ ?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>,
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, _) ->
+ #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y};
dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>,
?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) ->
#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id,
@@ -2045,6 +2128,8 @@ key_exchange_alg(psk) ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK;
key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK;
+key_exchange_alg(ecdhe_psk) ->
+ ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK;
key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) ->
?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK;
key_exchange_alg(Alg)
@@ -2189,7 +2274,8 @@ crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, C
ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath,
DBInfo})
end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}},
- {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}
+ {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end},
+ {undetermined_details, true}
],
case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of
no_dps ->
@@ -2199,7 +2285,7 @@ crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, C
DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed
%% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined}
case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of
- {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} ->
+ {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback,
CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options);
Other ->
@@ -2209,7 +2295,7 @@ crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, C
crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) ->
case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of
- {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} ->
+ {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} ->
valid;
Other ->
Other
@@ -2302,6 +2388,7 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, Supported
is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when
KeyExAlgo == psk;
KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk;
+ KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_psk;
KeyExAlgo == srp_anon;
KeyExAlgo == dh_anon;
KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
index 324b7dbde3..a191fcf766 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, 1).
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, 6).
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, 2).
+-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, 7).
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, 3).
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, 4).
-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, 5).
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@
dh_params
}).
+-record(server_ecdhe_psk_params, {
+ hint,
+ dh_params
+ }).
+
-record(server_srp_params, {
srp_n, %% opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>
srp_g, %% opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>
@@ -254,6 +260,11 @@
dh_public
}).
+-record(client_ecdhe_psk_identity, {
+ identity,
+ dh_public
+ }).
+
-record(client_rsa_psk_identity, {
identity,
exchange_keys
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
index ca9aaf4660..f44fe6a2bf 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
name(normal) ->
?MODULE;
name(dist) ->
- list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "dist").
+ list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "_dist").
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec start_link(list()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}.
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ server_register_session(Port, Session, #state{session_cache_server_max = Max,
do_register_session(Key, Session, Max, Pid, Cache, CacheCb) ->
try CacheCb:size(Cache) of
- Max ->
+ Size when Size >= Max ->
invalidate_session_cache(Pid, CacheCb, Cache);
_ ->
CacheCb:update(Cache, Key, Session),
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl
index 6cc0729208..115ab4451d 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pem_cache.erl
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
name(normal) ->
?MODULE;
name(dist) ->
- list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "dist").
+ list_to_atom(atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ "_dist").
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec start_link(list()) -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
index b28636569d..8828c3a0d8 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl
@@ -76,10 +76,17 @@ remove(Dbs) ->
true = ets:delete(Db1);
(undefined) ->
ok;
- (ssl_pem_cache) ->
- ok;
- (ssl_pem_cache_dist) ->
- ok;
+ (Name) when is_atom(Name) ->
+ NormalName = ssl_pem_cache:name(normal),
+ DistName = ssl_pem_cache:name(dist),
+ case Name of
+ NormalName ->
+ ok;
+ DistName ->
+ ok;
+ _ ->
+ true = ets:delete(Name)
+ end;
(Db) ->
true = ets:delete(Db)
end, Dbs).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 352874c77d..e3ffbea3d3 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1]).
%% Alert and close handling
--export([send_alert/2, close/5]).
+-export([send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]).
%% Data handling
-export([passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4, send/3,
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)->
encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) ->
tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates).
+protocol_name() ->
+ "TLS".
%%====================================================================
%% tls_connection_sup API
%%====================================================================
@@ -719,7 +721,7 @@ close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) ->
%% Other
close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) ->
Transport:close(Socket).
-
+
convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") ->
State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)};
convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") ->
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-19 07:58:15 +0000