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-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml78
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diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
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@@ -28,6 +28,84 @@
<p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p>
+<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title>
+
+ <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so
+ that sessions where client hostname verification would
+ fail can not connect reusing a session created when the
+ server name verification succeeded.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14632</p>
+ </item>
+ <item>
+ <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
+ using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive
+ Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack)
+ against RSA, which when exploited, may result in
+ plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
+ Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not
+ having gained access to the server’s private key
+ itself. <url
+ href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url>
+ </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform
+ plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most
+ practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext
+ only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
+ established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this
+ attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct
+ a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the
+ initial attack, which may require thousands of server
+ requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted
+ session within the window of the configured handshake
+ timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS
+ session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites
+ using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server.
+ The limited window of opportunity, limitations in
+ bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly
+ more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is
+ enabled by default although least prioritized if server
+ order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it
+ must also be supported by the client and probably the
+ only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions
+ encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are
+ not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this
+ vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher
+ suite configuration was used you can configure the server
+ to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like
+ this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+ ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p>
+ that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p>
+ <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+ ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]).
+ </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and
+ Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14748</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+
+ <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address
+ also check for IP-address match. This check is not as
+ good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using
+ IP-address are not recommended.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14655</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
<section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title>
<section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>