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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml18
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl43
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl10
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl7
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl12
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl189
9 files changed, 171 insertions, 122 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
index bd2cb70e3f..d77c6440b0 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
+++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
@@ -350,11 +350,23 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) ->
</p>
</item>
+ <tag>{padding_check, boolean()}</tag>
+ <item>
+ <p> This option only affects TLS-1.0 connections.
+ If set to false it disables the block cipher padding check
+ to be able to interoperate with legacy software.
+ </p>
+
+ <warning><p> Using this option makes TLS vulnerable to
+ the Poodle attack</p></warning>
+
+ </item>
+
</taglist>
-
+
</section>
-
- <section>
+
+ <section>
<title>SSL OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - CLIENT SIDE</title>
<p>Options described here are client specific or has a slightly different
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
index c0776e822b..59b3ddec5c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2014. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
} = ReadState0}= ConnnectionStates0) ->
{PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} = ssl_record:decipher(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
- CipherFragment, ReadState0),
+ CipherFragment, ReadState0, true),
MacHash = calc_mac_hash(ReadState1, Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, PlainFragment),
case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
true ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index b06b1aa7c7..78f3584225 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -656,7 +656,8 @@ handle_options(Opts0) ->
log_alert = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true),
server_name_indication = handle_option(server_name_indication, Opts, undefined),
honor_cipher_order = handle_option(honor_cipher_order, Opts, false),
- protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls)
+ protocol = proplists:get_value(protocol, Opts, tls),
+ padding_check = proplists:get_value(padding_check, Opts, true)
},
CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),
@@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0) ->
cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after,
erl_dist, next_protocols_advertised,
client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert,
- server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order],
+ server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check],
SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
@@ -847,6 +848,8 @@ validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined) ->
undefined;
validate_option(honor_cipher_order, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
Value;
+validate_option(padding_check, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
+ Value;
validate_option(Opt, Value) ->
throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index e1d89c149e..939778dd40 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
- cipher_init/3, decipher/5, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6,
+ cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6,
suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1,
ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1,
@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
{T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+-spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(),
+ ssl_record:ssl_version(), boolean()) ->
{binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Decrypts the data and the MAC using cipher described
@@ -190,9 +191,9 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first the data is decrypted
%% and the an HMAC of the decrypted data is checked
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
-decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
+decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _, _) ->
{Fragment, <<>>, CipherState};
-decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _) ->
+decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _, _) ->
try crypto:stream_decrypt(State0, Fragment) of
{State, Text} ->
GSC = generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(Text, HashSz),
@@ -208,20 +209,20 @@ decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _)
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
end;
-decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T)
- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version);
-decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
+decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version);
-decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
+decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
- end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version).
+ end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ decipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
aead_decipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version).
block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
- HashSz, Fragment, Version) ->
+ HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
try
Text = Fun(Key, IV, Fragment),
NextIV = next_iv(Fragment, IV),
@@ -245,7 +246,7 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
Content = GBC#generic_block_cipher.content,
Mac = GBC#generic_block_cipher.mac,
CipherState1 = CipherState0#cipher_state{iv=GBC#generic_block_cipher.next_iv},
- case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version) of
+ case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version, PaddingCheck) of
true ->
{Content, Mac, CipherState1};
false ->
@@ -1632,16 +1633,18 @@ generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(T, HashSz) ->
#generic_stream_cipher{content=Content,
mac=Mac}.
-%% For interoperability reasons we do not check the padding content in
-%% SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 as it is not strictly required and breaks
-%% interopability with for instance Google.
is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
- padding = Padding}, {3, N})
- when N == 0; N == 1 ->
- Len == byte_size(Padding);
-%% Padding must be check in TLS 1.1 and after
+ padding = Padding}, {3, 0}, _) ->
+ Len == byte_size(Padding); %% Only length check is done in SSL 3.0 spec
+%% For interoperability reasons it is possible to disable
+%% the padding check when using TLS 1.0, as it is not strictly required
+%% in the spec (only recommended), howerver this makes TLS 1.0 vunrable to the Poodle attack
+%% so by default this clause will not match
+is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 1}, false) ->
+ is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 0}, false);
+%% Padding must be checked in TLS 1.1 and after
is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
- padding = Padding}, _) ->
+ padding = Padding}, _, _) ->
Len == byte_size(Padding) andalso
list_to_binary(lists:duplicate(Len, Len)) == Padding.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index 4c2fdf74f1..3cf6020169 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@
server_name_indication = undefined,
%% Should the server prefer its own cipher order over the one provided by
%% the client?
- honor_cipher_order = false
+ honor_cipher_order = false,
+ padding_check = true
}).
-record(socket_options,
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
index 63fc57edad..a02375a947 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2014. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2013-2015. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
-export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]).
%% Payload encryption/decryption
--export([cipher/4, decipher/3, is_correct_mac/2,
+-export([cipher/4, decipher/4, is_correct_mac/2,
cipher_aead/4, decipher_aead/4]).
-export_type([ssl_version/0, ssl_atom_version/0]).
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ cipher_aead(Version, Fragment,
{CipherFragment, WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
+-spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}, boolean()) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Payload decryption
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -406,8 +406,8 @@ decipher(Version, CipherFragment,
BulkCipherAlgo,
hash_size = HashSz},
cipher_state = CipherS0
- } = ReadState) ->
- case ssl_cipher:decipher(BulkCipherAlgo, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version) of
+ } = ReadState, PaddingCheck) ->
+ case ssl_cipher:decipher(BulkCipherAlgo, HashSz, CipherS0, CipherFragment, Version, PaddingCheck) of
{PlainFragment, Mac, CipherS1} ->
CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
{PlainFragment, Mac, CS1};
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 7df73fb581..77d3aa7889 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -482,8 +482,9 @@ next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_ci
next_record(#state{protocol_buffers =
#protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]}
= Buffers,
- connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) ->
- case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0) of
+ connection_states = ConnStates0,
+ ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) ->
+ case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of
{Plain, ConnStates} ->
{Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers =
Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
index 37929c928d..3d5c5c0da3 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2014. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2015. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
-export([get_tls_records/2]).
%% Decoding
--export([decode_cipher_text/2]).
+-export([decode_cipher_text/3]).
%% Encoding
-export([encode_plain_text/4]).
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
{CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}) ->
+-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}, boolean()) ->
{#ssl_tls{}, #connection_states{}}| #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Decode cipher text
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
#security_parameters{
cipher_type = ?AEAD,
compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
- } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0) ->
+ } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) ->
AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0),
case ssl_record:decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, AAD) of
{PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
sequence_number = Seq,
security_parameters=
#security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
- } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0) ->
- case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0) of
+ } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) ->
+ case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of
{PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} ->
MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1),
case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
index f2dc1b52c1..3433f9a445 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2008-2015. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
suite() -> [{ct_hooks,[ts_install_cth]}].
all() ->
- [aes_decipher_good, aes_decipher_good_tls11, aes_decipher_fail, aes_decipher_fail_tls11].
+ [aes_decipher_good, aes_decipher_fail, padding_test].
groups() ->
[].
@@ -73,93 +73,122 @@ end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) ->
%% Test Cases --------------------------------------------------------
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
aes_decipher_good() ->
- [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext."}].
+ [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext using a correct key"}].
aes_decipher_good(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
HashSz = 32,
- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>},
- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8,
- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160,
- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
- Content = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56, "HELLO\n">>,
- Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>,
- Version = {3,0},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
- Version1 = {3,1},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
- ok.
+ CipherState = correct_cipher_state(),
+ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}),
+ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}),
+ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}),
+ decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-aes_decipher_good_tls11() ->
- [{doc,"Decipher a known TLS 1.1 cryptotext."}].
-
-%% the fragment is actuall a TLS 1.1 record, with
-%% Version = TLS 1.1, we get the correct NextIV in #cipher_state
-aes_decipher_good_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- HashSz = 32,
- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>},
- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8,
- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160,
- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
- Content = <<"HELLO\n">>,
- NextIV = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>,
- Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>,
- Version = {3,2},
- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
- Version1 = {3,2},
- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
- ok.
-
-%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
aes_decipher_fail() ->
- [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext."}].
+ [{doc,"Decipher a known cryptotext using a incorrect key"}].
-%% same as above, last byte of key replaced
aes_decipher_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
HashSz = 32,
- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>},
- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8,
- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160,
- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
- Version = {3,0},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
- 32 = byte_size(Content),
- 32 = byte_size(Mac),
- Version1 = {3,1},
- {Content1, Mac1, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
- 32 = byte_size(Content1),
- 32 = byte_size(Mac1),
- ok.
+ CipherState = incorrect_cipher_state(),
+ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}),
+ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}),
+ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}),
+ decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-aes_decipher_fail_tls11() ->
- [{doc,"Decipher a known TLS 1.1 cryptotext."}].
-
-%% same as above, last byte of key replaced
-%% stricter padding checks in TLS 1.1 mean we get an alert instead
-aes_decipher_fail_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- HashSz = 32,
- CipherState = #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
- key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>},
- Fragment = <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8,
- 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160,
- 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
- 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
- Version = {3,2},
- #alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} =
- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
- Version1 = {3,3},
- #alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} =
- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
- ok.
-
+padding_test(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ HashSz = 16,
+ CipherState = correct_cipher_state(),
+ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0}),
+ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1}),
+ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,2}),
+ pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,3}).
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+% Internal functions --------------------------------------------------------
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher_check_good(HashSz, CipherState, Version) ->
+ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = content_nextiv_mac(Version),
+ {Content, Mac, _} =
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, aes_fragment(Version), Version, true).
+
+decipher_check_fail(HashSz, CipherState, Version) ->
+ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = content_nextiv_mac(Version),
+ true = {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =/=
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, aes_fragment(Version), Version, true).
+
+pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,0} = Version) ->
+ %% 3.0 does not have padding test
+ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version),
+ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,0}), {3,0}, true),
+ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,0}), {3,0}, false);
+pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, {3,1} = Version) ->
+ %% 3.1 should have padding test, but may be disabled
+ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version),
+ BadCont = badpad_content(Content),
+ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,1}) , {3,1}, false),
+ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} =
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, badpad_aes_fragment({3,1}), {3,1}, true);
+pad_test(HashSz, CipherState, Version) ->
+ %% 3.2 and 3.3 must have padding test
+ {Content, NextIV, Mac} = badpad_content_nextiv_mac(Version),
+ BadCont = badpad_content(Content),
+ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState,
+ badpad_aes_fragment(Version), Version, false),
+ {BadCont, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState,
+ badpad_aes_fragment(Version), Version, true).
+
+aes_fragment({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1->
+ <<197,9,6,109,242,87,80,154,85,250,110,81,119,95,65,185,53,206,216,153,246,169,
+ 119,177,178,238,248,174,253,220,242,81,33,0,177,251,91,44,247,53,183,198,165,
+ 63,20,194,159,107>>;
+
+aes_fragment(_) ->
+ <<220,193,179,139,171,33,143,245,202,47,123,251,13,232,114,8,
+ 190,162,74,31,186,227,119,155,94,74,119,79,169,193,240,160,
+ 198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
+ 108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>.
+
+badpad_aes_fragment({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 ->
+ <<186,139,125,10,118,21,26,248,120,108,193,104,87,118,145,79,225,55,228,10,105,
+ 30,190,37,1,88,139,243,210,99,65,41>>;
+badpad_aes_fragment(_) ->
+ <<137,31,14,77,228,80,76,103,183,125,55,250,68,190,123,131,117,23,229,180,207,
+ 94,121,137,117,157,109,99,113,61,190,138,131,229,201,120,142,179,172,48,77,
+ 234,19,240,33,38,91,93>>.
+
+content_nextiv_mac({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 ->
+ {<<"HELLO\n">>,
+ <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184, 197,148>>,
+ <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>};
+content_nextiv_mac(_) ->
+ {<<"HELLO\n">>,
+ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>,
+ <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>}.
+
+badpad_content_nextiv_mac({3,N}) when N == 0; N == 1 ->
+ {<<"HELLO\n">>,
+ <<225,55,228,10,105,30,190,37,1,88,139,243,210,99,65,41>>,
+ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>
+ };
+badpad_content_nextiv_mac(_) ->
+ {<<"HELLO\n">>,
+ <<133,211,45,189,179,229,56,86,11,178,239,159,14,160,253,140>>,
+ <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>
+ }.
+
+badpad_content(Content) ->
+ %% BadContent will fail mac test
+ <<16#F0, Content/binary>>.
+
+correct_cipher_state() ->
+ #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
+ key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,148>>}.
+
+incorrect_cipher_state() ->
+ #cipher_state{iv = <<59,201,85,117,188,206,224,136,5,109,46,70,104,79,4,9>>,
+ key = <<72,196,247,97,62,213,222,109,210,204,217,186,172,184,197,254>>}.
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-05 06:45:08 +0000