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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml42
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml30
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl62
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src10
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl41
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl100
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl449
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl96
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl4
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl13
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl40
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl5
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl16
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl62
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl25
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec3
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl8
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl366
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl197
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl16
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl57
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/vsn.mk2
25 files changed, 1466 insertions, 183 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
index 1b37a2baa2..8643cd3745 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -25,7 +25,47 @@
<file>notes.xml</file>
</header>
<p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p>
- <section><title>SSL 5.3.5</title>
+ <section><title>SSL 5.3.6</title>
+
+ <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Corrected handling of ECC certificates, there where
+ several small issues with the handling of such
+ certificates in the ssl and public_key application. Now
+ ECC signed ECC certificates shall work and not only RSA
+ signed ECC certificates.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-12026</p>
+ </item>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT
+ CA e.i. a self-signed certificate, but provide an option
+ partial_chain to enable the application to define an
+ intermediat CA as trusted.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-12149</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+
+ <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Add decode functions for SNI (Server Name Indication)</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-12048</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
+<section><title>SSL 5.3.5</title>
<section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
<list>
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
index ffee4bd1af..19e0ba4c10 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
+++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
</c></p>
<p><c>cipher() = rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc'
- | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc </c></p>
+ | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm </c></p>
<p> <c>hash() = md5 | sha
</c></p>
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
<p>The verification fun should be defined as:</p>
<code>
-fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom()} |
+fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
{extension, #'Extension'{}}, InitialUserState :: term()) ->
{valid, UserState :: term()} | {valid_peer, UserState :: term()} |
{fail, Reason :: term()} | {unknown, UserState :: term()}.
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom()} |
always returns {valid, UserState}, the TLS/SSL handshake will
not be terminated with respect to verification failures and
the connection will be established. If called with an
- extension unknown to the user application the return value
+ extension unknown to the user application, the return value
{unknown, UserState} should be used.</p>
<p>The default verify_fun option in verify_peer mode:</p>
@@ -283,9 +283,29 @@ fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{}, Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom()} |
end, []}
</code>
-<p>Possible path validation errors: </p>
+ <p>Possible path validation errors are given on the form {bad_cert, Reason} where Reason is:</p>
-<p> {bad_cert, cert_expired}, {bad_cert, invalid_issuer}, {bad_cert, invalid_signature}, {bad_cert, unknown_ca},{bad_cert, selfsigned_peer}, {bad_cert, name_not_permitted}, {bad_cert, missing_basic_constraint}, {bad_cert, invalid_key_usage}</p>
+ <taglist>
+ <tag>unknown_ca</tag>
+ <item>No trusted CA was found in the trusted store. The trusted CA is
+ normally a so called ROOT CA that is a self-signed cert. Trust may
+ be claimed for an intermediat CA (trusted anchor does not have to be self signed
+ according to X-509) by using the option <c>partial_chain</c></item>
+
+ <tag>selfsigned_peer</tag>
+ <item>The chain consisted only of one self-signed certificate.</item>
+
+ <tag>PKIX X-509-path validation error</tag>
+ <item> Possible such reasons see <seealso
+ marker="public_key#pkix_path_validation-3"> public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 </seealso></item>
+ </taglist>
+
+ </item>
+
+ <tag>{partial_chain, fun(Chain::[DerCert]) -> {trusted_ca, DerCert} | unknown_ca </tag>
+ <item>
+ Claim an intermediat CA in the chain as trusted. TLS will then perform the public_key:pkix_path_validation/3
+ with the selected CA as trusted anchor and the rest of the chain.
</item>
<tag>{versions, [protocol()]}</tag>
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
index a7bbb6bc40..c0776e822b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
@@ -120,6 +120,26 @@ get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) ->
end.
encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+ #connection_states{current_write =
+ #connection_state{
+ epoch = Epoch,
+ sequence_number = Seq,
+ compression_state=CompS0,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{
+ cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+ compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+ {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+ WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+ AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq),
+ {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher_aead(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+ Comp, WriteState1, AAD),
+ CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, CipherFragment),
+ {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write =
+ WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}};
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
#connection_states{current_write=#connection_state{
epoch = Epoch,
sequence_number = Seq,
@@ -141,16 +161,44 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
sequence_number = Seq,
fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
#connection_states{current_read =
- #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
- security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0}
- = ConnnectionStates0) ->
- CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
+ #connection_state{
+ compression_state = CompressionS0,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{
+ cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+ compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ } = ReadState0}= ConnnectionStates0) ->
+ AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, Epoch, Seq),
+ case ssl_record:decipher_aead(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
+ CipherFragment, ReadState0, AAD) of
+ {PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
+ {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+ PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+ ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+ current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+ compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+ {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert
+ end;
+
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+ epoch = Epoch,
+ sequence_number = Seq,
+ fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+ #connection_states{current_read =
+ #connection_state{
+ compression_state = CompressionS0,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{
+ compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ } = ReadState0}= ConnnectionStates0) ->
{PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} = ssl_record:decipher(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version),
CipherFragment, ReadState0),
MacHash = calc_mac_hash(ReadState1, Type, Version, Epoch, Seq, PlainFragment),
case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
true ->
- {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompressAlg,
+ {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
@@ -368,3 +416,7 @@ calc_mac_hash(#connection_state{mac_secret = MacSecret,
mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
dtls_v1:mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
Length, Fragment).
+
+calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) ->
+ NewSeq = (Epoch bsl 48) + SeqNo,
+ <<NewSeq:64/integer, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
index b713f86c1e..650901ef54 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
@@ -1,12 +1,22 @@
%% -*- erlang -*-
{"%VSN%",
[
+ {"5.3.5", [{load_module, ssl, soft_purge, soft_purge, [ssl_connection]},
+ {load_module, ssl_handshake, soft_purge, soft_purge, [ssl_certificate]},
+ {load_module, ssl_certificate, soft_purge, soft_purge, []},
+ {load_module, ssl_connection, soft_purge, soft_purge, [tls_connection]},
+ {update, tls_connection, {advanced, {up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6"}}, [ssl_handshake]}]},
{<<"5\\.3\\.[1-4]($|\\..*)">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{<<"5\\.[0-2]($|\\..*)">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{<<"4\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{<<"3\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]}
],
[
+ {"5.3.5", [{load_module, ssl, soft_purge, soft_purge,[ssl_certificate]},
+ {load_module, ssl_handshake, soft_purge, soft_purge,[ssl_certificate]},
+ {load_module, ssl_certificate, soft_purge, soft_purge,[]},
+ {load_module, ssl_connection, soft_purge, soft_purge,[tls_connection]},
+ {update, tls_connection, {advanced, {down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5"}}, [ssl_handshake]}]},
{<<"5\\.3\\.[1-4]($|\\..*)">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{<<"5\\.[0-2]($|\\..*)">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
{<<"4\\..*">>, [{restart_application, ssl}]},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
index d741fa63fb..dcba69a65e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ cipher_suites(openssl) ->
cipher_suites(all) ->
Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
Supported = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version)
- ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
+ ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
ssl_cipher:filter_suites([suite_definition(S) || S <- Supported]).
@@ -569,21 +569,24 @@ handle_options(Opts0, #ssl_options{protocol = Protocol, cacerts = CaCerts0,
cacertfile = CaCertFile0} = InheritedSslOpts) ->
RecordCB = record_cb(Protocol),
CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts0, CaCerts0),
- {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun} = handle_verify_options(Opts0, CaCerts),
+ {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder} = handle_verify_options(Opts0, CaCerts),
CaCertFile = case proplists:get_value(cacertfile, Opts0, CaCertFile0) of
undefined ->
CaCertDefault;
CAFile ->
CAFile
end,
+
NewVerifyOpts = InheritedSslOpts#ssl_options{cacerts = CaCerts,
cacertfile = CaCertFile,
verify = Verify,
verify_fun = VerifyFun,
+ partial_chain = PartialChainHanlder,
fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert},
SslOpts1 = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) ->
proplists:delete(Key, PropList)
- end, Opts0, [cacerts, cacertfile, verify, verify_fun, fail_if_no_peer_cert]),
+ end, Opts0, [cacerts, cacertfile, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain,
+ fail_if_no_peer_cert]),
case handle_option(versions, SslOpts1, []) of
[] ->
new_ssl_options(SslOpts1, NewVerifyOpts, RecordCB);
@@ -603,10 +606,10 @@ handle_options(Opts0) ->
ReuseSessionFun = fun(_, _, _, _) -> true end,
CaCerts = handle_option(cacerts, Opts, undefined),
- {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun} = handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts),
+ {Verify, FailIfNoPeerCert, CaCertDefault, VerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder} =
+ handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts),
CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>),
-
RecordCb = record_cb(Opts),
Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of
@@ -620,6 +623,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0) ->
versions = Versions,
verify = validate_option(verify, Verify),
verify_fun = VerifyFun,
+ partial_chain = PartialChainHanlder,
fail_if_no_peer_cert = FailIfNoPeerCert,
verify_client_once = handle_option(verify_client_once, Opts, false),
depth = handle_option(depth, Opts, 1),
@@ -656,7 +660,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0) ->
},
CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}),
- SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun,
+ SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain,
fail_if_no_peer_cert, verify_client_once,
depth, cert, certfile, key, keyfile,
password, cacerts, cacertfile, dh, dhfile,
@@ -708,6 +712,8 @@ validate_option(verify_fun, Fun) when is_function(Fun) ->
end, Fun};
validate_option(verify_fun, {Fun, _} = Value) when is_function(Fun) ->
Value;
+validate_option(partial_chain, Value) when is_function(Value) ->
+ Value;
validate_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
Value;
validate_option(verify_client_once, Value) when is_boolean(Value) ->
@@ -947,7 +953,7 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, [{_,_,_}| _] = Ciphers0) ->
binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) ->
All = ssl_cipher:suites(Version)
- ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
+ ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, All)] of
@@ -1147,25 +1153,32 @@ handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts) ->
UserFailIfNoPeerCert = handle_option(fail_if_no_peer_cert, Opts, false),
UserVerifyFun = handle_option(verify_fun, Opts, undefined),
-
+ PartialChainHanlder = handle_option(partial_chain, Opts,
+ fun(_) -> unknown_ca end),
+
%% Handle 0, 1, 2 for backwards compatibility
case proplists:get_value(verify, Opts, verify_none) of
0 ->
{verify_none, false,
- ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts), VerifyNoneFun};
+ ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts),
+ VerifyNoneFun, PartialChainHanlder};
1 ->
{verify_peer, false,
- ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
+ ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+ UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder};
2 ->
{verify_peer, true,
- ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
- verify_none ->
+ ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+ UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder};
+ verify_none ->
{verify_none, false,
- ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts), VerifyNoneFun};
+ ca_cert_default(verify_none, VerifyNoneFun, CaCerts),
+ VerifyNoneFun, PartialChainHanlder};
verify_peer ->
{verify_peer, UserFailIfNoPeerCert,
- ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts), UserVerifyFun};
+ ca_cert_default(verify_peer, UserVerifyFun, CaCerts),
+ UserVerifyFun, PartialChainHanlder};
Value ->
throw({error, {options, {verify, Value}}})
end.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
index 53366b060c..9c0ed181fe 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
--export([trusted_cert_and_path/3,
+-export([trusted_cert_and_path/4,
certificate_chain/3,
file_to_certificats/2,
validate_extension/3,
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@
%%====================================================================
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec trusted_cert_and_path([der_cert()], db_handle(), certdb_ref()) ->
+-spec trusted_cert_and_path([der_cert()], db_handle(), certdb_ref(), fun()) ->
{der_cert() | unknown_ca, [der_cert()]}.
%%
%% Description: Extracts the root cert (if not presents tries to
%% look it up, if not found {bad_cert, unknown_ca} will be added verification
%% errors. Returns {RootCert, Path, VerifyErrors}
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
+trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChainHandler) ->
Path = [Cert | _] = lists:reverse(CertChain),
OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp),
SignedAndIssuerID =
@@ -62,32 +62,23 @@ trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) ->
{ok, IssuerId} = public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, self),
{self, IssuerId};
false ->
- case public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, other) of
- {ok, IssuerId} ->
- {other, IssuerId};
- {error, issuer_not_found} ->
- case find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) of
- {ok, IssuerId} ->
- {other, IssuerId};
- Other ->
- Other
- end
- end
+ other_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle)
end,
case SignedAndIssuerID of
{error, issuer_not_found} ->
%% The root CA was not sent and can not be found.
- {unknown_ca, Path};
+ handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler);
{self, _} when length(Path) == 1 ->
{selfsigned_peer, Path};
{_ ,{SerialNr, Issuer}} ->
case ssl_manager:lookup_trusted_cert(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, SerialNr, Issuer) of
- {ok, {BinCert,_}} ->
- {BinCert, Path};
+ {ok, Trusted} ->
+ %% Trusted must be selfsigned or it is an incomplete chain
+ handle_path(Trusted, Path, PartialChainHandler);
_ ->
%% Root CA could not be verified
- {unknown_ca, Path}
+ handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler)
end
end.
@@ -222,28 +213,27 @@ certificate_chain(CertDbHandle, CertsDbRef, Chain, SerialNr, Issuer, _SelfSigned
_ ->
%% The trusted cert may be obmitted from the chain as the
%% counter part needs to have it anyway to be able to
- %% verify it. This will be the normal case for servers
- %% that does not verify the clients and hence have not
- %% specified the cacertfile.
+ %% verify it.
{ok, lists:reverse(Chain)}
end.
find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) ->
- IsIssuerFun = fun({_Key, {_Der, #'OTPCertificate'{} = ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) ->
- case public_key:pkix_is_issuer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate) of
- true ->
- case verify_cert_signer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate) of
- true ->
- throw(public_key:pkix_issuer_id(ErlCertCandidate, self));
- false ->
- Acc
- end;
- false ->
- Acc
- end;
- (_, Acc) ->
- Acc
- end,
+ IsIssuerFun =
+ fun({_Key, {_Der, #'OTPCertificate'{} = ErlCertCandidate}}, Acc) ->
+ case public_key:pkix_is_issuer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate) of
+ true ->
+ case verify_cert_signer(OtpCert, ErlCertCandidate#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate) of
+ true ->
+ throw(public_key:pkix_issuer_id(ErlCertCandidate, self));
+ false ->
+ Acc
+ end;
+ false ->
+ Acc
+ end;
+ (_, Acc) ->
+ Acc
+ end,
try ssl_pkix_db:foldl(IsIssuerFun, issuer_not_found, CertDbHandle) of
issuer_not_found ->
@@ -275,3 +265,41 @@ public_key(#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = #'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{algorith
parameters = {params, Params}},
subjectPublicKey = Key}) ->
{Key, Params}.
+
+other_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) ->
+ case public_key:pkix_issuer_id(OtpCert, other) of
+ {ok, IssuerId} ->
+ {other, IssuerId};
+ {error, issuer_not_found} ->
+ case find_issuer(OtpCert, CertDbHandle) of
+ {ok, IssuerId} ->
+ {other, IssuerId};
+ Other ->
+ Other
+ end
+ end.
+
+handle_path({BinCert, OTPCert}, Path, PartialChainHandler) ->
+ case public_key:pkix_is_self_signed(OTPCert) of
+ true ->
+ {BinCert, Path};
+ false ->
+ handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler)
+ end.
+
+handle_incomplete_chain(Chain, Fun) ->
+ case catch Fun(Chain) of
+ {trusted_ca, DerCert} ->
+ new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, Chain);
+ unknown_ca = Error ->
+ {Error, Chain};
+ _ ->
+ {unknown_ca, Chain}
+ end.
+
+new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, [DerCert | Chain]) ->
+ {DerCert, Chain};
+new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, [_ | Rest]) ->
+ new_trusteded_chain(DerCert, Rest);
+new_trusteded_chain(_, []) ->
+ unknown_ca.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
index 72467ea2a0..e1d89c149e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1,
- decipher/5, cipher/5,
+ cipher_init/3, decipher/5, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6,
suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1,
- ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/0, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
+ ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0,
openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1,
hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2]).
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
key_algo/0]).
-type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | idea_cbc | des40_cbc | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc'
- | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc.
+ | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305.
-type hash() :: null | sha | md5 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512.
-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon.
-type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()}.
@@ -88,20 +88,32 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_init(cipher_enum(), binary(), binary()) -> #cipher_state{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Initializes the #cipher_state according to BCA
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) ->
+ State = crypto:stream_init(rc4, Key),
+ #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State};
+cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) ->
+ <<Nonce:64>> = ssl:random_bytes(8),
+ #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce};
+cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) ->
+ #cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec cipher(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
{binary(), #cipher_state{}}.
%%
%% Description: Encrypts the data and the MAC using chipher described
%% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state
+%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first an HMAC of the
+%% data is calculated and the data plus the HMAC is ecncrypted.
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
cipher(?NULL, CipherState, <<>>, Fragment, _Version) ->
GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, <<>>],
{GenStreamCipherList, CipherState};
-cipher(?RC4, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, _Version) ->
- State0 = case CipherState#cipher_state.state of
- undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key);
- S -> S
- end,
+cipher(?RC4, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Mac, Fragment, _Version) ->
GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, Mac],
{State1, T} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0, GenStreamCipherList),
{T, CipherState#cipher_state{state = State1}};
@@ -113,13 +125,40 @@ cipher(?'3DES', CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
block_cipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_encrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
end, block_size(des_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version);
-cipher(?AES, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
+cipher(?AES_CBC, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
block_cipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
end, block_size(aes_128_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {binary(), #cipher_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Encrypts the data and protects associated data (AAD) using chipher
+%% described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state
+%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+ aead_cipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version);
+cipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+ aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version).
+
+aead_cipher(chacha20_poly1305, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+ CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+ AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+ Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>,
+ {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(chacha20_poly1305, Key, Nonce, {AAD, Fragment}),
+ {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState};
+aead_cipher(Type, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv = IV0, nonce = Nonce} = CipherState, _SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+ CipherLen = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment),
+ AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+ <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>> = IV0,
+ IV = <<Salt/binary, Nonce:64/integer>>,
+ {Content, CipherTag} = crypto:block_encrypt(Type, Key, IV, {AAD, Fragment}),
+ {<<Nonce:64/integer, Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = Nonce + 1}}.
+
build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment) ->
TotSz = byte_size(Mac) + erlang:iolist_size(Fragment) + 1,
{PaddingLength, Padding} = get_padding(TotSz, BlockSz),
@@ -148,14 +187,12 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
%%
%% Description: Decrypts the data and the MAC using cipher described
%% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state.
+%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first the data is decrypted
+%% and the an HMAC of the decrypted data is checked
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
{Fragment, <<>>, CipherState};
-decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _) ->
- State0 = case CipherState#cipher_state.state of
- undefined -> crypto:stream_init(rc4, CipherState#cipher_state.key);
- S -> S
- end,
+decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _) ->
try crypto:stream_decrypt(State0, Fragment) of
{State, Text} ->
GSC = generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(Text, HashSz),
@@ -179,13 +216,26 @@ decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
block_decipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version);
-decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
+decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version) ->
block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version).
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
+ {binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Decrypts the data and checks the associated data (AAD) MAC using
+%% cipher described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state.
+%% Use for suites that use authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
+%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher_aead(?AES_GCM, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+ aead_decipher(aes_gcm, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version);
+decipher_aead(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version) ->
+ aead_decipher(chacha20_poly1305, CipherState, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version).
+
block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
HashSz, Fragment, Version) ->
try
@@ -215,6 +265,35 @@ block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
%% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
end.
+
+aead_ciphertext_to_state(chacha20_poly1305, SeqNo, _IV, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+ CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 16,
+ <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment,
+ AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+ Nonce = <<SeqNo:64/integer>>,
+ {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag};
+aead_ciphertext_to_state(_, _SeqNo, <<Salt:4/bytes, _/binary>>, AAD0, Fragment, _Version) ->
+ CipherLen = size(Fragment) - 24,
+ <<ExplicitNonce:8/bytes, CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:16/bytes>> = Fragment,
+ AAD = <<AAD0/binary, ?UINT16(CipherLen)>>,
+ Nonce = <<Salt/binary, ExplicitNonce/binary>>,
+ {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}.
+
+aead_decipher(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key, iv = IV} = CipherState,
+ SeqNo, AAD0, Fragment, Version) ->
+ try
+ {Nonce, AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_to_state(Type, SeqNo, IV, AAD0, Fragment, Version),
+ case crypto:block_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag}) of
+ Content when is_binary(Content) ->
+ {Content, CipherState};
+ _ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ end
+ catch
+ _:_ ->
+ ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC)
+ end.
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec suites(ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()].
%%
@@ -227,16 +306,26 @@ suites({3, N}) ->
all_suites(Version) ->
suites(Version)
- ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
+ ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites().
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
--spec anonymous_suites() -> [cipher_suite()].
+-spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-anonymous_suites() ->
+
+anonymous_suites({3, N}) ->
+ anonymous_suites(N);
+
+anonymous_suites(N)
+ when N >= 3 ->
+ [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ ] ++ anonymous_suites(0);
+
+anonymous_suites(_) ->
[?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
@@ -260,13 +349,20 @@ psk_suites({3, N}) ->
psk_suites(N)
when N >= 3 ->
- psk_suites(0) ++
- [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
- ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256];
+ [
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ ] ++ psk_suites(0);
psk_suites(_) ->
[?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
@@ -418,6 +514,19 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) ->
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
+suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
{psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf};
suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
@@ -537,7 +646,59 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
{ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256};
suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
- {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}.
+ {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384};
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384};
+
+%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+ {ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256};
+suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) ->
+ {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec suite(erl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -641,6 +802,19 @@ suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) ->
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
+suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
suite({psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
@@ -760,7 +934,60 @@ suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) ->
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) ->
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+
+%% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites
+suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256;
+suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256;
+suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null}) ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite().
@@ -875,7 +1102,47 @@ openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384") ->
openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256") ->
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256;
openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384") ->
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite("AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
+openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") ->
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite().
@@ -1012,6 +1279,46 @@ openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) ->
openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) ->
"ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384";
+%% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+
+%% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) ->
+ "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) ->
+ "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+
%% No oppenssl name
openssl_suite_name(Cipher) ->
suite_definition(Cipher).
@@ -1095,6 +1402,13 @@ is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos)
is_acceptable_keyexchange(_, _) ->
true.
+is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos)
+ when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+ proplists:get_bool(aes_gcm, Algos);
+is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos)
+ when Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
+ proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(_, _) ->
true.
@@ -1122,7 +1436,12 @@ bulk_cipher_algorithm('3des_ede_cbc') ->
?'3DES';
bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
- ?AES.
+ ?AES_CBC;
+bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+ ?AES_GCM;
+bulk_cipher_algorithm(chacha20_poly1305) ->
+ ?CHACHA20_POLY1305.
type(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
Cipher == rc4_128 ->
@@ -1132,7 +1451,11 @@ type(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
Cipher == '3des_ede_cbc';
Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
- ?BLOCK.
+ ?BLOCK;
+type(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+ Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
+ ?AEAD.
key_material(null) ->
0;
@@ -1145,6 +1468,12 @@ key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
key_material(aes_128_cbc) ->
16;
key_material(aes_256_cbc) ->
+ 32;
+key_material(aes_128_gcm) ->
+ 16;
+key_material(aes_256_gcm) ->
+ 32;
+key_material(chacha20_poly1305) ->
32.
expanded_key_material(null) ->
@@ -1156,7 +1485,10 @@ expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc ->
expanded_key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
24;
expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
- Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
+ Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+ Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+ Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
unknown.
@@ -1165,16 +1497,25 @@ effective_key_bits(null) ->
effective_key_bits(des_cbc) ->
56;
effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == rc4_128;
- Cipher == aes_128_cbc ->
+ Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
+ Cipher == aes_128_gcm ->
128;
effective_key_bits('3des_ede_cbc') ->
168;
-effective_key_bits(aes_256_cbc) ->
+effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+ Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
256.
iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
- Cipher == rc4_128 ->
+ Cipher == rc4_128;
+ Cipher == chacha20_poly1305->
0;
+
+iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
+ 4;
+
iv_size(Cipher) ->
block_size(Cipher).
@@ -1183,7 +1524,10 @@ block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
8;
block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
- Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
+ Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
+ Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
+ Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
+ Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
16.
prf_algorithm(default_prf, {3, N}) when N >= 3 ->
@@ -1337,10 +1681,15 @@ dhe_rsa_suites() ->
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA].
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
psk_rsa_suites() ->
- [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
@@ -1360,7 +1709,9 @@ rsa_suites() ->
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
- ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA].
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
[?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1369,7 +1720,9 @@ ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
ecdhe_rsa_suites() ->
[?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1378,7 +1731,10 @@ ecdhe_rsa_suites() ->
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
dsa_signed_suites() ->
dhe_dss_suites() ++ srp_dss_suites().
@@ -1389,7 +1745,9 @@ dhe_dss_suites() ->
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
- ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA].
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
srp_dss_suites() ->
[?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
@@ -1413,7 +1771,9 @@ ecdh_ecdsa_suites() ->
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384].
ecdhe_ecdsa_suites() ->
[?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -1422,7 +1782,10 @@ ecdhe_ecdsa_suites() ->
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
- ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384].
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256].
filter_keyuse(OtpCert, Ciphers, Suites, SignSuites) ->
TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
index 3ce9c19aa9..448c2405aa 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@
-record(cipher_state, {
iv,
key,
- state
+ state,
+ nonce
}).
%%% TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL is specified and is the initial state of a
@@ -395,6 +396,24 @@
%%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487
+%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
+-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A8)>>).
+
+%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA9};
+-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A9)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAA};
+-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AA)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAB};
+-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AB)>>).
+
+%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAC};
+-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AC)>>).
+
+%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAD};
+-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AD)>>).
+
%% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAE};
-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#AE)>>).
@@ -460,4 +479,79 @@
%% TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x22 };
-define(TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#22)>>).
+%%% AES-GCM Cipher Suites RFC 5288
+
+%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0x9C}
+-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9C)>>).
+
+%% TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0x9D}
+-define(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9D)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0x9E}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9E)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0x9F}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#9F)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA0}
+-define(TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A0)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA1}
+-define(TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A1)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA2}
+-define(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A2)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA3}
+-define(TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A3)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA4}
+-define(TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A4)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA5}
+-define(TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A5)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA6}
+-define(TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A6)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA7}
+-define(TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#A7)>>).
+
+%%% ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites RFC 5289
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2B};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2B)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2C};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2C)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2D};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2D)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x2E};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2E)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x2F};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#2F)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x30};
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#30)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x31};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#31)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x32};
+-define(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#32)>>).
+
+%%% Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x13}
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#13)>>).
+
+%% TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x14}
+-define(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#14)>>).
+
+%% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x15}
+-define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#15)>>).
+
-endif. % -ifdef(ssl_cipher).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 4ac4e81d9e..8ff9913cee 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -414,7 +414,9 @@ certify(#certificate{} = Cert,
ssl_options = Opts} = State, Connection) ->
case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, Opts#ssl_options.depth,
Opts#ssl_options.verify,
- Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role) of
+ Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun,
+ Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain,
+ Role) of
{PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} ->
handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo,
State#state{client_certificate_requested = false}, Connection);
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 94ffd180c5..0c9022b85d 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
finished/5, next_protocol/1]).
%% Handle handshake messages
--export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
+-export([certify/8, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5,
master_secret/5, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6,
init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5
]).
@@ -383,13 +383,13 @@ verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, ecdsa}, Signature,
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), integer() | nolimit,
- verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term},
+ verify_peer | verify_none, {fun(), term}, fun(),
client | server) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
- MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, Role) ->
+ MaxPathLen, _Verify, VerifyFunAndState, PartialChain, Role) ->
[PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs,
ValidationFunAndState =
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
try
{TrustedErlCert, CertPath} =
- ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef),
+ ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChain),
case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedErlCert,
CertPath,
[{max_path_length,
@@ -1435,6 +1435,7 @@ calc_finished({3, N}, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) ->
master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret,
#security_parameters{
+ bulk_cipher_algorithm = BCA,
client_random = ClientRandom,
server_random = ServerRandom,
hash_size = HashSize,
@@ -1453,8 +1454,8 @@ master_secret(_RecordCB, Version, MasterSecret,
ssl_record:set_mac_secret(ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret,
Role, ConnStates1),
- ClientCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ClientIV, key = ClientWriteKey},
- ServerCipherState = #cipher_state{iv = ServerIV, key = ServerWriteKey},
+ ClientCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ClientIV, ClientWriteKey),
+ ServerCipherState = ssl_cipher:cipher_init(BCA, ServerIV, ServerWriteKey),
{MasterSecret,
ssl_record:set_pending_cipher_state(ConnStates2, ClientCipherState,
ServerCipherState, Role)}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
index fd0d87bd5f..85724de4bd 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
versions :: [ssl_record:ssl_version()], %% ssl_record:atom_version() in API
verify :: verify_none | verify_peer,
verify_fun, %%:: fun(CertVerifyErrors::term()) -> boolean(),
+ partial_chain :: fun(),
fail_if_no_peer_cert :: boolean(),
verify_client_once :: boolean(),
%% fun(Extensions, State, Verify, AccError) -> {Extensions, State, AccError}
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
index 7337225bc4..63fc57edad 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
-export([compress/3, uncompress/3, compressions/0]).
%% Payload encryption/decryption
--export([cipher/4, decipher/3, is_correct_mac/2]).
+-export([cipher/4, decipher/3, is_correct_mac/2,
+ cipher_aead/4, decipher_aead/4]).
-export_type([ssl_version/0, ssl_atom_version/0]).
@@ -377,6 +378,24 @@ cipher(Version, Fragment,
ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MacHash, Fragment, Version),
{CipherFragment, WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec cipher_aead(ssl_version(), iodata(), #connection_state{}, MacHash::binary()) ->
+ {CipherFragment::binary(), #connection_state{}}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload encryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+cipher_aead(Version, Fragment,
+ #connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS0,
+ sequence_number = SeqNo,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+ BulkCipherAlgo}
+ } = WriteState0, AAD) ->
+
+ {CipherFragment, CipherS1} =
+ ssl_cipher:cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, SeqNo, AAD, Fragment, Version),
+ {CipherFragment, WriteState0#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1}}.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Payload decryption
@@ -396,6 +415,25 @@ decipher(Version, CipherFragment,
Alert
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+-spec decipher_aead(ssl_version(), binary(), #connection_state{}, binary()) -> {binary(), binary(), #connection_state{}} | #alert{}.
+%%
+%% Description: Payload decryption
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment,
+ #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo,
+ security_parameters =
+ #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm =
+ BulkCipherAlgo},
+ cipher_state = CipherS0
+ } = ReadState, AAD) ->
+ case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, SeqNo, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of
+ {PlainFragment, CipherS1} ->
+ CS1 = ReadState#connection_state{cipher_state = CipherS1},
+ {PlainFragment, CS1};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert
+ end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
index 6aab35d6da..53b5f2399b 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl
@@ -90,11 +90,14 @@
-define('3DES', 4).
-define(DES40, 5).
-define(IDEA, 6).
--define(AES, 7).
+-define(AES_CBC, 7).
+-define(AES_GCM, 8).
+-define(CHACHA20_POLY1305, 9).
%% CipherType
-define(STREAM, 0).
-define(BLOCK, 1).
+-define(AEAD, 2).
%% IsExportable
%-define(TRUE, 0). %% Already defined by ssl_internal.hrl
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 26de51985a..7df73fb581 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -329,7 +329,10 @@ terminate(Reason, StateName, State) ->
%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState}
%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) ->
+code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State0, {Direction, From, To}) ->
+ State = convert_state(State0, Direction, From, To),
+ {ok, StateName, State};
+code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) ->
{ok, StateName, State}.
format_status(Type, Data) ->
@@ -958,3 +961,14 @@ workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, gen_tcp = Transport) ->
Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 30000);
workaround_transport_delivery_problems(Socket, Transport) ->
Transport:close(Socket).
+
+convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") ->
+ State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)};
+convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") ->
+ State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down)}.
+
+convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up) ->
+ {Head, Tail} = lists:split(5, tuple_to_list(Options)),
+ list_to_tuple(Head ++ [{partial_chain, fun(_) -> unknown_ca end}] ++ Tail);
+convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down) ->
+ list_to_tuple(proplists:delete(partial_chain, tuple_to_list(Options))).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
index f50ea22f39..544d200f70 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
@@ -132,6 +132,23 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
sequence_number = Seq,
compression_state=CompS0,
security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{
+ cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+ compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ }= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
+ {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
+ WriteState1 = WriteState0#connection_state{compression_state = CompS1},
+ AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1),
+ {CipherFragment, WriteState} = ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD),
+ CipherText = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment),
+ {CipherText, ConnectionStates#connection_states{current_write = WriteState#connection_state{sequence_number = Seq +1}}};
+
+encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
+ #connection_states{current_write =
+ #connection_state{
+ sequence_number = Seq,
+ compression_state=CompS0,
+ security_parameters=
#security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
}= WriteState0} = ConnectionStates) ->
{Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0),
@@ -148,18 +165,45 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data,
%% Description: Decode cipher text
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
- fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) ->
- ReadState0 = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states.current_read,
- #connection_state{compression_state = CompressionS0,
- sequence_number = Seq,
- security_parameters = SecParams} = ReadState0,
- CompressAlg = SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm,
+ fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+ #connection_states{current_read =
+ #connection_state{
+ compression_state = CompressionS0,
+ sequence_number = Seq,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{
+ cipher_type = ?AEAD,
+ compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0) ->
+ AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0),
+ case ssl_record:decipher_aead(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, AAD) of
+ {PlainFragment, ReadState1} ->
+ {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
+ PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
+ ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
+ current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
+ sequence_number = Seq + 1,
+ compression_state = CompressionS1}},
+ {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates};
+ #alert{} = Alert ->
+ Alert
+ end;
+
+decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version,
+ fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText,
+ #connection_states{current_read =
+ #connection_state{
+ compression_state = CompressionS0,
+ sequence_number = Seq,
+ security_parameters=
+ #security_parameters{compression_algorithm=CompAlg}
+ } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0) ->
case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0) of
{PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} ->
MacHash = calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1),
case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of
true ->
- {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompressAlg,
+ {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg,
PlainFragment, CompressionS0),
ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#connection_states{
current_read = ReadState1#connection_state{
@@ -322,3 +366,7 @@ calc_mac_hash(Type, Version,
mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
Length, PlainFragment).
+
+calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer},
+ #connection_state{sequence_number = SeqNo}) ->
+ <<SeqNo:64/integer, ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
index 7a5f9c1b38..c4114278a4 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
@@ -221,25 +221,50 @@ suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 ->
];
suites(3) ->
[
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+
+ %% not supported
+ %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
] ++ suites(2).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile
index 2f8ff6f04e..3639c2b2da 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ VSN=$(GS_VSN)
MODULES = \
ssl_test_lib \
ssl_basic_SUITE \
+ ssl_bench_SUITE \
ssl_cipher_SUITE \
ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE\
ssl_crl_SUITE\
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ release_spec: opt
release_tests_spec: opt
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(RELSYSDIR)"
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(ERL_FILES) $(HRL_FILES) $(HRL_FILES_NEEDED_IN_TEST) $(COVER_FILE) "$(RELSYSDIR)"
- $(INSTALL_DATA) ssl.spec ssl.cover "$(RELSYSDIR)"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) ssl.spec ssl_bench.spec ssl.cover "$(RELSYSDIR)"
chmod -R u+w "$(RELSYSDIR)"
@tar cf - *_SUITE_data | (cd "$(RELSYSDIR)"; tar xf -)
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec
index fc7c1bbb82..86e14c033e 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec
@@ -1 +1,4 @@
{suites,"../ssl_test",all}.
+{skip_cases, "../ssl_test",
+ ssl_bench_SUITE, [setup_sequential, setup_concurrent, payload_simple],
+ "Benchmarks run separately"}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
index 77e4c80bbe..3566a8a0a5 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ client_ecdh_server_ecdh(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
client_ecdh_server_rsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
COpts = ?config(client_ecdh_rsa_opts, Config),
- SOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
+ SOpts = ?config(server_ecdh_rsa_verify_opts, Config),
basic_test(COpts, SOpts, Config).
client_rsa_server_ecdh(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- COpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ COpts = ?config(client_ecdh_rsa_opts, Config),
SOpts = ?config(server_ecdh_rsa_verify_opts, Config),
basic_test(COpts, SOpts, Config).
@@ -183,11 +183,11 @@ client_ecdsa_server_ecdsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
client_ecdsa_server_rsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
COpts = ?config(client_ecdsa_opts, Config),
- SOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
+ SOpts = ?config(server_ecdsa_verify_opts, Config),
basic_test(COpts, SOpts, Config).
client_rsa_server_ecdsa(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- COpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ COpts = ?config(client_ecdsa_opts, Config),
SOpts = ?config(server_ecdsa_verify_opts, Config),
basic_test(COpts, SOpts, Config).
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2f75b4203
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{suites,"../ssl_test",[ssl_bench_SUITE]}.
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6b3769922
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+%%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
+%% %CopyrightBegin%
+%%
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2014. All Rights Reserved.
+%%
+%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
+%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
+%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the
+%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be
+%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/.2
+%%
+%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS"
+%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See
+%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations
+%% under the License.
+%%
+%% %CopyrightEnd%
+%%
+-module(ssl_bench_SUITE).
+-compile(export_all).
+-include_lib("common_test/include/ct_event.hrl").
+
+-define(remote_host, "NETMARKS_REMOTE_HOST").
+
+suite() -> [{ct_hooks,[{ts_install_cth,[{nodenames,2}]}]}].
+
+all() -> [{group, setup}, {group, payload}].
+
+groups() ->
+ [{setup, [{repeat, 3}], [setup_sequential, setup_concurrent]},
+ {payload, [{repeat, 3}], [payload_simple]}
+ ].
+
+init_per_group(_GroupName, Config) ->
+ Config.
+
+end_per_group(_GroupName, _Config) ->
+ ok.
+
+init_per_suite(Config) ->
+ try
+ Server = setup(ssl, node()),
+ [{server_node, Server}|Config]
+ catch _:_ ->
+ {skipped, "Benchmark machines only"}
+ end.
+
+end_per_suite(_Config) ->
+ ok.
+
+init_per_testcase(_Func, Conf) ->
+ Conf.
+
+end_per_testcase(_Func, _Conf) ->
+ ok.
+
+
+-define(COUNT, 400).
+-define(TC(Cmd), tc(fun() -> Cmd end, ?MODULE, ?LINE)).
+
+-define(FPROF_CLIENT, false).
+-define(FPROF_SERVER, false).
+-define(EPROF_CLIENT, false).
+-define(EPROF_SERVER, false).
+-define(PERCEPT_SERVER, false).
+
+%% Current numbers gives roughly a testcase per minute on todays hardware..
+
+setup_sequential(Config) ->
+ Server = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config),
+ Server =/= undefined orelse error(no_server),
+ {ok, Result} = do_test(ssl, setup_connection, ?COUNT * 20, 1, Server),
+ ct_event:notify(#event{name = benchmark_data,
+ data=[{value, Result},
+ {suite, "ssl"}, {name, "Sequential setup"}]}),
+ ok.
+
+setup_concurrent(Config) ->
+ Server = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config),
+ Server =/= undefined orelse error(no_server),
+ {ok, Result} = do_test(ssl, setup_connection, ?COUNT, 100, Server),
+ ct_event:notify(#event{name = benchmark_data,
+ data=[{value, Result},
+ {suite, "ssl"}, {name, "Concurrent setup"}]}),
+ ok.
+
+payload_simple(Config) ->
+ Server = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config),
+ Server =/= undefined orelse error(no_server),
+ {ok, Result} = do_test(ssl, payload, ?COUNT*300, 10, Server),
+ ct_event:notify(#event{name = benchmark_data,
+ data=[{value, Result},
+ {suite, "ssl"}, {name, "Payload simple"}]}),
+ ok.
+
+
+ssl() ->
+ test(ssl, ?COUNT, node()).
+
+test(Type, Count, Host) ->
+ Server = setup(Type, Host),
+ (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count * 20, 1, Server)),
+ (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count, 100, Server)),
+ (do_test(Type, payload, Count*300, 10, Server)),
+ ok.
+
+do_test(Type, TC, Loop, ParallellConnections, Server) ->
+ _ = ssl:stop(),
+ {ok, _} = ensure_all_started(ssl, []),
+
+ {ok, {SPid, Host, Port}} = rpc:call(Server, ?MODULE, setup_server_init,
+ [Type, TC, Loop, ParallellConnections]),
+ link(SPid),
+ Me = self(),
+ Test = fun(Id) ->
+ CData = client_init(Me, Type, TC, Host, Port),
+ receive
+ go ->
+ ?FPROF_CLIENT andalso Id =:= 1 andalso
+ start_profile(fprof, [self(),new]),
+ ?EPROF_CLIENT andalso Id =:= 1 andalso
+ start_profile(eprof, [ssl_connection_sup, ssl_manager]),
+ ok = ?MODULE:TC(Loop, Type, CData),
+ ?FPROF_CLIENT andalso Id =:= 1 andalso
+ stop_profile(fprof, "test_connection_client_res.fprof"),
+ ?EPROF_CLIENT andalso Id =:= 1 andalso
+ stop_profile(eprof, "test_connection_client_res.eprof"),
+ Me ! self()
+ end
+ end,
+ Spawn = fun(Id) ->
+ Pid = spawn(fun() -> Test(Id) end),
+ receive {Pid, init} -> Pid end
+ end,
+ Pids = [Spawn(Id) || Id <- lists:seq(ParallellConnections, 1, -1)],
+ Run = fun() ->
+ [Pid ! go || Pid <- Pids],
+ [receive Pid -> ok end || Pid <- Pids]
+ end,
+ {TimeInMicro, _} = timer:tc(Run),
+ TotalTests = ParallellConnections * Loop,
+ TestPerSecond = 1000000 * TotalTests div TimeInMicro,
+ io:format("TC ~p ~p ~p ~p 1/s~n", [TC, Type, ParallellConnections, TestPerSecond]),
+ unlink(SPid),
+ SPid ! quit,
+ {ok, TestPerSecond}.
+
+server_init(ssl, setup_connection, _, _, Server) ->
+ {ok, Socket} = ssl:listen(0, ssl_opts(listen)),
+ {ok, {_Host, Port}} = ssl:sockname(Socket),
+ {ok, Host} = inet:gethostname(),
+ ?FPROF_SERVER andalso start_profile(fprof, [whereis(ssl_manager), new]),
+ %%?EPROF_SERVER andalso start_profile(eprof, [ssl_connection_sup, ssl_manager]),
+ ?EPROF_SERVER andalso start_profile(eprof, [ssl_manager]),
+ ?PERCEPT_SERVER andalso percept:profile("/tmp/ssl_server.percept"),
+ Server ! {self(), {init, Host, Port}},
+ Test = fun(TSocket) ->
+ ok = ssl:ssl_accept(TSocket),
+ ssl:close(TSocket)
+ end,
+ setup_server_connection(Socket, Test);
+server_init(ssl, payload, Loop, _, Server) ->
+ {ok, Socket} = ssl:listen(0, ssl_opts(listen)),
+ {ok, {_Host, Port}} = ssl:sockname(Socket),
+ {ok, Host} = inet:gethostname(),
+ Server ! {self(), {init, Host, Port}},
+ Test = fun(TSocket) ->
+ ok = ssl:ssl_accept(TSocket),
+ Size = byte_size(msg()),
+ server_echo(TSocket, Size, Loop),
+ ssl:close(TSocket)
+ end,
+ setup_server_connection(Socket, Test);
+
+server_init(Type, Tc, _, _, Server) ->
+ io:format("No server init code for ~p ~p~n",[Type, Tc]),
+ Server ! {self(), no_init}.
+
+client_init(Master, ssl, setup_connection, Host, Port) ->
+ Master ! {self(), init},
+ {Host, Port, ssl_opts(connect)};
+client_init(Master, ssl, payload, Host, Port) ->
+ {ok, Sock} = ssl:connect(Host, Port, ssl_opts(connect)),
+ Master ! {self(), init},
+ Size = byte_size(msg()),
+ {Sock, Size};
+client_init(_Me, Type, Tc, Host, Port) ->
+ io:format("No client init code for ~p ~p~n",[Type, Tc]),
+ {Host, Port}.
+
+setup_server_connection(LSocket, Test) ->
+ receive quit ->
+ ?FPROF_SERVER andalso stop_profile(fprof, "test_server_res.fprof"),
+ ?EPROF_SERVER andalso stop_profile(eprof, "test_server_res.eprof"),
+ ?PERCEPT_SERVER andalso stop_profile(percept, "/tmp/ssl_server.percept"),
+ ok
+ after 0 ->
+ case ssl:transport_accept(LSocket, 2000) of
+ {ok, TSocket} -> spawn_link(fun() -> Test(TSocket) end);
+ {error, timeout} -> ok
+ end,
+ setup_server_connection(LSocket, Test)
+ end.
+
+server_echo(Socket, Size, Loop) when Loop > 0 ->
+ {ok, Msg} = ssl:recv(Socket, Size),
+ ok = ssl:send(Socket, Msg),
+ server_echo(Socket, Size, Loop-1);
+server_echo(_, _, _) -> ok.
+
+setup_connection(N, ssl, Env = {Host, Port, Opts}) when N > 0 ->
+ case ssl:connect(Host, Port, Opts) of
+ {ok, Sock} ->
+ ssl:close(Sock),
+ setup_connection(N-1, ssl, Env);
+ {error, Error} ->
+ io:format("Error: ~p (~p)~n",[Error, length(erlang:ports())]),
+ setup_connection(N, ssl, Env)
+ end;
+setup_connection(_, _, _) ->
+ ok.
+
+payload(Loop, ssl, D = {Socket, Size}) when Loop > 0 ->
+ ok = ssl:send(Socket, msg()),
+ {ok, _} = ssl:recv(Socket, Size),
+ payload(Loop-1, ssl, D);
+payload(_, _, {Socket, _}) ->
+ ssl:close(Socket).
+
+msg() ->
+ <<"Hello",
+ 0:(512*8),
+ "asdlkjsafsdfoierwlejsdlkfjsdf",
+ 1:(512*8),
+ "asdlkjsafsdfoierwlejsdlkfjsdf">>.
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+setup(_Type, nonode@nohost) ->
+ exit(dist_not_enabled);
+setup(Type, _This) ->
+ Host = case os:getenv(?remote_host) of
+ false ->
+ {ok, This} = inet:gethostname(),
+ This;
+ RemHost ->
+ RemHost
+ end,
+ Node = list_to_atom("perf_server@" ++ Host),
+ SlaveArgs = case init:get_argument(pa) of
+ {ok, PaPaths} ->
+ lists:append([" -pa " ++ P || [P] <- PaPaths]);
+ _ -> []
+ end,
+ %% io:format("Slave args: ~p~n",[SlaveArgs]),
+ Prog =
+ case os:find_executable("erl") of
+ false -> "erl";
+ P -> P
+ end,
+ io:format("Prog = ~p~n", [Prog]),
+
+ case net_adm:ping(Node) of
+ pong -> ok;
+ pang ->
+ {ok, Node} = slave:start(Host, perf_server, SlaveArgs, no_link, Prog)
+ end,
+ Path = code:get_path(),
+ true = rpc:call(Node, code, set_path, [Path]),
+ ok = rpc:call(Node, ?MODULE, setup_server, [Type, node()]),
+ io:format("Client (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]),
+ (Node =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(client),
+ Node.
+
+setup_server(_Type, ClientNode) ->
+ (ClientNode =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(server),
+ io:format("Server (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]),
+ ok.
+
+
+ensure_all_started(App, Ack) ->
+ case application:start(App) of
+ ok -> {ok, [App|Ack]};
+ {error, {not_started, Dep}} ->
+ {ok, Ack1} = ensure_all_started(Dep, Ack),
+ ensure_all_started(App, Ack1);
+ {error, {already_started, _}} ->
+ {ok, Ack}
+ end.
+
+setup_server_init(Type, Tc, Loop, PC) ->
+ _ = ssl:stop(),
+ {ok, _} = ensure_all_started(ssl, []),
+ Me = self(),
+ Pid = spawn_link(fun() -> server_init(Type, Tc, Loop, PC, Me) end),
+ Res = receive
+ {Pid, {init, Host, Port}} -> {ok, {Pid, Host, Port}};
+ {Pid, Error} -> {error, Error}
+ end,
+ unlink(Pid),
+ Res.
+
+restrict_schedulers(Type) ->
+ %% We expect this to run on 8 core machine
+ Extra0 = 1,
+ Extra = if (Type =:= server) -> -Extra0; true -> Extra0 end,
+ Scheds = erlang:system_info(schedulers),
+ erlang:system_flag(schedulers_online, (Scheds div 2) + Extra).
+
+tc(Fun, Mod, Line) ->
+ case timer:tc(Fun) of
+ {_,{'EXIT',Reason}} ->
+ io:format("Process EXITED ~p:~p \n", [Mod, Line]),
+ exit(Reason);
+ {_T,R={error,_}} ->
+ io:format("Process Error ~p:~p \n", [Mod, Line]),
+ R;
+ {T,R} ->
+ io:format("~p:~p: Time: ~p\n", [Mod, Line, T]),
+ R
+ end.
+
+start_profile(eprof, Procs) ->
+ profiling = eprof:start_profiling(Procs),
+ io:format("(E)Profiling ...",[]);
+start_profile(fprof, Procs) ->
+ fprof:trace([start, {procs, Procs}]),
+ io:format("(F)Profiling ...",[]).
+
+stop_profile(percept, File) ->
+ percept:stop_profile(),
+ percept:analyze(File),
+ {started, _Host, Port} = percept:start_webserver(),
+ wx:new(),
+ wx_misc:launchDefaultBrowser("http://" ++ net_adm:localhost() ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Port)),
+ ok;
+stop_profile(eprof, File) ->
+ profiling_stopped = eprof:stop_profiling(),
+ eprof:log(File),
+ io:format(".analysed => ~s ~n",[File]),
+ eprof:analyze(total),
+ eprof:stop();
+stop_profile(fprof, File) ->
+ fprof:trace(stop),
+ io:format("..collect..",[]),
+ fprof:profile(),
+ fprof:analyse([{dest, File},{totals, true}]),
+ io:format(".analysed => ~s ~n",[File]),
+ fprof:stop(),
+ ok.
+
+ssl_opts(listen) ->
+ [{backlog, 500} | ssl_opts("server")];
+ssl_opts(connect) ->
+ [{verify, verify_peer}
+ | ssl_opts("client")];
+ssl_opts(Role) ->
+ Dir = filename:join([code:lib_dir(ssl), "examples", "certs", "etc"]),
+ [{active, false},
+ {depth, 2},
+ {reuseaddr, true},
+ {mode,binary},
+ {nodelay, true},
+ {ciphers, [{dhe_rsa,aes_256_cbc,sha}]},
+ {cacertfile, filename:join([Dir, Role, "cacerts.pem"])},
+ {certfile, filename:join([Dir, Role, "cert.pem"])},
+ {keyfile, filename:join([Dir, Role, "key.pem"])}].
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl
index 14047c6e9c..b7864ba6e7 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
%%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
-%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2012-2013. All Rights Reserved.
+%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2012-2014. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License,
%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ tests() ->
server_verify_none,
server_require_peer_cert_ok,
server_require_peer_cert_fail,
+ server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain,
+ server_require_peer_cert_allow_partial_chain,
+ server_require_peer_cert_do_not_allow_partial_chain,
+ server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain_fun_fail,
verify_fun_always_run_client,
verify_fun_always_run_server,
cert_expired,
@@ -143,8 +147,8 @@ server_verify_none() ->
[{doc,"Test server option verify_none"}].
server_verify_none(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
- ClientOpts = ?config(client_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
Active = ?config(active, Config),
ReceiveFunction = ?config(receive_function, Config),
@@ -261,6 +265,163 @@ server_require_peer_cert_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain() ->
+ [{doc, "Client sends an incompleate chain, by default not acceptable."}].
+
+server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ ServerOpts = [{verify, verify_peer}, {fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}
+ | ?config(server_verification_opts, Config)],
+ ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
+
+ {ok, ClientCAs} = file:read_file(proplists:get_value(cacertfile, ClientOpts)),
+ [{_,RootCA,_}, {_, _, _}] = public_key:pem_decode(ClientCAs),
+
+
+ Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server_error([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, [{active, false} | ServerOpts]}]),
+ Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server),
+ Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client_error([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port},
+ {host, Hostname},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, [{active, false},
+ {cacerts, [RootCA]} |
+ proplists:delete(cacertfile, ClientOpts)]}]),
+ receive
+ {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ receive
+ {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ ok;
+ {Client, {error, closed}} ->
+ ok
+ end
+ end.
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_require_peer_cert_allow_partial_chain() ->
+ [{doc, "Server trusts intermediat CA and accepts a partial chain. (partial_chain option)"}].
+
+server_require_peer_cert_allow_partial_chain(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ ServerOpts = [{verify, verify_peer}, {fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}
+ | ?config(server_verification_opts, Config)],
+ ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
+
+ {ok, ServerCAs} = file:read_file(proplists:get_value(cacertfile, ServerOpts)),
+ [{_,_,_}, {_, IntermidiateCA, _}] = public_key:pem_decode(ServerCAs),
+
+ PartialChain = fun(CertChain) ->
+ case lists:member(IntermidiateCA, CertChain) of
+ true ->
+ {trusted_ca, IntermidiateCA};
+ false ->
+ unknown_ca
+ end
+ end,
+
+ Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result_active, []}},
+ {options, [{cacerts, [IntermidiateCA]},
+ {partial_chain, PartialChain} |
+ proplists:delete(cacertfile, ServerOpts)]}]),
+ Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server),
+ Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port},
+ {host, Hostname},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result_active, []}},
+ {options, ClientOpts}]),
+ ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, ok, Client, ok),
+ ssl_test_lib:close(Server),
+ ssl_test_lib:close(Client).
+
+ %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_require_peer_cert_do_not_allow_partial_chain() ->
+ [{doc, "Server does not accept the chain sent by the client as ROOT CA is unkown, "
+ "and we do not choose to trust the intermediate CA. (partial_chain option)"}].
+
+server_require_peer_cert_do_not_allow_partial_chain(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ ServerOpts = [{verify, verify_peer}, {fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}
+ | ?config(server_verification_opts, Config)],
+ ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
+
+ {ok, ServerCAs} = file:read_file(proplists:get_value(cacertfile, ServerOpts)),
+ [{_,_,_}, {_, IntermidiateCA, _}] = public_key:pem_decode(ServerCAs),
+
+ PartialChain = fun(_CertChain) ->
+ unknown_ca
+ end,
+
+ Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server_error([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, [{cacerts, [IntermidiateCA]},
+ {partial_chain, PartialChain} |
+ proplists:delete(cacertfile, ServerOpts)]}]),
+
+ Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server),
+ Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client_error([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port},
+ {host, Hostname},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, ClientOpts}]),
+
+ receive
+ {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ receive
+ {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ ok;
+ {Client, {error, closed}} ->
+ ok
+ end
+ end.
+
+ %%--------------------------------------------------------------------
+server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain_fun_fail() ->
+ [{doc, "If parial_chain fun crashes, treat it as if it returned unkown_ca"}].
+
+server_require_peer_cert_partial_chain_fun_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
+ ServerOpts = [{verify, verify_peer}, {fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}
+ | ?config(server_verification_opts, Config)],
+ ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
+ {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
+
+ {ok, ServerCAs} = file:read_file(proplists:get_value(cacertfile, ServerOpts)),
+ [{_,_,_}, {_, IntermidiateCA, _}] = public_key:pem_decode(ServerCAs),
+
+ PartialChain = fun(_CertChain) ->
+ ture = false %% crash on purpose
+ end,
+
+ Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server_error([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, [{cacerts, [IntermidiateCA]},
+ {partial_chain, PartialChain} |
+ proplists:delete(cacertfile, ServerOpts)]}]),
+
+ Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server),
+ Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client_error([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port},
+ {host, Hostname},
+ {from, self()},
+ {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, no_result, []}},
+ {options, ClientOpts}]),
+
+ receive
+ {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ receive
+ {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ ok;
+ {Client, {error, closed}} ->
+ ok
+ end
+ end.
+
+%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
verify_fun_always_run_client() ->
[{doc,"Verify that user verify_fun is always run (for valid and valid_peer not only unknown_extension)"}].
@@ -434,10 +595,16 @@ cert_expired(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client_error([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port},
{host, Hostname},
{from, self()},
- {options, [{verify, verify_peer} | ClientOpts]}]),
-
- ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, {error, {tls_alert, "certificate expired"}},
- Client, {error, {tls_alert, "certificate expired"}}).
+ {options, [{verify, verify_peer} | ClientOpts]}]),
+ receive
+ {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "certificate expired"}}} ->
+ receive
+ {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "certificate expired"}}} ->
+ ok;
+ {Server, {error, closed}} ->
+ ok
+ end
+ end.
two_digits_str(N) when N < 10 ->
lists:flatten(io_lib:format("0~p", [N]));
@@ -632,7 +799,7 @@ no_authority_key_identifier() ->
no_authority_key_identifier(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ClientOpts = ?config(client_verification_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
PrivDir = ?config(priv_dir, Config),
KeyFile = filename:join(PrivDir, "otpCA/private/key.pem"),
@@ -804,7 +971,7 @@ unknown_server_ca_fail() ->
[{doc,"Test that the client fails if the ca is unknown in verify_peer mode"}].
unknown_server_ca_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ClientOpts = ?config(client_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
{ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server_error([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
{from, self()},
@@ -833,11 +1000,11 @@ unknown_server_ca_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
{verify_fun, FunAndState}
| ClientOpts]}]),
receive
- {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
receive
- {Client, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
+ {Server, {error, {tls_alert, "unknown ca"}}} ->
ok;
- {Client, {error, closed}} ->
+ {Server, {error, closed}} ->
ok
end
end.
@@ -848,7 +1015,7 @@ unknown_server_ca_accept_verify_none() ->
[{doc,"Test that the client succeds if the ca is unknown in verify_none mode"}].
unknown_server_ca_accept_verify_none(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ClientOpts = ?config(client_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
{ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
{from, self()},
@@ -873,7 +1040,7 @@ unknown_server_ca_accept_verify_peer() ->
" with a verify_fun that accepts the unknown ca error"}].
unknown_server_ca_accept_verify_peer(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ClientOpts = ?config(client_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
{ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
{from, self()},
@@ -912,7 +1079,7 @@ unknown_server_ca_accept_backwardscompatibility() ->
[{doc,"Test that old style verify_funs will work"}].
unknown_server_ca_accept_backwardscompatibility(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
ClientOpts = ?config(client_opts, Config),
- ServerOpts = ?config(server_opts, Config),
+ ServerOpts = ?config(server_verification_opts, Config),
{ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config),
Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0},
{from, self()},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
index 45e91786d4..f2dc1b52c1 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ aes_decipher_good(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
Content = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56, "HELLO\n">>,
Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>,
Version = {3,0},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
+ {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
Version1 = {3,1},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
+ {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
ok.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ aes_decipher_good_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
NextIV = <<183,139,16,132,10,209,67,86,168,100,61,217,145,57,36,56>>,
Mac = <<71,136,212,107,223,200,70,232,127,116,148,205,232,35,158,113,237,174,15,217,192,168,35,8,6,107,107,233,25,174,90,111>>,
Version = {3,2},
- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
+ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
Version1 = {3,2},
- {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
+ {Content, Mac, #cipher_state{iv = NextIV}} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
ok.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ aes_decipher_fail(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
198,181,81,19,98,162,213,228,74,224,253,168,156,59,195,122,
108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
Version = {3,0},
- {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
+ {Content, Mac, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
32 = byte_size(Content),
32 = byte_size(Mac),
Version1 = {3,1},
- {Content1, Mac1, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
+ {Content1, Mac1, _} = ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
32 = byte_size(Content1),
32 = byte_size(Mac1),
ok.
@@ -156,10 +156,10 @@ aes_decipher_fail_tls11(Config) when is_list(Config) ->
108,101,107,242,20,15,169,150,163,107,101,94,93,104,241,165>>,
Version = {3,2},
#alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} =
- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version),
Version1 = {3,3},
#alert{level = ?FATAL, description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC} =
- ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
+ ssl_cipher:decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version1),
ok.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
index 74d71263de..d2e6e41482 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
@@ -811,48 +811,34 @@ openssl_rsa_suites(CounterPart) ->
false ->
"DSS | ECDHE | ECDH"
end,
- lists:filter(fun(Str) ->
- case re:run(Str, Names,[]) of
- nomatch ->
- false;
- _ ->
- true
- end
- end, Ciphers).
+ lists:filter(fun(Str) -> string_regex_filter(Str, Names)
+ end, Ciphers).
openssl_dsa_suites() ->
Ciphers = ssl:cipher_suites(openssl),
- lists:filter(fun(Str) ->
- case re:run(Str,"DSS",[]) of
- nomatch ->
- false;
- _ ->
- true
- end
+ lists:filter(fun(Str) -> string_regex_filter(Str, "DSS")
end, Ciphers).
openssl_ecdsa_suites() ->
Ciphers = ssl:cipher_suites(openssl),
- lists:filter(fun(Str) ->
- case re:run(Str,"ECDHE-ECDSA",[]) of
- nomatch ->
- false;
- _ ->
- true
- end
+ lists:filter(fun(Str) -> string_regex_filter(Str, "ECDHE-ECDSA")
end, Ciphers).
openssl_ecdh_rsa_suites() ->
Ciphers = ssl:cipher_suites(openssl),
- lists:filter(fun(Str) ->
- case re:run(Str,"ECDH-RSA",[]) of
- nomatch ->
- false;
- _ ->
- true
- end
+ lists:filter(fun(Str) -> string_regex_filter(Str, "ECDH-RSA")
end, Ciphers).
+string_regex_filter(Str, Search) when is_list(Str) ->
+ case re:run(Str, Search, []) of
+ nomatch ->
+ false;
+ _ ->
+ true
+ end;
+string_regex_filter(Str, _Search) ->
+ false.
+
anonymous_suites() ->
Suites =
[{dh_anon, rc4_128, md5},
@@ -860,6 +846,8 @@ anonymous_suites() ->
{dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha},
{dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha},
{dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha},
+ {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null},
+ {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null},
{ecdh_anon,rc4_128,sha},
{ecdh_anon,'3des_ede_cbc',sha},
{ecdh_anon,aes_128_cbc,sha},
@@ -885,8 +873,13 @@ psk_suites() ->
{rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha},
{rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha},
{rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256},
- {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}
-],
+ {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384},
+ {psk, aes_128_gcm, null},
+ {psk, aes_256_gcm, null},
+ {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null},
+ {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null},
+ {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null},
+ {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null}],
ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites).
psk_anon_suites() ->
@@ -1130,7 +1123,7 @@ version_flag(sslv3) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers0) ->
Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]),
Supported0 = ssl_cipher:suites(Version)
- ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites()
+ ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)
++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites(),
Supported1 = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Supported0),
diff --git a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
index 004cacf7fc..404b71374f 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
+++ b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
@@ -1 +1 @@
-SSL_VSN = 5.3.5
+SSL_VSN = 5.3.6
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-12 01:29:12 +0000