diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl')
46 files changed, 6650 insertions, 3901 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile index d54ef47461..f9128e8e45 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/Makefile @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ XML_REF6_FILES = ssl_app.xml XML_PART_FILES = usersguide.xml XML_CHAPTER_FILES = \ + ssl_introduction.xml \ ssl_protocol.xml \ using_ssl.xml \ - pkix_certs.xml \ ssl_distribution.xml \ notes.xml diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 4c6a204e63..bdf8711b2f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -27,6 +27,136 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.3</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Packet options cannot be supported for unreliable + transports, that is, packet option for DTLS over udp will + not be supported.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14664</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Ensure data delivery before close if possible. This fix + is related to fix in PR-1479.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14794</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + The crypto API is extended to use private/public keys + stored in an Engine for sign/verify or encrypt/decrypt + operations.</p> + <p> + The ssl application provides an API to use this new + engine concept in TLS.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14448</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + Implemented renegotiation for DTLS</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14563</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> + A new command line option <c>-ssl_dist_optfile</c> has + been added to facilitate specifying the many options + needed when using SSL as the distribution protocol.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14657</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so + that sessions where client hostname verification would + fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + server name verification succeeded.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address + also check for IP-address match. This check is not as + good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using + IP-address are not recommended.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14655</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> @@ -175,9 +305,74 @@ </item> </list> </section> +</section> + +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3.1.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + Fix alert handling so that unexpected messages are logged + and alerted correctly</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14929</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> </section> +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.1.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -556,6 +751,60 @@ </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -585,7 +834,59 @@ </list> </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> <item> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml deleted file mode 100644 index f365acef4d..0000000000 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/pkix_certs.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,59 +0,0 @@ -<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> -<!DOCTYPE chapter SYSTEM "chapter.dtd"> - -<chapter> - <header> - <copyright> - <year>2003</year><year>2016</year> - <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> - </copyright> - <legalnotice> - Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); - you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. - You may obtain a copy of the License at - - http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - - Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, - WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - limitations under the License. - - </legalnotice> - - <title>PKIX Certificates</title> - <prepared>UAB/F/P Peter Högfeldt</prepared> - <docno></docno> - <date>2003-06-09</date> - <rev>A</rev> - <file>pkix_certs.xml</file> - </header> - - <section> - <title>Introduction to Certificates</title> - <p>Certificates were originally defined by ITU (CCITT) and the latest - definitions are described in <cite id="X.509"></cite>, but those definitions - are (as always) not working. - </p> - <p>Working certificate definitions for the Internet Community are found - in the the PKIX RFCs <cite id="rfc3279"></cite> and <cite id="rfc3280"></cite>. - The parsing of certificates in the Erlang/OTP SSL application is - based on those RFCS. - </p> - <p>Certificates are defined in terms of ASN.1 (<cite id="X.680"></cite>). - For an introduction to ASN.1 see <url href="http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/">ASN.1 Information Site</url>. - </p> - </section> - - <section> - <title>PKIX Certificates</title> - <p>Certificate handling is now handled by the <c>public_key</c> application.</p> - <p> - DER encoded certificates returned by <c>ssl:peercert/1</c> can for example - be decoded by the <c>public_key:pkix_decode_cert/2</c> function. - </p> - </section> -</chapter> - - diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml index e80fd59a7f..7267083e32 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ <modulesummary>Interface Functions for Secure Socket Layer</modulesummary> <description> <p> - This module contains interface functions for the SSL/TLS protocol. + This module contains interface functions for the SSL/TLS/DTLS protocol. For detailed information about the supported standards see <seealso marker="ssl_app">ssl(6)</seealso>. </p> @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ <section> <title>DATA TYPES</title> - <p>The following data types are used in the functions for SSL:</p> + <p>The following data types are used in the functions for SSL/TLS/DTLS:</p> <taglist> @@ -56,9 +56,11 @@ <p>The default socket options are <c>[{mode,list},{packet, 0},{header, 0},{active, true}]</c>.</p> <p>For valid options, see the - <seealso marker="kernel:inet">inet(3)</seealso> and - <seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_tcp(3)</seealso> manual pages - in Kernel.</p></item> + <seealso marker="kernel:inet">inet(3)</seealso>, + <seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_tcp(3)</seealso> and + <seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_udp(3)</seealso> + manual pages + in Kernel. Note that stream oriented options such as packet are only relevant for SSL/TLS and not DTLS</p></item> <tag><marker id="type-ssloption"/><c>ssl_option() =</c></tag> <item> @@ -69,7 +71,9 @@ <p><c>| {cert, public_key:der_encoded()}</c></p> <p><c>| {certfile, path()}</c></p> <p><c>| {key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' - | 'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()}}</c></p> + | 'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | + #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, + engine := crypto:engine_ref(), key_id := crypto:key_id(), password => crypto:password()}</c></p> <p><c>| {keyfile, path()}</c></p> <p><c>| {password, string()}</c></p> <p><c>| {cacerts, [public_key:der_encoded()]}</c></p> @@ -93,13 +97,14 @@ <item><p><c>{cb_info, {CallbackModule::atom(), DataTag::atom(), ClosedTag::atom(), ErrTag:atom()}}</c></p> - <p>Defaults to <c>{gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}</c>. Can be used - to customize the transport layer. The callback module must implement a + <p>Defaults to <c>{gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}</c> for TLS + and <c>{gen_udp, udp, udp_closed, udp_error}</c> for DTLS. Can be used + to customize the transport layer. For TLS the callback module must implement a reliable transport protocol, behave as <c>gen_tcp</c>, and have functions corresponding to <c>inet:setopts/2</c>, <c>inet:getopts/2</c>, <c>inet:peername/1</c>, <c>inet:sockname/1</c>, and <c>inet:port/1</c>. The callback <c>gen_tcp</c> is treated specially and calls <c>inet</c> - directly.</p> + directly. For DTLS this feature must be considered exprimental.</p> <taglist> <tag><c>CallbackModule =</c></tag> <item><p><c>atom()</c></p></item> @@ -135,18 +140,26 @@ <tag><c>sslsocket() =</c></tag> <item><p>opaque()</p></item> - - <tag><marker id="type-protocol"/><c>protocol() =</c></tag> + + <tag><marker id="type-protocol"/><c> protocol_version() =</c></tag> + <item><p><c> ssl_tls_protocol() | dtls_protocol() </c></p></item> + <item><p><c>sslv3 | tlsv1 | 'tlsv1.1' | 'tlsv1.2'</c></p></item> + <tag><marker id="type-protocol"/><c> dtls_protocol() =</c></tag> + <item><p><c>'dtlsv1' | 'dtlsv1.2'</c></p></item> + <tag><c>ciphers() =</c></tag> - <item><p><c>= [ciphersuite()] | string()</c></p> - <p>According to old API.</p></item> + <item><p><c>= [ciphersuite()]</c></p> + <p>Tuples and string formats accepted by versions + before ssl-8.2.4 will be converted for backwards compatibility</p></item> <tag><c>ciphersuite() =</c></tag> - - <item><p><c>{key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash()} | - {key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash(), PRF::hash()}</c></p></item> + <item><p><c> + #{key_exchange := key_exchange(), + cipher := cipher(), + mac := MAC::hash() | aead, + prf := PRF::hash() | default_prf} </c></p></item> <tag><c>key_exchange()=</c></tag> <item><p><c>rsa | dhe_dss | dhe_rsa | dh_anon | psk | dhe_psk @@ -163,6 +176,12 @@ <tag><c>prf_random() =</c></tag> <item><p><c>client_random | server_random</c></p></item> + <tag><c>cipher_filters() =</c></tag> + <item><p><c> [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, algo_filter()}])</c></p></item> + + <tag><c>algo_filter() =</c></tag> + <item><p>fun(key_exchange() | cipher() | hash() | aead | default_prf) -> true | false </p></item> + <tag><c>srp_param_type() =</c></tag> <item><p><c>srp_1024 | srp_1536 | srp_2048 | srp_3072 | srp_4096 | srp_6144 | srp_8192</c></p></item> @@ -182,7 +201,7 @@ </section> <section> - <title>SSL OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - COMMON for SERVER and CLIENT</title> + <title>TLS/DTLS OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - COMMON for SERVER and CLIENT</title> <p>The following options have the same meaning in the client and the server:</p> @@ -201,9 +220,15 @@ <tag><c>{certfile, path()}</c></tag> <item><p>Path to a file containing the user certificate.</p></item> - <tag><c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' - |'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()}}</c></tag> - <item><p>The DER-encoded user's private key. If this option + <tag> + <marker id="key_option_def"/> + <c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' + |'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, + engine := crypto:engine_ref(), key_id := crypto:key_id(), password => crypto:password()}</c></tag> + <item><p>The DER-encoded user's private key or a map refering to a crypto + engine and its key reference that optionally can be password protected, + seealso <seealso marker="crypto:crypto#engine_load-4"> crypto:engine_load/4 + </seealso> and <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load"> Crypto's Users Guide</seealso>. If this option is supplied, it overrides option <c>keyfile</c>.</p></item> <tag><c>{keyfile, path()}</c></tag> @@ -239,8 +264,9 @@ <item><p>Specifies if to reject renegotiation attempt that does not live up to <url href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5746.txt">RFC 5746</url>. - By default <c>secure_renegotiate</c> is set to <c>false</c>, - that is, secure renegotiation is used if possible, + By default <c>secure_renegotiate</c> is set to <c>true</c>, + that is, secure renegotiation is enforced. If set to <c>false</c> secure renegotiation + will still be used if possible, but it falls back to insecure renegotiation if the peer does not support <url href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5746.txt">RFC 5746</url>.</p> @@ -281,11 +307,11 @@ atom()}} | <list type="bulleted"> <item><p>If the verify callback fun returns <c>{fail, Reason}</c>, the verification process is immediately stopped, an alert is - sent to the peer, and the TLS/SSL handshake terminates.</p></item> + sent to the peer, and the TLS/DTLS handshake terminates.</p></item> <item><p>If the verify callback fun returns <c>{valid, UserState}</c>, the verification process continues.</p></item> <item><p>If the verify callback fun always returns - <c>{valid, UserState}</c>, the TLS/SSL handshake does not + <c>{valid, UserState}</c>, the TLS/DTLS handshake does not terminate regarding verification failures and the connection is established.</p></item> <item><p>If called with an extension unknown to the user application, @@ -448,15 +474,16 @@ marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_path_validation-3">public_key:pkix_path_valid marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_path_validation-3">public_key:pkix_path_validation/3</seealso> with the selected CA as trusted anchor and the rest of the chain.</p></item> - <tag><c>{versions, [protocol()]}</c></tag> + <tag><c>{versions, [protocol_version()]}</c></tag> + <item><p>TLS protocol versions supported by started clients and servers. This option overrides the application environment option - <c>protocol_version</c>. If the environment option is not set, it defaults + <c>protocol_version</c> and <c>dtls_protocol_version</c>. If the environment option is not set, it defaults to all versions, except SSL-3.0, supported by the SSL application. See also <seealso marker="ssl:ssl_app">ssl(6).</seealso></p></item> <tag><c>{hibernate_after, integer()|undefined}</c></tag> - <item><p>When an integer-value is specified, <c>ssl_connection</c> + <item><p>When an integer-value is specified, <c>TLS/DTLS-connection</c> goes into hibernation after the specified number of milliseconds of inactivity, thus reducing its memory footprint. When <c>undefined</c> is specified (this is the default), the process @@ -516,7 +543,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </section> <section> - <title>SSL OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - CLIENT SIDE</title> + <title>TLS/DTLS OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - CLIENT SIDE</title> <p>The following options are client-specific or have a slightly different meaning in the client than in the server:</p> @@ -656,7 +683,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </section> <section> - <title>SSL OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - SERVER SIDE</title> + <title>TLS/DTLS OPTION DESCRIPTIONS - SERVER SIDE</title> <p>The following options are server-specific or have a slightly different meaning in the server than in the client:</p> @@ -694,7 +721,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </p></item> <tag><c>{fail_if_no_peer_cert, boolean()}</c></tag> - <item><p>Used together with <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c> by an SSL server. + <item><p>Used together with <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c> by an TLS/DTLS server. If set to <c>true</c>, the server fails if the client does not have a certificate to send, that is, sends an empty certificate. If set to <c>false</c>, it fails only if the client sends an invalid @@ -708,7 +735,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <tag><c>{reuse_session, fun(SuggestedSessionId, PeerCert, Compression, CipherSuite) -> boolean()}</c></tag> - <item><p>Enables the SSL server to have a local policy + <item><p>Enables the TLS/DTLS server to have a local policy for deciding if a session is to be reused or not. Meaningful only if <c>reuse_sessions</c> is set to <c>true</c>. <c>SuggestedSessionId</c> is a <c>binary()</c>, <c>PeerCert</c> is @@ -806,7 +833,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <section> <title>General</title> - <p>When an SSL socket is in active mode (the default), data from the + <p>When an TLS/DTLS socket is in active mode (the default), data from the socket is delivered to the owner of the socket in the form of messages:</p> @@ -821,14 +848,34 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </section> <funcs> + + <func> + <name>append_cipher_suites(Deferred, Suites) -> ciphers() </name> + <fsummary></fsummary> + <type> + <v>Deferred = ciphers() | cipher_filters() </v> + <v>Suites = ciphers() </v> + </type> + <desc><p>Make <c>Deferred</c> suites become the least preferred + suites, that is put them at the end of the cipher suite list + <c>Suites</c> after removing them from <c>Suites</c> if + present. <c>Deferred</c> may be a list of cipher suits or a + list of filters in which case the filters are use on <c>Suites</c> to + extract the Deferred cipher list.</p> + </desc> + </func> + <func> <name>cipher_suites() -></name> - <name>cipher_suites(Type) -> ciphers()</name> + <name>cipher_suites(Type) -> old_ciphers()</name> <fsummary>Returns a list of supported cipher suites.</fsummary> <type> <v>Type = erlang | openssl | all</v> </type> - <desc><p>Returns a list of supported cipher suites. + <desc> + <p>Returns a list of supported cipher suites. + This function will become deprecated in OTP 21, and replaced + by <seealso marker="#cipher_suites-2">ssl:cipher-suites/2</seealso> <c>cipher_suites()</c> is equivalent to <c>cipher_suites(erlang).</c> Type <c>openssl</c> is provided for backwards compatibility with the old SSL, which used OpenSSL. <c>cipher_suites(all)</c> returns @@ -836,12 +883,26 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> in <c>cipher_suites(erlang)</c> but included in <c>cipher_suites(all)</c> are not used unless explicitly configured by the user.</p> + </desc> + </func> + + <func> + <name>cipher_suites(Supported, Version) -> ciphers()</name> + <fsummary>Returns a list of all default or + all supported cipher suites.</fsummary> + <type> + <v> Supported = default | all | anonymous </v> + <v> Version = protocol_version() </v> + </type> + <desc><p>Returns all default or all supported (except anonymous), + or all anonymous cipher suites for a + TLS version</p> </desc> </func> <func> <name>eccs() -></name> - <name>eccs(protocol()) -> [named_curve()]</name> + <name>eccs(protocol_version()) -> [named_curve()]</name> <fsummary>Returns a list of supported ECCs.</fsummary> <desc><p>Returns a list of supported ECCs. <c>eccs()</c> @@ -849,7 +910,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> supported protocols and then deduplicating the output.</p> </desc> </func> - + <func> <name>clear_pem_cache() -> ok </name> <fsummary> Clears the pem cache</fsummary> @@ -864,20 +925,20 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <func> <name>connect(Socket, SslOptions) -> </name> - <name>connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> {ok, SslSocket} + <name>connect(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> {ok, TLSSocket} | {error, Reason}</name> <fsummary>Upgrades a <c>gen_tcp</c>, or - equivalent, connected socket to an SSL socket.</fsummary> + equivalent, connected socket to an TLS socket.</fsummary> <type> <v>Socket = socket()</v> <v>SslOptions = [ssl_option()]</v> <v>Timeout = integer() | infinity</v> - <v>SslSocket = sslsocket()</v> + <v>TLSSocket = sslsocket()</v> <v>Reason = term()</v> </type> <desc><p>Upgrades a <c>gen_tcp</c>, or equivalent, - connected socket to an SSL socket, that is, performs the - client-side ssl handshake.</p> + connected socket to an TLS socket, that is, performs the + client-side TLS handshake.</p> <note><p>If the option <c>verify</c> is set to <c>verify_peer</c> the option <c>server_name_indication</c> shall also be specified, @@ -891,7 +952,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <name>connect(Host, Port, Options) -></name> <name>connect(Host, Port, Options, Timeout) -> {ok, SslSocket} | {error, Reason}</name> - <fsummary>Opens an SSL connection to <c>Host</c>, <c>Port</c>.</fsummary> + <fsummary>Opens an TLS/DTLS connection to <c>Host</c>, <c>Port</c>.</fsummary> <type> <v>Host = host()</v> <v>Port = integer()</v> @@ -900,13 +961,13 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <v>SslSocket = sslsocket()</v> <v>Reason = term()</v> </type> - <desc><p>Opens an SSL connection to <c>Host</c>, <c>Port</c>.</p> + <desc><p>Opens an TLS/DTLS connection to <c>Host</c>, <c>Port</c>.</p> <p> When the option <c>verify</c> is set to <c>verify_peer</c> the check <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_verify_hostname-2">public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2</seealso> will be performed in addition to the usual x509-path validation checks. If the check fails the error {bad_cert, hostname_check_failed} will be propagated to the path validation fun <seealso marker="#verify_fun">verify_fun</seealso>, where it is possible to do customized - checks by using the full possibilitis of the <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_verify_hostname-2">public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2</seealso> API. + checks by using the full possibilities of the <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_verify_hostname-3">public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3</seealso> API. When the option <c>server_name_indication</c> is provided, its value (the DNS name) will be used as <c>ReferenceID</c> to <seealso marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_verify_hostname-2">public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2</seealso>. @@ -922,24 +983,24 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <func> <name>close(SslSocket) -> ok | {error, Reason}</name> - <fsummary>Closes an SSL connection.</fsummary> + <fsummary>Closes an TLS/DTLS connection.</fsummary> <type> <v>SslSocket = sslsocket()</v> <v>Reason = term()</v> </type> - <desc><p>Closes an SSL connection.</p> + <desc><p>Closes an TLS/DTLS connection.</p> </desc> </func> <func> <name>close(SslSocket, How) -> ok | {ok, port()} | {error, Reason}</name> - <fsummary>Closes an SSL connection.</fsummary> + <fsummary>Closes an TLS connection.</fsummary> <type> <v>SslSocket = sslsocket()</v> <v>How = timeout() | {NewController::pid(), timeout()} </v> <v>Reason = term()</v> </type> - <desc><p>Closes or downgrades an SSL connection. In the latter case the transport + <desc><p>Closes or downgrades an TLS connection. In the latter case the transport connection will be handed over to the <c>NewController</c> process after receiving the TLS close alert from the peer. The returned transport socket will have the following options set: <c>[{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]</c></p> @@ -950,7 +1011,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <name>controlling_process(SslSocket, NewOwner) -> ok | {error, Reason}</name> <fsummary>Assigns a new controlling process to the - SSL socket.</fsummary> + TLS/DTLS socket.</fsummary> <type> <v>SslSocket = sslsocket()</v> <v>NewOwner = pid()</v> @@ -1000,6 +1061,21 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </desc> </func> + <func> + <name>filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters) -> ciphers()</name> + <fsummary></fsummary> + <type> + <v> Suites = ciphers()</v> + <v> Filters = cipher_filters()</v> + </type> + <desc><p>Removes cipher suites if any of the filter functions + returns false for any part of the cipher suite. This function + also calls default filter functions to make sure the cipher + suites are supported by crypto. If no filter function is supplied for some + part the default behaviour is fun(Algorithm) -> true.</p> + </desc> + </func> + <func> <name>format_error(Reason) -> string()</name> <fsummary>Returns an error string.</fsummary> @@ -1097,6 +1173,22 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <p>Returns the address and port number of the peer.</p> </desc> </func> + + <func> + <name>prepend_cipher_suites(Preferred, Suites) -> ciphers()</name> + <fsummary></fsummary> + <type> + <v>Preferred = ciphers() | cipher_filters() </v> + <v>Suites = ciphers() </v> + </type> + <desc><p>Make <c>Preferred</c> suites become the most preferred + suites that is put them at the head of the cipher suite list + <c>Suites</c> after removing them from <c>Suites</c> if + present. <c>Preferred</c> may be a list of cipher suits or a + list of filters in which case the filters are use on <c>Suites</c> to + extract the preferred cipher list. </p> + </desc> + </func> <func> <name>prf(Socket, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> {ok, binary()} | {error, reason()}</name> @@ -1113,7 +1205,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> extra key material. It either takes user-generated values for <c>Secret</c> and <c>Seed</c> or atoms directing it to use a specific value from the session security parameters.</p> - <p>Can only be used with TLS connections; <c>{error, undefined}</c> + <p>Can only be used with TLS/DTLS connections; <c>{error, undefined}</c> is returned for SSLv3 connections.</p> </desc> </func> @@ -1213,7 +1305,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <v>Reason = term()</v> </type> <desc> - <p>Performs the SSL/TLS server-side handshake.</p> + <p>Performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS server-side handshake.</p> <p><c>Socket</c> is a socket as returned by <seealso marker="#transport_accept-2">ssl:transport_accept/[1,2]</seealso> </p> @@ -1223,7 +1315,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <func> <name>ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions) -> </name> <name>ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> {ok, Socket} | ok | {error, Reason}</name> - <fsummary>Performs server-side SSL/TLS handshake.</fsummary> + <fsummary>Performs server-side SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake.</fsummary> <type> <v>Socket = socket() | sslsocket() </v> <v>SslOptions = [ssl_option()]</v> @@ -1240,10 +1332,10 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> by calling this function, else the upgrade succeeds or does not succeed depending on timing.</p></warning> - <p>If <c>Socket</c> is an <c>sslsocket()</c>: provides extra SSL/TLS + <p>If <c>Socket</c> is an <c>sslsocket()</c>: provides extra SSL/TLS/DTLS options to those specified in <seealso marker="#listen-2">ssl:listen/2 </seealso> and then performs - the SSL/TLS handshake. + the SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake. </p> </desc> </func> @@ -1302,7 +1394,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> The socket returned is to be passed to <seealso marker="#ssl_accept-2"> ssl:ssl_accept[2,3]</seealso> to complete handshaking, that is, - establishing the SSL/TLS connection.</p> + establishing the SSL/TLS/DTLS connection.</p> <warning> <p>The socket returned can only be used with <seealso marker="#ssl_accept-2"> ssl:ssl_accept[2,3]</seealso>. @@ -1324,7 +1416,8 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <fsummary>Returns version information relevant for the SSL application.</fsummary> <type> - <v>versions_info() = {app_vsn, string()} | {supported | available, [protocol()] </v> + <v>versions_info() = {app_vsn, string()} | {supported | available, [ssl_tls_protocol()]} | + {supported_dtls | available_dtls, [dtls_protocol()]} </v> </type> <desc> <p>Returns version information relevant for the SSL @@ -1334,19 +1427,35 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <item>The application version of the SSL application.</item> <tag><c>supported</c></tag> - <item>TLS/SSL versions supported by default. + <item>SSL/TLS versions supported by default. Overridden by a version option on <seealso marker="#connect-2"> connect/[2,3,4]</seealso>, <seealso marker="#listen-2"> listen/2</seealso>, and <seealso marker="#ssl_accept-2">ssl_accept/[1,2,3]</seealso>. - For the negotiated TLS/SSL version, see <seealso + For the negotiated SSL/TLS version, see <seealso marker="#connection_information-1">ssl:connection_information/1 </seealso>.</item> - + + <tag><c>supported_dtls</c></tag> + <item>DTLS versions supported by default. + Overridden by a version option on + <seealso marker="#connect-2"> connect/[2,3,4]</seealso>, + <seealso marker="#listen-2"> listen/2</seealso>, and <seealso + marker="#ssl_accept-2">ssl_accept/[1,2,3]</seealso>. + For the negotiated DTLS version, see <seealso + marker="#connection_information-1">ssl:connection_information/1 + </seealso>.</item> + <tag><c>available</c></tag> - <item>All TLS/SSL versions supported by the SSL application. + <item>All SSL/TLS versions supported by the SSL application. TLS 1.2 requires sufficient support from the Crypto application.</item> + + <tag><c>available_dtls</c></tag> + <item>All DTLS versions supported by the SSL application. + DTLS 1.2 requires sufficient support from the Crypto + application.</item> + </taglist> </desc> </func> @@ -1357,6 +1466,7 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> <title>SEE ALSO</title> <p><seealso marker="kernel:inet">inet(3)</seealso> and <seealso marker="kernel:gen_tcp">gen_tcp(3)</seealso> + <seealso marker="kernel:gen_udp">gen_udp(3)</seealso> </p> </section> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml index f317dfded4..51070bb083 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml @@ -35,16 +35,20 @@ <description> <p> - The ssl application is an implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol in Erlang. + The ssl application is an implementation of the SSL/TLS/DTLS protocol in Erlang. </p> <list type="bulleted"> - <item>Supported SSL/TLS-versions are SSL-3.0, TLS-1.0, - TLS-1.1, and TLS-1.2.</item> + <item>Supported SSL/TLS/DTLS-versions are SSL-3.0, TLS-1.0, + TLS-1.1, TLS-1.2, DTLS-1.0 (based on TLS-1.1), DTLS-1.2 (based on TLS-1.2)</item> <item>For security reasons SSL-2.0 is not supported.</item> <item>For security reasons SSL-3.0 is no longer supported by default, - but can be configured.</item> + but can be configured. (OTP 19) </item> + <item>For security reasons RSA key exchange cipher suites are no longer supported by default, + but can be configured. (OTP 21) </item> <item>For security reasons DES cipher suites are no longer supported by default, - but can be configured.</item> + but can be configured. (OTP 20) </item> + <item>For security reasons 3DES cipher suites are no longer supported by default, + but can be configured. (OTP 21) </item> <item> Renegotiation Indication Extension <url href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5746.txt">RFC 5746</url> is supported </item> <item>Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman cipher suites are supported, @@ -72,7 +76,7 @@ <section> <title>DEPENDENCIES</title> - <p>The SSL application uses the <c>public_key</c> and + <p>The SSL application uses the <c>public_key</c>, <c>asn1</c> and Crypto application to handle public keys and encryption, hence these applications must be loaded for the SSL application to work. In an embedded environment this means they must be started with @@ -94,13 +98,20 @@ <p><c>erl -ssl protocol_version "['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1']"</c></p> <taglist> - <tag><c>protocol_version = </c><seealso marker="ssl#type-protocol">ssl:protocol()</seealso><c><![CDATA[<optional>]]></c></tag> + <tag><c>protocol_version = </c><seealso marker="ssl#type-protocol">ssl:ssl_tls_protocol()</seealso><c><![CDATA[<optional>]]></c></tag> <item><p>Protocol supported by started clients and servers. If this option is not set, it defaults to all - protocols currently supported by the SSL application. + TLS protocols currently supported by the SSL application. This option can be overridden by the version option to <c>ssl:connect/[2,3]</c> and <c>ssl:listen/2</c>.</p></item> + <tag><c>dtls_protocol_version = </c><seealso marker="ssl#type-protocol">ssl:dtls_protocol()</seealso><c><![CDATA[<optional>]]></c></tag> + <item><p>Protocol supported by started clients and + servers. If this option is not set, it defaults to all + DTLS protocols currently supported by the SSL application. + This option can be overridden by the version option + to <c>ssl:connect/[2,3]</c> and <c>ssl:listen/2</c>.</p></item> + <tag><c><![CDATA[session_lifetime = integer() <optional>]]></c></tag> <item><p>Maximum lifetime of the session data in seconds. Defaults to 24 hours which is the maximum recommended lifetime by <url href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/5246rfc.txt">RFC 5246</url>. However @@ -123,14 +134,14 @@ new client connections. If the maximum number of sessions is reached, the current cache entries will be invalidated regardless of their remaining lifetime. Defaults to - 1000.</p></item> + 1000. Recommended ssl-8.2.1 or later for this option to work as intended.</p></item> <tag> <c><![CDATA[session_cache_server_max = integer() <optional>]]></c></tag> <item><p>Limits the growth of the servers session cache, that is how many client sessions are cached by the server. If the maximum number of sessions is reached, the current cache entries will be invalidated regardless of their remaining - lifetime. Defaults to 1000.</p></item> + lifetime. Defaults to 1000. Recommended ssl-8.2.1 or later for this option to work as intended.</p></item> <tag><c><![CDATA[ssl_pem_cache_clean = integer() <optional>]]></c></tag> <item> @@ -145,9 +156,8 @@ <tag><c><![CDATA[bypass_pem_cache = boolean() <optional>]]></c></tag> <item> <p>Introduced in ssl-8.0.2. Disables the PEM-cache. - The PEM cache has proven to be a bottleneck, until the - implementation has been improved this can be used as - a workaround. Defaults to false. + Can be used as a workaround for the PEM-cache bottleneck + before ssl-8.1.1. Defaults to false. </p> </item> @@ -167,7 +177,7 @@ <title>ERROR LOGGER AND EVENT HANDLERS</title> <p>The SSL application uses the default <seealso marker="kernel:error_logger">OTP error logger</seealso> to log - unexpected errors and TLS alerts. The logging of TLS alerts may be + unexpected errors and TLS/DTLS alerts. The logging of TLS/DTLS alerts may be turned off with the <c>log_alert</c> option. </p> </section> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_crl_cache.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_crl_cache.xml index 7a67de3971..738487759a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_crl_cache.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_crl_cache.xml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ <name>delete(Entries) -> ok | {error, Reason} </name> <fsummary> </fsummary> <type> - <v> Entries = <seealso marker="inets:http_uri">http_uri:uri() </seealso> | {file, string()} | {der, [<seealso + <v> Entries = <seealso marker="stdlib:uri_string">uri_string:uri_string()</seealso> | {file, string()} | {der, [<seealso marker="public_key:public_key"> public_key:der_encoded() </seealso>]}</v> <v> Reason = term()</v> </type> @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ <type> <v> CRLSrc = {file, string()} | {der, [ <seealso marker="public_key:public_key"> public_key:der_encoded() </seealso> ]}</v> - <v> URI = <seealso marker="inets:http_uri">http_uri:uri() </seealso> </v> + <v> URI = <seealso marker="stdlib:uri_string">uri_string:uri_string() </seealso> </v> <v> Reason = term()</v> </type> <desc> @@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ </desc> </func> </funcs> -</erlref>
\ No newline at end of file +</erlref> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml index 61f88e3860..e14f3f90dc 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2000</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2000</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ </legalnotice> - <title>Using SSL for Erlang Distribution</title> + <title>Using TLS for Erlang Distribution</title> <prepared>P Nyblom</prepared> <responsible></responsible> <docno></docno> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ <file>ssl_distribution.xml</file> </header> <p>This section describes how the Erlang distribution can use - SSL to get extra verification and security.</p> + TLS to get extra verification and security.</p> <p>The Erlang distribution can in theory use almost any connection-based protocol as bearer. However, a module that @@ -45,16 +45,16 @@ <p>In the SSL application, an extra distribution module, <c>inet_tls_dist</c>, can be used as an - alternative. All distribution connections will use SSL and + alternative. All distribution connections will use TLS and all participating Erlang nodes in a distributed system must use this distribution module.</p> <p>The security level depends on the parameters provided to the - SSL connection setup. Erlang node cookies are however always + TLS connection setup. Erlang node cookies are however always used, as they can be used to differentiate between two different Erlang networks.</p> - <p>To set up Erlang distribution over SSL:</p> + <p>To set up Erlang distribution over TLS:</p> <list type="bulleted"> <item><em>Step 1:</em> Build boot scripts including the @@ -63,13 +63,13 @@ <c>net_kernel</c>.</item> <item><em>Step 3:</em> Specify the security options and other SSL options.</item> - <item><em>Step 4:</em> Set up the environment to always use SSL.</item> + <item><em>Step 4:</em> Set up the environment to always use TLS.</item> </list> <p>The following sections describe these steps.</p> <section> - <title>Building Boot Scripts Including the ssl Application</title> + <title>Building Boot Scripts Including the SSL Application</title> <p>Boot scripts are built using the <c>systools</c> utility in the SASL application. For more information on <c>systools</c>, see the SASL documentation. This is only an example of @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ STDLIB application.</p></item> </list> - <p>The following shows an example <c>.rel</c> file with SSL + <p>The following shows an example <c>.rel</c> file with TLS added:</p> <code type="none"> {release, {"OTP APN 181 01","R15A"}, {erts, "5.9"}, @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) <section> <title>Specifying Distribution Module for net_kernel</title> - <p>The distribution module for SSL is named <c>inet_tls_dist</c> + <p>The distribution module for SSL/TLS is named <c>inet_tls_dist</c> and is specified on the command line with option <c>-proto_dist</c>. The argument to <c>-proto_dist</c> is to be the module name without suffix <c>_dist</c>. So, this distribution @@ -174,21 +174,107 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) (ssl_test@myhost)1> </code> <p>However, a node started in this way refuses to talk - to other nodes, as no SSL parameters are supplied + to other nodes, as no TLS parameters are supplied (see the next section).</p> </section> <section> - <title>Specifying SSL Options</title> - <p>For SSL to work, at least - a public key and a certificate must be specified for the server - side. In the following example, the PEM-files consist of two - entries, the server certificate and its private key.</p> + <title>Specifying SSL/TLS Options</title> + + <p> + The SSL/TLS distribution options can be written into a file + that is consulted when the node is started. This file name + is then specified with the command line argument + <c>-ssl_dist_optfile</c>. + </p> + <p> + Any available SSL/TLS option can be specified in an options file, + but note that options that take a <c>fun()</c> has to use + the syntax <c>fun Mod:Func/Arity</c> since a function + body can not be compiled when consulting a file. + </p> + <p> + Do not tamper with the socket options + <c>list</c>, <c>binary</c>, <c>active</c>, <c>packet</c>, + <c>nodelay</c> and <c>deliver</c> since they are used + by the distribution protocol handler itself. + Other raw socket options such as <c>packet_size</c> may + interfere severely, so beware! + </p> + <p> + For SSL/TLS to work, at least a public key and a certificate + must be specified for the server side. + In the following example, the PEM file + <c>"/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"</c> contains both + the server certificate and its private key. + </p> + <p> + Create a file named for example + <c>"/home/me/ssl/[email protected]"</c>: + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ +[{server, + [{certfile, "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"}, + {secure_renegotiate, true}]}, + {client, + [{secure_renegotiate, true}]}].]]> + </code> + <p> + And then start the node like this + (line breaks in the command are for readability, + and shall not be there when typed): + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ +$ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet_tls + -ssl_dist_optfile "/home/me/ssl/[email protected]" + -sname ssl_test]]> + </code> + <p> + The options in the <c>{server, Opts}</c> tuple are used + when calling <c>ssl:ssl_accept/3</c>, and the options in the + <c>{client, Opts}</c> tuple are used when calling + <c>ssl:connect/4</c>. + </p> + <p> + For the client, the option + <c>{server_name_indication, atom_to_list(TargetNode)}</c> + is added when connecting. + This makes it possible to use the client option + <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c>, + and the client will verify that the certificate matches + the node name you are connecting to. + This only works if the the server certificate is issued + to the name <c>atom_to_list(TargetNode)</c>. + </p> + <p> + For the server it is also possible to use the option + <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c> and the server will only accept + client connections with certificates that are trusted by + a root certificate that the server knows. + A client that presents an untrusted certificate will be rejected. + This option is preferably combined with + <c>{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}</c> or a client will + still be accepted if it does not present any certificate. + </p> + <p> + A node started in this way is fully functional, using TLS + as the distribution protocol. + </p> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Specifying SSL/TLS Options (Legacy)</title> + + <p> + As in the previous section the PEM file + <c>"/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"</c> contains both + the server certificate and its private key. + </p> <p>On the <c>erl</c> command line you can specify options that the - SSL distribution adds when creating a socket.</p> + SSL/TLS distribution adds when creating a socket.</p> - <p>The simplest SSL options in the following list can be specified + <p>The simplest SSL/TLS options in the following list can be specified by adding the prefix <c>server_</c> or <c>client_</c> to the option name:</p> <list type="bulleted"> @@ -208,7 +294,7 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) </list> <p>Note that <c>verify_fun</c> needs to be written in a different - form than the corresponding SSL option, since funs are not + form than the corresponding SSL/TLS option, since funs are not accepted on the command line.</p> <p>The server can also take the options <c>dhfile</c> and @@ -221,32 +307,34 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) <p>Raw socket options, such as <c>packet</c> and <c>size</c> must not be specified on the command line.</p> - <p>The command-line argument for specifying the SSL options is named + <p>The command-line argument for specifying the SSL/TLS options is named <c>-ssl_dist_opt</c> and is to be followed by pairs of SSL options and their values. Argument <c>-ssl_dist_opt</c> can be repeated any number of times.</p> - <p>An example command line can now look as follows + <p> + An example command line doing the same as the example + in the previous section can now look as follows (line breaks in the command are for readability, - and are not be there when typed):</p> - <code type="none"> + and shall not be there when typed): + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ $ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet_tls - -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" + -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" -ssl_dist_opt server_secure_renegotiate true client_secure_renegotiate true -sname ssl_test Erlang (BEAM) emulator version 5.0 [source] - + Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) -(ssl_test@myhost)1> </code> - <p>A node started in this way is fully functional, using SSL - as the distribution protocol.</p> +(ssl_test@myhost)1>]]> + </code> </section> <section> - <title>Setting up Environment to Always Use SSL</title> + <title>Setting up Environment to Always Use SSL/TLS (Legacy)</title> <p>A convenient way to specify arguments to Erlang is to use environment variable <c>ERL_FLAGS</c>. All the flags needed to - use the SSL distribution can be specified in that variable and are + use the SSL/TLS distribution can be specified in that variable and are then interpreted as command-line arguments for all subsequent invocations of Erlang.</p> @@ -277,25 +365,21 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) </section> <section> - <title>Using SSL distribution over IPv6</title> - <p>It is possible to use SSL distribution over IPv6 instead of + <title>Using SSL/TLS distribution over IPv6</title> + <p>It is possible to use SSL/TLS distribution over IPv6 instead of IPv4. To do this, pass the option <c>-proto_dist inet6_tls</c> instead of <c>-proto_dist inet_tls</c> when starting Erlang, either on the command line or in the <c>ERL_FLAGS</c> environment variable.</p> <p>An example command line with this option would look like this:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ $ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet6_tls - -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" - -ssl_dist_opt server_secure_renegotiate true client_secure_renegotiate true - -sname ssl_test -Erlang (BEAM) emulator version 5.0 [source] - -Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) -(ssl_test@myhost)1> </code> + -ssl_dist_optfile "/home/me/ssl/[email protected]" + -sname ssl_test]]> + </code> <p>A node started in this way will only be able to communicate with - other nodes using SSL distribution over IPv6.</p> + other nodes using SSL/TLS distribution over IPv6.</p> </section> </chapter> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_introduction.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_introduction.xml index d3e39dbb01..a416924eb1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_introduction.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_introduction.xml @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ <header> <copyright> <year>2015</year> - <year>2015</year> + <year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -36,19 +36,20 @@ <title>Purpose</title> <p>Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols designed to - provide communications security over a computer network. The protocols use + provide communications security over a computer network. The protocols use X.509 certificates and hence public key (asymmetric) cryptography to authenticate the counterpart with whom they communicate, and to exchange a symmetric key for payload encryption. The protocol provides data/message confidentiality (encryption), integrity (through message authentication code checks) - and host verification (through certificate path validation).</p> + and host verification (through certificate path validation). DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) that + is based on TLS but datagram oriented instead of stream oriented.</p> </section> <section> <title>Prerequisites</title> <p>It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the Erlang programming language, the concepts of OTP, and has a basic - understanding of SSL/TLS.</p> + understanding of SSL/TLS/DTLS.</p> </section> </chapter> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_protocol.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_protocol.xml index 31a22db58b..0b12dc7dc5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_protocol.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_protocol.xml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ </legalnotice> - <title>TLS and its Predecessor, SSL</title> + <title>TLS/DTLS and TLS Predecessor, SSL</title> <prepared></prepared> <responsible></responsible> <docno></docno> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ <file>ssl_protocol.xml</file> </header> - <p>The Erlang SSL application implements the SSL/TLS protocol + <p>The Erlang SSL application implements the SSL/TLS/DTLS protocol for the currently supported versions, see the <seealso marker="ssl">ssl(3)</seealso> manual page. </p> @@ -41,20 +41,22 @@ <p>By default SSL/TLS is run over the TCP/IP protocol even though you can plug in any other reliable transport protocol with the same Application Programming Interface (API) as the - <c>gen_tcp</c> module in Kernel.</p> + <c>gen_tcp</c> module in Kernel. DTLS is by default run over UDP/IP, + which means that application data has no delivery guarentees. Other + transports, such as SCTP, may be supported in future releases.</p> <p>If a client and a server wants to use an upgrade mechanism, such as - defined by RFC 2817, to upgrade a regular TCP/IP connection to an SSL + defined by RFC 2817, to upgrade a regular TCP/IP connection to an TLS connection, this is supported by the Erlang SSL application API. This can be useful for, for example, supporting HTTP and HTTPS on the same port and - implementing virtual hosting. + implementing virtual hosting. Note this is a TLS feature only. </p> <section> <title>Security Overview</title> <p>To achieve authentication and privacy, the client and server - perform a TLS handshake procedure before transmitting or receiving + perform a TLS/DTLS handshake procedure before transmitting or receiving any data. During the handshake, they agree on a protocol version and cryptographic algorithms, generate shared secrets using public key cryptographies, and optionally authenticate each other with @@ -73,10 +75,10 @@ <p>The keys for the symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated - in the TLS handshake.</p> + in the TLS/DTLS handshake.</p> - <p>The TLS handshake protocol and data transfer is run on top of - the TLS Record Protocol, which uses a keyed-hash Message + <p>The TLS/DTLS handshake protocol and data transfer is run on top of + the TLS/DTLS Record Protocol, which uses a keyed-hash Message Authenticity Code (MAC), or a Hash-based MAC (HMAC), to protect the message data integrity. From the TLS RFC: "A Message Authentication Code is a @@ -152,8 +154,8 @@ from it was saved, for security reasons. The amount of time the session data is to be saved can be configured.</p> - <p>By default the SSL clients try to reuse an available session and - by default the SSL servers agree to reuse sessions when clients + <p>By default the TLS/DTLS clients try to reuse an available session and + by default the TLS/DTLS servers agree to reuse sessions when clients ask for it.</p> </section> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/using_ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/using_ssl.xml index f84cd6e391..3ef33df719 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/using_ssl.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/using_ssl.xml @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ </legalnotice> - <title>Using SSL API</title> + <title>Using SSL application API</title> <prepared></prepared> <responsible></responsible> <docno></docno> @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ <section> <title>Minimal Example</title> - <note><p> The minimal setup is not the most secure setup of SSL.</p> + <note><p> The minimal setup is not the most secure setup of SSL/TLS/DTLS.</p> </note> <p>To set up client/server connections:</p> @@ -60,27 +60,27 @@ <code type="erl">1 server> ssl:start(). ok</code> - <p><em>Step 2:</em> Create an SSL listen socket:</p> + <p><em>Step 2:</em> Create an TLS listen socket: (To run DTLS add the option {protocol, dtls})</p> <code type="erl">2 server> {ok, ListenSocket} = ssl:listen(9999, [{certfile, "cert.pem"}, {keyfile, "key.pem"},{reuseaddr, true}]). {ok,{sslsocket, [...]}}</code> - <p><em>Step 3:</em> Do a transport accept on the SSL listen socket:</p> + <p><em>Step 3:</em> Do a transport accept on the TLS listen socket:</p> <code type="erl">3 server> {ok, Socket} = ssl:transport_accept(ListenSocket). {ok,{sslsocket, [...]}}</code> - <p><em>Step 4:</em> Start the client side:</p> + <p><em>Step 4:</em> Start the client side: </p> <code type="erl">1 client> ssl:start(). ok</code> - + <p> To run DTLS add the option {protocol, dtls} to third argument.</p> <code type="erl">2 client> {ok, Socket} = ssl:connect("localhost", 9999, [], infinity). {ok,{sslsocket, [...]}}</code> - <p><em>Step 5:</em> Do the SSL handshake:</p> + <p><em>Step 5:</em> Do the TLS handshake:</p> <code type="erl">4 server> ok = ssl:ssl_accept(Socket). ok</code> - <p><em>Step 6:</em> Send a message over SSL:</p> + <p><em>Step 6:</em> Send a message over TLS:</p> <code type="erl">5 server> ssl:send(Socket, "foo"). ok</code> @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ ok</code> </section> <section> - <title>Upgrade Example</title> + <title>Upgrade Example - TLS only </title> <note><p>To upgrade a TCP/IP connection to an SSL connection, the client and server must agree to do so. The agreement @@ -125,24 +125,24 @@ ok</code> <code type="erl">4 server> inet:setopts(Socket, [{active, false}]). ok</code> - <p><em>Step 6:</em> Do the SSL handshake:</p> - <code type="erl">5 server> {ok, SSLSocket} = ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, [{cacertfile, "cacerts.pem"}, + <p><em>Step 6:</em> Do the TLS handshake:</p> + <code type="erl">5 server> {ok, TLSSocket} = ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, [{cacertfile, "cacerts.pem"}, {certfile, "cert.pem"}, {keyfile, "key.pem"}]). {ok,{sslsocket,[...]}}</code> - <p><em>Step 7:</em> Upgrade to an SSL connection. The client and server + <p><em>Step 7:</em> Upgrade to an TLS connection. The client and server must agree upon the upgrade. The server must call <c>ssl:accept/2</c> before the client calls <c>ssl:connect/3.</c></p> - <code type="erl">3 client>{ok, SSLSocket} = ssl:connect(Socket, [{cacertfile, "cacerts.pem"}, + <code type="erl">3 client>{ok, TLSSocket} = ssl:connect(Socket, [{cacertfile, "cacerts.pem"}, {certfile, "cert.pem"}, {keyfile, "key.pem"}], infinity). {ok,{sslsocket,[...]}}</code> - <p><em>Step 8:</em> Send a message over SSL:</p> - <code type="erl">4 client> ssl:send(SSLSocket, "foo"). + <p><em>Step 8:</em> Send a message over TLS:</p> + <code type="erl">4 client> ssl:send(TLSSocket, "foo"). ok</code> - <p><em>Step 9:</em> Set <c>active true</c> on the SSL socket:</p> - <code type="erl">4 server> ssl:setopts(SSLSocket, [{active, true}]). + <p><em>Step 9:</em> Set <c>active true</c> on the TLS socket:</p> + <code type="erl">4 server> ssl:setopts(TLSSocket, [{active, true}]). ok</code> <p><em>Step 10:</em> Flush the shell message queue to see that the message @@ -152,4 +152,85 @@ Shell got {ssl,{sslsocket,[...]},"foo"} ok</code> </section> </section> + + <section> + <title>Customizing cipher suits</title> + + <p>Fetch default cipher suite list for an TLS/DTLS version. Change default + to all to get all possible cipher suites.</p> + <code type="erl">1> Default = ssl:cipher_suites(default, 'tlsv1.2'). + [#{cipher => aes_256_gcm,key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + mac => aead,prf => sha384}, ....] +</code> + + <p>In OTP 20 it is desirable to remove all cipher suites + that uses rsa kexchange (removed from default in 21) </p> + <code type="erl">2> NoRSA = + ssl:filter_cipher_suites(Default, + [{key_exchange, fun(rsa) -> false; + (_) -> true end}]). + [...] + </code> + + <p> Pick just a few suites </p> + <code type="erl"> 3> Suites = + ssl:filter_cipher_suites(Default, + [{key_exchange, fun(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true; + (_) -> false end}, + {cipher, fun(aes_128_cbc) ->true; + (_) ->false end}]). + [#{cipher => aes_128_cbc,key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + mac => sha256,prf => sha256}, + #{cipher => aes_128_cbc,key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa,mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}] + </code> + + <p> Make some particular suites the most preferred, or least + preferred by changing prepend to append.</p> + <code type="erl"> 4>ssl:prepend_cipher_suites(Suites, Default). + [#{cipher => aes_128_cbc,key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + mac => sha256,prf => sha256}, + #{cipher => aes_128_cbc,key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa,mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}, + #{cipher => aes_256_cbc,key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + mac => sha384,prf => sha384}, ...] + </code> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Using an Engine Stored Key</title> + + <p>Erlang ssl application is able to use private keys provided + by OpenSSL engines using the following mechanism:</p> + + <code type="erl">1> ssl:start(). +ok</code> + + <p>Load a crypto engine, should be done once per engine used. For example + dynamically load the engine called <c>MyEngine</c>: + </p> + <code type="erl">2> {ok, EngineRef} = +crypto:engine_load(<<"dynamic">>, + [{<<"SO_PATH">>, "/tmp/user/engines/MyEngine"},<<"LOAD">>],[]). +{ok,#Ref<0.2399045421.3028942852.173962>} + </code> + + <p>Create a map with the engine information and the algorithm used by the engine:</p> + <code type="erl">3> PrivKey = + #{algorithm => rsa, + engine => EngineRef, + key_id => "id of the private key in Engine"}. + </code> + <p>Use the map in the ssl key option:</p> + <code type="erl">4> {ok, SSLSocket} = +ssl:connect("localhost", 9999, + [{cacertfile, "cacerts.pem"}, + {certfile, "cert.pem"}, + {key, PrivKey}], infinity). + </code> + + <p>See also <seealso marker="crypto:engine_load#engine_load"> crypto documentation</seealso> </p> + + </section> + </chapter> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 387d632ef8..fb12a729b1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -39,20 +39,18 @@ -export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4]). +-export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). %% Handshake handling --export([renegotiate/2, - reinit_handshake_data/1, - send_handshake/2, queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, - select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). +-export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, + queue_handshake/2, queue_change_cipher/2, + reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling -export([encode_alert/3,send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling - --export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4, +-export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, send/3, socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions @@ -64,6 +62,9 @@ %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API +%%==================================================================== +%%==================================================================== +%% Setup %%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, @@ -79,6 +80,224 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} Error end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> + {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to +%% initialize. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> + {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. + +init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + try + State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) + catch + throw:Error -> + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% State transition handling +%%==================================================================== +next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; + +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CT | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + CurrentRead = dtls_record:get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnectionStates, read), + case dtls_record:replay_detect(CT, CurrentRead) of + false -> + decode_cipher_text(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) ; + true -> + %% Ignore replayed record + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}) + end; +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) + when Epoch > CurrentEpoch -> + %% TODO Buffer later Epoch message, drop it for now + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}); +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ _ | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + %% Drop old epoch message + next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates}); +next_record(#state{role = server, + socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}, + transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> + dtls_udp_listener:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), + {no_record, State}; +next_record(#state{role = client, + socket = {_Server, Socket} = DTLSSocket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> + case dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of + ok -> + {no_record, State}; + _ -> + self() ! {CloseTag, DTLSSocket}, + {no_record, State} + end; +next_record(State) -> + {no_record, State}. + +next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). + +next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case next_record_if_active(State0) of + {no_record, State} -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record, State1} -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State1), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake + {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + {#ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, + version = _Version}, State1} -> + %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end; +next_event(connection = StateName, Record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case Record of + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake + #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, + type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> + {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), + {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); + _ -> + next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) + end; +next_event(StateName, Record, + #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> + case Record of + no_record -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, + version = Version} = Record -> + State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), + {next_state, StateName, State, + [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, + version = _Version} = _Record -> + %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); + #alert{} = Alert -> + {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end. + +handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, + fragment = Data}, + StateName, + #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, + negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> + try + case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of + {[], Buffers} -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + {Packets, Buffers} -> + State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}, + Events = dtls_handshake_events(Packets), + {next_state, StateName, + State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + end + catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + end; +%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; +%%% DTLS record protocol level change cipher messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; +%%% DTLS record protocol level Alert messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of + Alerts = [_|_] -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); + #alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + end; +%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State}. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Handshake handling +%%==================================================================== + +renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> + %% Handle same way as if server requested + %% the renegotiation + {next_state, connection, State, + [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + +renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> + HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), + State1 = prepare_flight(State0), + {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), + {Record, State} = next_record(State2), + next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). + send_handshake(Handshake, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State), Epoch). @@ -104,85 +323,12 @@ queue_handshake(Handshake0, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hist0, next_sequence => Seq +1}, tls_handshake_history = Hist}. - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, - change_cipher_spec := undefined}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size - {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), - - send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates2} = - encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates1), - {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates2), - send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; - -send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], - change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, - handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> - {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = - encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), - {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = - encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), - send(Transport, Socket, [EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), - {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}. - queue_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, #state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates0, write), State#state{flight_buffer = Flight#{change_cipher_spec => ChangeCipher}, connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - -close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> - ok; -%% Other -close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> - dtls_socket:close(Transport,Socket). - reinit_handshake_data(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State) -> State#state{premaster_secret = undefined, public_key_info = undefined, @@ -200,54 +346,81 @@ select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. + empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> Empty = ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation), dtls_record:empty_connection_state(Empty). -socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> - dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> + dtls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). -setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> - dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). -getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> - dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). +send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. + +close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> + ok; +%% Other +close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> + dtls_socket:close(Transport,Socket). protocol_name() -> "DTLS". %%==================================================================== -%% tls_connection_sup API -%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> - {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to -%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function -%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> - {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. +encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> + dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). -init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), - try - State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) - catch - throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error,State0}) +passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> + case Buffer of + <<>> -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State) end. +next_record_if_active(State = + #state{socket_options = + #socket_options{active = false}}) -> + {no_record ,State}; -callback_mode() -> - [state_functions, state_enter]. +next_record_if_active(State) -> + next_record(State). + +send(Transport, {_, {{_,_}, _} = Socket}, Data) -> + send(Transport, Socket, Data); +send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> + dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). + +socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, _) -> + dtls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection). + +setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> + dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). + +getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> + dtls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% State functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec init(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, @@ -277,28 +450,33 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State3), next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server, transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> - Result = ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, - ignored_alerts => 0, - max_ignored_alerts => 10}}, - ?MODULE), + Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, + protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, + ignored_alerts => 0, + max_ignored_alerts => 10}}), erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), Result; init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server} = State) -> %% I.E. DTLS over sctp - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}); init(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -393,49 +571,66 @@ hello(internal, {handshake, {#hello_verify_request{} = Handshake, _}}, State) -> %% hello_verify should not be in handshake history {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; hello(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- abbreviated(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates1, read), - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); abbreviated(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - flight_state = connection}), ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + flight_state = connection})); abbreviated(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). - + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- certify(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; certify(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal = Type, #server_hello_done{} = Event, State) -> ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, prepare_flight(State), ?MODULE); +certify(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, State0) -> + {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0, retransmit_epoch(?FUNCTION_NAME, State0)), + {Record, State2} = next_record(State1), + {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Actions} = next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State2, Actions0), + %% This will reset the retransmission timer by repeating the enter state event + {repeat_state, State, Actions}; certify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; cipher(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -451,10 +646,15 @@ cipher(state_timeout, Event, State) -> cipher(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), + #hello_request{} | #client_hello{}| term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; connection(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, @@ -492,136 +692,24 @@ connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%TODO does this make sense for DTLS ? +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- downgrade(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Description: This function is called by a gen_fsm when it receives any -%% other message than a synchronous or asynchronous event -%% (or a system message). +%% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +callback_mode() -> + [state_functions, state_enter]. -%% raw data from socket, unpack records -handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> - case next_dtls_record(Data, State0) of - {Record, State} -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} - end; -handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, - socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - close_tag = CloseTag, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), - %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a - %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform - %% with widespread implementation practice. - case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of - false -> - case Version of - {254, N} when N =< 253 -> - ok; - _ -> - %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, - %% we will conform to the widespread implementation - %% practice and go aginst the spec - %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) - ok - end, - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; - true -> - %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. - %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again - %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) - end; - -handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, - #state{protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret} = CookieInfo} = State) -> - erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), - {next_state, StateName, State#state{protocol_specific = - CookieInfo#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => Secret}}}; -handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). - -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). - -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); -%%% DTLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - fragment = Data}, - StateName, - #state{protocol_buffers = Buffers0, - negotiated_version = Version} = State0) -> - try - case dtls_handshake:get_dtls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffers0) of - {[], Buffers} -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - {Packets, Buffers} -> - State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers}, - Events = dtls_handshake_events(Packets), - {next_state, StateName, - State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} - end - catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) - end; -%%% DTLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; -%%% DTLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; -%%% DTLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - case decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of - Alerts = [_|_] -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); - #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - end; -%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. - -handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, - #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> - {State1, Actions} = send_handshake_flight(State0#state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}}, - retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions). - -send(Transport, {_, {{_,_}, _} = Socket}, Data) -> - send(Transport, Socket, Data); -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - dtls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Description:This function is called by a gen_fsm when it is about -%% to terminate. It should be the opposite of Module:init/1 and do any -%% necessary cleaning up. When it returns, the gen_fsm terminates with -%% Reason. The return value is ignored. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState} -%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _Extra) -> {ok, StateName, State}. @@ -631,55 +719,6 @@ format_status(Type, Data) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, - #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, - renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, - session_cache = Cache, - session_cache_cb = CacheCb, - negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, - key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, - ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> - - case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, - ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0); - {Version, {Type, Session}, - ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> - Protocol = case Protocol0 of - undefined -> CurrentProtocol; - _ -> Protocol0 - end, - - State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), - - ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State, ?MODULE) - end. - -encode_handshake_flight(Flight, Version, MaxFragmentSize, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> - Fragments = lists:map(fun(Handshake) -> - dtls_handshake:fragment_handshake(Handshake, MaxFragmentSize) - end, Flight), - dtls_record:encode_handshake(Fragments, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). - -encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> - dtls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). - -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - dtls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). - -encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> - dtls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). - -decode_alerts(Bin) -> - ssl_alert:decode(Bin). - initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, @@ -720,10 +759,12 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, _}, User, flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT} }. -next_dtls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ +next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ dtls_record_buffer = Buf0, dtls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> - case dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Data, Buf0) of + case dtls_record:get_dtls_records(Data, + acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), + Buf0) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = @@ -733,153 +774,15 @@ next_dtls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{ Alert end. -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CT | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - CurrentRead = dtls_record:get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnectionStates, read), - case dtls_record:replay_detect(CT, CurrentRead) of - false -> - decode_cipher_text(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) ; - true -> - %% Ignore replayed record - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}) - end; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}} = ConnectionStates} = State) - when Epoch > CurrentEpoch -> - %% TODO Buffer later Epoch message, drop it for now - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ _ | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - %% Drop old epoch message - next_record(State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates}); -next_record(#state{role = server, - socket = {Listener, {Client, _}}, - transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> - dtls_udp_listener:active_once(Listener, Client, self()), - {no_record, State}; -next_record(#state{role = client, - socket = {_Server, Socket}, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> - dtls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]), - {no_record, State}; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. - -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; - -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. - -next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). +acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> + [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS]; +acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = Version}) -> + [Version]. -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of - {no_record, State} -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = Version} = Record, State1} -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State1), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake - {#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = _Version}, State1} = _Record when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State1, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - {#ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, - version = _Version}, State1} -> - %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); - {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end; -next_event(connection = StateName, Record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case Record of - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = Version} = Record -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch} -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - %% From FLIGHT perspective CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC is treated as a handshake - #ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch, - type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = _Version} when Epoch == CurrentEpoch-1 -> - {State1, MoreActions} = send_handshake_flight(State0, CurrentEpoch), - {NextRecord, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, NextRecord, State, Actions ++ MoreActions); - _ -> - next_event(StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) - end; -next_event(StateName, Record, - #state{connection_states = #{current_read := #{epoch := CurrentEpoch}}} = State0, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = CurrentEpoch, - version = Version} = Record -> - State = dtls_version(StateName, Version, State0), - {next_state, StateName, State, - [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #ssl_tls{epoch = _Epoch, - version = _Version} = _Record -> - %% TODO maybe buffer later epoch - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions); - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. +dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> + lists:map(fun(Packet) -> + {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} + end, Packets). decode_cipher_text(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = [ CT | Rest]} = Buffers, connection_states = ConnStates0} = State) -> @@ -897,6 +800,178 @@ dtls_version(hello, Version, #state{role = server} = State) -> dtls_version(_,_, State) -> State. +handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, + renegotiation = {Renegotiation, _}, + session_cache = Cache, + session_cache_cb = CacheCb, + negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, + key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> + + case dtls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, + ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, State0); + {Version, {Type, Session}, + ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> + Protocol = case Protocol0 of + undefined -> CurrentProtocol; + _ -> Protocol0 + end, + + State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), + + ssl_connection:hello(internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State, ?MODULE) + end. + + +%% raw data from socket, unpack records +handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, + #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + case next_dtls_record(Data, StateName, State0) of + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) + end; +handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{dtls_cipher_texts = CTs}, + close_tag = CloseTag, + negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + %% Note that as of DTLS 1.2 (TLS 1.1), + %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a + %% session not be resumed. This is a change from DTLS 1.0 to conform + %% with widespread implementation practice. + case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of + false -> + case Version of + {254, N} when N =< 253 -> + ok; + _ -> + %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, + %% we will conform to the widespread implementation + %% practice and go aginst the spec + %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) + ok + end, + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); + true -> + %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. + %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again + %% and then receive the final message. + next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + end; + +handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, + #state{protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret} = CookieInfo} = State) -> + erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), + {next_state, StateName, State#state{protocol_specific = + CookieInfo#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => Secret}}}; +handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). + +handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, + #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> + {State1, Actions0} = send_handshake_flight(State0#state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}}, + retransmit_epoch(StateName, State0)), + {Record, State2} = next_record(State1), + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} = next_event(StateName, Record, State2, Actions0), + %% This will reset the retransmission timer by repeating the enter state event + {repeat_state, State, Actions}. + +handle_alerts([], Result) -> + Result; +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> + Stop; +handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); +handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). + +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = gen_udp, + role = Role, + ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> + case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of + {true, State} -> + log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), + {next_state, StateName, State}; + {false, State} -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + end; +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). + +encode_handshake_flight(Flight, Version, MaxFragmentSize, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> + Fragments = lists:map(fun(Handshake) -> + dtls_handshake:fragment_handshake(Handshake, MaxFragmentSize) + end, Flight), + dtls_record:encode_handshake(Fragments, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). + +encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> + dtls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates). + +decode_alerts(Bin) -> + ssl_alert:decode(Bin). + +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + +gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, + malformed_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end; + +gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. +unprocessed_events(Events) -> + %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately + %% as it is entered first in the event queue and + %% when it is processed there will be length(Events)-1 + %% handshake events left to process before we should + %% process more TLS-records received on the socket. + erlang:length(Events)-1. + +update_handshake_history(#hello_verify_request{}, _, Hist) -> + Hist; +update_handshake_history(_, Handshake, Hist) -> + %% DTLS never needs option "v2_hello_compatible" to be true + ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist, iolist_to_binary(Handshake), false). prepare_flight(#state{flight_buffer = Flight, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, protocol_buffers = @@ -937,67 +1012,67 @@ new_timeout(N) when N =< 30 -> new_timeout(_) -> 60. -dtls_handshake_events(Packets) -> - lists:map(fun(Packet) -> - {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} - end, Packets). +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := Flight, + change_cipher_spec := undefined}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + %% TODO remove hardcoded Max size + {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, Encoded), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> - %% Handle same way as if server requested - %% the renegotiation - %% Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State, - [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := []}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates0), + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), -renegotiate(#state{role = server} = State0, Actions) -> - HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), - State1 = prepare_flight(State0), - {State2, MoreActions} = send_handshake(HelloRequest, State1), - {Record, State} = next_record(State2), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions ++ MoreActions). + send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; -handle_alerts([], Result) -> - Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> - Stop; -handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); -handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [_|_] = Flight0, + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {HsBefore, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight0), Version, 1400, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates2} = + encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates1), + {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates2), + send(Transport, Socket, [HsBefore, EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}; + +send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + flight_buffer = #{handshakes := [], + change_cipher_spec := ChangeCipher, + handshakes_after_change_cipher_spec := Flight1}, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Epoch) -> + {EncChangeCipher, ConnectionStates1} = + encode_change_cipher(ChangeCipher, Version, Epoch-1, ConnectionStates0), + {HsAfter, ConnectionStates} = + encode_handshake_flight(lists:reverse(Flight1), Version, 1400, Epoch, ConnectionStates1), + send(Transport, Socket, [EncChangeCipher, HsAfter]), + {State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, []}. retransmit_epoch(_StateName, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> #{epoch := Epoch} = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, write), Epoch. -update_handshake_history(#hello_verify_request{}, _, Hist) -> - Hist; -update_handshake_history(_, Handshake, Hist) -> - %% DTLS never needs option "v2_hello_compatible" to be true - ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist, iolist_to_binary(Handshake), false). - -unprocessed_events(Events) -> - %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately - %% as it is entered first in the event queue and - %% when it is processed there will be length(Events)-1 - %% handshake events left to process before we should - %% process more TLS-records received on the socket. - erlang:length(Events)-1. - -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{transport_cb = gen_udp, - role = Role, - ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> - case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of - {true, State} -> - log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), - {next_state, StateName, State}; - {false, State} -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - end; -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). - - ignore_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL}, #state{protocol_specific = #{ignored_alerts := N, max_ignored_alerts := N}} = State) -> {false, State}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 37a46b862e..6071eece13 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ %% limitations under the License. %% %% %CopyrightEnd% + +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the DTLS (specific parts of) +%%% SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake protocol +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- -module(dtls_handshake). -include("dtls_connection.hrl"). @@ -24,15 +29,21 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +%% Handshake handling -export([client_hello/8, client_hello/9, cookie/4, hello/4, - hello_verify_request/2, get_dtls_handshake/3, fragment_handshake/2, - handshake_bin/2, encode_handshake/3]). + hello_verify_request/2]). + +%% Handshake encoding +-export([fragment_handshake/2, encode_handshake/3]). + +%% Handshake decodeing +-export([get_dtls_handshake/3]). -type dtls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | #hello_verify_request{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake(). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), @@ -56,7 +67,8 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, - ciphers = UserSuites + ciphers = UserSuites, + fallback = Fallback } = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> Version = dtls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), @@ -66,12 +78,15 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates, CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, TLSVersion), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(TLSVersion, CipherSuites, - SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + SslOpts, ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, client_version = Version, - cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(CipherSuites, Renegotiation), + cipher_suites = + ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(CipherSuites, + Renegotiation, Fallback), compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(), random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random, cookie = Cookie, @@ -87,11 +102,11 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of true -> handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; - hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) -> @@ -107,7 +122,7 @@ cookie(Key, Address, Port, #client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor)>>, Random, SessionId, CipherSuites, CompressionMethods], crypto:hmac(sha, Key, CookieData). - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_verify_request(binary(), dtls_record:dtls_version()) -> #hello_verify_request{}. %% %% Description: Creates a hello verify request message sent by server to @@ -117,11 +132,8 @@ hello_verify_request(Cookie, Version) -> #hello_verify_request{protocol_version = Version, cookie = Cookie}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> - {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Handshake, Version), - Len = byte_size(Bin), - [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(Seq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin]. +%%% Handshake encoding +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- fragment_handshake(Bin, _) when is_binary(Bin)-> %% This is the change_cipher_spec not a "real handshake" but part of the flight @@ -129,10 +141,15 @@ fragment_handshake(Bin, _) when is_binary(Bin)-> fragment_handshake([MsgType, Len, Seq, _, Len, Bin], Size) -> Bins = bin_fragments(Bin, Size), handshake_fragments(MsgType, Seq, Len, Bins, []). +encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, Seq) -> + {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Handshake, Version), + Len = byte_size(Bin), + [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), ?uint16(Seq), ?uint24(0), ?uint24(Len), Bin]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake decodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handshake_bin([Type, Length, Data], Seq) -> - handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, Data). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec get_dtls_handshake(dtls_record:dtls_version(), binary(), #protocol_buffers{}) -> {[dtls_handshake()], #protocol_buffers{}}. @@ -147,16 +164,19 @@ get_dtls_handshake(Version, Fragment, ProtocolBuffers) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = Compressions, - random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt}, +handle_client_hello(Version, + #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = Compressions, + random = Random, + extensions = + #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, + signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} + = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns} = SslOpts, - {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) -> + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, + Renegotiation) -> case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), @@ -164,14 +184,15 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert,TLSVersion), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, ssl_handshake:supported_ecc(TLSVersion)), {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1} - = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, + = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, + AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, TLSVersion, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), case CipherSuite of no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> @@ -190,7 +211,8 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) -> try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(dtls_record, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), - SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of + SslOpts, Session0, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> @@ -212,7 +234,7 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, end. -%%%%%%% Encodeing %%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, cookie = Cookie}, _Version) -> @@ -220,7 +242,6 @@ enc_handshake(#hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, {?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, @@ -243,19 +264,29 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, ?BYTE(CookieLength), Cookie/binary, ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(#server_hello{} = HandshakeMsg, Version) -> {Type, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>} = ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version), {DTLSMajor, DTLSMinor} = dtls_v1:corresponding_dtls_version({Major, Minor}), {Type, <<?BYTE(DTLSMajor), ?BYTE(DTLSMinor), Rest/binary>>}; - enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)). +handshake_bin(#handshake_fragment{ + type = Type, + length = Len, + message_seq = Seq, + fragment_length = Len, + fragment_offset = 0, + fragment = Fragment}) -> + handshake_bin(Type, Len, Seq, Fragment). +handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, FragmentData) -> + <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), + ?UINT16(Seq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), + FragmentData:Length/binary>>. + bin_fragments(Bin, Size) -> bin_fragments(Bin, size(Bin), Size, 0, []). - bin_fragments(Bin, BinSize, FragSize, Offset, Fragments) -> case (BinSize - Offset - FragSize) > 0 of true -> @@ -279,7 +310,7 @@ address_to_bin({A,B,C,D}, Port) -> address_to_bin({A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H}, Port) -> <<A:16,B:16,C:16,D:16,E:16,F:16,G:16,H:16,Port:16>>. -%%%%%%% Decodeing %%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- handle_fragments(Version, FragmentData, Buffers0, Acc) -> Fragments = decode_handshake_fragments(FragmentData), @@ -322,7 +353,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), compression_methods = Comp_methods, extensions = DecodedExtensions }; - decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), @@ -330,7 +360,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), Cookie:CookieLength/binary>>) -> #hello_verify_request{protocol_version = {Major, Minor}, cookie = Cookie}; - decode_handshake(Version, Tag, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), Msg/binary>>) -> %% DTLS specifics stripped @@ -370,9 +399,10 @@ reassemble(Version, #handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Fragment, end; reassemble(_, #handshake_fragment{message_seq = FragSeq} = Fragment, #protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_next_seq = Seq, - dtls_handshake_later_fragments = LaterFragments} = Buffers0) when FragSeq > Seq-> - {more_data, - Buffers0#protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [Fragment | LaterFragments]}}; + dtls_handshake_later_fragments = LaterFragments} + = Buffers0) when FragSeq > Seq-> + {more_data, + Buffers0#protocol_buffers{dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [Fragment | LaterFragments]}}; reassemble(_, _, Buffers) -> %% Disregard fragments FragSeq < Seq {more_data, Buffers}. @@ -396,26 +426,6 @@ merge_fragment(Frag0, [Frag1 | Rest]) -> Frag -> merge_fragment(Frag, Rest) end. - -is_complete_handshake(#handshake_fragment{length = Length, fragment_length = Length}) -> - true; -is_complete_handshake(_) -> - false. - -next_fragments(LaterFragments) -> - case lists:keysort(#handshake_fragment.message_seq, LaterFragments) of - [] -> - {[], []}; - [#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} | _] = Fragments -> - split_frags(Fragments, Seq, []) - end. - -split_frags([#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Frag | Rest], Seq, Acc) -> - split_frags(Rest, Seq, [Frag | Acc]); -split_frags(Frags, _, Acc) -> - {lists:reverse(Acc), Frags}. - - %% Duplicate merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ fragment_offset = PreviousOffSet, @@ -486,17 +496,26 @@ merge_fragments(#handshake_fragment{ %% No merge there is a gap merge_fragments(Previous, Current) -> [Previous, Current]. - -handshake_bin(#handshake_fragment{ - type = Type, - length = Len, - message_seq = Seq, - fragment_length = Len, - fragment_offset = 0, - fragment = Fragment}) -> - handshake_bin(Type, Len, Seq, Fragment). -handshake_bin(Type, Length, Seq, FragmentData) -> - <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), - ?UINT16(Seq), ?UINT24(0), ?UINT24(Length), - FragmentData:Length/binary>>. +next_fragments(LaterFragments) -> + case lists:keysort(#handshake_fragment.message_seq, LaterFragments) of + [] -> + {[], []}; + [#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} | _] = Fragments -> + split_frags(Fragments, Seq, []) + end. + +split_frags([#handshake_fragment{message_seq = Seq} = Frag | Rest], Seq, Acc) -> + split_frags(Rest, Seq, [Frag | Acc]); +split_frags(Frags, _, Acc) -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), Frags}. + +is_complete_handshake(#handshake_fragment{length = Length, fragment_length = Length}) -> + true; +is_complete_handshake(_) -> + false. + + + + + diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl index a8520717e5..316de05532 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl @@ -30,15 +30,17 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_dtls_records/2, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). +-export([get_dtls_records/3, init_connection_states/2, empty_connection_state/1]). -%% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/2]). +-export([save_current_connection_state/2, next_epoch/2, get_connection_state_by_epoch/3, replay_detect/2, + init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2]). %% Encoding -export([encode_handshake/4, encode_alert_record/3, - encode_change_cipher_spec/3, encode_data/3]). --export([encode_plain_text/5]). + encode_change_cipher_spec/3, encode_data/3, encode_plain_text/5]). + +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/2]). %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, @@ -46,9 +48,6 @@ is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). --export([save_current_connection_state/2, next_epoch/2, get_connection_state_by_epoch/3, replay_detect/2]). - --export([init_connection_state_seq/2, current_connection_state_epoch/2]). -export_type([dtls_version/0, dtls_atom_version/0]). @@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ -compile(inline). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handling of incoming data %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled) -> @@ -86,7 +85,6 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> empty_connection_state(Empty) -> Empty#{epoch => undefined, replay_window => init_replay_window(?REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE)}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec save_current_connection_state(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> ssl_record:connection_states(). @@ -137,67 +135,58 @@ set_connection_state_by_epoch(ReadState, Epoch, #{saved_read := #{epoch := Epoch States#{saved_read := ReadState}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_dtls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + ssl_record:connection_state(). +%% +%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number +%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init_connection_state_seq({254, _}, + #{current_read := #{epoch := 0, sequence_number := Seq}, + current_write := #{epoch := 0} = Write} = ConnnectionStates0) -> + ConnnectionStates0#{current_write => Write#{sequence_number => Seq}}; +init_connection_state_seq(_, ConnnectionStates) -> + ConnnectionStates. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------- +-spec current_connection_state_epoch(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> + integer(). +%% +%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record +%% that is currently defined as the current connection state. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}}, + read) -> + Epoch; +current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, + write) -> + Epoch. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec get_dtls_records(binary(), [dtls_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from UDP/SCTP, packs up a records %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_dtls_records(Data, <<>>) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Data, []); -get_dtls_records(Data, Buffer) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []). - -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); -get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), - ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> - get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); - -get_dtls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, - _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); - -get_dtls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc) - when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); - -get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> - case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of - true -> - {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) +get_dtls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> + BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), + case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of + N when N >= 3 -> + case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of + true -> + get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, []); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + _ -> + get_dtls_records_aux(BinData, []) end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding DTLS records +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(iolist(), dtls_version(), integer(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. @@ -245,11 +234,19 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Epoch, Data, ConnectionStates) -> {CipherText, Write} = encode_dtls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment, Write1), {CipherText, set_connection_state_by_epoch(Write, Epoch, ConnectionStates, write)}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{epoch = Epoch} = CipherText, ConnnectionStates0) -> ReadState = get_connection_state_by_epoch(Epoch, ConnnectionStates0, read), decode_cipher_text(CipherText, ReadState, ConnnectionStates0). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Protocol version handling +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec protocol_version(dtls_atom_version() | dtls_version()) -> dtls_version() | dtls_atom_version(). @@ -381,35 +378,6 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) -> lists:member(Version, Versions). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec init_connection_state_seq(dtls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> - ssl_record:connection_state(). -%% -%% Description: Copy the read sequence number to the write sequence number -%% This is only valid for DTLS in the first client_hello -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -init_connection_state_seq({254, _}, - #{current_read := #{epoch := 0, sequence_number := Seq}, - current_write := #{epoch := 0} = Write} = ConnnectionStates0) -> - ConnnectionStates0#{current_write => Write#{sequence_number => Seq}}; -init_connection_state_seq(_, ConnnectionStates) -> - ConnnectionStates. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------- --spec current_connection_state_epoch(ssl_record:connection_states(), read | write) -> - integer(). -%% -%% Description: Returns the epoch the connection_state record -%% that is currently defined as the current connection state. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_read := #{epoch := Epoch}}, - read) -> - Epoch; -current_connection_state_epoch(#{current_write := #{epoch := Epoch}}, - write) -> - Epoch. - -spec hello_version(dtls_version(), [dtls_version()]) -> dtls_version(). hello_version(Version, Versions) -> case dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version) of @@ -437,16 +405,92 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> client_verify_data => undefined, server_verify_data => undefined }. +assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) -> + is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions). -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), + Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) when MajVer >= 128 -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, + Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SequenceNumber), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Acc) -> + get_dtls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = SequenceNumber, + fragment = Data} | Acc]); -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +get_dtls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, + _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); + +get_dtls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> + case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of + true -> + {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) + end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +init_replay_window(Size) -> + #{size => Size, + top => Size, + bottom => 0, + mask => 0 bsl 64 + }. + +replay_detect(#ssl_tls{sequence_number = SequenceNumber}, #{replay_window := Window}) -> + is_replay(SequenceNumber, Window). + + +is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{bottom := Bottom}) when SequenceNumber < Bottom -> + true; +is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{size := Size, + top := Top, + bottom := Bottom, + mask := Mask}) when (SequenceNumber >= Bottom) andalso (SequenceNumber =< Top) -> + Index = (SequenceNumber rem Size), + (Index band Mask) == 1; + +is_replay(_, _) -> + false. + +update_replay_window(SequenceNumber, #{replay_window := #{size := Size, + top := Top, + bottom := Bottom, + mask := Mask0} = Window0} = ConnectionStates) -> + NoNewBits = SequenceNumber - Top, + Index = SequenceNumber rem Size, + Mask = (Mask0 bsl NoNewBits) bor Index, + Window = Window0#{top => SequenceNumber, + bottom => Bottom + NoNewBits, + mask => Mask}, + ConnectionStates#{replay_window := Window}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_dtls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, #{epoch := Epoch, sequence_number := Seq} = WriteState) -> @@ -490,6 +534,7 @@ encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Fragment, #{compression_state := CompS0, ssl_cipher:cipher(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, MAC, Fragment, TLSVersion), {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, epoch = Epoch, sequence_number = Seq, @@ -541,6 +586,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, #{mac_secret := MacSecret, security_parameters := #security_parameters{mac_algorithm = MacAlg}}, @@ -549,16 +595,6 @@ calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, #{mac_secret := MacSecret, mac_hash(Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment). -highest_protocol_version() -> - highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -lowest_protocol_version() -> - lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> - CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), - proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). - mac_hash({Major, Minor}, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) -> Value = [<<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, @@ -568,37 +604,25 @@ mac_hash({Major, Minor}, MacAlg, MacSecret, Epoch, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Epoch, SeqNo) -> <<?UINT16(Epoch), ?UINT48(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. -init_replay_window(Size) -> - #{size => Size, - top => Size, - bottom => 0, - mask => 0 bsl 64 - }. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -replay_detect(#ssl_tls{sequence_number = SequenceNumber}, #{replay_window := Window}) -> - is_replay(SequenceNumber, Window). +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). -is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{bottom := Bottom}) when SequenceNumber < Bottom -> - true; -is_replay(SequenceNumber, #{size := Size, - top := Top, - bottom := Bottom, - mask := Mask}) when (SequenceNumber >= Bottom) andalso (SequenceNumber =< Top) -> - Index = (SequenceNumber rem Size), - (Index band Mask) == 1; +highest_protocol_version() -> + highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). -is_replay(_, _) -> - false. +lowest_protocol_version() -> + lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +sufficient_dtlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> + CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), + proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). -update_replay_window(SequenceNumber, #{replay_window := #{size := Size, - top := Top, - bottom := Bottom, - mask := Mask0} = Window0} = ConnectionStates) -> - NoNewBits = SequenceNumber - Top, - Index = SequenceNumber rem Size, - Mask = (Mask0 bsl NoNewBits) bor Index, - Window = Window0#{top => SequenceNumber, - bottom => Bottom + NoNewBits, - mask => Mask}, - ConnectionStates#{replay_window := Window}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl index c9e04767aa..0608c6bd2b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ init([Port, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSOptions]) -> listener = Socket, close = false}} catch _:_ -> - {error, closed} + {stop, {shutdown, {error, closed}}} end. handle_call({accept, _}, _, #state{close = true} = State) -> {reply, {error, closed}, State}; @@ -153,15 +153,18 @@ handle_info({udp_error, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket} = State) -> handle_info({'DOWN', _, process, Pid, _}, #state{clients = Clients, dtls_processes = Processes0, + dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues0, close = ListenClosed} = State) -> Client = kv_get(Pid, Processes0), Processes = kv_delete(Pid, Processes0), + MsgQueues = kv_delete(Client, MsgQueues0), case ListenClosed andalso kv_empty(Processes) of true -> {stop, normal, State}; false -> {noreply, State#state{clients = set_delete(Client, Clients), - dtls_processes = Processes}} + dtls_processes = Processes, + dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues}} end. terminate(_Reason, _State) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl index 51ee8ec047..0f6344b6f7 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_v1.erl @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). --export([suites/1, all_suites/1, hmac_hash/3, ecc_curves/1, +-export([suites/1, all_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1,hmac_hash/3, ecc_curves/1, corresponding_tls_version/1, corresponding_dtls_version/1, cookie_secret/0, cookie_timeout/0]). @@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ all_suites(Version) -> end, ssl_cipher:all_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). +anonymous_suites(Version) -> + lists:filter(fun(Cipher) -> + is_acceptable_cipher(ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Cipher)) + end, + ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(corresponding_tls_version(Version))). + hmac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, Value) -> tls_v1:hmac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, Value). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index 96782dcfc0..8e605bec65 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -324,12 +324,13 @@ do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> timer = Timer, this_flags = 0, allowed = Allowed}, + link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_other_started(trace(HSData)); {false,IP} -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), - ?shutdown(trace(no_node)) + ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) end end. @@ -357,7 +358,11 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of {port, TcpPort, Version} -> - Opts = trace(connect_options(get_ssl_options(client))), + Opts = + trace( + connect_options( + [{server_name_indication, atom_to_list(Node)} + |get_ssl_options(client)])), dist_util:reset_timer(Timer), case ssl:connect( Address, TcpPort, @@ -378,21 +383,26 @@ do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> this_flags = 0, other_version = Version, request_type = Type}, + link(DistCtrl), dist_util:handshake_we_started(trace(HSData)); Other -> %% Other Node may have closed since %% port_please ! ?shutdown2( Node, - trace({shutdown, {connect_failed, Other}})) + trace( + {ssl_connect_failed, Ip, TcpPort, Other})) end; Other -> ?shutdown2( Node, - trace({shutdown, {port_please_failed, Other}})) + trace( + {port_please_failed, ErlEpmd, Name, Ip, Other})) end; Other -> - ?shutdown2(Node, trace({shutdown, {getaddr_failed, Other}})) + ?shutdown2( + Node, + trace({getaddr_failed, Driver, Address, Other})) end. close(Socket) -> @@ -411,8 +421,9 @@ check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) -> case get_ifs(SslSocket) of {ok, IFs, IP} -> check_ip(Driver, IFs, IP); - _ -> - ?shutdown(no_node) + Other -> + ?shutdown2( + no_node, trace({check_ip_failed, SslSocket, Other})) end; _ -> true @@ -441,23 +452,22 @@ get_ifs(#sslsocket{fd = {gen_tcp, Socket, _}}) -> %% If Node is illegal terminate the connection setup!! splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [Name|Tail] when Tail =/= [] -> - Host = lists:append(Tail), + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Host =/= [] -> check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames); [_] -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node); + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> error_logger:error_msg( "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node) + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(Host, $., []) of + case string:split(Host, ".") of [_] when LongOrShortNames == longnames -> case Driver:parse_address(Host) of {ok, _} -> @@ -468,35 +478,28 @@ check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node) + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; - [_, _ | _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> + [_, _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> error_logger:error_msg( "** System NOT running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node); + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_shortnames, Host})); _ -> [Name, Host] end. split_node(Node) when is_atom(Node) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [_, Host] -> + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Name =/= [], Host =/= [] -> Host; _ -> false end; split_node(_) -> false. -%% -split_node([Chr|T], Chr, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)|split_node(T, Chr, [])]; -split_node([H|T], Chr, Ack) -> - split_node(T, Chr, [H|Ack]); -split_node([], _, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)]. %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -524,6 +527,17 @@ nodelay() -> get_ssl_options(Type) -> + try ets:lookup(ssl_dist_opts, Type) of + [{Type, Opts}] -> + [{erl_dist, true} | Opts]; + _ -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + catch + error:badarg -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + end. + +get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) -> case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_opt) of {ok, Args} -> [{erl_dist, true} | ssl_options(Type, lists:append(Args))]; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src index c5b55641a1..3962d1fc2c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src @@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ {applications, [crypto, public_key, kernel, stdlib]}, {env, []}, {mod, {ssl_app, []}}, - {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.2","public_key-1.5","kernel-6.0", - "erts-10.0","crypto-3.3", "inets-5.10.7"]}]}. + {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.5","public_key-1.5","kernel-6.0", + "erts-10.0","crypto-4.2", "inets-5.10.7"]}]}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 60118549e4..82f62b51b9 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ ]). %% SSL/TLS protocol handling --export([cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, eccs/0, eccs/1, versions/0, +-export([cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, cipher_suites/2, filter_cipher_suites/2, + prepend_cipher_suites/2, append_cipher_suites/2, + eccs/0, eccs/1, versions/0, format_error/1, renegotiate/1, prf/5, negotiated_protocol/1, connection_information/1, connection_information/2]). %% Misc @@ -374,25 +376,98 @@ negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> ssl_connection:negotiated_protocol(Pid). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites() -> cipher_suites(erlang). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> + [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite() | string()]. %% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites(erlang) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(openssl) -> - [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(default)]; + [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite_name(Suite) || + Suite <- available_suites(default)]; cipher_suites(all) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- available_suites(all)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec cipher_suites(default | all | anonymous, tls_record:tls_version() | dtls_record:dtls_version() | + tls_record:tls_atom_version() | dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()) -> + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +%% Description: Returns all default and all supported cipher suites for a +%% TLS/DTLS version +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; + Version == 'tlsv1.1'; + Version == tlsv1; + Version == sslv3 -> + cipher_suites(Base, tls_record:protocol_version(Version)); +cipher_suites(Base, Version) when Version == 'dtlsv1.2'; + Version == 'dtlsv1'-> + cipher_suites(Base, dtls_record:protocol_version(Version)); +cipher_suites(Base, Version) -> + [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()], + [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}] | []) -> + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +%% Description: Removes cipher suites if any of the filter functions returns false +%% for any part of the cipher suite. This function also calls default filter functions +%% to make sure the cipher suite are supported by crypto. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters0) -> + #{key_exchange_filters := KexF, + cipher_filters := CipherF, + mac_filters := MacF, + prf_filters := PrfF} + = ssl_cipher:crypto_support_filters(), + Filters = #{key_exchange_filters => add_filter(proplists:get_value(key_exchange, Filters0), KexF), + cipher_filters => add_filter(proplists:get_value(cipher, Filters0), CipherF), + mac_filters => add_filter(proplists:get_value(mac, Filters0), MacF), + prf_filters => add_filter(proplists:get_value(prf, Filters0), PrfF)}, + ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites, Filters). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec prepend_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | + [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}], + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]) -> + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +%% Description: Make <Preferred> suites become the most prefered +%% suites that is put them at the head of the cipher suite list +%% and remove them from <Suites> if present. <Preferred> may be a +%% list of cipher suits or a list of filters in which case the +%% filters are use on Suites to extract the the preferred +%% cipher list. +%% -------------------------------------------------------------------- +prepend_cipher_suites([First | _] = Preferred, Suites0) when is_map(First) -> + Suites = Preferred ++ (Suites0 -- Preferred), + Suites; +prepend_cipher_suites(Filters, Suites) -> + Preferred = filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters), + Preferred ++ (Suites -- Preferred). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec append_cipher_suites(Deferred :: [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | + [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}], + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]) -> + [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()]. +%% Description: Make <Deferred> suites suites become the +%% least prefered suites that is put them at the end of the cipher suite list +%% and removed them from <Suites> if present. +%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +append_cipher_suites([First | _] = Deferred, Suites0) when is_map(First)-> + Suites = (Suites0 -- Deferred) ++ Deferred, + Suites; +append_cipher_suites(Filters, Suites) -> + Deferred = filter_cipher_suites(Suites, Filters), + (Suites -- Deferred) ++ Deferred. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec eccs() -> tls_v1:curves(). %% Description: returns all supported curves across all versions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -411,6 +486,11 @@ eccs({3,0}) -> eccs({3,_}) -> Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(all), eccs_filter_supported(Curves); +eccs({_,_} = DTLSVersion) -> + eccs(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(DTLSVersion)); +eccs(DTLSAtomVersion) when DTLSAtomVersion == 'dtlsv1'; + DTLSAtomVersion == 'dtlsv2' -> + eccs(dtls_record:protocol_version(DTLSAtomVersion)); eccs(AtomVersion) when is_atom(AtomVersion) -> eccs(tls_record:protocol_version(AtomVersion)). @@ -543,16 +623,23 @@ sockname(#sslsocket{pid = Pid, fd = {Transport, Socket, _, _}}) when is_pid(Pid) %%--------------------------------------------------------------- -spec versions() -> [{ssl_app, string()} | {supported, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]} | - {available, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]}]. + {supported_dtls, [dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()]} | + {available, [tls_record:tls_atom_version()]} | + {available_dtls, [dtls_record:dtls_atom_version()]}]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of relevant versions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- versions() -> - Vsns = tls_record:supported_protocol_versions(), - SupportedVsns = [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns], - AvailableVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, - %% TODO Add DTLS versions when supported - [{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedVsns}, {available, AvailableVsns}]. + TLSVsns = tls_record:supported_protocol_versions(), + DTLSVsns = dtls_record:supported_protocol_versions(), + SupportedTLSVsns = [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- TLSVsns], + SupportedDTLSVsns = [dtls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- DTLSVsns], + AvailableTLSVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, + AvailableDTLSVsns = ?ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS, + [{ssl_app, ?VSN}, {supported, SupportedTLSVsns}, + {supported_dtls, SupportedDTLSVsns}, + {available, AvailableTLSVsns}, + {available_dtls, AvailableDTLSVsns}]. %%--------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -632,16 +719,21 @@ tls_version({254, _} = Version) -> %%%-------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - %% Possible filters out suites not supported by crypto available_suites(default) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]), ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(Version)); - available_suites(all) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]), ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version)). +supported_suites(default, Version) -> + ssl_cipher:suites(Version); +supported_suites(all, Version) -> + ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version); +supported_suites(anonymous, Version) -> + ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version). + do_listen(Port, #config{transport_info = {Transport, _, _, _}} = Config, tls_connection) -> tls_socket:listen(Transport, Port, Config); @@ -751,7 +843,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> %% Server side option reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun), reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true), - secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, false), + secure_renegotiate = handle_option(secure_renegotiate, Opts, true), client_renegotiation = handle_option(client_renegotiation, Opts, default_option_role(server, true, Role), server, Role), @@ -896,7 +988,8 @@ validate_option(key, {KeyType, Value}) when is_binary(Value), KeyType == 'ECPrivateKey'; KeyType == 'PrivateKeyInfo' -> {KeyType, Value}; - +validate_option(key, #{algorithm := _} = Value) -> + Value; validate_option(keyfile, undefined) -> <<>>; validate_option(keyfile, Value) when is_binary(Value) -> @@ -991,17 +1084,21 @@ validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) -> Value; validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) -> undefined; -validate_option(server_name_indication = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) -> +validate_option(server_name_indication, Value) when is_list(Value) -> %% RFC 6066, Section 3: Currently, the only server names supported are %% DNS hostnames - case inet_parse:domain(Value) of - false -> - throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); - true -> - Value - end; -validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined = Value) -> + %% case inet_parse:domain(Value) of + %% false -> + %% throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); + %% true -> + %% Value + %% end; + %% + %% But the definition seems very diffuse, so let all strings through + %% and leave it up to public_key to decide... Value; +validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined) -> + undefined; validate_option(server_name_indication, disable) -> disable; @@ -1146,18 +1243,21 @@ handle_cipher_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> %% Defaults to all supported suites that does %% not require explicit configuration - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(tls_version(Version))); -binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> + default_binary_suites(Version); +binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Map|_] = Ciphers0) when is_map(Map) -> Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); - +binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], + binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) -> - All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(tls_version(Version)), + All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version) ++ + ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version), case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, All)] of [] -> %% Defaults to all supported suites that does %% not require explicit configuration - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(tls_version(Version))); + default_binary_suites(Version); Ciphers -> Ciphers end; @@ -1170,6 +1270,30 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) -> Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers). +default_binary_suites(Version) -> + ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(Version)). + +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => default_prf}; +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac, Prf}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => tuple_to_map_mac(Cipher, Mac), + prf => Prf}. + +%% Backwards compatible +tuple_to_map_mac(aes_128_gcm, _) -> + aead; +tuple_to_map_mac(aes_256_gcm, _) -> + aead; +tuple_to_map_mac(chacha20_poly1305, _) -> + aead; +tuple_to_map_mac(_, MAC) -> + MAC. + handle_eccs_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> {_Major, Minor} = tls_version(Version), try tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor, Value) of @@ -1448,3 +1572,8 @@ reject_alpn_next_prot_options([Opt| AlpnNextOpts], Opts) -> false -> reject_alpn_next_prot_options(AlpnNextOpts, Opts) end. + +add_filter(undefined, Filters) -> + Filters; +add_filter(Filter, Filters) -> + [Filter | Filters]. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl index 95ab955ad0..fc7b1e6d1c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl @@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ decode(Bin) -> decode(Bin, [], 0). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}. +-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> + closed | {tls_alert, unicode:chardata()}. +%-spec reason_code(#alert{}, client | server) -> closed | {essl, string()}. %% %% Description: Returns the error reason that will be returned to the %% user. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index b6cd22dd13..6e436aa7c0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -36,28 +36,31 @@ -export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, suite_definition/1, erl_suite_definition/1, cipher_init/3, decipher/6, cipher/5, decipher_aead/6, cipher_aead/6, - suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, - ec_keyed_suites/0, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, srp_suites/0, - rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, filter/2, filter_suites/1, + suite/1, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, + ec_keyed_suites/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1, + srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0, + rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1, openssl_suite/1, openssl_suite_name/1, + filter/2, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2, hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). -export_type([cipher_suite/0, - erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, + erl_cipher_suite/0, old_erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]). --type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' - | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. +-type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. -type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. -type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | - psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. --type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 - %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf - | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. - - +-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. +-type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := key_algo(), + cipher := cipher(), + mac := hash() | aead, + prf := hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent + }. +-type old_erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. -type cipher_suite() :: binary(). -type cipher_enum() :: integer(). -type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). @@ -83,7 +86,8 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> %% cipher values has been updated according to <CipherSuite> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> - { _, Cipher, Hash, PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, + prf := PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), SecParams#security_parameters{ cipher_suite = CipherSuite, bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), @@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> expanded_key_material_length = expanded_key_material(Cipher), key_material_length = key_material(Cipher), iv_size = iv_size(Cipher), - mac_algorithm = hash_algorithm(Hash), + mac_algorithm = mac_algorithm(Hash), prf_algorithm = prf_algorithm(PrfHashAlg, Version), hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}. @@ -235,7 +239,7 @@ decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decipher_aead(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, integer(), binary(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}. + {binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Decrypts the data and checks the associated data (AAD) MAC using %% cipher described by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state. @@ -318,13 +322,28 @@ suites({_, Minor}) -> all_suites({3, _} = Version) -> suites(Version) - ++ anonymous_suites(Version) + ++ chacha_suites(Version) ++ psk_suites(Version) ++ srp_suites() ++ rc4_suites(Version) - ++ des_suites(Version); + ++ des_suites(Version) + ++ rsa_suites(Version); + all_suites(Version) -> dtls_v1:all_suites(Version). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec chacha_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Returns list of the chacha cipher suites, only supported +%% if explicitly set by user for now due to interop problems, proably need +%% to be fixed in crypto. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +chacha_suites({3, _}) -> + [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256]; +chacha_suites(_) -> + []. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. @@ -332,14 +351,13 @@ all_suites(Version) -> %% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported %% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - anonymous_suites({3, N}) -> - anonymous_suites(N); + srp_suites_anon() ++ anonymous_suites(N); anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) -> - anonymous_suites(dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version)) - -- [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; + dtls_v1:anonymous_suites(Version); anonymous_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> + psk_suites_anon(N) ++ [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, @@ -348,20 +366,20 @@ anonymous_suites(N) ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; - -anonymous_suites(2) -> +anonymous_suites(2 = N) -> + psk_suites_anon(N) ++ [?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; - anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; N == 1 -> - [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - ]. + psk_suites_anon(N) ++ + [?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + ]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. @@ -371,46 +389,55 @@ anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- psk_suites({3, N}) -> psk_suites(N); - psk_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> [ - ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + ] ++ psk_suites(0); +psk_suites(_) -> + [?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec psk_suites_anon(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous PSK cipher suites, only supported +%% if explicitly set by user. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +psk_suites_anon({3, N}) -> + psk_suites_anon(N); +psk_suites_anon(N) + when N >= 3 -> + [ + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - ] ++ psk_suites(0); - -psk_suites(_) -> - [?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ] ++ psk_suites_anon(0); +psk_suites_anon(_) -> + [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec srp_suites() -> [cipher_suite()]. %% @@ -418,17 +445,26 @@ psk_suites(_) -> %% if explicitly set by user. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- srp_suites() -> - [?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + [?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec srp_suites_anon() -> [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Returns a list of the SRP anonymous cipher suites, only supported +%% if explicitly set by user. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +srp_suites_anon() -> + [?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Returns a list of the RSA|(ECDH/RSA)| (ECDH/ECDSA) %% with RC4 cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user. @@ -436,13 +472,15 @@ srp_suites() -> %% belonged to the user configured only category. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- rc4_suites({3, 0}) -> + rc4_suites(0); +rc4_suites({3, Minor}) -> + rc4_suites(Minor) ++ rc4_suites(0); +rc4_suites(0) -> [?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; -rc4_suites({3, N}) when N =< 3 -> +rc4_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -454,9 +492,39 @@ rc4_suites({3, N}) when N =< 3 -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- des_suites(_)-> [?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA]. + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + ]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec rsa_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Returns a list of the RSA key exchange +%% cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user. +%% Are not considered secure any more. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +rsa_suites({3, 0}) -> + rsa_suites(0); +rsa_suites({3, Minor}) -> + rsa_suites(Minor) ++ rsa_suites(0); +rsa_suites(0) -> + [?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + ]; +rsa_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> + [ + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + ]. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. @@ -465,353 +533,740 @@ des_suites(_)-> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- %% TLS v1.1 suites suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> - {null, null, null, null}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; %% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension %% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore %% hello extension data as they should. suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> - {null, null, null, null}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5) -> -%% {rsa, null, md5, default_prf}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% TLS v1.2 suites - %% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> %% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %% not defined YET: %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 - %%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available %%% by default, but good for testing purposes. suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {dh_anon, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {psk, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 - suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 - suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> -%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256}; +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf =>sha256}; %% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> -%% {ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256}; - +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf => sha256}; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}. + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). +-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value %% for now (compatibility reasons). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -erl_suite_definition(S) -> - case suite_definition(S) of - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, default_prf} -> +erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> + erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); +erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> + case Prf of + default_prf -> {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; - Suite -> - Suite + _ -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -819,327 +1274,607 @@ erl_suite_definition(S) -> %% %% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - %% TLS v1.1 suites -%%suite({rsa, null, md5}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5; -%%suite({rsa, null, sha}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({dh_anon, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; - %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %% TLS v1.2 suites - -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, sha256}; -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; - %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - -suite({psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 - -suite({psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; - %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - -suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - -suite({psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; - %%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 - -suite({ecdhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; - %%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 - -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_128_ccm, null, sha256}) -> -%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; -%% suite({ecdhe_psk, aes_256_ccm, null, sha256}) -> -%% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; - + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - -suite({srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_anon, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac:= sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - - %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1298,9 +2033,9 @@ openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite(). +-spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite(). %% -%% Description: Return openssl cipher suite name. +%% Description: Return openssl cipher suite name if possible %%------------------------------------------------------------------- openssl_suite_name(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"; @@ -1510,36 +2245,74 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) -> {_, ecdsa} -> Ciphers1 -- rsa_signed_suites() end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter_suites([cipher_suite()]) -> [cipher_suite()]. +-spec filter_suites([erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()], map()) -> + [erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]. +%% +%% Description: Filter suites using supplied filter funs +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +filter_suites(Suites, Filters) -> + ApplyFilters = fun(Suite) -> + filter_suite(Suite, Filters) + end, + lists:filter(ApplyFilters, Suites). + +filter_suite(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := Prf}, + #{key_exchange_filters := KeyFilters, + cipher_filters := CipherFilters, + mac_filters := HashFilters, + prf_filters := PrfFilters}) -> + all_filters(KeyExchange, KeyFilters) andalso + all_filters(Cipher, CipherFilters) andalso + all_filters(Hash, HashFilters) andalso + all_filters(Prf, PrfFilters); +filter_suite(Suite, Filters) -> + filter_suite(suite_definition(Suite), Filters). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec filter_suites([erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]) -> + [erl_cipher_suite()] | [cipher_suite()]. %% %% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- -filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_tuple(Value) -> - Algos = crypto:supports(), - Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), - lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}) -> - is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)); - ({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) -> - is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso - is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Hashs) - end, Suites); - filter_suites(Suites) -> + Filters = crypto_support_filters(), + filter_suites(Suites, Filters). + +all_filters(_, []) -> + true; +all_filters(Value, [Filter| Rest]) -> + case Filter(Value) of + true -> + all_filters(Value, Rest); + false -> + false + end. +crypto_support_filters() -> Algos = crypto:supports(), Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), - lists:filter(fun(Suite) -> - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite), - is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso - is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Hashs) - end, Suites). + #{key_exchange_filters => + [fun(KeyExchange) -> + is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) + end], + cipher_filters => + [fun(Cipher) -> + is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, + proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) + end], + mac_filters => + [fun(Hash) -> + is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) + end], + prf_filters => + [fun(Prf) -> + is_acceptable_prf(Prf, + proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)) + end]}. is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, _Algos) when KeyExchange == psk; KeyExchange == null -> @@ -1630,7 +2403,7 @@ calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, PlainFragment). -is_stream_ciphersuite({_, rc4_128, _, _}) -> +is_stream_ciphersuite(#{cipher := rc4_128}) -> true; is_stream_ciphersuite(_) -> false. @@ -1758,6 +2531,11 @@ prf_algorithm(default_prf, {3, _}) -> prf_algorithm(Algo, _) -> hash_algorithm(Algo). +mac_algorithm(aead) -> + aead; +mac_algorithm(Algo) -> + hash_algorithm(Algo). + hash_algorithm(null) -> ?NULL; hash_algorithm(md5) -> ?MD5; hash_algorithm(sha) -> ?SHA; %% Only sha always refers to "SHA-1" @@ -1788,6 +2566,10 @@ sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other hash_size(null) -> 0; +%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context +%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3. +hash_size(aead) -> + 0; hash_size(md5) -> 16; hash_size(sha) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl index e4611995ec..022fb7eac0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_config.erl @@ -91,7 +91,15 @@ init_certificates(undefined, #{pem_cache := PemCache} = Config, CertFile, server end; init_certificates(Cert, Config, _, _) -> {ok, Config#{own_certificate => Cert}}. - +init_private_key(_, #{algorithm := Alg} = Key, <<>>, _Password, _Client) when Alg == ecdsa; + Alg == rsa; + Alg == dss -> + case maps:is_key(engine, Key) andalso maps:is_key(key_id, Key) of + true -> + Key; + false -> + throw({key, {invalid_key_id, Key}}) + end; init_private_key(_, undefined, <<>>, _Password, _Client) -> undefined; init_private_key(DbHandle, undefined, KeyFile, Password, _) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index d83c9cb59f..2031735a71 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -44,33 +44,35 @@ -export([send/2, recv/3, close/2, shutdown/2, new_user/2, get_opts/2, set_opts/2, peer_certificate/1, renegotiation/1, negotiated_protocol/1, prf/5, - get_sslsocket/1, handshake_complete/3, - connection_information/2, handle_common_event/5 + connection_information/2 ]). +%% Alert and close handling +-export([handle_own_alert/4, handle_alert/3, + handle_normal_shutdown/3, stop/2, stop_and_reply/3 + ]). + +%% Data handling +-export([write_application_data/3, read_application_data/2]). + +%% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl +-export([handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, + prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). + %% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument %% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine --export([init/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, +-export([init/4, error/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, connection/4, death_row/4, downgrade/4]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([terminate/3, format_status/2]). -%% --export([handle_info/3, handle_call/5, handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, - prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). - -%% Alert and close handling --export([handle_own_alert/4,handle_alert/3, - handle_normal_shutdown/3 - ]). - -%% Data handling --export([write_application_data/3, read_application_data/2]). +%% Erlang Distribution export +-export([get_sslsocket/1, handshake_complete/3]). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API -%%==================================================================== +%% Setup +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connect(tls_connection | dtls_connection, host(), inet:port_number(), @@ -166,6 +168,16 @@ socket_control(dtls_connection = Connection, {_, Socket}, Pid, Transport, Listen {error, Reason} -> {error, Reason} end. + +start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> + undefined; +start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> + erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). + +%%==================================================================== +%% User events +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec send(pid(), iodata()) -> ok | {error, reason()}. %% @@ -281,6 +293,197 @@ handshake_complete(ConnectionPid, Node, DHandle) -> prf(ConnectionPid, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> call(ConnectionPid, {prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, + #state{role = Role, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + connection_states = ConnectionStates, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> + try %% Try to tell the other side + {BinMsg, _} = + Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), + Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg) + catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state + ignore + end, + try %% Try to tell the local user + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) + catch _:_ -> + ok + end, + stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State). + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, + tracker = Tracker, + role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> + alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); + +handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, + socket_options = Opts, + transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + tracker = Tracker, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> + alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, + protocol_cb = Connection, + ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, + port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> + invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), + StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), + stop(normal, State); + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, + StateName, State) -> + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, + #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); + +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, + #state{role = Role, + ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, + protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), + {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), + %% Go back to connection! + State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); + +%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts +handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, + #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) -> + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), + Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== +write_application_data(Data0, {FromPid, _} = From, + #state{socket = Socket, + negotiated_version = Version, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + socket_options = SockOpts, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> + Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), + + case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of + true -> + Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, + [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); + false -> + {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = + Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), + NewState = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, + case Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of + ok when FromPid =:= self() -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, []); + Error when FromPid =:= self() -> + stop({shutdown, Error}, NewState); + ok -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, ok}]); + Result -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, Result}]) + end + end. + +read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, + socket = Socket, + protocol_cb = Connection, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket_options = SOpts, + bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, + start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, + timer = Timer, + user_data_buffer = Buffer0, + tracker = Tracker} = State0) -> + Buffer1 = if + Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; + Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; + true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>> + end, + case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of + {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data + case State0 of + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} -> + State = + State0#state{ + user_data_buffer = Buffer, + bytes_to_read = undefined}, + try erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, ClientData) of + _ + when SOpts#socket_options.active =:= false; + Buffer =:= <<>> -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + %% Active and empty, get more data + Connection:next_record_if_active(State); + _ -> %% We have more data + read_application_data(<<>>, State) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) + end; + _ -> + SocketOpt = + deliver_app_data( + Transport, Socket, SOpts, + ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + cancel_timer(Timer), + State = + State0#state{ + user_data_buffer = Buffer, + start_or_recv_from = undefined, + timer = undefined, + bytes_to_read = undefined, + socket_options = SocketOpt + }, + if + SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; + Buffer =:= <<>> -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + %% Active and empty, get more data + Connection:next_record_if_active(State); + true -> %% We have more data + read_application_data(<<>>, State) + end + end; + {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data + Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); + {passive, Buffer} -> + Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); + {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode + deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + stop(normal, State0) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec handle_session(#server_hello{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), _,_, #state{}) -> @@ -292,7 +495,7 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId}, negotiated_version = ReqVersion, negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = State0) -> - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), @@ -349,7 +552,7 @@ ssl_config(Opts, Role, State) -> ssl_options = Opts}. %%==================================================================== -%% gen_statem state functions +%% gen_statem general state functions with connection cb argument %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -378,7 +581,7 @@ init({call, From}, {start, {Opts, EmOpts}, Timeout}, init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State#state{ssl_options = SslOpts, socket_options = new_emulated(EmOpts, SockOpts)}, Connection) catch throw:Error -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}} + stop_and_reply(normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State0) end; init({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); @@ -386,6 +589,15 @@ init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}, + tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +error({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> + handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(), #hello_request{} | #server_hello{} | term(), #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> @@ -408,7 +620,6 @@ hello(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- abbreviated({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -429,7 +640,6 @@ abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{role = client, tls_handshake_history = Handshake0, session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret}, @@ -449,7 +659,6 @@ abbreviated(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation abbreviated(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, @@ -490,7 +699,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, #state{role = server, ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, @@ -499,7 +707,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}), Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{}, #state{role = server, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -507,7 +714,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{}, State, _) -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, unrequested_certificate), handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, @@ -524,7 +730,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{} = Cert, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, key_algorithm = Alg, @@ -557,7 +762,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end end; - certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _) @@ -565,8 +769,7 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), - Version, certify, State); - + Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, role = client, @@ -580,7 +783,6 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, Record, State#state{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign}) end; - %% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, @@ -599,7 +801,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, State0#state{premaster_secret = PremasterSecret}), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; - certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = undefined}, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}, @@ -620,7 +821,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, State0#state{premaster_secret = RSAPremasterSecret}), client_certify_and_key_exchange(State, Connection) end; - %% Master secret was determined with help of server-key exchange msg certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session, @@ -636,7 +836,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% Master secret is calculated from premaster_secret certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #state{session = Session0, @@ -654,7 +853,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, #state{role = server, client_certificate_requested = true, @@ -662,7 +860,6 @@ certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, Connection) -> %% We expect a certificate here handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, State = #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, negotiated_version = Version}, Connection) -> try @@ -672,7 +869,6 @@ certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - certify(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -684,10 +880,8 @@ certify(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); - cipher(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); - cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, #state{role = server, @@ -710,14 +904,12 @@ cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) end; - %% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it cipher(internal, #finished{}, #state{role = server, expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = true, negotiated_protocol = undefined, negotiated_version = Version} = State0, _Connection) -> handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0); - cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #state{negotiated_version = Version, host = Host, @@ -740,7 +932,6 @@ cipher(internal, #finished{verify_data = Data} = Finished, #alert{} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end; - %% only allowed to send next_protocol message after change cipher spec %% & before finished message and it is not allowed during renegotiation cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, @@ -775,7 +966,7 @@ connection({call, {FromPid, _} = From}, {application_data, Data}, catch throw:Error -> case self() of FromPid -> - {stop, {shutdown, Error}}; + stop({shutdown, Error}, State); _ -> hibernate_after( ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) @@ -826,8 +1017,8 @@ connection( ProtocolSpecific#{d_handle => DHandle}}, {Record, NewerState} = Connection:next_record_if_active(NewState), Connection:next_event(connection, Record, NewerState, [{reply, From, ok}]) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) end; connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); @@ -839,10 +1030,24 @@ connection( _) -> eat_msgs(Msg), try send_dist_data(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, DHandle, []) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) end; connection( + info, {send, From, Ref, Data}, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, + _) -> + %% This is for testing only! + %% + %% Needed by some OTP distribution + %% test suites... + From ! {Ref, ok}, + {keep_state_and_data, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, + {application_data, iolist_to_binary(Data)}}]}; +connection( info, tick = Msg, #state{ ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, @@ -867,20 +1072,22 @@ connection(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> %% or the socket may die too death_row( info, {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, - #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid} = State}, + #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}, _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; death_row( - info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket} = State, _) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket}, _) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; death_row(state_timeout, Reason, _State, _Connection) -> {stop, {shutdown,Reason}}; -death_row(_Type, _Msg, State, _Connection) -> - {keep_state, State, [postpone]}. +death_row(_Type, _Msg, _State, _Connection) -> + %% Waste all other events + keep_state_and_data. %% State entry function death_row(State, Reason) -> - {next_state, death_row, State, [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. + {next_state, death_row, State, + [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), @@ -893,10 +1100,10 @@ downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]), Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), gen_statem:reply(From, {ok, Socket}), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{downgrade = {_, From}} = State, _) -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, timeout}), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -911,7 +1118,7 @@ handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{} = Handshake, _}}, co handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, #state{role = client}, _) when StateName =/= connection -> {keep_state_and_data}; -handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, +handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0, ssl_options = #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2HComp}} = State0, Connection) -> @@ -930,8 +1137,8 @@ handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]}; handle_common_event(internal, {application_data, Data}, StateName, State0, Connection) -> case read_application_data(Data, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; {Record, State} -> Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State) end; @@ -941,8 +1148,8 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, StateName, StateName, State); handle_common_event(_Type, Msg, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State, _) -> - Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE), - handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, {StateName, Msg}, State). + Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, {unexpected_msg, Msg}), + handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State). handle_call({application_data, _Data}, _, _, _, _) -> %% In renegotiation priorities handshake, send data when handshake is finished @@ -960,8 +1167,9 @@ handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, State, Connection) -> %% Run terminate before returning so that the reuseaddr %% inet-option works properly Result = Connection:terminate(Close, StateName, State#state{terminated = true}), - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, - {reply, From, Result}, State}; + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, normal}, + {reply, From, Result}, State); handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, #state{transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -982,7 +1190,7 @@ handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Error -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, Error}), - stop_normal(State) + stop(normal, State) end; handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _, #state{socket_options = @@ -1062,43 +1270,55 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, tracker = Tracker} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), error_logger:error_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - stop_normal(State); + stop(normal, State); handle_info( + {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, _, + #state{ + user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +handle_info( {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, - #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}} = State) -> - stop_normal(State); + #state{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}) -> + {stop, normal}; +handle_info( + {'EXIT', Pid, _Reason}, StateName, + #state{user_application = {_MonitorRef, Pid}} = State) -> + %% It seems the user application has linked to us + %% - ignore that and let the monitor handle this + {next_state, StateName, State}; %%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) -> - {stop, shutdown, State}; + stop(shutdown, State); handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> %% Handle as transport close" - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; + stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> - {stop, {shutdown, Reason}, State}; + stop({shutdown, Reason}, State); handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}}; handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, user_timeout}, - {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{timer = undefined}}; - + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, user_timeout}, + {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, + State#state{timer = undefined}); handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, bytes_to_read = undefined, timer = undefined}, [{reply, RecvFrom, {error, timeout}}]}; - handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{timer = undefined}}; @@ -1107,41 +1327,9 @@ handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) -> error_logger:info_report(Report), {next_state, StateName, State}. - - -send_dist_data(StateName, State, DHandle, Acc) -> - case erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data(DHandle) of - none -> - erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle), - hibernate_after(StateName, State, lists:reverse(Acc)); - Data -> - send_dist_data( - StateName, State, DHandle, - [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, Data}} - |Acc]) - end. - -%% Overload mitigation -eat_msgs(Msg) -> - receive Msg -> eat_msgs(Msg) - after 0 -> ok - end. - -%% When running with erl_dist the stop reason 'normal' -%% would be too silent and prevent cleanup -stop_normal(State) -> - Reason = - case State of - #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}} -> - {shutdown, normal}; - _ -> - normal - end, - {stop, Reason, State}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% gen_statem callbacks -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%==================================================================== +%% general gen_statem callbacks +%%==================================================================== terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% Happens when user closes the connection using ssl:close/1 %% we want to guarantee that Transport:close has been called @@ -1150,7 +1338,6 @@ terminate(_, _, #state{terminated = true}) -> %% returning. In both cases terminate has been run manually %% before run by gen_statem which will end up here ok; - terminate({shutdown, transport_closed} = Reason, _StateName, #state{protocol_cb = Connection, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> @@ -1177,7 +1364,6 @@ terminate(Reason, connection, #state{negotiated_version = Version, {BinAlert, ConnectionStates} = terminate_alert(Reason, Version, ConnectionStates0, Connection), Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinAlert), Connection:close(Reason, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); - terminate(Reason, _StateName, #state{transport_cb = Transport, protocol_cb = Connection, socket = Socket } = State) -> @@ -1211,155 +1397,6 @@ format_status(terminate, [_, StateName, State]) -> }}]}]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -write_application_data(Data0, {FromPid, _} = From, - #state{socket = Socket, - negotiated_version = Version, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - socket_options = SockOpts, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}} = State) -> - Data = encode_packet(Data0, SockOpts), - - case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of - true -> - Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, - [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); - false -> - {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = - Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), - NewState = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, - case Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of - ok when FromPid =:= self() -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, []); - Error when FromPid =:= self() -> - {stop, {shutdown, Error}, NewState}; - ok -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, ok}]); - Result -> - hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, Result}]) - end - end. - -read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket_options = SOpts, - bytes_to_read = BytesToRead, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, - timer = Timer, - user_data_buffer = Buffer0, - tracker = Tracker} = State0) -> - Buffer1 = if - Buffer0 =:= <<>> -> Data; - Data =:= <<>> -> Buffer0; - true -> <<Buffer0/binary, Data/binary>> - end, - case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of - {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data - case State0 of - #state{ - ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, - protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} -> - State = - State0#state{ - user_data_buffer = Buffer, - bytes_to_read = undefined}, - try erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, ClientData) of - _ - when SOpts#socket_options.active =:= false; - Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - _ -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - catch _:Reason -> - death_row(State, Reason) - end; - _ -> - SocketOpt = - deliver_app_data( - Transport, Socket, SOpts, - ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - cancel_timer(Timer), - State = - State0#state{ - user_data_buffer = Buffer, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, - timer = undefined, - bytes_to_read = undefined, - socket_options = SocketOpt - }, - if - SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; - Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - true -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - end - end; - {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data - Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {passive, Buffer} -> - Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); - {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode - deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - stop_normal(State0) - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, - port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> - invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), - StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), - stop_normal(State); - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, - StateName, State) -> - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; - -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, - protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), - {Record, State1} = Connection:next_record(State0), - %% Go back to connection! - State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State1#state{renegotiation = undefined}), - Connection:next_event(connection, Record, State); - -%% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts -handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, - #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), - {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State0), - Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, @@ -1369,9 +1406,9 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version, ssl_options = Opts}) -> RecordCB = record_cb(Connection), - CipherSuiteDef = ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuite), - IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(element(1,CipherSuiteDef), - [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), + CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg, + [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of {namedCurve, Curve} when IsNamedCurveSuite -> [{ecc, {named_curve, pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)}}]; @@ -1380,7 +1417,7 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, end, [{protocol, RecordCB:protocol_version(Version)}, {session_id, SessionId}, - {cipher_suite, CipherSuiteDef}, + {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, {sni_hostname, SNIHostname} | CurveInfo] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts). security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> @@ -1448,7 +1485,7 @@ resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), State#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}. @@ -1462,8 +1499,8 @@ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State1 = State0#state{session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, - {KeyAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlg, State1), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2), Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State). @@ -1476,7 +1513,6 @@ handle_peer_cert_key(client, _, ECDHKey = public_key:generate_key(PublicKeyParams), PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(PublicKey, ECDHKey), master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey}); - %% We do currently not support cipher suites that use fixed DH. %% If we want to implement that the following clause can be used %% to extract DH parameters form cert. @@ -1496,7 +1532,6 @@ certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = true, role = client, = State, Connection) -> Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client), Connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State); - certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> State. @@ -1546,10 +1581,26 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> request_client_cert(State2, Connection). certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, - #state{private_key = Key} = State, Connection) -> - PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) -> + FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), + %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret + %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. + PremasterSecret = + try ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key) of + Secret when erlang:byte_size(Secret) == ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES -> + case Secret of + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> -> %% Correct + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>; + <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_), Rest/binary>> -> %% Version mismatch + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> + end; + _ -> %% erlang:byte_size(Secret) =/= ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES + FakeSecret + catch + #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} -> + FakeSecret + end, calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} = State, @@ -1561,14 +1612,12 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientP #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKey} = State, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, ECDHKey), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State0, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, diffie_hellman_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}, @@ -1578,7 +1627,6 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey, ssl_options = @@ -1587,7 +1635,6 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerEcDhPrivateKey, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{private_key = Key, ssl_options = @@ -1595,7 +1642,6 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, Connection) -> PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); - certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{} = ClientKey, #state{srp_params = Params, srp_keys = Key @@ -1610,7 +1656,6 @@ certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon -> State; - certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle, cert_db_ref = CertDbRef, session = #session{own_certificate = OwnCert}} = State, Connection) -> @@ -1644,7 +1689,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, private_key = Key, key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == ecdh_ecdsa; Algo == ecdh_rsa -> State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Key}; @@ -1670,7 +1714,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; @@ -1691,7 +1734,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = psk, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, @@ -1713,7 +1755,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, @@ -1735,7 +1776,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; @@ -1756,7 +1796,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = LookupFun}, hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, @@ -1787,7 +1826,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = Algo, State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{srp_params = SrpParams, srp_keys = Keys}; - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = rsa, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo, @@ -1795,7 +1833,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, premaster_secret = PremasterSecret} = State0, Connection) -> Msg = rsa_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -1816,7 +1853,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Algorithm == ecdh_anon -> Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {ecdh, Keys}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, key_algorithm = psk, @@ -1824,7 +1860,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), {psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, @@ -1855,7 +1890,6 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, Msg = rsa_psk_key_exchange(ssl:tls_version(Version), SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, PremasterSecret, PublicKeyInfo), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); - key_exchange(#state{role = client, key_algorithm = Algorithm, negotiated_version = Version, @@ -2244,10 +2278,7 @@ set_socket_opts(_,_, _, [{active, _} = Opt| _], SockOpts, _) -> set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, [Opt | Opts], SockOpts, Other) -> set_socket_opts(ConnectionCb, Transport, Socket, Opts, SockOpts, [Opt | Other]). -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(infinity, _RecvFrom) -> - undefined; -start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, RecvFrom) -> - erlang:send_after(Timeout, self(), {cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}). + hibernate_after(connection = StateName, #state{ssl_options=#ssl_options{hibernate_after = HibernateAfter}} = State, @@ -2426,8 +2457,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]); {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply} | Actions]); - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State} + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop end; handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State) -> %% Active once already set @@ -2436,8 +2467,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = %% user_data_buffer =/= <<>> handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop; {Record, State1} -> %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of @@ -2595,7 +2626,8 @@ send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) -> send_user(Pid, Data). send_user(Pid, Msg) -> - Pid ! Msg. + Pid ! Msg, + ok. alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); @@ -2632,45 +2664,6 @@ log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) -> ok. -handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, - #state{role = Role, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, - protocol_cb = Connection, - connection_states = ConnectionStates, - ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - try %% Try to tell the other side - {BinMsg, _} = - Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates), - Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg) - catch _:_ -> %% Can crash if we are in a uninitialized state - ignore - end, - try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), - handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) - catch _:_ -> - ok - end, - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}. - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - start_or_recv_from = StartFrom, - tracker = Tracker, - role = Role, renegotiation = {false, first}}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, Alert, Role, Connection); - -handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, - socket_options = Opts, - transport_cb = Transport, - protocol_cb = Connection, - user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - tracker = Tracker, - start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom, role = Role}) -> - alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, RecvFrom, Alert, Role, Connection). - invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session); invalidate_session(server, _, Port, Session) -> @@ -2727,3 +2720,42 @@ new_emulated([], EmOpts) -> EmOpts; new_emulated(NewEmOpts, _) -> NewEmOpts. +%%---------------Erlang distribution -------------------------------------- + +send_dist_data(StateName, State, DHandle, Acc) -> + case erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data(DHandle) of + none -> + erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle), + hibernate_after(StateName, State, lists:reverse(Acc)); + Data -> + send_dist_data( + StateName, State, DHandle, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, Data}} + |Acc]) + end. + +%% Overload mitigation +eat_msgs(Msg) -> + receive Msg -> eat_msgs(Msg) + after 0 -> ok + end. + +%% When acting as distribution controller map the exit reason +%% to follow the documented nodedown_reason for net_kernel +stop(Reason, State) -> + {stop, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), State}. + +stop_and_reply(Reason, Replies, State) -> + {stop_and_reply, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), Replies, State}. + +erl_dist_stop_reason( + Reason, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + case Reason of + normal -> + %% We can not exit with normal since that will not bring + %% down the rest of the distribution processes + {shutdown, normal}; + _ -> Reason + end; +erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, _State) -> + Reason. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index 3e26f67de1..f9d2149170 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ session_cache_cb :: atom(), crl_db :: term(), negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', + client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), key_algorithm :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(), hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl index 8817b0c884..66f46da75f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_cache.erl @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ delete({der, CRLs}) -> ssl_manager:delete_crls({?NO_DIST_POINT, CRLs}); delete(URI) -> - case http_uri:parse(URI) of - {ok, {http, _, _ , _, Path,_}} -> + case uri_string:normalize(URI, [return_map]) of + #{scheme := "http", path := Path} -> ssl_manager:delete_crls(string:trim(Path, leading, "/")); _ -> {error, {only_http_distribution_points_supported, URI}} @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ delete(URI) -> %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- do_insert(URI, CRLs) -> - case http_uri:parse(URI) of - {ok, {http, _, _ , _, Path,_}} -> + case uri_string:normalize(URI, [return_map]) of + #{scheme := "http", path := Path} -> ssl_manager:insert_crls(string:trim(Path, leading, "/"), CRLs); _ -> {error, {only_http_distribution_points_supported, URI}} @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ http_get(URL, Rest, CRLDbInfo, Timeout) -> cache_lookup(_, undefined) -> []; cache_lookup(URL, {{Cache, _}, _}) -> - {ok, {_, _, _ , _, Path,_}} = http_uri:parse(URL), + #{path := Path} = uri_string:normalize(URL, [return_map]), case ssl_pkix_db:lookup(string:trim(Path, leading, "/"), Cache) of undefined -> []; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl index c241a9bced..bea67935d8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ %% Supervisor callback -export([init/1]). +%% Debug +-export([consult/1]). + %%%========================================================================= %%% API %%%========================================================================= @@ -37,7 +40,18 @@ -spec start_link() -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}. start_link() -> - supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []). + case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_optfile) of + {ok, [File]} -> + DistOpts = consult(File), + TabOpts = [set, protected, named_table], + Tab = ets:new(ssl_dist_opts, TabOpts), + true = ets:insert(Tab, DistOpts), + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []); + {ok, BadArg} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, BadArg}); + error -> + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []) + end. %%%========================================================================= %%% Supervisor callback @@ -68,3 +82,52 @@ ssl_connection_sup() -> Modules = [ssl_connection_sup], Type = supervisor, {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}. + +consult(File) -> + case erl_prim_loader:get_file(File) of + {ok, Binary, _FullName} -> + Encoding = + case epp:read_encoding_from_binary(Binary) of + none -> latin1; + Enc -> Enc + end, + case unicode:characters_to_list(Binary, Encoding) of + {error, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_error, Rest}}); + {incomplete, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_incomplete, Rest}}); + String when is_list(String) -> + consult_string(String) + end; + error -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, File}) + end. + +consult_string(String) -> + case erl_scan:string(String) of + {error, Info, Location} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {scan_error, Info, Location}}); + {ok, Tokens, _EndLocation} -> + consult_tokens(Tokens) + end. + +consult_tokens(Tokens) -> + case erl_parse:parse_exprs(Tokens) of + {error, Info} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Info}}); + {ok, [Expr]} -> + consult_expr(Expr); + {ok, Other} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Other}}) + end. + +consult_expr(Expr) -> + {value, Value, Bs} = erl_eval:expr(Expr, erl_eval:new_bindings()), + case erl_eval:bindings(Bs) of + [] -> + Value; + Other -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {bindings, Other}}) + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 81d38a38e4..9e2b12b186 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -44,46 +44,44 @@ #client_key_exchange{} | #finished{} | #certificate_verify{} | #hello_request{} | #next_protocol{}. -%% Handshake messages +%% Create handshake messages -export([hello_request/0, server_hello/4, server_hello_done/0, - certificate/4, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, + certificate/4, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_request/5, key_exchange/3, finished/5, next_protocol/1]). %% Handle handshake messages --export([certify/7, client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, +-export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, - init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5 + init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/3, verify_server_key/5, + select_version/3 ]). -%% Encode/Decode +%% Encode -export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, - encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1, - decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, + encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). +%% Decode +-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3, decode_suites/2 ]). %% Cipher suites handling --export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, cipher_suites/2, - select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, available_signature_algs/4]). +-export([available_suites/2, available_signature_algs/2, available_signature_algs/4, + cipher_suites/3, prf/6, select_session/11, supported_ecc/1, + premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %% Extensions handling -export([client_hello_extensions/5, handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions - handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3 + handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, + select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, + select_hashsign_algs/3 ]). -%% MISC --export([select_version/3, prf/6, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3, - premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). - %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Create handshake messages %%==================================================================== -%% ---------- Create handshake messages ---------- - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello_request() -> #hello_request{}. %% @@ -119,31 +117,6 @@ server_hello(SessionId, Version, ConnectionStates, Extensions) -> server_hello_done() -> #server_hello_done{}. -client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, - eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of - true -> - client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); - false -> - {undefined, undefined} - end, - SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), - - #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, - Renegotiation), - sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate(der_cert(), db_handle(), certdb_ref(), client | server) -> #certificate{} | #alert{}. %% @@ -171,14 +144,6 @@ certificate(OwnCert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, server) -> end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a next protocol message -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> - #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_certificate_verify(undefined | der_cert(), binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), public_key:private_key(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> @@ -224,12 +189,18 @@ certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) -> {dh, binary()} | {dh, {binary(), binary()}, #'DHParameter'{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()}, binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()} | + {ecdh, _, _, _, _, _} | {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} | + {psk, _, _, _, _, _} | {psk, binary()} | + {dhe_psk, _, _, _, _, _, _, _} | {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} | + {ecdhe_psk, _, _, _, _, _, _} | {ecdhe_psk, binary(), #'ECPrivateKey'{}} | {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()}, - binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()}) -> + binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()} | + {srp, _} | + {psk_premaster_secret, _, _, _}) -> #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}. %% @@ -346,22 +317,51 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _}, finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, {Handshake, _}) -> % use the current handshake #finished{verify_data = calc_finished(Version, Role, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake)}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec next_protocol(binary()) -> #next_protocol{}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a next protocol message +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +next_protocol(SelectedProtocol) -> + #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}. -%% ---------- Handle handshake messages ---------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Handle handshake messages +%%==================================================================== +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), + client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> -verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, - signature = Signature}, - HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, - ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, - server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, - <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), + [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, + try + {TrustedCert, CertPath} = + ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), + ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, + CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, + Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), + case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, + CertPath, + [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, + {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of + {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; + {error, Reason} -> + path_validation_alert(Reason) + end + catch + error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> + %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); + error:OtherReason -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_verify(binary(), public_key_info(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), term(), @@ -404,43 +404,55 @@ verify_signature(_, Hash, {HashAlgo, _SignAlg}, Signature, {?'id-ecPublicKey', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec certify(#certificate{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref(), #ssl_options{}, term(), - client | server, inet:hostname() | inet:ip_address()) -> {der_cert(), public_key_info()} | #alert{}. +-spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), + client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. %% -%% Description: Handles a certificate handshake message -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certify(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1Certs}, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts, CRLDbHandle, Role, Host) -> +%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, +%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update +%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, + ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, + ConnectionStates, Role) + catch + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) + end; - ServerName = server_name(Opts#ssl_options.server_name_indication, Host, Role), - [PeerCert | _] = ASN1Certs, - try - {TrustedCert, CertPath} = - ssl_certificate:trusted_cert_and_path(ASN1Certs, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, - Opts#ssl_options.partial_chain), - ValidationFunAndState = validation_fun_and_state(Opts#ssl_options.verify_fun, Role, - CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerName, - Opts#ssl_options.crl_check, CRLDbHandle, CertPath), - case public_key:pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, - CertPath, - [{max_path_length, Opts#ssl_options.depth}, - {verify_fun, ValidationFunAndState}]) of - {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,_}} -> - {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo}; - {error, Reason} -> - path_validation_alert(Reason) - end +master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + + #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, + client_random = ClientRandom, + server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, + try master_secret(Version, + calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom), + SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) catch - error:{badmatch,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> - %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN, {failed_to_decode_certificate, Asn1Reason}); - error:OtherReason -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, {unexpected_error, OtherReason}) + exit:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). +%% +%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> + MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), + SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), + <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; + +server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> + crypto:hash(Hash, Value). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec verify_connection(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #finished{}, client | server, integer(), binary(), ssl_handshake_history()) -> verified | #alert{}. %% @@ -487,292 +499,31 @@ update_handshake_history(Handshake, % special-case SSL2 client hello update_handshake_history({Handshake0, _Prev}, Data, _) -> {[Data|Handshake0], Handshake0}. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -spec decrypt_premaster_secret(binary(), #'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> binary(). - -%% %% -%% %% Description: Public key decryption using the private key. -%% %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% decrypt_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPrivateKey) -> -%% try public_key:decrypt_private(Secret, RSAPrivateKey, -%% [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) -%% catch -%% _:_ -> -%% throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) -%% end. - -premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> - try - public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> - try - crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) - catch - error:computation_failed -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, - verifier = Verifier}) -> - case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; -premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, - ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> - case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of - ok -> - DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), - case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of - error -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); - PremasterSecret -> - PremasterSecret - end; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end; -premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} - }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); -premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, - PrivateDhKey, - LookupFun) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), - psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{ - public = ECServerPubKey}}, - PrivateEcDhKey, - LookupFun) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey), - psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret); - -premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). - -premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ - identity = PSKIdentity, - dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> - PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). - -premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); -premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> - public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); -premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> - try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, - [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) - catch - _:_ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) - end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha | md5 | sha | sha224 |sha256 | sha384 | sha512, binary()) -> binary(). -%% -%% Description: Calculate server key exchange hash -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -server_key_exchange_hash(md5sha, Value) -> - MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Value), - SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Value), - <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; - -server_key_exchange_hash(Hash, Value) -> - crypto:hash(Hash, Value). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> - {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. -%% -%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> - {error, undefined}; -prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> - {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), - atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(_, undefined, _, _, _Version) -> - {null, anon}; -%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have -%% negotiated a lower version. -select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, - undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, - SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; -select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), - [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. - -%% -%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail - %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is - %% no certificate to verify. - {undefined, undefined}; - -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, - certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of - true -> - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign - end; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) - end; -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> - select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - {atom(), atom()}. - -%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be -%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, -%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. -%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms -%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the -%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, -%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had -%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, -%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. -%% -%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, -%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso - Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - HashSign; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - {sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> - {sha, ecdsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> - {md5sha, rsa}; -select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> - {sha, dsa}. - - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec master_secret(ssl_record:ssl_version(), #session{} | binary(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - client | server) -> {binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()} | #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Sets or calculates the master secret and calculate keys, -%% updating the pending connection states. The Mastersecret and the update -%% connection states are returned or an alert if the calculation fails. -%%------------------------------------------------------------------- -master_secret(Version, #session{master_secret = Mastersecret}, - ConnectionStates, Role) -> - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = - ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - try master_secret(Version, Mastersecret, SecParams, - ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, key_calculation_failure) - end; - -master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates, Role) -> +verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, + signature = Signature}, + HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, + ConnectionStates, Version, PubKeyInfo) -> #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - - #security_parameters{prf_algorithm = PrfAlgo, - client_random = ClientRandom, + #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, - try master_secret(Version, - calc_master_secret(Version,PrfAlgo,PremasterSecret, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom), - SecParams, ConnectionStates, Role) - catch - exit:_ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, master_secret_calculation_failure) - end. + Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, + <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo). + +select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encode handshake +%%==================================================================== -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- encode_handshake(#next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, _Version) -> PaddingLength = 32 - ((byte_size(SelectedProtocol) + 2) rem 32), {?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE((byte_size(SelectedProtocol))), SelectedProtocol/binary, ?BYTE(PaddingLength), 0:(PaddingLength * 8)>>}; - encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, @@ -894,71 +645,6 @@ encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, Acc/binary>>). -enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> - EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), - case HashAlgo of - null -> - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {null, anon}, - signature = <<>>}; - _ -> - Hash = - server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - EncParams/binary>>), - Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = EncParams, - hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, - signature = Signature} - end. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #encrypted_premaster_secret{} - | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} - | #client_psk_identity{} - | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} - | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} - | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} - | #client_srp_public{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> - #server_key_params{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> - dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). - -%% -%% Description: Encode and decode functions for ALPN extension data. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - -%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice -%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during -%% renegotiation, as done here. -encode_alpn(_, true) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> - #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. - -decode_alpn(undefined) -> - undefined; -decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> - decode_protocols(Data, []). - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; encode_client_protocol_negotiation(_, false) -> @@ -972,6 +658,10 @@ encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(undefined) -> encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(Protocols) -> #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Decode handshake +%%==================================================================== + decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), @@ -1004,7 +694,6 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3 cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, extensions = HelloExtensions}; - decode_handshake(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) -> @@ -1051,83 +740,30 @@ decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -%% ECParameters with named_curve -%% TODO: explicit curve -dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), - ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, - _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> - Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, - public = ECPoint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - KeyExchange, Version) - when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> - Params = #server_psk_params{ - hint = PskIdentityHint}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #server_key_params{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, - ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> - DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = DHParams}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, - ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), - ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, - _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) -> - DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{ - curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, - public = ECPoint}, - Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{ - hint = IdentityHint, - dh_params = DHParams}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, - ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, - ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> - Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, - {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), - #server_key_params{params = Params, - params_bin = BinMsg, - hashsign = HashSign, - signature = Signature}; -dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_client_key(binary(), ssl_cipher:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + #encrypted_premaster_secret{} + | #client_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} + | #client_psk_identity{} + | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} + | #client_srp_public{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode client_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_suites('2_bytes'|'3_bytes', binary()) -> list(). @@ -1139,12 +775,13 @@ decode_suites('2_bytes', Dec) -> decode_suites('3_bytes', Dec) -> from_3bytes(Dec). -%%-------------Cipeher suite handling -------------------------------- +%%==================================================================== +%% Cipher suite handling +%%==================================================================== available_suites(UserSuites, Version) -> - lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> - lists:member(Suite, ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version)) - end, UserSuites). + VersionSuites = ssl_cipher:all_suites(Version) ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version), + lists:filtermap(fun(Suite) -> lists:member(Suite, VersionSuites) end, UserSuites). available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> ssl_cipher:filter(ServerCert, available_suites(UserSuites, Version)) @@ -1152,61 +789,42 @@ available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve) -> available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, HashSigns, Curve) -> Suites = available_suites(ServerCert, UserSuites, Version, undefined, Curve), filter_hashsigns(Suites, [ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- Suites], HashSigns, []). -filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> - lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); - -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, - Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == srp_rsa; - KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> - do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> - %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature - %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names - %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when - KeyExchange == dh_anon; - KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; - KeyExchange == srp_anon; - KeyExchange == psk; - KeyExchange == dhe_psk; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> - %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). - -do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> - case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of - true -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); - false -> - filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) - end. -unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> - ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); -unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> - []. +available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; +available_signature_algs(_, _) -> + undefined. +available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when + Version >= {3,3} -> + SupportedHashSigns; +available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, + _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> + sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), + sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); +available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> + undefined. +cipher_suites(Suites, Renegotiation, true) -> + %% TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV should be placed last -RFC7507 + cipher_suites(Suites, Renegotiation) ++ [?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV]; +cipher_suites(Suites, Renegotiation, false) -> + cipher_suites(Suites, Renegotiation). cipher_suites(Suites, false) -> [?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | Suites]; cipher_suites(Suites, true) -> Suites. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec prf(ssl_record:ssl_version(), non_neg_integer(), binary(), binary(), [binary()], non_neg_integer()) -> + {ok, binary()} | {error, undefined}. +%% +%% Description: use the TLS PRF to generate key material +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +prf({3,0}, _, _, _, _, _) -> + {error, undefined}; +prf({3,_N}, PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength) -> + {ok, tls_v1:prf(PRFAlgo, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength)}. select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, #session{ecc = ECCCurve} = Session, Version, @@ -1227,68 +845,121 @@ select_session(SuggestedSessionId, CipherSuites, HashSigns, Compressions, Port, {resumed, Resumed} end. -%% Deprecated? supported_ecc({Major, Minor}) when ((Major == 3) and (Minor >= 1)) orelse (Major > 3) -> Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor), #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves}; supported_ecc(_) -> #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = []}. -%%-------------certificate handling -------------------------------- - -certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> - case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, - proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of - true -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - false -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> +premaster_secret(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params) -> + try + public_key:compute_key(OtherPublicDhKey, MyPrivateKey, Params) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, #server_dh_params{dh_p = Prime, dh_g = Base}) -> + try + crypto:compute_key(dh, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, [Prime, Base]) + catch + error:computation_failed -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) end; +premaster_secret(#client_srp_public{srp_a = ClientPublicKey}, ServerKey, #srp_user{prime = Prime, + verifier = Verifier}) -> + case crypto:compute_key(srp, ClientPublicKey, ServerKey, {host, [Verifier, Prime, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; +premaster_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator, srp_s = Salt, srp_b = Public}, + ClientKeys, {Username, Password}) -> + case ssl_srp_primes:check_srp_params(Generator, Prime) of + ok -> + DerivedKey = crypto:hash(sha, [Salt, crypto:hash(sha, [Username, <<$:>>, Password])]), + case crypto:compute_key(srp, Public, ClientKeys, {user, [DerivedKey, Prime, Generator, '6a']}) of + error -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)); + PremasterSecret -> + PremasterSecret + end; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end; +premaster_secret(#client_rsa_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + exchange_keys = #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = EncPMS} + }, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_dh_params{dh_y = PublicDhKey} = Params}, + PrivateDhKey, + LookupFun) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), + psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{ + public = ECServerPubKey}}, + PrivateEcDhKey, + LookupFun) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey), + psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). +premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateKey, Params), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). +premaster_secret(#client_psk_identity{identity = PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret({psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup) -> + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup); +premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{} = ECPoint, #'ECPrivateKey'{} = ECDHKeys) -> + public_key:compute_key(ECPoint, ECDHKeys); +premaster_secret(EncSecret, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = RSAPrivateKey) -> + try public_key:decrypt_private(EncSecret, RSAPrivateKey, + [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) + catch + _:_ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR)) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% Extensions handling +%%==================================================================== +client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, + eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = + case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of + true -> + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); + false -> + {undefined, undefined} + end, + SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(_, _) -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. - -certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> - Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), - Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> - OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, - DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), - DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), - <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> - end, - list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). - -certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> - ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> - [Cert | Acc]; - (_, Acc) -> - Acc - end, - ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); -certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> - %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data - lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, - [], CertDbData). - - -%%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- + #hello_extensions{ + renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), + next_protocol_negotiation = + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, + Renegotiation), + sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, @@ -1365,233 +1036,208 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, too_many_protocols_in_server_hello) end. -select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). - -do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> - ClientVersion; -do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - keep looking - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); - false -> - %% Version ok for client - look for a higher - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) - end. -%% -do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> - GoodVersion; -do_select_version( - RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> - BetterVersion = - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of - true -> - %% Version too high for client - GoodVersion; - false -> - %% Version ok for client - case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of - true -> - %% Use higher version - Version; - false -> - GoodVersion - end - end, - do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). +select_curve(Client, Server) -> + select_curve(Client, Server, false). -renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end; -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} +select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, + ServerOrder) -> + case ServerOrder of + false -> + select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); + true -> + select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) end; +select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> + %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if + %% ECC cipher is negotiated + {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. -renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of - true -> - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; - false -> - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{} | undefined, undefined | binary(), + atom(), [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | undefined | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, - ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature_algorithms hello extension (server) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(_, _, KeyExAlgo, _, _Version) when KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; + KeyExAlgo == ecdh_anon; + KeyExAlgo == srp_anon -> + {null, anon}; +%% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have +%% negotiated a lower version. +select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; - false -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSing = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == Sign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, Sign, + SubSing, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign end; +select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_,Algo, _}} = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + select_hashsign_algs(undefined, Algo, Version). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, binary(), + [atom()], ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()} | #alert{}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> - {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; +%% +%% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, undefined, _, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + %% There client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail + %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is + %% no certificate to verify. + {undefined, undefined}; + +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, + certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, + {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), + SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), + + case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, HashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign + end; false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, - ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> - - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), - case Data == ClientVerify of - true -> - {ok, ConnectionStates}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) - end - end; - -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> + select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). -handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> - case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); - false -> - handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> + {atom(), atom()}. -handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> - ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), - case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of - {_, true} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); - {true, false} -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); - {false, false} -> - {ok, ConnectionStates} - end. +%% Description: For TLS 1.2 hash function and signature algorithm pairs can be +%% negotiated with the signature_algorithms extension, +%% for previous versions always use appropriate defaults. +%% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms +%% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the +%% server MUST do the following: (e.i defaults for TLS 1.2) +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA, +%% DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had +%% sent the value {sha1,rsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS, +%% DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}. +%% +%% - If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA, +%% ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. -hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = HashSigns, - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, - sni = Sni}) -> - [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +select_hashsign_algs(HashSign, _, {Major, Minor}) when HashSign =/= undefined andalso + Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + HashSign; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + {sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined,?'id-ecPublicKey', _) -> + {sha, ecdsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> + {md5sha, rsa}; +select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> + {sha, dsa}. srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) -> #srp{username = UserName}; srp_user(_) -> undefined. -client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of - true -> - EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, - EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; - _ -> - {undefined, undefined} - end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%------------- Create handshake messages ---------------------------- -server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> - CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), - case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of +int_to_bin(I) -> + L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, + <<I:(L*8)>>. + +certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> + case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of true -> - handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; false -> - undefined - end. - -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> - undefined; -handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> - #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> + end; -advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> - false; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) -> - true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> - advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; -select_curve(Client, Server) -> - select_curve(Client, Server, false). +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; -select_curve(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ClientCurves}, - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = ServerCurves}, - ServerOrder) -> - case ServerOrder of - false -> - select_shared_curve(ClientCurves, ServerCurves); - true -> - select_shared_curve(ServerCurves, ClientCurves) - end; -select_curve(undefined, _, _) -> - %% Client did not send ECC extension use default curve if - %% ECC cipher is negotiated - {namedCurve, ?secp256r1}. +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; +certificate_types(_, _) -> + <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. -select_shared_curve([], _) -> - no_curve; -select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> - case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of - true -> - {namedCurve, Curve}; - false -> - select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) - end. +certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> + Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), + Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> + OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, + DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), + DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), + <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> + end, + list_to_binary([Enc(Cert) || {_, Cert} <- Authorities]). -sni(undefined) -> - undefined; -sni(disable) -> - undefined; -sni(Hostname) -> - #sni{hostname = Hostname}. +certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) when is_reference(CertDbRef) -> + ConnectionCerts = fun({{Ref, _, _}, Cert}, Acc) when Ref == CertDbRef -> + [Cert | Acc]; + (_, Acc) -> + Acc + end, + ssl_pkix_db:foldl(ConnectionCerts, [], CertDbHandle); +certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> + %% Cache disabled, Ref contains data + lists:foldl(fun({decoded, {_Key,Cert}}, Acc) -> [Cert | Acc] end, + [], CertDbData). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% Internal functions -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------Handle handshake messages -------------------------------- validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) -> {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> @@ -1683,17 +1329,6 @@ path_validation_alert({bad_cert, unknown_ca}) -> path_validation_alert(Reason) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason). -encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> - try - PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, - [{rsa_pad, - rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), - #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} - catch - _:_-> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) - end. - digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> try do_digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) of Signature -> @@ -1702,17 +1337,123 @@ digitally_signed(Version, Hashes, HashAlgo, PrivateKey) -> error:badkey-> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, bad_key(PrivateKey))) end. - +do_digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) + when Minor >= 3 -> + crypto:sign(Alg, HashAlgo, {digest, Hash}, maps:remove(algorithm, Engine)); do_digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key); -do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> - public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key); do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]); +do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, _, + #{algorithm := rsa} = Engine) -> + crypto:private_encrypt(rsa, Hash, maps:remove(algorithm, Engine), + rsa_pkcs1_padding); +do_digitally_signed({3, _}, Hash, HashAlgo, #{algorithm := Alg} = Engine) -> + crypto:sign(Alg, HashAlgo, {digest, Hash}, maps:remove(algorithm, Engine)); do_digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key). +bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_dsa_key; +bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_rsa_key; +bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> + unacceptable_ecdsa_key. + +crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> + valid; +crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. + valid; +crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> + Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> + ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, + DBInfo}) + end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, + {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, + {undetermined_details, true} + ], + case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of + no_dps -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, + dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), + Options); + DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed + %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, + CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); + Other -> + Other + end + end. + +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> + case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of + {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> + valid; + Other -> + Other + end; +crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> + public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> + case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of + [] -> + no_dps; + DistPoints -> + Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, + CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), + dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) + end; + +dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> + DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = + public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), + CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> + Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); + (_) -> + [] + end, GenNames), + [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. + +dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> + Acc; +dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> + DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], + dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). + +distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> + []; +distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> + Result = + try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) + catch + error:undef -> + %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument + %% version of the lookup function. + Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) + end, + case Result of + not_available -> + distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); + CRLs -> + CRLs + end. + +encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, RSAPublicKey) -> + try + PreMasterSecret = public_key:encrypt_public(Secret, RSAPublicKey, + [{rsa_pad, + rsa_pkcs1_padding}]), + #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PreMasterSecret} + catch + _:_-> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, premaster_encryption_failed)) + end. + calc_certificate_verify({3, 0}, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) -> ssl_v3:certificate_verify(HashAlgo, MasterSecret, lists:reverse(Handshake)); calc_certificate_verify({3, N}, HashAlgo, _MasterSecret, Handshake) -> @@ -1765,24 +1506,7 @@ calc_master_secret({3,0}, _PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) calc_master_secret({3,_}, PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> tls_v1:master_secret(PrfAlgo, PremasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom). - -handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, - ClientCipherSuites, Compression, - ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> - case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, - Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, - ClientCipherSuites) of - {ok, ConnectionStates} -> - hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, - Version, - NegotiatedCipherSuite, - Random, - Compression, - ConnectionStates); - #alert{} = Alert -> - throw(Alert) - end. - + %% Update pending connection states with parameters exchanged via %% hello messages %% NOTE : Role is the role of the receiver of the hello message @@ -1822,7 +1546,43 @@ hello_security_parameters(server, Version, #{security_parameters := SecParams}, compression_algorithm = Compression }. -%%-------------Encode/Decode -------------------------------- +select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> + ?NULL. + +do_select_version(_, ClientVersion, []) -> + ClientVersion; +do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions]) -> + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client - keep looking + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions); + false -> + %% Version ok for client - look for a higher + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, Version) + end. +%% +do_select_version(_, _, [], GoodVersion) -> + GoodVersion; +do_select_version( + RecordCB, ClientVersion, [Version | Versions], GoodVersion) -> + BetterVersion = + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, ClientVersion) of + true -> + %% Version too high for client + GoodVersion; + false -> + %% Version ok for client + case RecordCB:is_higher(Version, GoodVersion) of + true -> + %% Use higher version + Version; + false -> + GoodVersion + end + end, + do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions, BetterVersion). + +%%-------------Encode handshakes -------------------------------- encode_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) -> PLen = byte_size(P), @@ -1928,6 +1688,126 @@ encode_protocol(Protocol, Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Protocol), <<Acc/binary, ?BYTE(Len), Protocol/binary>>. +enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> + EncParams = encode_server_key(Params), + case HashAlgo of + null -> + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {null, anon}, + signature = <<>>}; + _ -> + Hash = + server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + signature = Signature} + end. + +%% While the RFC opens the door to allow ALPN during renegotiation, in practice +%% this does not work and it is recommended to ignore any ALPN extension during +%% renegotiation, as done here. +encode_alpn(_, true) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> + undefined; +encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> + #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. + +hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, + srp = SRP, + signature_algs = HashSigns, + ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, + alpn = ALPN, + next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, + sni = Sni}) -> + [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, + EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + +%%-------------Decode handshakes--------------------------------- +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +%% ECParameters with named_curve +%% TODO: explicit curve +dec_server_key(<<?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), + ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, + _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, + public = ECPoint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint:Len/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + KeyExchange, Version) + when KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; KeyExchange == ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -> + Params = #server_psk_params{ + hint = PskIdentityHint}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, + ?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, Version) -> + DHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + Params = #server_dhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = DHParams}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + PLen + GLen + YLen + 8, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, + ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), + ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, + _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) -> + DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{ + curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, + public = ECPoint}, + Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = DHParams}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, + ?UINT16(BLen), B:BLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, Version) -> + Params = #server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(NLen + GLen + SLen + BLen + 7, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(_, KeyExchange, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_key_exchange, KeyExchange})). + dec_client_key(PKEPMS, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, {3, 0}) -> #encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret = PKEPMS}; dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(_), PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, _) -> @@ -2073,6 +1953,11 @@ dec_sni(<<?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), ?UINT16(Len), dec_sni(<<?BYTE(_), ?UINT16(Len), _:Len, Rest/binary>>) -> dec_sni(Rest); dec_sni(_) -> undefined. +decode_alpn(undefined) -> + undefined; +decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> + decode_protocols(Data, []). + decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> decode_protocols(Protocols, []). @@ -2117,6 +2002,7 @@ from_2bytes(<<>>, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); from_2bytes(<<?UINT16(N), Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> from_2bytes(Rest, [?uint16(N) | Acc]). + key_exchange_alg(rsa) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA; key_exchange_alg(Alg) when Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == dhe_dss; @@ -2140,8 +2026,123 @@ key_exchange_alg(Alg) key_exchange_alg(_) -> ?NULL. +%%-------------Cipher suite handling ----------------------------- +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> + select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); +select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> + select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). + +select_cipher_suite([], _) -> + no_suite; +select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> + case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of + true -> + Suite; + false -> + select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) + end. + +is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> + lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> + case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of + {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> + Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), + PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), + <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + _ -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) + end. + +handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) + when LookupFun == undefined -> + error; +handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> + Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). + +filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> + do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); + +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, + Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == srp_rsa; + KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> + do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> + do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa -> + %% Fixed DH certificates MAY be signed with any hash/signature + %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names + %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when + KeyExchange == dh_anon; + KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; + KeyExchange == srp_anon; + KeyExchange == psk; + KeyExchange == dhe_psk; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> + %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). + +do_filter_hashsigns(SignAlgo, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) -> + case lists:keymember(SignAlgo, 2, HashSigns) of + true -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); + false -> + filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc) + end. + +unavailable_ecc_suites(no_curve) -> + ssl_cipher:ec_keyed_suites(); +unavailable_ecc_suites(_) -> + []. %%-------------Extension handling -------------------------------- +handle_renegotiation_extension(Role, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, + ClientCipherSuites, Compression, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation) -> + case handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, Role, Info, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation, + ClientCipherSuites) of + {ok, ConnectionStates} -> + hello_pending_connection_states(RecordCB, Role, + Version, + NegotiatedCipherSuite, + Random, + Compression, + ConnectionStates); + #alert{} = Alert -> + throw(Alert) + end. + %% Receive protocols, choose one from the list, return it. handle_alpn_extension(_, {error, Reason}) -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, Reason); @@ -2204,150 +2205,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) -> handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) -> Session#session{srp_username = Username}. -%%-------------Misc -------------------------------- - -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, false) -> - select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites); -select_cipher_suite(CipherSuites, Suites, true) -> - select_cipher_suite(Suites, CipherSuites). - -select_cipher_suite([], _) -> - no_suite; -select_cipher_suite([Suite | ClientSuites], SupportedSuites) -> - case is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) of - true -> - Suite; - false -> - select_cipher_suite(ClientSuites, SupportedSuites) - end. - -int_to_bin(I) -> - L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, - <<I:(L*8)>>. - -is_member(Suite, SupportedSuites) -> - lists:member(Suite, SupportedSuites). - -select_compression(_CompressionMetodes) -> - ?NULL. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, _) -> - undefined; -available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = SupportedHashSigns}; -available_signature_algs(_, _) -> - undefined. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), 0:(Len*8), ?UINT16(Len), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret) -> - case handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup) of - {ok, PSK} when is_binary(PSK) -> - Len = erlang:byte_size(PremasterSecret), - PSKLen = erlang:byte_size(PSK), - <<?UINT16(Len), PremasterSecret/binary, ?UINT16(PSKLen), PSK/binary>>; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - _ -> - throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER)) - end. - -handle_psk_identity(_PSKIdentity, LookupFun) - when LookupFun == undefined -> - error; -handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> - Fun(psk, PSKIdentity, UserState). - -crl_check(_, false, _,_,_, _, _) -> - valid; -crl_check(_, peer, _, _,_, valid, _) -> %% Do not check CAs with this option. - valid; -crl_check(OtpCert, Check, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, {Callback, CRLDbHandle}, _, CertPath) -> - Options = [{issuer_fun, {fun(_DP, CRL, Issuer, DBInfo) -> - ssl_crl:trusted_cert_and_path(CRL, Issuer, {CertPath, - DBInfo}) - end, {CertDbHandle, CertDbRef}}}, - {update_crl, fun(DP, CRL) -> Callback:fresh_crl(DP, CRL) end}, - {undetermined_details, true} - ], - case dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) of - no_dps -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, - dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), - Options); - DpsAndCRLs -> %% This DP list may be empty if relevant CRLs existed - %% but could not be retrived, will result in {bad_cert, revocation_status_undetermined} - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, DpsAndCRLs, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, Check, dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, - CRLDbHandle, same_issuer), Options); - Other -> - Other - end - end. - -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, best_effort, Dps, Options) -> - case public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options) of - {bad_cert, {revocation_status_undetermined, _}} -> - valid; - Other -> - Other - end; -crl_check_same_issuer(OtpCert, _, Dps, Options) -> - public_key:pkix_crls_validate(OtpCert, Dps, Options). - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, ext) -> - case public_key:pkix_dist_points(OtpCert) of - [] -> - no_dps; - DistPoints -> - Issuer = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.issuer, - CRLs = distpoints_lookup(DistPoints, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle), - dps_and_crls(DistPoints, CRLs, []) - end; - -dps_and_crls(OtpCert, Callback, CRLDbHandle, same_issuer) -> - DP = #'DistributionPoint'{distributionPoint = {fullName, GenNames}} = - public_key:pkix_dist_point(OtpCert), - CRLs = lists:flatmap(fun({directoryName, Issuer}) -> - Callback:select(Issuer, CRLDbHandle); - (_) -> - [] - end, GenNames), - [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs]. - -dps_and_crls([], _, Acc) -> - Acc; -dps_and_crls([DP | Rest], CRLs, Acc) -> - DpCRL = [{DP, {CRL, public_key:der_decode('CertificateList', CRL)}} || CRL <- CRLs], - dps_and_crls(Rest, CRLs, DpCRL ++ Acc). - -distpoints_lookup([],_, _, _) -> - []; -distpoints_lookup([DistPoint | Rest], Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle) -> - Result = - try Callback:lookup(DistPoint, Issuer, CRLDbHandle) - catch - error:undef -> - %% The callback module still uses the 2-argument - %% version of the lookup function. - Callback:lookup(DistPoint, CRLDbHandle) - end, - case Result of - not_available -> - distpoints_lookup(Rest, Issuer, Callback, CRLDbHandle); - CRLs -> - CRLs - end. sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> rsa; @@ -2398,7 +2255,6 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when true; is_acceptable_hash_sign(_,_, _,_,_) -> false. - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). @@ -2418,27 +2274,164 @@ sign_type(dsa) -> sign_type(ecdsa) -> ?ECDSA_SIGN. - -bad_key(#'DSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_dsa_key; -bad_key(#'RSAPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_rsa_key; -bad_key(#'ECPrivateKey'{}) -> - unacceptable_ecdsa_key. - -available_signature_algs(undefined, SupportedHashSigns, _, Version) when - Version >= {3,3} -> - SupportedHashSigns; -available_signature_algs(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, SupportedHashSigns, - _, Version) when Version >= {3,3} -> - sets:to_list(sets:intersection(sets:from_list(ClientHashSigns), - sets:from_list(SupportedHashSigns))); -available_signature_algs(_, _, _, _) -> - undefined. - server_name(_, _, server) -> undefined; %% Not interesting to check your own name. server_name(undefined, Host, client) -> {fallback, Host}; %% Fallback to Host argument to connect server_name(SNI, _, client) -> SNI. %% If Server Name Indication is available + +client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, + EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; + _ -> + {undefined, undefined} + end. + +server_ecc_extension(_Version, EcPointFormats) -> + CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), + case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of + true -> + handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(EcPointFormats); + false -> + undefined + end. + +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(undefined) -> + undefined; +handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}. + +advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> + false; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> + advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). + +select_shared_curve([], _) -> + no_curve; +select_shared_curve([Curve | Rest], Curves) -> + case lists:member(Curve, Curves) of + true -> + {namedCurve, Curve}; + false -> + select_shared_curve(Rest, Curves) + end. + +sni(undefined) -> + undefined; +sni(disable) -> + undefined; +sni(Hostname) -> + #sni{hostname = Hostname}. + +renegotiation_info(_, client, _, false) -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined}; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, false) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Data}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end; + +renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, ConnectionStates, true) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState) of + true -> + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<CData/binary, SData/binary>>}; + false -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0)}, + ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, _, _, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(true, ConnectionStates)}; + false -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)} + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, _, undefined, ConnectionStates, false, _, _) -> + {ok, ssl_record:set_renegotiation_flag(false, ConnectionStates)}; + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, client, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientServerVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, _) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + CData = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + SData = maps:get(server_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case <<CData/binary, SData/binary>> == ClientServerVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, client_renegotiation) + end; +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, server, #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ClientVerify}, + ConnectionStates, true, _, CipherSuites) -> + + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + Data = maps:get(client_verify_data, ConnectionState), + case Data == ClientVerify of + true -> + {ok, ConnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, server_renegotiation) + end + end; + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, client, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, _) -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation); + +handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, undefined, ConnectionStates, true, SecureRenegotation, CipherSuites) -> + case is_member(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, CipherSuites) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {server_renegotiation, empty_renegotiation_info_scsv}); + false -> + handle_renegotiation_info(RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) + end. + +handle_renegotiation_info(_RecordCB, ConnectionStates, SecureRenegotation) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + case {SecureRenegotation, maps:get(secure_renegotiation, ConnectionState)} of + {_, true} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, already_secure); + {true, false} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?NO_RENEGOTIATION); + {false, false} -> + {ok, ConnectionStates} + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl index 24ac34653e..bbe1374fec 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ %% sslv3 is considered insecure due to lack of padding check (Poodle attack) %% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default -define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). +-define(ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). -define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). -define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). -define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). @@ -95,7 +96,8 @@ certfile :: binary(), cert :: public_key:der_encoded() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', keyfile :: binary(), - key :: {'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | secret_printout() | 'undefined', + key :: {'RSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' | 'PrivateKeyInfo', + public_key:der_encoded()} | key_map() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', password :: string() | secret_printout() | 'undefined', cacerts :: [public_key:der_encoded()] | secret_printout() | 'undefined', cacertfile :: binary(), @@ -164,7 +166,15 @@ connection_cb }). - +-type key_map() :: #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, + %% engine and key_id ought to + %% be :=, but putting it in + %% the spec gives dialyzer warning + %% of correct code! + engine => crypto:engine_ref(), + key_id => crypto:key_id(), + password => crypto:password() + }. -type state_name() :: hello | abbreviated | certify | cipher | connection. -type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} | {next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} | diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index 003ad4994b..c0eee466ae 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ -type ssl_atom_version() :: tls_record:tls_atom_version(). -type connection_states() :: term(). %% Map -type connection_state() :: term(). %% Map + %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Connection state handling %%==================================================================== - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec current_connection_state(connection_states(), read | write) -> connection_state(). @@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ set_pending_cipher_state(#{pending_read := Read, pending_read => Read#{cipher_state => ServerState}, pending_write => Write#{cipher_state => ClientState}}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Compression +%%==================================================================== uncompress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> {Data, CS}. @@ -282,6 +285,11 @@ compress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> compressions() -> [?byte(?NULL)]. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Payload encryption/decryption +%%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(ssl_version(), iodata(), connection_state(), MacHash::binary()) -> {CipherFragment::binary(), connection_state()}. @@ -318,7 +326,7 @@ cipher_aead(Version, Fragment, %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decipher(ssl_version(), binary(), connection_state(), boolean()) -> - {binary(), binary(), connection_state} | #alert{}. + {binary(), binary(), connection_state()} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Payload decryption %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index 62452808ae..2872ca9fe5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -45,10 +45,8 @@ %% Setup -export([start_fsm/8, start_link/7, init/1]). --export([encode_data/3, encode_alert/3]). - %% State transition handling --export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4]). +-export([next_record/1, next_event/3, next_event/4, handle_common_event/4]). %% Handshake handling -export([renegotiate/2, send_handshake/2, @@ -56,11 +54,11 @@ reinit_handshake_data/1, select_sni_extension/1, empty_connection_state/2]). %% Alert and close handling --export([send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). +-export([encode_alert/3, send_alert/2, close/5, protocol_name/0]). %% Data handling --export([passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, handle_common_event/4, send/3, - socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). +-export([encode_data/3, passive_receive/2, next_record_if_active/1, send/3, + socket/5, setopts/3, getopts/3]). %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states @@ -72,6 +70,9 @@ %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== +%%==================================================================== +%% Setup +%%==================================================================== start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = false},_, Tracker} = Opts, User, {CbModule, _,_, _} = CbInfo, Timeout) -> @@ -100,6 +101,165 @@ start_fsm(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {#ssl_options{erl_dist = true},_, Tracker} = Error end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> + {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. +%% +%% Description: Creates a gen_statem process which calls Module:init/1 to +%% initialize. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> + {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. + +init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), + try + State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) + catch throw:Error -> + gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error, State0}) + end. +%%==================================================================== +%% State transition handling +%%==================================================================== +next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> + {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; + +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} + = Buffers, + connection_states = ConnStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of + {Plain, ConnStates} -> + {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, + connection_states = ConnStates}}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + {Alert, State} + end; +next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, + socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, + transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> + case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of + ok -> + {no_record, State}; + _ -> + self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, + {no_record, State} + end; +next_record(State) -> + {no_record, State}. + +next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). + +next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> + case next_record_if_active(State0) of + {no_record, State} -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); + {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end; +next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> + case Record of + no_record -> + {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; + #ssl_tls{} = Record -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} + end. + +handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); +%%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, + StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers, + negotiated_version = Version, + ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> + try + {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), + State1 = + State0#state{protocol_buffers = + Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, + case Packets of + [] -> + assert_buffer_sanity(Buf, Options), + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets), + case StateName of + connection -> + ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State1, Events); + _ -> + {next_state, StateName, + State1#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} + end + end + catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) + end; +%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; +%%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; +%%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of + Alerts = [_|_] -> + handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); + [] -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), + Version, StateName, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), + Version, StateName, State) + + end; +%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages +handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> + {next_state, StateName, State}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Handshake handling +%%==================================================================== +renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> + %% Handle same way as if server requested + %% the renegotiation + Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, + [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + +renegotiate(#state{role = server, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + negotiated_version = Version, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) -> + HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), + Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), + Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State1 = State0#state{connection_states = + ConnectionStates, + tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, + {Record, State} = next_record(State1), + next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions). + send_handshake(Handshake, State) -> send_handshake_flight(queue_handshake(Handshake, State)). @@ -128,15 +288,6 @@ queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version, State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}. -send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. - reinit_handshake_data(State) -> %% premaster_secret, public_key_info and tls_handshake_info %% are only needed during the handshake phase. @@ -155,8 +306,17 @@ select_sni_extension(_) -> empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> ssl_record:empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation). -encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> - tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). +%%==================================================================== +%% Alert and close handling +%%==================================================================== +send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, + socket = Socket, + transport_cb = Transport, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = + encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_alert(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> @@ -166,42 +326,66 @@ encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> tls_record:encode_alert_record(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates). - +%% User closes or recursive call! +close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) -> + tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), + Transport:shutdown(Socket, write), + _ = Transport:recv(Socket, 0, Timeout), + ok; +%% Peer closed socket +close({shutdown, transport_closed}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> + close({close, 0}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); +%% We generate fatal alert +close({shutdown, own_alert}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> + %% Standard trick to try to make sure all + %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the + %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will + %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close. + %% Will return when other side has closed or after timout millisec + %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong + %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that + %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection. + close({close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); +close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> + ok; +%% Other +close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> + Transport:close(Socket). protocol_name() -> "TLS". -%%==================================================================== -%% tls_connection_sup API -%%==================================================================== -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec start_link(atom(), host(), inet:port_number(), port(), list(), pid(), tuple()) -> - {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, reason()}. -%% -%% Description: Creates a gen_fsm process which calls Module:init/1 to -%% initialize. To ensure a synchronized start-up procedure, this function -%% does not return until Module:init/1 has returned. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -start_link(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo) -> - {ok, proc_lib:spawn_link(?MODULE, init, [[Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]])}. +%%==================================================================== +%% Data handling +%%==================================================================== +encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0)-> + tls_record:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0). -init([Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo]) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - State0 = initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, Options, User, CbInfo), - try - State = ssl_connection:ssl_config(State0#state.ssl_options, Role, State0), - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], init, State) - catch throw:Error -> - gen_statem:enter_loop(?MODULE, [], error, {Error, State0}) +passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> + case Buffer of + <<>> -> + {Record, State} = next_record(State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + _ -> + {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), + next_event(StateName, Record, State) end. -callback_mode() -> - state_functions. +next_record_if_active(State = + #state{socket_options = + #socket_options{active = false}}) -> + {no_record ,State}; +next_record_if_active(State) -> + next_record(State). + +send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> + tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker) -> tls_socket:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker). setopts(Transport, Socket, Other) -> tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, Other). + getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag) -> tls_socket:getopts(Transport, Socket, Tag). @@ -244,7 +428,7 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_event(hello, Record, State); init(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -253,9 +437,15 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, + #state{protocol_specific = #{error := Error}} = State) -> + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, {Error, #state{protocol_specific = Map} = State}) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, + State#state{protocol_specific = Map#{error => Error}}); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -285,13 +475,13 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, undefined -> CurrentProtocol; _ -> Protocol0 end, - - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, hello, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -309,7 +499,7 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, hello(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -318,7 +508,7 @@ hello(Type, Event, State) -> abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -327,7 +517,7 @@ abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> certify(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -336,7 +526,7 @@ certify(Type, Event, State) -> cipher(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -394,156 +584,24 @@ death_row(Type, Event, State) -> downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% Event handling functions called by state functions to handle -%% common or unexpected events for the state. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). - -%% raw data from socket, unpack records -handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, - #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> - case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of - {Record, State} -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} - end; -handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, - #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, - socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, - protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}, - negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - - %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, - %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a - %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform - %% with widespread implementation practice. - - case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of - false -> - case Version of - {1, N} when N >= 1 -> - ok; - _ -> - %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, - %% we will conform to the widespread implementation - %% practice and go aginst the spec - %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) - ok - end, - - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; - true -> - %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. - %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again - %% and then receive the final message. - next_event(StateName, no_record, State) - end; -handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). - -handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); - -%%% TLS record protocol level handshake messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, - StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf0} = Buffers, - negotiated_version = Version, - ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> - try - {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), - State1 = - State0#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, - case Packets of - [] -> - assert_buffer_sanity(Buf, Options), - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - Events = tls_handshake_events(Packets), - case StateName of - connection -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State1, Events); - _ -> - {next_state, StateName, - State1#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = unprocessed_events(Events)}, Events} - end - end - catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State0) - end; -%%% TLS record protocol level application data messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {application_data, Data}}]}; -%%% TLS record protocol level change cipher messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, fragment = Data}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = Data}}]}; -%%% TLS record protocol level Alert messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, fragment = EncAlerts}, StateName, - #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - try decode_alerts(EncAlerts) of - Alerts = [_|_] -> - handle_alerts(Alerts, {next_state, StateName, State}); - [] -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, empty_alert), - Version, StateName, State); - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) - catch - _:_ -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, alert_decode_error), - Version, StateName, State) - - end; -%% Ignore unknown TLS record level protocol messages -handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = _Unknown}, StateName, State) -> - {next_state, StateName, State}. - -send(Transport, Socket, Data) -> - tls_socket:send(Transport, Socket, Data). - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +callback_mode() -> + state_functions. + terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> catch ssl_connection:terminate(Reason, StateName, State). format_status(Type, Data) -> ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% code_change(OldVsn, StateName, State, Extra) -> {ok, StateName, NewState} -%% Description: Convert process state when code is changed -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State0, {Direction, From, To}) -> - State = convert_state(State0, Direction, From, To), - {ok, StateName, State}; code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) -> {ok, StateName, State}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0, V2HComp) -> - Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version), - Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Frag, V2HComp), - {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = - tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), - {Encoded, ConnectionStates, Hist}. - -encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> - tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). - -decode_alerts(Bin) -> - ssl_alert:decode(Bin). - initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, User, {CbModule, DataTag, CloseTag, ErrorTag}) -> #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation} = SSLOptions, @@ -582,170 +640,109 @@ initial_state(Role, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Tracker}, Us flight_buffer = [] }. -next_tls_record(Data, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, - tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} = State0) -> - case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, Buf0) of +next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = + #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, + tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} + = State0) -> + case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, + acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), + Buf0) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf1, tls_cipher_texts = CT1}}); #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert + handle_record_alert(Alert, State0) end. -next_record(#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N} = State) when N > 0 -> - {no_record, State#state{unprocessed_handshake_events = N-1}}; - -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = - #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} - = Buffers, - connection_states = ConnStates0, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of - {Plain, ConnStates} -> - {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = - Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, - connection_states = ConnStates}}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {Alert, State} - end; -next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> - case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of - ok -> - {no_record, State}; - _ -> - {socket_closed, State} - end; -next_record(State) -> - {no_record, State}. -next_record_if_active(State = - #state{socket_options = - #socket_options{active = false}}) -> - {no_record ,State}; - -next_record_if_active(State) -> - next_record(State). - -passive_receive(State0 = #state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}, StateName) -> - case Buffer of - <<>> -> - {Record, State} = next_record(State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State); - _ -> - {Record, State} = ssl_connection:read_application_data(<<>>, State0), - next_event(StateName, Record, State) - end. - -next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> - next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). - -next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, _) -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; -next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> - case next_record_if_active(State0) of - {no_record, State} -> - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {socket_closed, State} -> - next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, Actions); - {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end; -next_event(StateName, Record, State, Actions) -> - case Record of - no_record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}; - #ssl_tls{} = Record -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} - end. +acceptable_record_versions(hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = true}}) -> + [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS ++ ['sslv2']]; +acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> + [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS]; +acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = Version}) -> + [Version]. +handle_record_alert(#alert{description = ?BAD_RECORD_MAC}, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = true}}) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION); +handle_record_alert(Alert, _) -> + Alert. tls_handshake_events(Packets) -> lists:map(fun(Packet) -> {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} end, Packets). +%% raw data from socket, upack records +handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, + #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> + case next_tls_record(Data, StateName, State0) of + {Record, State} -> + next_event(StateName, Record, State); + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) + end; +handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, + #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = Active}, + protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = CTs}, + negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> -renegotiate(#state{role = client} = State, Actions) -> - %% Handle same way as if server requested - %% the renegotiation - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {next_state, connection, State#state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, - [{next_event, internal, #hello_request{}} | Actions]}; + %% Note that as of TLS 1.1, + %% failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a + %% session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform + %% with widespread implementation practice. -renegotiate(#state{role = server, - socket = Socket, - transport_cb = Transport, - negotiated_version = Version, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0, Actions) -> - HelloRequest = ssl_handshake:hello_request(), - Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(HelloRequest, Version), - Hs0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), - send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), - State1 = State0#state{connection_states = - ConnectionStates, - tls_handshake_history = Hs0}, - {Record, State} = next_record(State1), - next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions). + case (Active == false) andalso (CTs =/= []) of + false -> + case Version of + {1, N} when N >= 1 -> + ok; + _ -> + %% As invalidate_sessions here causes performance issues, + %% we will conform to the widespread implementation + %% practice and go aginst the spec + %%invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session) + ok + end, + + ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); + true -> + %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. + %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again + %% and then receive the final message. + next_event(StateName, no_record, State) + end; +handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State, _Actions}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)). +encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0, V2HComp) -> + Frag = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, Version), + Hist = ssl_handshake:update_handshake_history(Hist0, Frag, V2HComp), + {Encoded, ConnectionStates} = + tls_record:encode_handshake(Frag, Version, ConnectionStates0), + {Encoded, ConnectionStates, Hist}. -%% User closes or recursive call! -close({close, Timeout}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, _,_) -> - tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}]), - Transport:shutdown(Socket, write), - _ = Transport:recv(Socket, 0, Timeout), - ok; -%% Peer closed socket -close({shutdown, transport_closed}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> - close({close, 0}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); -%% We generate fatal alert -close({shutdown, own_alert}, Socket, Transport = gen_tcp, ConnectionStates, Check) -> - %% Standard trick to try to make sure all - %% data sent to the tcp port is really delivered to the - %% peer application before tcp port is closed so that the peer will - %% get the correct TLS alert message and not only a transport close. - %% Will return when other side has closed or after timout millisec - %% e.g. we do not want to hang if something goes wrong - %% with the network but we want to maximise the odds that - %% peer application gets all data sent on the tcp connection. - close({close, ?DEFAULT_TIMEOUT}, Socket, Transport, ConnectionStates, Check); -close(downgrade, _,_,_,_) -> - ok; -%% Other -close(_, Socket, Transport, _,_) -> - Transport:close(Socket). - -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)}; -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down)}. +encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record:encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates). -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up) -> - {Head, Tail} = lists:split(5, tuple_to_list(Options)), - list_to_tuple(Head ++ [{partial_chain, fun(_) -> unknown_ca end}] ++ Tail); -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down) -> - list_to_tuple(proplists:delete(partial_chain, tuple_to_list(Options))). +decode_alerts(Bin) -> + ssl_alert:decode(Bin). -gen_handshake(GenConnection, StateName, Type, Event, +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - try GenConnection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of Result -> Result catch diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index b54540393a..8817418fb0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -32,13 +32,19 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --export([client_hello/8, hello/4, - get_tls_handshake/4, encode_handshake/2, decode_handshake/4]). +%% Handshake handling +-export([client_hello/8, hello/4]). + +%% Handshake encoding +-export([encode_handshake/2]). + +%% Handshake decodeing +-export([get_tls_handshake/4, decode_handshake/4]). -type tls_handshake() :: #client_hello{} | ssl_handshake:ssl_handshake(). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handshake handling %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), @@ -54,18 +60,14 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, } = SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), - #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), AvailableCipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, AvailableCipherSuites, - SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - CipherSuites = - case Fallback of - true -> - [?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV | ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation)]; - false -> - ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation) - end, + SslOpts, ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation), + CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation, Fallback), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, client_version = Version, @@ -85,8 +87,8 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ssl_record:connection_states(), alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}| {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, - #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | undefined} | - #alert{}. + #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher:hash(), ssl_cipher:sign_algo()} | + undefined} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -99,7 +101,8 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of true -> handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; @@ -127,18 +130,29 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data) end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake encodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(tls_handshake(), tls_record:tls_version()) -> iolist(). %% %% Description: Encode a handshake packet -%%--------------------------------------------------------------------x +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_handshake(Package, Version) -> {MsgType, Bin} = enc_handshake(Package, Version), Len = byte_size(Bin), [MsgType, ?uint24(Len), Bin]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Handshake decodeing +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), #ssl_options{}) -> +-spec get_tls_handshake(tls_record:tls_version(), binary(), binary() | iolist(), + #ssl_options{}) -> {[tls_handshake()], binary()}. %% %% Description: Given buffered and new data from ssl_record, collects @@ -153,37 +167,45 @@ get_tls_handshake(Version, Data, Buffer, Options) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = Compressions, - random = Random, - extensions = #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} = HelloExt}, +handle_client_hello(Version, + #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = Compressions, + random = Random, + extensions = + #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, + signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} + = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, honor_ecc_order = ECCOrder} = SslOpts, - {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, Renegotiation) -> + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, ConnectionStates0, Cert, _}, + Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert, Version), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, SupportedECCs, ECCOrder), {Type, #session{cipher_suite = CipherSuite} = Session1} - = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, - Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, Version, - SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), + = ssl_handshake:select_session(SugesstedId, CipherSuites, + AvailableHashSigns, Compressions, + Port, Session0#session{ecc = ECCCurve}, + Version, SslOpts, Cache, CacheCb, Cert), case CipherSuite of no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, + SupportedHashSigns, Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; HashSign -> - handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, HelloExt, - SslOpts, Session1, ConnectionStates0, + handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, + CipherSuites, HelloExt, + SslOpts, Session1, + ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) end end; @@ -191,6 +213,59 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, #client_hello{session_id = SugesstedId, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end. +handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, + HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation, HashSign) -> + try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuites, + HelloExt, Version, SslOpts, + Session0, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> + {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, + ServerHelloExt, HashSign} + catch throw:Alert -> + Alert + end. + + +handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> + case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, + Compression, HelloExt, Version, + SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> + {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} + end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> + {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; +enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = Random, + session_id = SessionID, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + compression_methods = CompMethods, + extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) -> + SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), + BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), + CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), + BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), + CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), + ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), + + {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, + ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, + ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; + +enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> + ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body:Length/binary,Rest/binary>>, #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2Hello} = Opts, Acc) -> @@ -219,11 +294,12 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, Bin, true) -> decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, Bin, false) -> decode_hello(Bin); -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, - ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, - ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, - ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, - Extensions/binary>>, _) -> +decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, + ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, + ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, + ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, + Extensions/binary>>, _) -> DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), @@ -268,53 +344,3 @@ decode_v2_hello(<<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), compression_methods = [?NULL], extensions = #hello_extensions{} }. - -enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> - {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; -enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, - random = Random, - session_id = SessionID, - cipher_suites = CipherSuites, - compression_methods = CompMethods, - extensions = HelloExtensions}, _Version) -> - SIDLength = byte_size(SessionID), - BinCompMethods = list_to_binary(CompMethods), - CmLength = byte_size(BinCompMethods), - BinCipherSuites = list_to_binary(CipherSuites), - CsLength = byte_size(BinCipherSuites), - ExtensionsBin = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(HelloExtensions), - - {?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, - ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, - ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, - ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - -enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> - ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). - - -handle_client_hello_extensions(Version, Type, Random, CipherSuites, - HelloExt, SslOpts, Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, HashSign) -> - try ssl_handshake:handle_client_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuites, - HelloExt, Version, SslOpts, - Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt} -> - {Version, {Type, Session}, ConnectionStates, Protocol, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} - catch throw:Alert -> - Alert - end. - - -handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - case ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions(tls_record, Random, CipherSuite, - Compression, HelloExt, Version, - SslOpt, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert; - {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> - {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} - end. - diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index 4ac6cdc6b5..188ec6809d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -32,22 +32,22 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_tls_records/2, init_connection_states/2]). +-export([get_tls_records/3, init_connection_states/2]). %% Encoding TLS records -export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3, encode_change_cipher_spec/2, encode_data/3]). -export([encode_plain_text/4]). +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/3]). + %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2, is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). -%% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/3]). - -export_type([tls_version/0, tls_atom_version/0]). -type tls_version() :: ssl_record:ssl_version(). @@ -56,13 +56,12 @@ -compile(inline). %%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API +%% Handling of incoming data %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_connection_states(client | server, one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled) -> ssl_record:connection_states(). -%% % - % +%% %% Description: Creates a connection_states record with appropriate %% values for the initial SSL connection setup. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -76,16 +75,29 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> pending_write => Pending}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_tls_records(binary(), binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec get_tls_records(binary(), [tls_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_tls_records(Data, <<>>) -> - get_tls_records_aux(Data, []); -get_tls_records(Data, Buffer) -> - get_tls_records_aux(list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), []). +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> + BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), + case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of + N when N >= 3 -> + case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of + true -> + get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + _ -> + get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []) + end. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_handshake(iolist(), tls_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> @@ -141,6 +153,74 @@ encode_data(Frag, Version, Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, Version, BCA, BeastMitigation), encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, Version, ConnectionStates). +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> + {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode cipher text +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, + fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, + #{current_read := + #{compression_state := CompressionS0, + sequence_number := Seq, + cipher_state := CipherS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = + BulkCipherAlgo, + compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) -> + AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0), + case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of + {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> + {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, + PlainFragment, CompressionS0), + ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ + current_read => ReadState0#{ + cipher_state => CipherS1, + sequence_number => Seq + 1, + compression_state => CompressionS1}}, + {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end; + +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, + fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, + #{current_read := + #{compression_state := CompressionS0, + sequence_number := Seq, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> + case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of + {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), + case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of + true -> + {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, + PlainFragment, CompressionS0), + ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ + current_read => ReadState1#{ + sequence_number => Seq + 1, + compression_state => CompressionS1}}, + {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) + end; + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Protocol version handling +%%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec protocol_version(tls_atom_version() | tls_version()) -> @@ -278,11 +358,6 @@ supported_protocol_versions([_|_] = Vsns) -> end end. -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%% -%% Description: ssl version 2 is not acceptable security risks are too big. -%% -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec is_acceptable_version(tls_version()) -> boolean(). is_acceptable_version({N,_}) when N >= ?LOWEST_MAJOR_SUPPORTED_VERSION -> @@ -302,6 +377,7 @@ hello_version(Version, _) when Version >= {3, 3} -> Version; hello_version(_, Versions) -> lowest_protocol_version(Versions). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -318,6 +394,19 @@ initial_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> server_verify_data => undefined }. +assert_version(<<1:1, Length0:15, Data0:Length0/binary, _/binary>>, Versions) -> + case Data0 of + <<?BYTE(?CLIENT_HELLO), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), _/binary>> -> + %% First check v2_hello_compatible mode is active + lists:member({2,0}, Versions) andalso + %% andalso we want to negotiate higher version + lists:member({Major, Minor}, Versions -- [{2,0}]); + _ -> + false + end; +assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) -> + is_acceptable_version({MajVer, MinVer}, Versions). + get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> @@ -361,10 +450,9 @@ get_tls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, Data0:Length0/binary, Rest/binary>>, end; get_tls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, + ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); - get_tls_records_aux(<<1:1, Length0:15, _/binary>>,_Acc) when Length0 > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); @@ -376,37 +464,17 @@ get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) end. - +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{current_write := Write0} = ConnectionStates) -> {CipherFragment, Write1} = do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, Write0), {CipherText, Write} = encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, Version, CipherFragment, Write1), {CipherText, ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}. -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). - -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> - Ver; -highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> - highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). - encode_tls_cipher_text(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, Fragment, #{sequence_number := Seq} = Write) -> Length = erlang:iolist_size(Fragment), {[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment], Write#{sequence_number => Seq +1}}. -highest_protocol_version() -> - highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -lowest_protocol_version() -> - lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). - -sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> - CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), - proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). - encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) -> {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} = lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) -> @@ -415,6 +483,31 @@ encode_iolist(Type, Data, Version, ConnectionStates0) -> {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]} end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data), {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + } = WriteState0) -> + {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), + WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, + AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1), + ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD); +do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} + }= WriteState0) -> + {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), + WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, + MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1), + ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash); +do_encode_plain_text(_,_,_,CS) -> + exit({cs, CS}). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, + #{sequence_number := SeqNo}) -> + <<?UINT64(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. %% 1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast, RC4 chiphers are %% not vulnerable to this attack. @@ -440,89 +533,25 @@ do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) -> _ -> lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin]) end. - %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> - {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. -%% -%% Description: Decode cipher text -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, - #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - cipher_state := CipherS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - bulk_cipher_algorithm = - BulkCipherAlgo, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, _) -> - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, ReadState0), - case ssl_cipher:decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, Seq, AAD, CipherFragment, Version) of - {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, - PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ - current_read => ReadState0#{ - cipher_state => CipherS1, - sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert - end; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +lowest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + lowest_list_protocol_version(lowest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, - fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, - #{current_read := - #{compression_state := CompressionS0, - sequence_number := Seq, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = ReadState0} = ConnnectionStates0, PaddingCheck) -> - case ssl_record:decipher(Version, CipherFragment, ReadState0, PaddingCheck) of - {PlainFragment, Mac, ReadState1} -> - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, PlainFragment, ReadState1), - case ssl_record:is_correct_mac(Mac, MacHash) of - true -> - {Plain, CompressionS1} = ssl_record:uncompress(CompAlg, - PlainFragment, CompressionS0), - ConnnectionStates = ConnnectionStates0#{ - current_read => ReadState1#{ - sequence_number => Seq + 1, - compression_state => CompressionS1}}, - {CipherText#ssl_tls{fragment = Plain}, ConnnectionStates}; - false -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) - end; - #alert{} = Alert -> - Alert - end. +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver, []) -> + Ver; +highest_list_protocol_version(Ver1, [Ver2 | Rest]) -> + highest_list_protocol_version(highest_protocol_version(Ver1, Ver2), Rest). + +highest_protocol_version() -> + highest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +lowest_protocol_version() -> + lowest_protocol_version(supported_protocol_versions()). + +sufficient_tlsv1_2_crypto_support() -> + CryptoSupport = crypto:supports(), + proplists:get_bool(sha256, proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupport)). -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{ - cipher_type = ?AEAD, - compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - } = WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - AAD = calc_aad(Type, Version, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher_aead(Version, Comp, WriteState1, AAD); -do_encode_plain_text(Type, Version, Data, #{compression_state := CompS0, - security_parameters := - #security_parameters{compression_algorithm = CompAlg} - }= WriteState0) -> - {Comp, CompS1} = ssl_record:compress(CompAlg, Data, CompS0), - WriteState1 = WriteState0#{compression_state => CompS1}, - MacHash = ssl_cipher:calc_mac_hash(Type, Version, Comp, WriteState1), - ssl_record:cipher(Version, Comp, WriteState1, MacHash); -do_encode_plain_text(_,_,_,CS) -> - exit({cs, CS}). -calc_aad(Type, {MajVer, MinVer}, - #{sequence_number := SeqNo}) -> - <<?UINT64(SeqNo), ?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl index a8fe119bf8..a31ab8d044 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -202,23 +202,13 @@ suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, - - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ]; suites(3) -> [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -230,16 +220,10 @@ suites(3) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, - ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, - ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, @@ -253,9 +237,7 @@ suites(3) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 %% not supported %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, @@ -264,8 +246,6 @@ suites(3) -> %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ] ++ suites(2). - - signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) -> CryptoSupports = crypto:supports(), Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports), diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile index c7e2f402af..9347b56f39 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ VSN=$(GS_VSN) MODULES = \ ssl_test_lib \ + ssl_bench_test_lib \ + ssl_dist_test_lib \ ssl_alpn_handshake_SUITE \ ssl_basic_SUITE \ ssl_bench_SUITE \ @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ MODULES = \ ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE\ ssl_crl_SUITE\ ssl_dist_SUITE \ + ssl_dist_bench_SUITE \ + ssl_engine_SUITE\ ssl_handshake_SUITE \ ssl_npn_hello_SUITE \ ssl_npn_handshake_SUITE \ @@ -61,7 +65,8 @@ MODULES = \ ERL_FILES = $(MODULES:%=%.erl) -HRL_FILES = +HRL_FILES = \ + ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl HRL_FILES_SRC = \ ssl_api.hrl\ diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec index 0ad94e22bc..cb54168d36 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ {suites,"../ssl_test",all}. -{skip_cases, "../ssl_test", - ssl_bench_SUITE, [setup_sequential, setup_concurrent, payload_simple, - use_pem_cache, bypass_pem_cache], - "Benchmarks run separately"}. +{skip_suites, "../ssl_test", + [ssl_bench_SUITE, ssl_dist_bench_SUITE], + "Benchmarks run separately"}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl index 3b4ca40058..05979d3cfd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ api_tests() -> server_name_indication_option, accept_pool, prf, - socket_options + socket_options, + cipher_suites ]. api_tests_tls() -> @@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ renegotiate_tests() -> [client_renegotiate, server_renegotiate, client_secure_renegotiate, + client_secure_renegotiate_fallback, client_renegotiate_reused_session, server_renegotiate_reused_session, client_no_wrap_sequence_number, @@ -207,12 +209,14 @@ tls_cipher_tests() -> rc4_ecdsa_cipher_suites]. cipher_tests() -> - [cipher_suites, + [old_cipher_suites, cipher_suites_mix, ciphers_rsa_signed_certs, ciphers_rsa_signed_certs_openssl_names, ciphers_dsa_signed_certs, ciphers_dsa_signed_certs_openssl_names, + chacha_rsa_cipher_suites, + chacha_ecdsa_cipher_suites, anonymous_cipher_suites, psk_cipher_suites, psk_with_hint_cipher_suites, @@ -280,8 +284,11 @@ end_per_suite(_Config) -> init_per_group(GroupName, Config) when GroupName == basic_tls; GroupName == options_tls; + GroupName == options; GroupName == basic; - GroupName == options -> + GroupName == session; + GroupName == error_handling_tests_tls + -> ssl_test_lib:clean_tls_version(Config); init_per_group(GroupName, Config) -> case ssl_test_lib:is_tls_version(GroupName) andalso ssl_test_lib:sufficient_crypto_support(GroupName) of @@ -381,12 +388,12 @@ init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) when TestCase == psk_cipher_suites; TestCase == anonymous_cipher_suites; TestCase == psk_anon_cipher_suites; TestCase == psk_anon_with_hint_cipher_suites; - TestCase == srp_cipher_suites, - TestCase == srp_anon_cipher_suites, - TestCase == srp_dsa_cipher_suites, - TestCase == des_rsa_cipher_suites, - TestCase == des_ecdh_rsa_cipher_suites, - TestCase == versions_option, + TestCase == srp_cipher_suites; + TestCase == srp_anon_cipher_suites; + TestCase == srp_dsa_cipher_suites; + TestCase == des_rsa_cipher_suites; + TestCase == des_ecdh_rsa_cipher_suites; + TestCase == versions_option; TestCase == tls_tcp_connect_big -> ssl_test_lib:ct_log_supported_protocol_versions(Config), ct:timetrap({seconds, 60}), @@ -427,6 +434,12 @@ init_per_testcase(rizzo_disabled, Config) -> ct:timetrap({seconds, 60}), rizzo_add_mitigation_option(disabled, Config); +init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) when TestCase == no_reuses_session_server_restart_new_cert_file; + TestCase == no_reuses_session_server_restart_new_cert -> + ct:log("TLS/SSL version ~p~n ", [tls_record:supported_protocol_versions()]), + ct:timetrap({seconds, 15}), + Config; + init_per_testcase(prf, Config) -> ct:log("TLS/SSL version ~p~n ", [tls_record:supported_protocol_versions()]), ct:timetrap({seconds, 40}), @@ -655,7 +668,7 @@ connection_info(Config) when is_list(Config) -> {from, self()}, {mfa, {?MODULE, connection_info_result, []}}, {options, - [{ciphers,[{rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}]} | + [{ciphers,[{dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}]} | ClientOpts]}]), ct:log("Testcase ~p, Client ~p Server ~p ~n", @@ -663,7 +676,7 @@ connection_info(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), - ServerMsg = ClientMsg = {ok, {Version, {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}}}, + ServerMsg = ClientMsg = {ok, {Version, {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}}}, ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, ServerMsg, Client, ClientMsg), @@ -693,8 +706,6 @@ secret_connection_info(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ct:log("Testcase ~p, Client ~p Server ~p ~n", [self(), Client, Server]), - - Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, true, Client, true), @@ -1119,11 +1130,16 @@ fallback(Config) when is_list(Config) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_format() -> - [{doc, "Test that cipher conversion from tuples to binarys works"}]. + [{doc, "Test that cipher conversion from maps | tuples | stings to binarys works"}]. cipher_format(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - {ok, Socket} = ssl:listen(0, [{ciphers, ssl:cipher_suites()}]), - ssl:close(Socket). - + {ok, Socket0} = ssl:listen(0, [{ciphers, ssl:cipher_suites(default, 'tlsv1.2')}]), + ssl:close(Socket0), + %% Legacy + {ok, Socket1} = ssl:listen(0, [{ciphers, ssl:cipher_suites()}]), + ssl:close(Socket1), + {ok, Socket2} = ssl:listen(0, [{ciphers, ssl:cipher_suites(openssl)}]), + ssl:close(Socket2). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- peername() -> @@ -1274,22 +1290,83 @@ sockname_result(S) -> ssl:sockname(S). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + cipher_suites() -> - [{doc,"Test API function cipher_suites/0"}]. + [{doc,"Test API function cipher_suites/2, filter_cipher_suites/2" + " and prepend|append_cipher_suites/2"}]. cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - MandatoryCipherSuite = {rsa,'3des_ede_cbc',sha}, + MandatoryCipherSuiteTLS1_0TLS1_1 = #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}, + MandatoryCipherSuiteTLS1_0TLS1_2 = #{key_exchange =>rsa, + cipher => 'aes_128_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}, + Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), + All = [_|_] = ssl:cipher_suites(all, Version), + Default = [_|_] = ssl:cipher_suites(default, Version), + Anonymous = [_|_] = ssl:cipher_suites(anonymous, Version), + true = length(Default) < length(All), + Filters = [{key_exchange, + fun(dhe_rsa) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end + }, + {cipher, + fun(aes_256_cbc) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end + }, + {mac, + fun(sha) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end + } + ], + Cipher = #{cipher => aes_256_cbc, + key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}, + [Cipher] = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(All, Filters), + [Cipher | Rest0] = ssl:prepend_cipher_suites([Cipher], Default), + [Cipher | Rest0] = ssl:prepend_cipher_suites(Filters, Default), + true = lists:member(Cipher, Default), + false = lists:member(Cipher, Rest0), + [Cipher | Rest1] = lists:reverse(ssl:append_cipher_suites([Cipher], Default)), + [Cipher | Rest1] = lists:reverse(ssl:append_cipher_suites(Filters, Default)), + true = lists:member(Cipher, Default), + false = lists:member(Cipher, Rest1), + [] = lists:dropwhile(fun(X) -> not lists:member(X, Default) end, Anonymous), + [] = lists:dropwhile(fun(X) -> not lists:member(X, All) end, Anonymous), + true = lists:member(MandatoryCipherSuiteTLS1_0TLS1_1, All), + true = lists:member(MandatoryCipherSuiteTLS1_0TLS1_2, All). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +old_cipher_suites() -> + [{doc,"Test API function cipher_suites/0"}]. + +old_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + MandatoryCipherSuite = {rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, [_|_] = Suites = ssl:cipher_suites(), - true = lists:member(MandatoryCipherSuite, Suites), Suites = ssl:cipher_suites(erlang), - [_|_] =ssl:cipher_suites(openssl). + [_|_] = ssl:cipher_suites(openssl), + true = lists:member(MandatoryCipherSuite, ssl:cipher_suites(all)). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites_mix() -> [{doc,"Test to have old and new cipher suites at the same time"}]. cipher_suites_mix(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - CipherSuites = [{ecdh_rsa,aes_128_cbc,sha256,sha256}, {rsa,aes_128_cbc,sha}], + CipherSuites = [{dhe_rsa,aes_128_cbc,sha256,sha256}, {dhe_rsa,aes_128_cbc,sha}], ClientOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), ServerOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config), @@ -2357,7 +2434,24 @@ ciphers_dsa_signed_certs_openssl_names() -> ciphers_dsa_signed_certs_openssl_names(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:openssl_dsa_suites(), run_suites(Ciphers, Config, dsa). + %%------------------------------------------------------------------- +chacha_rsa_cipher_suites()-> + [{doc,"Test the cacha with ECDSA signed certs ciphersuites"}]. +chacha_rsa_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = [S || {KeyEx,_,_} = S <- ssl_test_lib:chacha_suites(NVersion), + KeyEx == ecdhe_rsa, KeyEx == dhe_rsa], + run_suites(Ciphers, Config, chacha_ecdsa). + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +chacha_ecdsa_cipher_suites()-> + [{doc,"Test the cacha with ECDSA signed certs ciphersuites"}]. +chacha_ecdsa_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = [S || {ecdhe_ecdsa,_,_} = S <- ssl_test_lib:chacha_suites(NVersion)], + run_suites(Ciphers, Config, chacha_rsa). +%%----------------------------------------------------------------- anonymous_cipher_suites()-> [{doc,"Test the anonymous ciphersuites"}]. anonymous_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> @@ -2437,14 +2531,15 @@ rc4_ecdsa_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> des_rsa_cipher_suites()-> [{doc, "Test the des_rsa ciphersuites"}]. des_rsa_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:des_suites(Config), + NVersion = tls_record:highest_protocol_version([]), + Ciphers = [S || {rsa,_,_} = S <- ssl_test_lib:des_suites(NVersion)], run_suites(Ciphers, Config, des_rsa). %------------------------------------------------------------------- des_ecdh_rsa_cipher_suites()-> [{doc, "Test ECDH rsa signed ciphersuites"}]. des_ecdh_rsa_cipher_suites(Config) when is_list(Config) -> NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), - Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:des_suites(NVersion), + Ciphers = [S || {dhe_rsa,_,_} = S <- ssl_test_lib:des_suites(NVersion)], run_suites(Ciphers, Config, des_dhe_rsa). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -2804,6 +2899,36 @@ client_secure_renegotiate(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ssl_test_lib:close(Server), ssl_test_lib:close(Client). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +client_secure_renegotiate_fallback() -> + [{doc,"Test that we can set secure_renegotiate to false that is " + "fallback option, we however do not have a insecure server to test against!"}]. +client_secure_renegotiate_fallback(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ServerOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_opts, Config), + ClientOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_opts, Config), + + {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), + + Data = "From erlang to erlang", + + Server = + ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {?MODULE, erlang_ssl_receive, [Data]}}, + {options, [{secure_renegotiate, false} | ServerOpts]}]), + Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), + + Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port}, + {host, Hostname}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {?MODULE, + renegotiate, [Data]}}, + {options, [{reuse_sessions, false}, + {secure_renegotiate, false}| ClientOpts]}]), + + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Client, ok, Server, ok), + ssl_test_lib:close(Server), + ssl_test_lib:close(Client). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- server_renegotiate() -> @@ -3137,18 +3262,25 @@ no_reuses_session_server_restart_new_cert_file(Config) when is_list(Config) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- defaults(Config) when is_list(Config)-> - [_, - {supported, Supported}, - {available, Available}] - = ssl:versions(), - true = lists:member(sslv3, Available), - false = lists:member(sslv3, Supported), + Versions = ssl:versions(), + true = lists:member(sslv3, proplists:get_value(available, Versions)), + false = lists:member(sslv3, proplists:get_value(supported, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1', proplists:get_value(available, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1', proplists:get_value(supported, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1.1', proplists:get_value(available, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1.1', proplists:get_value(supported, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1.2', proplists:get_value(available, Versions)), + true = lists:member('tlsv1.2', proplists:get_value(supported, Versions)), false = lists:member({rsa,rc4_128,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites()), true = lists:member({rsa,rc4_128,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites(all)), false = lists:member({rsa,des_cbc,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites()), true = lists:member({rsa,des_cbc,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites(all)), false = lists:member({dhe_rsa,des_cbc,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites()), - true = lists:member({dhe_rsa,des_cbc,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites(all)). + true = lists:member({dhe_rsa,des_cbc,sha}, ssl:cipher_suites(all)), + true = lists:member('dtlsv1.2', proplists:get_value(available_dtls, Versions)), + true = lists:member('dtlsv1', proplists:get_value(available_dtls, Versions)), + true = lists:member('dtlsv1.2', proplists:get_value(supported_dtls, Versions)), + true = lists:member('dtlsv1', proplists:get_value(supported_dtls, Versions)). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- reuseaddr() -> @@ -3234,16 +3366,16 @@ tls_tcp_reuseaddr(Config) when is_list(Config) -> honor_server_cipher_order() -> [{doc,"Test API honor server cipher order."}]. honor_server_cipher_order(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - ClientCiphers = [{rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ServerCiphers = [{rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}, {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}], -honor_cipher_order(Config, true, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}). + ClientCiphers = [{dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], + ServerCiphers = [{dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}, {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}], +honor_cipher_order(Config, true, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}). honor_client_cipher_order() -> [{doc,"Test API honor server cipher order."}]. honor_client_cipher_order(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - ClientCiphers = [{rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ServerCiphers = [{rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}, {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}], -honor_cipher_order(Config, false, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}). + ClientCiphers = [{dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], + ServerCiphers = [{dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}, {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}], +honor_cipher_order(Config, false, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}). honor_cipher_order(Config, Honor, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, Expected) -> ClientOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_opts, Config), @@ -3759,9 +3891,23 @@ rizzo() -> vunrable to Rizzo/Dungon attack"}]. rizzo(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - Ciphers = [X || X ={_,Y,_} <- ssl:cipher_suites(), Y =/= rc4_128], Prop = proplists:get_value(tc_group_properties, Config), Version = proplists:get_value(name, Prop), + NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(ssl:cipher_suites(all, NVersion), + [{key_exchange, + fun(Alg) when Alg == ecdh_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_rsa-> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}, + {cipher, + fun(rc4_128) -> + false; + (_) -> + true + end}]), + run_send_recv_rizzo(Ciphers, Config, Version, {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_rizzo, []}). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -3773,8 +3919,13 @@ no_rizzo_rc4(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Version = proplists:get_value(name, Prop), NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), %% Test uses RSA certs - Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:rc4_suites(NVersion) -- [{ecdhe_ecdsa,rc4_128,sha}, - {ecdh_ecdsa,rc4_128,sha}], + Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(ssl_test_lib:rc4_suites(NVersion), + [{key_exchange, + fun(Alg) when Alg == ecdh_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_rsa-> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}]), run_send_recv_rizzo(Ciphers, Config, Version, {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_no_rizzo, []}). @@ -3785,10 +3936,21 @@ rizzo_one_n_minus_one(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Prop = proplists:get_value(tc_group_properties, Config), Version = proplists:get_value(name, Prop), NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), - AllSuites = ssl_test_lib:available_suites(NVersion), - Ciphers = [X || X ={_,Y,_} <- AllSuites, Y =/= rc4_128], + Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(ssl:cipher_suites(all, NVersion), + [{key_exchange, + fun(Alg) when Alg == ecdh_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_rsa-> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}, + {cipher, + fun(rc4_128) -> + false; + (_) -> + true + end}]), run_send_recv_rizzo(Ciphers, Config, Version, - {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_rizzo, []}). + {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_rizzo, []}). rizzo_zero_n() -> [{doc,"Test that the 0/n-split mitigation of Rizzo/Dungon attack can be explicitly selected"}]. @@ -3797,8 +3959,13 @@ rizzo_zero_n(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Prop = proplists:get_value(tc_group_properties, Config), Version = proplists:get_value(name, Prop), NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), - AllSuites = ssl_test_lib:available_suites(NVersion), - Ciphers = [X || X ={_,Y,_} <- AllSuites, Y =/= rc4_128], + Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(ssl:cipher_suites(default, NVersion), + [{cipher, + fun(rc4_128) -> + false; + (_) -> + true + end}]), run_send_recv_rizzo(Ciphers, Config, Version, {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_no_rizzo, []}). @@ -3806,9 +3973,16 @@ rizzo_disabled() -> [{doc,"Test that the mitigation of Rizzo/Dungon attack can be explicitly disabled"}]. rizzo_disabled(Config) when is_list(Config) -> - Ciphers = [X || X ={_,Y,_} <- ssl:cipher_suites(), Y =/= rc4_128], Prop = proplists:get_value(tc_group_properties, Config), Version = proplists:get_value(name, Prop), + NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = ssl:filter_cipher_suites(ssl:cipher_suites(default, NVersion), + [{cipher, + fun(rc4_128) -> + false; + (_) -> + true + end}]), run_send_recv_rizzo(Ciphers, Config, Version, {?MODULE, send_recv_result_active_no_rizzo, []}). @@ -4583,55 +4757,58 @@ rizzo_test(Cipher, Config, Version, Mfa) -> [{Cipher, Error}] end. -client_server_opts({KeyAlgo,_,_}, Config) +client_server_opts(#{key_exchange := KeyAlgo}, Config) when KeyAlgo == rsa orelse KeyAlgo == dhe_rsa orelse - KeyAlgo == ecdhe_rsa -> + KeyAlgo == ecdhe_rsa orelse + KeyAlgo == rsa_psk orelse + KeyAlgo == srp_rsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_opts, Config), ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_opts, Config)}; -client_server_opts({KeyAlgo,_,_}, Config) when KeyAlgo == dss orelse KeyAlgo == dhe_dss -> +client_server_opts(#{key_exchange := KeyAlgo}, Config) when KeyAlgo == dss orelse KeyAlgo == dhe_dss -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_dsa_opts, Config), ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_dsa_opts, Config)}; -client_server_opts({KeyAlgo,_,_}, Config) when KeyAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa orelse KeyAlgo == ecdhe_ecdsa -> +client_server_opts(#{key_exchange := KeyAlgo}, Config) when KeyAlgo == ecdh_ecdsa orelse KeyAlgo == ecdhe_ecdsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_opts, Config), ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdsa_opts, Config)}; -client_server_opts({KeyAlgo,_,_}, Config) when KeyAlgo == ecdh_rsa -> +client_server_opts(#{key_exchange := KeyAlgo}, Config) when KeyAlgo == ecdh_rsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_opts, Config), ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdh_rsa_opts, Config)}. run_suites(Ciphers, Config, Type) -> - NVersion = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), ct:log("Running cipher suites ~p~n", [Ciphers]), {ClientOpts, ServerOpts} = case Type of rsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), - ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config)}; + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config)]}; dsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), - ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_dsa_opts, Config)}; + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_dsa_opts, Config)]}; anonymous -> %% No certs in opts! {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), - [{reuseaddr, true}, {ciphers, ssl_test_lib:anonymous_suites(NVersion)} | + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ssl_test_lib:ssl_options([], Config)]}; psk -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_psk, Config), - [{ciphers, ssl_test_lib:psk_suites(NVersion)} | + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_psk, Config)]}; psk_with_hint -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_psk, Config), - [{ciphers, ssl_test_lib:psk_suites(NVersion)} | + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_psk_hint, Config) ]}; psk_anon -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_psk, Config), - [{ciphers, ssl_test_lib:psk_anon_suites(NVersion)} | + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_psk_anon, Config)]}; psk_anon_with_hint -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_psk, Config), - [{ciphers, ssl_test_lib:psk_anon_suites(NVersion)} | + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_psk_anon_hint, Config)]}; srp -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_srp, Config), @@ -4644,7 +4821,8 @@ run_suites(Ciphers, Config, Type) -> ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_srp_dsa, Config)}; ecdsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), - ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdsa_opts, Config)}; + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdsa_opts, Config)]}; ecdh_rsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdh_rsa_opts, Config)}; @@ -4667,9 +4845,16 @@ run_suites(Ciphers, Config, Type) -> des_rsa -> {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), [{ciphers, Ciphers} | - ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config)]} + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config)]}; + chacha_rsa -> + {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_verification_opts, Config)]}; + chacha_ecdsa -> + {ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_verification_opts, Config), + [{ciphers, Ciphers} | + ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_ecdsa_opts, Config)]} end, - Result = lists:map(fun(Cipher) -> cipher(Cipher, Version, Config, ClientOpts, ServerOpts) end, ssl_test_lib:filter_suites(Ciphers, Version)), diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec index d2f75b4203..8b746c5ca9 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec @@ -1 +1 @@ -{suites,"../ssl_test",[ssl_bench_SUITE]}. +{suites,"../ssl_test",[ssl_bench_SUITE, ssl_dist_bench_SUITE]}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl index ae2928b1c3..3fe6338d69 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ end_per_group(_GroupName, _Config) -> ok. init_per_suite(Config) -> - try - Server = setup(ssl, node()), - [{server_node, Server}|Config] - catch _:_ -> - {skipped, "Benchmark machines only"} + case node() of + nonode@nohost -> + {skipped, "Node not distributed"}; + _ -> + [{server_node, ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(perf_server)}|Config] end. end_per_suite(_Config) -> @@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ bypass_pem_cache(_Config) -> ssl() -> - test(ssl, ?COUNT, node()). + test(ssl, ?COUNT). -test(Type, Count, Host) -> - Server = setup(Type, Host), +test(Type, Count) -> + Server = ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(perf_server), (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count * 20, 1, Server)), (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count, 100, Server)), (do_test(Type, payload, Count*300, 10, Server)), @@ -294,47 +294,6 @@ msg() -> "asdlkjsafsdfoierwlejsdlkfjsdf">>. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -setup(_Type, nonode@nohost) -> - exit(dist_not_enabled); -setup(Type, _This) -> - Host = case os:getenv(?remote_host) of - false -> - {ok, This} = inet:gethostname(), - This; - RemHost -> - RemHost - end, - Node = list_to_atom("perf_server@" ++ Host), - SlaveArgs = case init:get_argument(pa) of - {ok, PaPaths} -> - lists:append([" -pa " ++ P || [P] <- PaPaths]); - _ -> [] - end, - %% io:format("Slave args: ~p~n",[SlaveArgs]), - Prog = - case os:find_executable("erl") of - false -> "erl"; - P -> P - end, - io:format("Prog = ~p~n", [Prog]), - - case net_adm:ping(Node) of - pong -> ok; - pang -> - {ok, Node} = slave:start(Host, perf_server, SlaveArgs, no_link, Prog) - end, - Path = code:get_path(), - true = rpc:call(Node, code, set_path, [Path]), - ok = rpc:call(Node, ?MODULE, setup_server, [Type, node()]), - io:format("Client (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), - (Node =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(client), - Node. - -setup_server(_Type, ClientNode) -> - (ClientNode =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(server), - io:format("Server (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), - ok. - ensure_all_started(App, Ack) -> case application:start(App) of @@ -358,13 +317,6 @@ setup_server_init(Type, Tc, Loop, PC) -> unlink(Pid), Res. -restrict_schedulers(Type) -> - %% We expect this to run on 8 core machine - Extra0 = 1, - Extra = if (Type =:= server) -> -Extra0; true -> Extra0 end, - Scheds = erlang:system_info(schedulers), - erlang:system_flag(schedulers_online, (Scheds div 2) + Extra). - tc(Fun, Mod, Line) -> case timer:tc(Fun) of {_,{'EXIT',Reason}} -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e5cbb911bd --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +-module(ssl_bench_test_lib). + +%% API +-export([setup/1]). + +%% Internal exports +-export([setup_server/1]). + +-define(remote_host, "NETMARKS_REMOTE_HOST"). + +setup(Name) -> + Host = case os:getenv(?remote_host) of + false -> + {ok, This} = inet:gethostname(), + This; + RemHost -> + RemHost + end, + Node = list_to_atom(atom_to_list(Name) ++ "@" ++ Host), + SlaveArgs = case init:get_argument(pa) of + {ok, PaPaths} -> + lists:append([" -pa " ++ P || [P] <- PaPaths]); + _ -> [] + end, + %% io:format("Slave args: ~p~n",[SlaveArgs]), + Prog = + case os:find_executable("erl") of + false -> "erl"; + P -> P + end, + io:format("Prog = ~p~n", [Prog]), + + case net_adm:ping(Node) of + pong -> ok; + pang -> + {ok, Node} = + slave:start(Host, Name, SlaveArgs, no_link, Prog) + end, + Path = code:get_path(), + true = rpc:call(Node, code, set_path, [Path]), + ok = rpc:call(Node, ?MODULE, setup_server, [node()]), + io:format("Client (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), + (Node =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(client), + Node. + +setup_server(ClientNode) -> + (ClientNode =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(server), + io:format("Server (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), + ok. + +restrict_schedulers(Type) -> + %% We expect this to run on 8 core machine + Extra0 = 1, + Extra = if (Type =:= server) -> -Extra0; true -> Extra0 end, + Scheds = erlang:system_info(schedulers), + erlang:system_flag(schedulers_online, (Scheds div 2) + Extra). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl index 8740e8c8f0..c822a52d1f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include("ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl"). %% Note: This directive should only be used in test suites. -compile(export_all). @@ -30,12 +31,12 @@ -define(AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT, 30000). --record(node_handle, - {connection_handler, - socket, - name, - nodename} - ). +-import(ssl_dist_test_lib, + [tstsrvr_format/2, send_to_tstcntrl/1, + apply_on_ssl_node/4, apply_on_ssl_node/2, + stop_ssl_node/1]). +start_ssl_node_name(Name, Args) -> + ssl_dist_test_lib:start_ssl_node(Name, Args). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Common Test interface functions ----------------------------------- @@ -140,11 +141,14 @@ basic_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> apply_on_ssl_node( NH1, fun () -> - tstsrvr_format("Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), - send_to_tstcntrl({Ref, self()}), + tstsrvr_format( + "Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), + send_to_tstcntrl( + {Ref, self()}), receive {From, ping} -> - tstsrvr_format("Received ping ~p!~n", [node()]), + tstsrvr_format( + "Received ping ~p!~n", [node()]), From ! {self(), pong} end end) @@ -154,7 +158,8 @@ basic_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> ok = apply_on_ssl_node( NH2, fun () -> - tstsrvr_format("Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), + tstsrvr_format( + "Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), SslPid ! {self(), ping}, receive {SslPid, pong} -> @@ -183,7 +188,8 @@ payload_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> apply_on_ssl_node( NH1, fun () -> - send_to_tstcntrl({Ref, self()}), + send_to_tstcntrl( + {Ref, self()}), receive {From, Msg} -> From ! {self(), Msg} @@ -616,12 +622,6 @@ gen_dist_test(Test, Config) -> %% ssl_node side api %% -tstsrvr_format(Fmt, ArgList) -> - send_to_tstsrvr({format, Fmt, ArgList}). - -send_to_tstcntrl(Message) -> - send_to_tstsrvr({message, Message}). - try_setting_priority(TestFun, Config) -> Prio = 1, case gen_udp:open(0, [{priority,Prio}]) of @@ -653,44 +653,6 @@ inet_ports() -> %% test_server side api %% -apply_on_ssl_node(Node, M, F, A) when is_atom(M), is_atom(F), is_list(A) -> - Ref = make_ref(), - send_to_ssl_node(Node, {apply, self(), Ref, M, F, A}), - receive - {Ref, Result} -> - Result - end. - -apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Fun) when is_function(Fun, 0) -> - Ref = make_ref(), - send_to_ssl_node(Node, {apply, self(), Ref, Fun}), - receive - {Ref, Result} -> - Result - end. - -stop_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Handler, - socket = Socket, - name = Name}) -> - ?t:format("Trying to stop ssl node ~s.~n", [Name]), - Mon = erlang:monitor(process, Handler), - unlink(Handler), - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(stop)) of - ok -> - receive - {'DOWN', Mon, process, Handler, Reason} -> - case Reason of - normal -> - ok; - _ -> - ct:pal("Down ~p ~n", [Reason]) - end - end; - Error -> - erlang:demonitor(Mon, [flush]), - ct:pal("Warning ~p ~n", [Error]) - end. - start_ssl_node(Config) -> start_ssl_node(Config, ""). @@ -698,29 +660,8 @@ start_ssl_node(Config, XArgs) -> Name = mk_node_name(Config), SSL = proplists:get_value(ssl_opts, Config), SSLDistOpts = setup_dist_opts(Config), - start_ssl_node_raw(Name, SSL ++ " " ++ SSLDistOpts ++ XArgs). - -start_ssl_node_raw(Name, Args) -> - {ok, LSock} = gen_tcp:listen(0, - [binary, {packet, 4}, {active, false}]), - {ok, ListenPort} = inet:port(LSock), - CmdLine = mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args), - ?t:format("Attempting to start ssl node ~ts: ~ts~n", [Name, CmdLine]), - case open_port({spawn, CmdLine}, []) of - Port when is_port(Port) -> - unlink(Port), - erlang:port_close(Port), - case await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) of - #node_handle{} = NodeHandle -> - ?t:format("Ssl node ~s started.~n", [Name]), - NodeName = list_to_atom(Name ++ "@" ++ host_name()), - NodeHandle#node_handle{nodename = NodeName}; - Error -> - exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) - end; - Error -> - exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) - end. + start_ssl_node_name( + Name, SSL ++ " " ++ SSLDistOpts ++ XArgs). cache_crls_on_ssl_nodes(PrivDir, CANames, NHs) -> [begin @@ -739,11 +680,6 @@ cache_crls_on_ssl_nodes(PrivDir, CANames, NHs) -> %% command line creation %% -host_name() -> - [$@ | Host] = lists:dropwhile(fun ($@) -> false; (_) -> true end, - atom_to_list(node())), - Host. - mk_node_name(Config) -> N = erlang:unique_integer([positive]), Case = proplists:get_value(testcase, Config), @@ -753,225 +689,6 @@ mk_node_name(Config) -> ++ "_" ++ integer_to_list(N). -mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args) -> - Static = "-detached -noinput", - Pa = filename:dirname(code:which(?MODULE)), - Prog = case catch init:get_argument(progname) of - {ok,[[P]]} -> P; - _ -> exit(no_progname_argument_found) - end, - NameSw = case net_kernel:longnames() of - false -> "-sname "; - _ -> "-name " - end, - {ok, Pwd} = file:get_cwd(), - "\"" ++ Prog ++ "\" " - ++ Static ++ " " - ++ NameSw ++ " " ++ Name ++ " " - ++ "-pa " ++ Pa ++ " " - ++ "-run application start crypto -run application start public_key " - ++ "-eval 'net_kernel:verbose(1)' " - ++ "-run " ++ atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ " cnct2tstsrvr " - ++ host_name() ++ " " - ++ integer_to_list(ListenPort) ++ " " - ++ Args ++ " " - ++ "-env ERL_CRASH_DUMP " ++ Pwd ++ "/erl_crash_dump." ++ Name ++ " " - ++ "-kernel error_logger \"{file,\\\"" ++ Pwd ++ "/error_log." ++ Name ++ "\\\"}\" " - ++ "-setcookie " ++ atom_to_list(erlang:get_cookie()). - -%% -%% Connection handler test_server side -%% - -await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) -> - case gen_tcp:accept(LSock, ?AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT) of - timeout -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - ?t:format("Timeout waiting for ssl node ~s to come up~n", - [Name]), - timeout; - {ok, Socket} -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - case gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0) of - {ok, Bin} -> - check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin); - {error, closed} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node_before_up, Name}) - end; - {error, Error} -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - exit({accept_failed, Error}) - end. - -check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin) -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); - {ssl_node_up, NodeName} -> - case list_to_atom(Name++"@"++host_name()) of - NodeName -> - Parent = self(), - Go = make_ref(), - %% Spawn connection handler on test server side - Pid = spawn_link( - fun () -> - receive Go -> ok end, - tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) - end), - ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), - Pid ! Go, - #node_handle{connection_handler = Pid, - socket = Socket, - name = Name}; - _ -> - exit({unexpected_ssl_node_connected, NodeName}) - end; - Msg -> - exit({unexpected_msg_instead_of_ssl_node_up, Name, Msg}) - end. - -send_to_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr}, Term) -> - Hndlr ! {relay_to_ssl_node, term_to_binary(Term)}, - ok. - -tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) -> - inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), - receive - {relay_to_ssl_node, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of - ok -> - ok; - _Error -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({failed_to_relay_data_to_ssl_node, Name, Data}) - end; - {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); - {format, FmtStr, ArgList} -> - ?t:format(FmtStr, ArgList); - {message, Msg} -> - ?t:format("Got message ~p", [Msg]), - Parent ! Msg; - {apply_res, To, Ref, Res} -> - To ! {Ref, Res}; - bye -> - ?t:format("Ssl node ~s stopped.~n", [Name]), - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit(normal); - Unknown -> - exit({unexpected_message_from_ssl_node, Name, Unknown}) - end; - {tcp_closed, Socket} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node, Name}) - end, - tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent). - -%% -%% Connection handler ssl_node side -%% - -% cnct2tstsrvr() is called via command line arg -run ... -cnct2tstsrvr([Host, Port]) when is_list(Host), is_list(Port) -> - %% Spawn connection handler on ssl node side - ConnHandler - = spawn(fun () -> - case catch gen_tcp:connect(Host, - list_to_integer(Port), - [binary, - {packet, 4}, - {active, false}]) of - {ok, Socket} -> - notify_ssl_node_up(Socket), - ets:new(test_server_info, - [set, - public, - named_table, - {keypos, 1}]), - ets:insert(test_server_info, - {test_server_handler, self()}), - ssl_node_con_loop(Socket); - Error -> - halt("Failed to connect to test server " ++ - lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Host:~p ~n Port:~p~n Error:~p~n", - [Host, Port, Error]))) - end - end), - spawn(fun () -> - Mon = erlang:monitor(process, ConnHandler), - receive - {'DOWN', Mon, process, ConnHandler, Reason} -> - receive after 1000 -> ok end, - halt("test server connection handler terminated: " ++ - lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~p", [Reason]))) - end - end). - -notify_ssl_node_up(Socket) -> - case catch gen_tcp:send(Socket, - term_to_binary({ssl_node_up, node()})) of - ok -> ok; - _ -> halt("Failed to notify test server that I'm up") - end. - -send_to_tstsrvr(Term) -> - case catch ets:lookup_element(test_server_info, test_server_handler, 2) of - Hndlr when is_pid(Hndlr) -> - Hndlr ! {relay_to_test_server, term_to_binary(Term)}, ok; - _ -> - receive after 200 -> ok end, - send_to_tstsrvr(Term) - end. - -ssl_node_con_loop(Socket) -> - inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), - receive - {relay_to_test_server, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of - ok -> - ok; - _Error -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - halt("Failed to relay data to test server") - end; - {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - halt("test server sent me bad data"); - {apply, From, Ref, M, F, A} -> - spawn_link( - fun () -> - send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, - From, - Ref, - (catch apply(M, F, A))}) - end); - {apply, From, Ref, Fun} -> - spawn_link(fun () -> - send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, - From, - Ref, - (catch Fun())}) - end); - stop -> - gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(bye)), - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - init:stop(), - receive after infinity -> ok end; - _Unknown -> - halt("test server sent me an unexpected message") - end; - {tcp_closed, Socket} -> - halt("Lost connection to test server") - end, - ssl_node_con_loop(Socket). - %% %% Setup ssl dist info %% diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d27564319 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +-module(ssl_dist_bench_SUITE). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct_event.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +%% CT meta +-export([suite/0, all/0, groups/0, + init_per_suite/1, end_per_suite/1, + init_per_group/2, end_per_group/2, + init_per_testcase/2, end_per_testcase/2]). + +%% Test cases +-export( + [setup/1, + roundtrip/1, + throughput_1024/1, + throughput_4096/1, + throughput_16384/1, + throughput_65536/1, + throughput_262144/1, + throughput_1048576/1]). + +%% Debug +-export([payload/1]). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- + +suite() -> [{ct_hooks, [{ts_install_cth, [{nodenames, 2}]}]}]. + +all() -> [{group, ssl}, {group, plain}]. + +groups() -> + [{ssl, all_groups()}, + {plain, all_groups()}, + %% + {setup, [{repeat, 1}], [setup]}, + {roundtrip, [{repeat, 1}], [roundtrip]}, + {throughput, [{repeat, 1}], + [throughput_1024, + throughput_4096, + throughput_16384, + throughput_65536, + throughput_262144, + throughput_1048576]}]. + +all_groups() -> + [{group, setup}, + {group, roundtrip}, + {group, throughput}]. + +init_per_suite(Config) -> + Digest = sha1, + ECCurve = secp521r1, + TLSVersion = 'tlsv1.2', + TLSCipher = {ecdhe_ecdsa,aes_128_cbc,sha256,sha256}, + %% + Node = node(), + try + Node =/= nonode@nohost orelse + throw({skipped,"Node not distributed"}), + {supported, SSLVersions} = + lists:keyfind(supported, 1, ssl:versions()), + lists:member(TLSVersion, SSLVersions) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(TLSVersion)}), + lists:member(ECCurve, ssl:eccs(TLSVersion)) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(ECCurve)}), + lists:member(TLSCipher, ssl:cipher_suites()) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(TLSCipher)}) + of + _ -> + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + %% + [_, HostA] = string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@"), + NodeAName = ?MODULE_STRING ++ "_node_a", + NodeAString = NodeAName ++ "@" ++ HostA, + NodeAConfFile = filename:join(PrivDir, NodeAString ++ ".conf"), + NodeA = list_to_atom(NodeAString), + %% + ServerNode = ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(dist_server), + [_, HostB] = string:split(atom_to_list(ServerNode), "@"), + NodeBName = ?MODULE_STRING ++ "_node_b", + NodeBString = NodeBName ++ "@" ++ HostB, + NodeBConfFile = filename:join(PrivDir, NodeBString ++ ".conf"), + NodeB = list_to_atom(NodeBString), + %% + CertOptions = + [{digest, Digest}, + {key, {namedCurve, ECCurve}}], + RootCert = + public_key:pkix_test_root_cert( + ?MODULE_STRING ++ " ROOT CA", CertOptions), + SSLConf = + [{verify, verify_peer}, + {versions, [TLSVersion]}, + {ciphers, [TLSCipher]}], + %% + write_node_conf( + NodeAConfFile, NodeA, + [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true} | SSLConf], SSLConf, + CertOptions, RootCert), + write_node_conf( + NodeBConfFile, NodeB, + [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true} | SSLConf], SSLConf, + CertOptions, RootCert), + %% + [{node_a_name, NodeAName}, + {node_a, NodeA}, + {node_a_dist_args, + "-proto_dist inet_tls " + "-ssl_dist_optfile " ++ NodeAConfFile ++ " "}, + {node_b_name, NodeBName}, + {node_b, NodeB}, + {node_b_dist_args, + "-proto_dist inet_tls " + "-ssl_dist_optfile " ++ NodeBConfFile ++ " "}, + {server_node, ServerNode} + |Config] + catch + throw:Result -> + Result + end. + +end_per_suite(Config) -> + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + slave:stop(ServerNode). + +init_per_group(ssl, Config) -> + [{ssl_dist, true}, {ssl_dist_prefix, "SSL"}|Config]; +init_per_group(plain, Config) -> + [{ssl_dist, false}, {ssl_dist_prefix, "Plain"}|Config]; +init_per_group(_GroupName, Config) -> + Config. + +end_per_group(_GroupName, _Config) -> + ok. + +init_per_testcase(_Func, Conf) -> + Conf. + +end_per_testcase(_Func, _Conf) -> + ok. + +-define(COUNT, 400). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% CommonTest API helpers + +write_node_conf( + ConfFile, Node, ServerConf, ClientConf, CertOptions, RootCert) -> + Conf = + public_key:pkix_test_data( + #{root => RootCert, + peer => + [{extensions, + [#'Extension'{ + extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName', + extnValue = [{dNSName, atom_to_list(Node)}], + critical = false}]} | CertOptions]}), + NodeConf = + [{server, ServerConf ++ Conf}, {client, ClientConf ++ Conf}], + {ok, Fd} = file:open(ConfFile, [write]), + ok = file:change_mode(ConfFile, 8#400), + io:format(Fd, "~p.~n", [NodeConf]), + ok = file:close(Fd). + + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Test cases + +%%----------------------- +%% Connection setup speed + +setup(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test(fun setup/5, Config). + +setup(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + Rounds = 10, + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + {SetupTime, CycleTime} = + ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> setup_runner(A, B, Rounds) end), + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + SetupSpeed = round((Rounds*1000000*1000) / SetupTime), + CycleSpeed = round((Rounds*1000000*1000) / CycleTime), + _ = report(Prefix++" Setup", SetupSpeed, "setups/1000s"), + report(Prefix++" Setup Cycle", CycleSpeed, "cycles/1000s"). + +%% Runs on node A against rex in node B +setup_runner(A, B, Rounds) -> + StartTime = start_time(), + SetupTime = setup_loop(A, B, 0, Rounds), + {microseconds(SetupTime), microseconds(elapsed_time(StartTime))}. + +setup_loop(_A, _B, T, 0) -> + T; +setup_loop(A, B, T, N) -> + StartTime = start_time(), + [A] = rpc:block_call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = elapsed_time(StartTime), + [B] = erlang:nodes(), + Mref = erlang:monitor(process, {rex,B}), + true = net_kernel:disconnect(B), + receive + {'DOWN',Mref,process,_,_} -> + [] = erlang:nodes(), + setup_loop(A, B, Time + T, N - 1) + end. + + +%%---------------- +%% Roundtrip speed + +roundtrip(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test(fun roundtrip/5, Config). + +roundtrip(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + Rounds = 40000, + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> roundtrip_runner(A, B, Rounds) end), + [B] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [A] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Speed = round((Rounds*1000000) / Time), + report(Prefix++" Roundtrip", Speed, "pings/s"). + +%% Runs on node A and spawns a server on node B +roundtrip_runner(A, B, Rounds) -> + ClientPid = self(), + [A] = rpc:call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + ServerPid = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun () -> roundtrip_server(ClientPid, Rounds) end), + ServerMon = erlang:monitor(process, ServerPid), + microseconds( + roundtrip_client(ServerPid, ServerMon, start_time(), Rounds)). + +roundtrip_server(_Pid, 0) -> + ok; +roundtrip_server(Pid, N) -> + receive + N -> + Pid ! N, + roundtrip_server(Pid, N-1) + end. + +roundtrip_client(_Pid, Mon, StartTime, 0) -> + Time = elapsed_time(StartTime), + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, normal} -> + Time; + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, Other} -> + exit(Other) + end; +roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N) -> + Pid ! N, + receive + N -> + roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N - 1) + end. + + +%%----------------- +%% Throughput speed + +throughput_1024(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 100000, 1024) + end, Config). + +throughput_4096(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 50000, 4096) + end, Config). + +throughput_16384(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 10000, 16384) + end, Config). + +throughput_65536(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 2000, 65536) + end, Config). + +throughput_262144(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 500, 262144) + end, Config). + +throughput_1048576(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 200, 1048576) + end, Config). + +throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, Packets, Size) -> + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = + ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> throughput_runner(A, B, Packets, Size) end), + [B] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [A] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Speed = round((Packets*Size*1000000) / (1024*Time)), + report(Prefix++" Throughput_"++integer_to_list(Size), Speed, "kB/s"). + +%% Runs on node A and spawns a server on node B +throughput_runner(A, B, Rounds, Size) -> + Payload = payload(Size), + ClientPid = self(), + [A] = rpc:call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + ServerPid = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun () -> throughput_server(ClientPid, Rounds) end), + ServerMon = erlang:monitor(process, ServerPid), + microseconds( + throughput_client( + ServerPid, ServerMon, Payload, start_time(), Rounds)). + +throughput_server(_Pid, 0) -> + ok; +throughput_server(Pid, N) -> + receive + [N|_] -> + throughput_server(Pid, N-1) + end. + +throughput_client(_Pid, Mon, _Payload, StartTime, 0) -> + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, normal} -> + elapsed_time(StartTime); + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, Other} -> + exit(Other) + end; +throughput_client(Pid, Mon, Payload, StartTime, N) -> + Pid ! [N|Payload], + throughput_client(Pid, Mon, Payload, StartTime, N - 1). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Test cases helpers + +run_nodepair_test(TestFun, Config) -> + A = proplists:get_value(node_a, Config), + B = proplists:get_value(node_b, Config), + Prefix = proplists:get_value(ssl_dist_prefix, Config), + HA = start_ssl_node_a(Config), + HB = start_ssl_node_b(Config), + try TestFun(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) + after + stop_ssl_node_a(HA), + stop_ssl_node_b(HB, Config), + ok + end. + +ssl_apply(Handle, M, F, Args) -> + case ssl_dist_test_lib:apply_on_ssl_node(Handle, M, F, Args) of + {'EXIT',Reason} -> + error(Reason); + Result -> + Result + end. + +ssl_apply(Handle, Fun) -> + case ssl_dist_test_lib:apply_on_ssl_node(Handle, Fun) of + {'EXIT',Reason} -> + error(Reason); + Result -> + Result + end. + +start_ssl_node_a(Config) -> + Name = proplists:get_value(node_a_name, Config), + Args = get_node_args(node_a_dist_args, Config), + ssl_dist_test_lib:start_ssl_node(Name, Args). + +start_ssl_node_b(Config) -> + Name = proplists:get_value(node_b_name, Config), + Args = get_node_args(node_b_dist_args, Config), + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + rpc:call( + ServerNode, ssl_dist_test_lib, start_ssl_node, [Name, Args]). + +stop_ssl_node_a(HA) -> + ssl_dist_test_lib:stop_ssl_node(HA). + +stop_ssl_node_b(HB, Config) -> + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + rpc:call(ServerNode, ssl_dist_test_lib, stop_ssl_node, [HB]). + +get_node_args(Tag, Config) -> + case proplists:get_value(ssl_dist, Config) of + true -> + proplists:get_value(Tag, Config); + false -> + "" + end. + + + +payload(Size) -> + iolist_to_binary( + [case Size bsr 8 of + 0 -> + []; + Blocks -> + payload(Blocks, create_binary(256)) + end | create_binary(Size band 255)]). +%% +payload(0, _) -> + []; +payload(Blocks, Block) -> + Half = payload(Blocks bsr 1, Block), + [Half, Half | + if + Blocks band 1 =:= 1 -> + Block; + true -> + [] + end]. + +create_binary(Size) -> + create_binary(Size, <<>>). +%% +create_binary(0, Bin) -> + Bin; +create_binary(Size, Bin) -> + NextSize = Size - 1, + create_binary(NextSize, <<Bin/binary, NextSize>>). + +start_time() -> + erlang:system_time(). + +elapsed_time(StartTime) -> + erlang:system_time() - StartTime. + +microseconds(Time) -> + erlang:convert_time_unit(Time, native, microsecond). + +report(Name, Value, Unit) -> + ct:pal("~s: ~w ~s", [Name, Value, Unit]), + ct_event:notify( + #event{ + name = benchmark_data, + data = [{value, Value}, {suite, "ssl_dist"}, {name, Name}]}), + {comment, term_to_string(Value) ++ " " ++ Unit}. + +term_to_string(Term) -> + unicode:characters_to_list( + io_lib:write(Term, [{encoding, unicode}])). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b9c853fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_dist_test_lib). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include("ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl"). + +-export([tstsrvr_format/2, send_to_tstcntrl/1]). +-export([apply_on_ssl_node/4, apply_on_ssl_node/2]). +-export([stop_ssl_node/1, start_ssl_node/2]). +%% +-export([cnct2tstsrvr/1]). + +-define(AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT, 30000). + + + +%% ssl_node side api +%% + +tstsrvr_format(Fmt, ArgList) -> + send_to_tstsrvr({format, Fmt, ArgList}). + +send_to_tstcntrl(Message) -> + send_to_tstsrvr({message, Message}). + + +%% +%% test_server side api +%% + +apply_on_ssl_node( + #node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr} = Node, + M, F, A) when is_atom(M), is_atom(F), is_list(A) -> + Ref = erlang:monitor(process, Hndlr), + apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, {apply, self(), Ref, M, F, A}). + +apply_on_ssl_node( + #node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr} = Node, + Fun) when is_function(Fun, 0) -> + Ref = erlang:monitor(process, Hndlr), + apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, {apply, self(), Ref, Fun}). + +apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, Msg) -> + send_to_ssl_node(Node, Msg), + receive + {'DOWN', Ref, process, Hndlr, Reason} -> + exit({handler_died, Hndlr, Reason}); + {Ref, Result} -> + Result + end. + +stop_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Handler, + socket = Socket, + name = Name}) -> + ?t:format("Trying to stop ssl node ~s.~n", [Name]), + Mon = erlang:monitor(process, Handler), + unlink(Handler), + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(stop)) of + ok -> + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, process, Handler, Reason} -> + case Reason of + normal -> + ok; + _ -> + ct:pal( + "stop_ssl_node/1 ~s Down ~p ~n", + [Name,Reason]) + end + end; + Error -> + erlang:demonitor(Mon, [flush]), + ct:pal("stop_ssl_node/1 ~s Warning ~p ~n", [Name,Error]) + end. + +start_ssl_node(Name, Args) -> + {ok, LSock} = gen_tcp:listen(0, + [binary, {packet, 4}, {active, false}]), + {ok, ListenPort} = inet:port(LSock), + CmdLine = mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args), + ?t:format("Attempting to start ssl node ~ts: ~ts~n", [Name, CmdLine]), + case open_port({spawn, CmdLine}, []) of + Port when is_port(Port) -> + unlink(Port), + erlang:port_close(Port), + case await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) of + #node_handle{} = NodeHandle -> + ?t:format("Ssl node ~s started.~n", [Name]), + NodeName = list_to_atom(Name ++ "@" ++ host_name()), + NodeHandle#node_handle{nodename = NodeName}; + Error -> + exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) + end; + Error -> + exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) + end. + +host_name() -> + [_, Host] = string:split(atom_to_list(node()), "@"), + %% [$@ | Host] = lists:dropwhile(fun ($@) -> false; (_) -> true end, + %% atom_to_list(node())), + Host. + +mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args) -> + Static = "-detached -noinput", + Pa = filename:dirname(code:which(?MODULE)), + Prog = case catch init:get_argument(progname) of + {ok,[[P]]} -> P; + _ -> exit(no_progname_argument_found) + end, + NameSw = case net_kernel:longnames() of + false -> "-sname "; + _ -> "-name " + end, + {ok, Pwd} = file:get_cwd(), + "\"" ++ Prog ++ "\" " + ++ Static ++ " " + ++ NameSw ++ " " ++ Name ++ " " + ++ "-pa " ++ Pa ++ " " + ++ "-run application start crypto -run application start public_key " + ++ "-eval 'net_kernel:verbose(1)' " + ++ "-run " ++ atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ " cnct2tstsrvr " + ++ host_name() ++ " " + ++ integer_to_list(ListenPort) ++ " " + ++ Args ++ " " + ++ "-env ERL_CRASH_DUMP " ++ Pwd ++ "/erl_crash_dump." ++ Name ++ " " + ++ "-kernel error_logger \"{file,\\\"" ++ Pwd ++ "/error_log." ++ Name ++ "\\\"}\" " + ++ "-setcookie " ++ atom_to_list(erlang:get_cookie()). + +%% +%% Connection handler test_server side +%% + +await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) -> + case gen_tcp:accept(LSock, ?AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT) of + {ok, Socket} -> + gen_tcp:close(LSock), + case gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0) of + {ok, Bin} -> + check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin); + {error, closed} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node_before_up, Name}) + end; + {error, Error} -> + gen_tcp:close(LSock), + ?t:format("Accept failed for ssl node ~s: ~p~n", [Name,Error]), + exit({accept_failed, Error}) + end. + +check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin) -> + case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of + {'EXIT', _} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); + {ssl_node_up, NodeName} -> + case list_to_atom(Name++"@"++host_name()) of + NodeName -> + Parent = self(), + Go = make_ref(), + %% Spawn connection handler on test server side + Pid = spawn_link( + fun () -> + receive Go -> ok end, + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) + end), + ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), + Pid ! Go, + #node_handle{connection_handler = Pid, + socket = Socket, + name = Name}; + _ -> + exit({unexpected_ssl_node_connected, NodeName}) + end; + Msg -> + exit({unexpected_msg_instead_of_ssl_node_up, Name, Msg}) + end. + +send_to_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr}, Term) -> + Hndlr ! {relay_to_ssl_node, term_to_binary(Term)}, + ok. + +tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) -> + ok = inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), + receive + {relay_to_ssl_node, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of + ok -> + ok; + _Error -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({failed_to_relay_data_to_ssl_node, Name, Data}) + end; + {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> + try binary_to_term(Bin) of + {format, FmtStr, ArgList} -> + ?t:format(FmtStr, ArgList); + {message, Msg} -> + ?t:format("Got message ~p", [Msg]), + Parent ! Msg; + {apply_res, To, Ref, Res} -> + To ! {Ref, Res}; + bye -> + {error, closed} = gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0), + ?t:format("Ssl node ~s stopped.~n", [Name]), + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit(normal); + Unknown -> + exit({unexpected_message_from_ssl_node, Name, Unknown}) + catch + error : _ -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}) + end; + {tcp_closed, Socket} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node, Name}); + {'EXIT', Parent, Reason} -> + exit({'EXIT', parent, Reason}); + Unknown -> + exit({unknown, Unknown}) + end, + tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent). + +%% +%% Connection handler ssl_node side +%% + +% cnct2tstsrvr() is called via command line arg -run ... +cnct2tstsrvr([Host, Port]) when is_list(Host), is_list(Port) -> + %% Spawn connection handler on ssl node side + ConnHandler + = spawn(fun () -> + case catch gen_tcp:connect(Host, + list_to_integer(Port), + [binary, + {packet, 4}, + {active, false}]) of + {ok, Socket} -> + notify_ssl_node_up(Socket), + ets:new(test_server_info, + [set, + public, + named_table, + {keypos, 1}]), + ets:insert(test_server_info, + {test_server_handler, self()}), + ssl_node_con_loop(Socket); + Error -> + halt("Failed to connect to test server " ++ + lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Host:~p ~n Port:~p~n Error:~p~n", + [Host, Port, Error]))) + end + end), + spawn(fun () -> + Mon = erlang:monitor(process, ConnHandler), + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, process, ConnHandler, Reason} -> + receive after 1000 -> ok end, + halt("test server connection handler terminated: " ++ + lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~p", [Reason]))) + end + end). + +notify_ssl_node_up(Socket) -> + case catch gen_tcp:send(Socket, + term_to_binary({ssl_node_up, node()})) of + ok -> ok; + _ -> halt("Failed to notify test server that I'm up") + end. + +send_to_tstsrvr(Term) -> + case catch ets:lookup_element(test_server_info, test_server_handler, 2) of + Hndlr when is_pid(Hndlr) -> + Hndlr ! {relay_to_test_server, term_to_binary(Term)}, ok; + _ -> + receive after 200 -> ok end, + send_to_tstsrvr(Term) + end. + +ssl_node_con_loop(Socket) -> + inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), + receive + {relay_to_test_server, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of + ok -> + ok; + _Error -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + halt("Failed to relay data to test server") + end; + {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> + case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of + {'EXIT', _} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + halt("test server sent me bad data"); + {apply, From, Ref, M, F, A} -> + spawn_link( + fun () -> + send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, + From, + Ref, + (catch apply(M, F, A))}) + end); + {apply, From, Ref, Fun} -> + spawn_link(fun () -> + send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, + From, + Ref, + (catch Fun())}) + end); + stop -> + gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(bye)), + init:stop(), + receive after infinity -> ok end; + _Unknown -> + halt("test server sent me an unexpected message") + end; + {tcp_closed, Socket} -> + halt("Lost connection to test server") + end, + ssl_node_con_loop(Socket). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..86b9b37026 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-record(node_handle, + {connection_handler, + socket, + name, + nodename} + ). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_engine_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_engine_SUITE.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71891356e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_engine_SUITE.erl @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017-2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +-module(ssl_engine_SUITE). + +%% Note: This directive should only be used in test suites. +-compile(export_all). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Common Test interface functions ----------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +all() -> + [ + private_key + ]. + +init_per_suite(Config) -> + catch crypto:stop(), + try crypto:start() of + ok -> + case crypto:info_lib() of + [{_,_, <<"OpenSSL 1.0.1s-freebsd 1 Mar 2016">>}] -> + {skip, "Problem with engine on OpenSSL 1.0.1s-freebsd"}; + _ -> + ssl_test_lib:clean_start(), + case crypto:get_test_engine() of + {ok, EngineName} -> + try crypto:engine_load(<<"dynamic">>, + [{<<"SO_PATH">>, EngineName}, + <<"LOAD">>], + []) of + {ok, Engine} -> + [{engine, Engine} |Config]; + {error, Reason} -> + ct:pal("Reason ~p", [Reason]), + {skip, "No dynamic engine support"} + catch error:notsup -> + {skip, "No engine support in OpenSSL"} + end; + {error, notexist} -> + {skip, "Test engine not found"} + end + end + catch _:_ -> + {skip, "Crypto did not start"} + end. + +end_per_suite(Config) -> + Engine = proplists:get_value(engine, Config), + crypto:engine_unload(Engine), + ssl:stop(), + application:stop(crypto). + + +init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) -> + ssl:stop(), + ssl:start(), + ssl_test_lib:ct_log_supported_protocol_versions(Config), + ct:timetrap({seconds, 10}), + Config. + +end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) -> + Config. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Test Cases -------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +private_key(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + ClientFileBase = filename:join([proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), "client_engine"]), + ServerFileBase = filename:join([proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), "server_engine"]), + #{server_config := ServerConf, + client_config := ClientConf} = GenCertData = + public_key:pkix_test_data(#{server_chain => + #{root => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(1)}], + intermediates => [[{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(2)}]], + peer => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(3)} + ]}, + client_chain => + #{root => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(4)}], + intermediates => [[{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(5)}]], + peer => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(6)}]}}), + [{server_config, FileServerConf}, + {client_config, FileClientConf}] = + x509_test:gen_pem_config_files(GenCertData, ClientFileBase, ServerFileBase), + + Engine = proplists:get_value(engine, Config), + + ClientKey = engine_key(FileClientConf), + ServerKey = engine_key(FileServerConf), + + EngineClientConf = [{key, #{algorithm => rsa, + engine => Engine, + key_id => ClientKey}} | proplists:delete(key, ClientConf)], + + EngineServerConf = [{key, #{algorithm => rsa, + engine => Engine, + key_id => ServerKey}} | proplists:delete(key, ServerConf)], + %% Test with engine + test_tls_connection(EngineServerConf, EngineClientConf, Config), + %% Test that sofware fallback is available + test_tls_connection(ServerConf, [{reuse_sessions, false} |ClientConf], Config). + +engine_key(Conf) -> + FileStr = proplists:get_value(keyfile, Conf), + list_to_binary(FileStr). + + +test_tls_connection(ServerConf, ClientConf, Config) -> + {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), + + Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result_active, []}}, + {options, [{verify, verify_peer} + | ServerConf]}]), + Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), + Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port}, + {host, Hostname}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result_active, []}}, + {options, [{verify, verify_peer} | ClientConf]}]), + + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, ok, Client, ok), + ssl_test_lib:close(Server), + ssl_test_lib:close(Client). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl index 4e7252f469..26ef311615 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl @@ -1025,48 +1025,60 @@ string_regex_filter(_Str, _Search) -> false. anonymous_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)],[]). psk_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)], []). psk_anon_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [Suite || Suite <- psk_suites(Version), is_psk_anon_suite(Suite)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:psk_suites_anon(Version)], + [{key_exchange, + fun(psk) -> + true; + (psk_dhe) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}]). srp_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}, - {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:srp_suites()], + [{key_exchange, + fun(srp_rsa) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}]). srp_anon_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:srp_suites_anon()], + []). srp_dss_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:srp_suites()], + [{key_exchange, + fun(srp_dss) -> + true; + (_) -> + false + end}]). +chacha_suites(Version) -> + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:chacha_suites(Version))]. + rc4_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:rc4_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <-ssl_cipher:rc4_suites(Version)], []). des_suites(Version) -> - Suites = ssl_cipher:des_suites(Version), - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + ssl:filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher:suite_definition(S) || S <-ssl_cipher:des_suites(Version)], []). + +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => default_prf}; +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac, Prf}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => Prf}. pem_to_der(File) -> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(File), @@ -1292,6 +1304,32 @@ cipher_restriction(Config0) -> Config0 end. +openssl_dsa_support() -> + case os:cmd("openssl version") of + "LibreSSL 2.6.1" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.6.2" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.6" ++ _ -> + false; + "LibreSSL 2.4" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.3" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.2" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.1" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL 2.0" ++ _ -> + true; + "LibreSSL" ++ _ -> + false; + "OpenSSL 1.0.1" ++ Rest -> + hd(Rest) >= s; + _ -> + true + end. + check_sane_openssl_version(Version) -> case supports_ssl_tls_version(Version) of true -> @@ -1329,8 +1367,9 @@ enough_openssl_crl_support(_) -> true. wait_for_openssl_server(Port, tls) -> do_wait_for_openssl_tls_server(Port, 10); -wait_for_openssl_server(Port, dtls) -> - do_wait_for_openssl_dtls_server(Port, 10). +wait_for_openssl_server(_Port, dtls) -> + ok. %% No need to wait for DTLS over UDP server + %% client will retransmitt until it is up. do_wait_for_openssl_tls_server(_, 0) -> exit(failed_to_connect_to_openssl); @@ -1343,21 +1382,6 @@ do_wait_for_openssl_tls_server(Port, N) -> do_wait_for_openssl_tls_server(Port, N-1) end. -do_wait_for_openssl_dtls_server(_, 0) -> - %%exit(failed_to_connect_to_openssl); - ok; -do_wait_for_openssl_dtls_server(Port, N) -> - %% case gen_udp:open(0) of - %% {ok, S} -> - %% gen_udp:connect(S, "localhost", Port), - %% gen_udp:close(S); - %% _ -> - %% ct:sleep(?SLEEP), - %% do_wait_for_openssl_dtls_server(Port, N-1) - %% end. - ct:sleep(500), - do_wait_for_openssl_dtls_server(Port, N-1). - version_flag(tlsv1) -> "-tls1"; version_flag('tlsv1.1') -> @@ -1384,7 +1408,9 @@ filter_suites(Ciphers0, AtomVersion) -> Supported0 = ssl_cipher:suites(Version) ++ ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version) ++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version) + ++ ssl_cipher:psk_suites_anon(Version) ++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites() + ++ ssl_cipher:srp_suites_anon() ++ ssl_cipher:rc4_suites(Version), Supported1 = ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Supported0), Supported2 = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- Supported1], @@ -1658,78 +1684,3 @@ hardcode_dsa_key(3) -> y = 48598545580251057979126570873881530215432219542526130654707948736559463436274835406081281466091739849794036308281564299754438126857606949027748889019480936572605967021944405048011118039171039273602705998112739400664375208228641666852589396502386172780433510070337359132965412405544709871654840859752776060358, x = 1457508827177594730669011716588605181448418352823}. -dtls_hello() -> - [1, - <<0,1,4>>, - <<0,0>>, - <<0,0,0>>, - <<0,1,4>>, - <<254,253,88, - 156,129,61, - 131,216,15, - 131,194,242, - 46,154,190, - 20,228,234, - 234,150,44, - 62,96,96,103, - 127,95,103, - 23,24,42,138, - 13,142,32,57, - 230,177,32, - 210,154,152, - 188,121,134, - 136,53,105, - 118,96,106, - 103,231,223, - 133,10,165, - 50,32,211, - 227,193,14, - 181,143,48, - 66,0,0,100,0, - 255,192,44, - 192,48,192, - 36,192,40, - 192,46,192, - 50,192,38, - 192,42,0,159, - 0,163,0,107, - 0,106,0,157, - 0,61,192,43, - 192,47,192, - 35,192,39, - 192,45,192, - 49,192,37, - 192,41,0,158, - 0,162,0,103, - 0,64,0,156,0, - 60,192,10, - 192,20,0,57, - 0,56,192,5, - 192,15,0,53, - 192,8,192,18, - 0,22,0,19, - 192,3,192,13, - 0,10,192,9, - 192,19,0,51, - 0,50,192,4, - 192,14,0,47, - 1,0,0,86,0,0, - 0,14,0,12,0, - 0,9,108,111, - 99,97,108, - 104,111,115, - 116,0,10,0, - 58,0,56,0,14, - 0,13,0,25,0, - 28,0,11,0,12, - 0,27,0,24,0, - 9,0,10,0,26, - 0,22,0,23,0, - 8,0,6,0,7,0, - 20,0,21,0,4, - 0,5,0,18,0, - 19,0,1,0,2,0, - 3,0,15,0,16, - 0,17,0,11,0, - 2,1,0>>]. - diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl index 9118e4b7e3..dcdea6beb5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl @@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ all_versions_tests() -> erlang_server_openssl_client, erlang_client_openssl_server_dsa_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert, + erlang_client_openssl_server_anon, + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon, + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon_with_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_reuse_session, erlang_client_openssl_server_renegotiate, erlang_client_openssl_server_nowrap_seqnum, @@ -89,6 +92,9 @@ dtls_all_versions_tests() -> erlang_server_openssl_client, erlang_client_openssl_server_dsa_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert, + erlang_client_openssl_server_anon, + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon, + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon_with_cert, erlang_server_openssl_client_reuse_session, erlang_client_openssl_server_renegotiate, erlang_client_openssl_server_nowrap_seqnum, @@ -143,10 +149,15 @@ init_per_suite(Config0) -> try crypto:start() of ok -> ssl_test_lib:clean_start(), - - Config1 = ssl_test_lib:make_rsa_cert(Config0), - Config2 = ssl_test_lib:make_dsa_cert(Config1), - ssl_test_lib:cipher_restriction(Config2) + Config = + case ssl_test_lib:openssl_dsa_support() of + true -> + Config1 = ssl_test_lib:make_rsa_cert(Config0), + ssl_test_lib:make_dsa_cert(Config1); + false -> + ssl_test_lib:make_rsa_cert(Config0) + end, + ssl_test_lib:cipher_restriction(Config) catch _:_ -> {skip, "Crypto did not start"} end @@ -199,15 +210,27 @@ init_per_testcase(expired_session, Config) -> ssl:start(), Config; -init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) when TestCase == ciphers_rsa_signed_certs; - TestCase == ciphers_dsa_signed_certs -> - ct:timetrap({seconds, 60}), - special_init(TestCase, Config); - +init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) when + TestCase == ciphers_dsa_signed_certs; + TestCase == erlang_client_openssl_server_dsa_cert; + TestCase == erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert; + TestCase == erlang_client_openssl_server_dsa_cert; + TestCase == erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert -> + case ssl_test_lib:openssl_dsa_support() of + true -> + special_init(TestCase, Config); + false -> + {skip, "DSA not supported by OpenSSL"} + end; init_per_testcase(TestCase, Config) -> - ct:timetrap({seconds, 20}), + ct:timetrap({seconds, 35}), special_init(TestCase, Config). +special_init(TestCase, Config) when + TestCase == ciphers_rsa_signed_certs; + TestCase == ciphers_dsa_signed_certs-> + ct:timetrap({seconds, 90}), + Config; special_init(TestCase, Config) when TestCase == erlang_client_openssl_server_renegotiate; TestCase == erlang_client_openssl_server_nowrap_seqnum; @@ -533,7 +556,121 @@ erlang_server_openssl_client_dsa_cert(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ssl_test_lib:close_port(OpenSslPort), process_flag(trap_exit, false). -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +erlang_client_openssl_server_anon() -> + [{doc,"Test erlang client with openssl server, anonymous"}]. +erlang_client_openssl_server_anon(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + %% OpenSSL expects a certificate and key, even if the cipher spec + %% is restructed to aNULL, so we use 'server_rsa_opts' here + ServerOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_rsa_opts, Config), + ClientOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(client_anon_opts, Config), + VersionTuple = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:anonymous_suites(VersionTuple), + + {ClientNode, _, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), + + Data = "From openssl to erlang", + + Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(node()), + CertFile = proplists:get_value(certfile, ServerOpts), + KeyFile = proplists:get_value(keyfile, ServerOpts), + Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), + Exe = "openssl", + Args = ["s_server", "-accept", integer_to_list(Port), + ssl_test_lib:version_flag(Version), + "-cert", CertFile, "-key", KeyFile, + "-cipher", "aNULL", "-msg"], + + OpensslPort = ssl_test_lib:portable_open_port(Exe, Args), + + ssl_test_lib:wait_for_openssl_server(Port, proplists:get_value(protocol, Config)), + + Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port}, + {host, Hostname}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {?MODULE, + erlang_ssl_receive, [Data]}}, + {options, [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ClientOpts]}]), + + true = port_command(OpensslPort, Data), + + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Client, ok), + + %% Clean close down! Server needs to be closed first !! + ssl_test_lib:close_port(OpensslPort), + ssl_test_lib:close(Client), + process_flag(trap_exit, false), + ok. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +erlang_server_openssl_client_anon() -> + [{doc,"Test erlang server with openssl client, anonymous"}]. +erlang_server_openssl_client_anon(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + ServerOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_anon_opts, Config), + VersionTuple = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:anonymous_suites(VersionTuple), + + {_, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), + + Data = "From openssl to erlang", + + Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {?MODULE, erlang_ssl_receive, [Data]}}, + {options, [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ServerOpts]}]), + Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), + Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), + Exe = "openssl", + Args = ["s_client", "-connect", hostname_format(Hostname) ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Port), + ssl_test_lib:version_flag(Version), + "-cipher", "aNULL", "-msg"], + + OpenSslPort = ssl_test_lib:portable_open_port(Exe, Args), + true = port_command(OpenSslPort, Data), + + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, ok), + + %% Clean close down! Server needs to be closed first !! + ssl_test_lib:close(Server), + ssl_test_lib:close_port(OpenSslPort), + process_flag(trap_exit, false). + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon_with_cert() -> + [{doc,"Test erlang server with openssl client, anonymous (with cert)"}]. + erlang_server_openssl_client_anon_with_cert(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + ServerOpts = ssl_test_lib:ssl_options(server_rsa_opts, Config), + VersionTuple = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config, tuple), + Ciphers = ssl_test_lib:anonymous_suites(VersionTuple), + + {_, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), + + Data = "From openssl to erlang", + + Server = ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0}, + {from, self()}, + {mfa, {?MODULE, erlang_ssl_receive, [Data]}}, + {options, [{ciphers, Ciphers} | ServerOpts]}]), + Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), + Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), + Exe = "openssl", + Args = ["s_client", "-connect", hostname_format(Hostname) ++ ":" ++ integer_to_list(Port), + ssl_test_lib:version_flag(Version), + "-cipher", "aNULL", "-msg"], + + OpenSslPort = ssl_test_lib:portable_open_port(Exe, Args), + true = port_command(OpenSslPort, Data), + + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, ok), + + %% Clean close down! Server needs to be closed first !! + ssl_test_lib:close(Server), + ssl_test_lib:close_port(OpenSslPort), + process_flag(trap_exit, false). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- erlang_server_openssl_client_reuse_session() -> [{doc, "Test erlang server with openssl client that reconnects with the" @@ -1016,7 +1153,7 @@ ssl2_erlang_server_openssl_client(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ct:log("Ports ~p~n", [[erlang:port_info(P) || P <- erlang:ports()]]), consume_port_exit(OpenSslPort), - ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, {error, {tls_alert, "handshake failure"}}), + ssl_test_lib:check_result(Server, {error, {tls_alert, "bad record mac"}}), process_flag(trap_exit, false). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ssl2_erlang_server_openssl_client_comp() -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk index bb77326751..2650399eea 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -SSL_VSN = 8.2.1 +SSL_VSN = 8.2.3 |