diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl')
52 files changed, 5720 insertions, 638 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 48372babf8..fa85b5b8cc 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ <p> TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so that sessions where client hostname verification would - fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + fail cannot connect reusing a session created when the server name verification succeeded.</p> <p> Own Id: OTP-14632</p> @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2 to verify the hostname of the connection with the server certificates specified hostname during certificate path validation. The user may - explicitly disables it. Also if the hostname can not be + explicitly disables it. Also if the hostname cannot be derived from the first argument to connect or is not supplied by the server name indication option, the check will not be performed.</p> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml index b4aa8746f9..2da70131e1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ <p><c>| {client_preferred_next_protocols, {client | server, [binary()]} | {client | server, [binary()], binary()}}</c></p> <p><c>| {log_alert, boolean()}</c></p> + <p><c>| {log_level, atom()}</c></p> <p><c>| {server_name_indication, hostname() | disable}</c></p> <p><c>| {customize_hostname_check, list()}</c></p> <p><c>| {sni_hosts, [{hostname(), [ssl_option()]}]}</c></p> @@ -208,7 +209,24 @@ elliptic_curves => [oid] | undefined, sni => string() | undefined} }</c></p></item> - + + <tag><c>signature_scheme() =</c></tag> + <item> + <p><c>rsa_pkcs1_sha256</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pkcs1_sha384</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pkcs1_sha512</c></p> + <p><c>| ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256</c></p> + <p><c>| ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384</c></p> + <p><c>| ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_rsae_sha256</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_rsae_sha384</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_rsae_sha512</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_pss_sha256</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_pss_sha384</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pss_pss_sha512</c></p> + <p><c>| rsa_pkcs1_sha1</c></p> + <p><c>| ecdsa_sha1</c></p> + </item> </taglist> </section> @@ -409,7 +427,7 @@ marker="public_key:public_key#pkix_path_validation-3">public_key:pkix_path_valid <item>check is only performed on the peer certificate.</item> <tag><c>best_effort</c></tag> - <item>if certificate revocation status can not be determined + <item>if certificate revocation status cannot be determined it will be accepted as valid.</item> </taglist> @@ -708,6 +726,26 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> that may be selected. Default support for {md5, rsa} removed in ssl-8.0 </p> </item> + <tag><marker id="signature_algs_cert"/><c>{signature_algs_cert, [signature_scheme()]}</c></tag> + <item> + <p> + In addition to the signature_algorithms extension from TLS 1.2, + <url href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt#section-4.2.3">TLS 1.3 + (RFC 5246 Section 4.2.3)</url>adds the signature_algorithms_cert extension + which enables having special requirements on the signatures used in the + certificates that differs from the requirements on digital signatures as a whole. + If this is not required this extension is not needed. + </p> + <p> + The client will send a signature_algorithms_cert extension (ClientHello), + if TLS version 1.3 or later is used, and the signature_algs_cert option is + explicitly specified. By default, only the signature_algs extension is sent. + </p> + <p> + The signature schemes shall be ordered according to the client's preference + (favorite choice first). + </p> + </item> </taglist> </section> @@ -796,7 +834,17 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> the client.</p></item> <tag><c>{log_alert, boolean()}</c></tag> - <item><p>If set to <c>false</c>, error reports are not displayed.</p></item> + <item><p>If set to <c>false</c>, error reports are not displayed.</p> + <p>Deprecated in OTP 22, use <seealso marker="#log_level">log_level</seealso> instead.</p> + </item> + + <tag><marker id="log_level"/><c>{log_level, atom()}</c></tag> + <item><p>Specifies the log level for TLS/DTLS. It can take the following + values (ordered by increasing verbosity level): <c>emergency, alert, critical, error, + warning, notice, info, debug.</c></p> + <p>At verbosity level <c>notice</c> and above error reports are + displayed in TLS. The level <c>debug</c> triggers verbose logging of TLS protocol + messages and logging of ignored alerts in DTLS.</p></item> <tag><c>{honor_cipher_order, boolean()}</c></tag> <item><p>If set to <c>true</c>, use the server preference for cipher @@ -849,7 +897,6 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> negotiation, introduced in TLS-1.2. The algorithms will also be offered to the client if a client certificate is requested. For more details see the <seealso marker="#client_signature_algs">corresponding client option</seealso>. </p> </item> - </taglist> </section> @@ -1400,6 +1447,17 @@ fun(srp, Username :: string(), UserState :: term()) -> </func> <func> + <name since="OTP 22.0">set_log_level(Level) -> ok | {error, Reason}</name> + <fsummary>Sets log level for the SSL application.</fsummary> + <type> + <v>Level = atom()</v> + </type> + <desc> + <p>Sets log level for the SSL application.</p> + </desc> + </func> + + <func> <name since="OTP R14B">shutdown(SslSocket, How) -> ok | {error, Reason}</name> <fsummary>Immediately closes a socket.</fsummary> <type> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml index e14f3f90dc..1774bd8f77 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) Any available SSL/TLS option can be specified in an options file, but note that options that take a <c>fun()</c> has to use the syntax <c>fun Mod:Func/Arity</c> since a function - body can not be compiled when consulting a file. + body cannot be compiled when consulting a file. </p> <p> Do not tamper with the socket options diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile index 8d1341f594..8dc76f2638 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile @@ -39,60 +39,80 @@ RELSYSDIR = $(RELEASE_PATH)/lib/ssl-$(VSN) # ---------------------------------------------------- BEHAVIOUR_MODULES= \ - ssl_session_cache_api \ - ssl_crl_cache_api + ssl_crl_cache_api \ + ssl_session_cache_api + MODULES= \ - ssl \ - ssl_alert \ - ssl_app \ - ssl_sup \ - ssl_admin_sup\ - tls_connection_sup \ - ssl_connection_sup \ - ssl_listen_tracker_sup\ + dtls_connection \ dtls_connection_sup \ - dtls_packet_demux \ + dtls_handshake \ dtls_listener_sup \ - ssl_dist_sup\ - ssl_dist_admin_sup\ - ssl_dist_connection_sup\ + dtls_packet_demux \ + dtls_record \ + dtls_socket \ + dtls_v1 \ inet_tls_dist \ inet6_tls_dist \ - ssl_certificate\ - ssl_pkix_db\ + ssl \ + ssl_admin_sup \ + ssl_alert \ + ssl_app \ + ssl_certificate \ ssl_cipher \ ssl_cipher_format \ - ssl_srp_primes \ - tls_connection \ - dtls_connection \ - tls_sender\ ssl_config \ ssl_connection \ - tls_handshake \ - dtls_handshake\ - ssl_handshake\ - ssl_manager \ - ssl_session \ - ssl_session_cache \ - ssl_pem_cache \ - ssl_crl\ + ssl_connection_sup \ + ssl_crl \ ssl_crl_cache \ ssl_crl_hash_dir \ - tls_socket \ - dtls_socket \ - tls_record \ - dtls_record \ + ssl_dh_groups \ + ssl_dist_admin_sup \ + ssl_dist_connection_sup \ + ssl_dist_sup \ + ssl_handshake \ + ssl_listen_tracker_sup \ + ssl_logger \ + ssl_manager \ + ssl_pem_cache \ + ssl_pkix_db \ ssl_record \ + ssl_session \ + ssl_session_cache \ + ssl_srp_primes \ + ssl_sup \ ssl_v3 \ - tls_v1 \ - dtls_v1 + tls_connection \ + tls_connection_sup \ + tls_connection_1_3 \ + tls_handshake \ + tls_handshake_1_3 \ + tls_record \ + tls_record_1_3 \ + tls_sender \ + tls_socket \ + tls_v1 + INTERNAL_HRL_FILES = \ - ssl_alert.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl \ - tls_connection.hrl dtls_connection.hrl ssl_connection.hrl \ - ssl_handshake.hrl tls_handshake.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_api.hrl ssl_internal.hrl \ - ssl_record.hrl tls_record.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_srp.hrl + dtls_connection.hrl \ + dtls_handshake.hrl \ + dtls_record.hrl \ + ssl_alert.hrl \ + ssl_api.hrl \ + ssl_cipher.hrl \ + ssl_connection.hrl \ + ssl_handshake.hrl \ + ssl_internal.hrl \ + ssl_record.hrl \ + ssl_srp.hrl \ + tls_connection.hrl \ + tls_handshake.hrl \ + tls_handshake_1_3.hrl \ + tls_record.hrl \ + tls_record_1_3.hrl + ERL_FILES= \ $(MODULES:%=%.erl) \ @@ -111,6 +131,10 @@ APP_TARGET= $(EBIN)/$(APP_FILE) APPUP_SRC= $(APPUP_FILE).src APPUP_TARGET= $(EBIN)/$(APPUP_FILE) +DEPDIR=$(ERL_TOP)/lib/ssl/src/deps +DEP_FILE=$(DEPDIR)/ssl.d +$(shell mkdir -p $(dir $(DEP_FILE)) >/dev/null) + # ---------------------------------------------------- # FLAGS # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -118,7 +142,7 @@ EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS = +warn_unused_vars ERL_COMPILE_FLAGS += -I$(ERL_TOP)/lib/kernel/src \ -pz $(EBIN) \ -pz $(ERL_TOP)/lib/public_key/ebin \ - $(EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS) -DVSN=\"$(VSN)\" + $(EXTRA_ERLC_FLAGS) # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -127,11 +151,22 @@ ERL_COMPILE_FLAGS += -I$(ERL_TOP)/lib/kernel/src \ $(TARGET_FILES): $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES) -debug opt: $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) +$(DEP_FILE): $(ERL_FILES) + $(gen_verbose)erlc -M $(ERL_FILES) \ + | sed "s@$(ERL_TOP)@../../..@g" \ + | sed "s/\.$(EMULATOR)/\.$$\(EMULATOR\)/" \ + | sed 's@^dtls_@$$(EBIN)/dtls_@' \ + | sed 's@^inet_@$$(EBIN)/inet_@' \ + | sed 's@^ssl_@$$(EBIN)/ssl_@' \ + | sed 's@^tls_@$$(EBIN)/tls_@' \ + > $(DEP_FILE) + +debug opt: $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) $(DEP_FILE) clean: rm -f $(TARGET_FILES) $(APP_TARGET) $(APPUP_TARGET) $(BEHAVIOUR_TARGET_FILES) rm -f errs core *~ + rm -rf $(DEPDIR) $(APP_TARGET): $(APP_SRC) ../vsn.mk $(vsn_verbose)sed -e 's;%VSN%;$(VSN);' $< > $@ @@ -141,7 +176,6 @@ $(APPUP_TARGET): $(APPUP_SRC) ../vsn.mk docs: - # ---------------------------------------------------- # Release Target # ---------------------------------------------------- @@ -159,22 +193,4 @@ release_docs_spec: # ---------------------------------------------------- # Dependencies # ---------------------------------------------------- -$(EBIN)/inet_tls_dist.$(EMULATOR): ../../kernel/include/net_address.hrl ../../kernel/include/dist.hrl ../../kernel/include/dist_util.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_alert.$(EMULATOR): ssl_alert.hrl ssl_record.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_certificate.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_certificate_db.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_cipher.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_connection.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/dtls_connection.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl dtls_connection.hrl dtls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl dtls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl tls_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl tls_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/tls_handshake.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_connection.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_manager.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ../../kernel/include/file.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_record.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl ssl_alert.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_session_cache_api.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_handshake.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_ssl3.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_tls1.$(EMULATOR): ssl_internal.hrl ssl_record.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl -$(EBIN)/ssl_cache.$(EMULATOR): ssl_cache.erl ssl_internal.hrl ../../public_key/include/public_key.hrl - +-include $(DEP_FILE) diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index 37719ad439..73885de6c1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Internal application API @@ -337,8 +338,8 @@ reinit_handshake_data(#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers} = State) -> dtls_handshake_later_fragments = [] }}. -select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> - HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; +select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = #{sni := SNI}}) -> + SNI; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. @@ -519,19 +520,17 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, hello = Hello}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; -hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, - #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, - start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; +hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, + start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, hello = Hello}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; -hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, - #state{role = server, - transport_cb = Transport, - socket = Socket, - protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret, - previous_cookie_secret := PSecret}} = State0) -> + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; +hello(internal, #client_hello{cookie = Cookie} = Hello, #state{role = server, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket, + protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret := Secret, + previous_cookie_secret := PSecret}} = State0) -> {ok, {IP, Port}} = dtls_socket:peername(Transport, Socket), case dtls_handshake:cookie(Secret, IP, Port, Hello) of Cookie -> @@ -912,7 +911,7 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, #state{data_tag = udp, ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> case ignore_alert(Alert, State0) of {true, State} -> - log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_alert, StateName, Alert, Role), + log_ignore_alert(Options#ssl_options.log_level, StateName, Alert, Role), {next_state, StateName, State}; {false, State} -> ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State) @@ -1109,11 +1108,11 @@ is_ignore_alert(#alert{description = ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER}) -> is_ignore_alert(_) -> false. -log_ignore_alert(true, StateName, Alert, Role) -> +log_ignore_alert(debug, StateName, Alert, Role) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:format("DTLS over UDP ~p: In state ~p ignored to send ALERT ~s as DoS-attack mitigation \n", - [Role, StateName, Txt]); -log_ignore_alert(false, _, _,_) -> + ?LOG_ERROR("DTLS over UDP ~p: In state ~p ignored to send ALERT ~s as DoS-attack mitigation \n", + [Role, StateName, Txt]); +log_ignore_alert(_, _, _, _) -> ok. send_application_data(Data, From, _StateName, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 3f70eaec8a..3dbda2c91b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, Cookie, ConnectionStates, Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(TLSVersion, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, - Renegotiation), + Renegotiation, undefined), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, @@ -169,10 +169,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = Compressions, random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} - = HelloExt}, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, @@ -181,6 +178,8 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, Renegotiation) -> case dtls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> + Curves = maps:get(elliptic_curves, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientHashSigns = maps:get(signature_algs, HelloExt, undefined), TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert,TLSVersion), @@ -195,7 +194,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, undefined}, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; @@ -335,7 +334,7 @@ decode_handshake(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), Bin/binary>>) -> decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> #hello_request{}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), +decode_handshake(Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT24(_), ?UINT24(_), ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, @@ -343,8 +342,9 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?UINT24(_), ?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, Extensions/binary>>) -> - - DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), + TLSVersion = dtls_v1:corresponding_tls_version(Version), + Exts = ssl_handshake:decode_vector(Extensions), + DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Exts, TLSVersion, client), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl index 50e92027d2..a16489bbd1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.hrl @@ -56,4 +56,11 @@ fragment }). +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7764 Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys +%% for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(USE_SRTP, 14). + -endif. % -ifdef(dtls_handshake). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl index 1497c77cf3..e03a4e9cb9 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_packet_demux.erl @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ -behaviour(gen_server). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% API -export([start_link/5, active_once/3, accept/2, sockname/1, close/1, @@ -146,11 +147,11 @@ handle_info({Transport, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket %% appears to make things work as expected! handle_info({Error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, udp_error}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("Ignore SSL UDP Listener: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {noreply, State}; handle_info({Error, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket, transport = {_,_,_, Error}} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL Packet muliplxer shutdown: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {noreply, State#state{close=true}}; handle_info({'DOWN', _, process, Pid, _}, #state{clients = Clients, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index a4f8bb7562..ce771343fe 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -include("ssl_api.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -225,7 +226,7 @@ accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) -> true -> accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel, Socket); {false,IP} -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel, Socket) -> {error, {options, _}} = Error -> %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. %% Let's log that. - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", [ssl:format_error(Error)]), gen_tcp:close(Socket), @@ -436,7 +437,7 @@ allowed_nodes(SslSocket, Allowed) -> PeerCert, allowed_hosts(Allowed), PeerIP) of [] -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Connection attempt from " "disallowed node(s) ~p ** ~n", [PeerIP]), ?shutdown2( @@ -690,12 +691,12 @@ split_node(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> {node, Name, Host} -> check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames); {host, _} -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. @@ -707,7 +708,7 @@ check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> {ok, _} -> {Name, Host}; _ -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** System running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", @@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ check_node(Driver, Node, Name, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; [_,_|_] when LongOrShortNames =:= shortnames -> - error_logger:error_msg( + ?LOG_ERROR( "** System NOT running to use " "fully qualified hostnames **~n" "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", @@ -845,13 +846,13 @@ monitor_pid(Pid) -> %% MRef = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), %% receive %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, normal} -> - %% error_logger:error_report( - %% [dist_proc_died, + %% ?LOG_ERROR( + %% [{slogan, dist_proc_died}, %% {reason, normal}, %% {pid, Pid}]); %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, Reason} -> - %% error_logger:info_report( - %% [dist_proc_died, + %% ?LOG_NOTICE( + %% [{slogan, dist_proc_died}, %% {reason, Reason}, %% {pid, Pid}]) %% end diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src index 936df12e70..e7a4d73ec4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src @@ -4,13 +4,17 @@ {modules, [ %% TLS/SSL tls_connection, + tls_connection_1_3, tls_handshake, + tls_handshake_1_3, tls_record, + tls_record_1_3, tls_socket, tls_v1, ssl_v3, tls_connection_sup, tls_sender, + ssl_dh_groups, %% DTLS dtls_connection, dtls_handshake, @@ -51,6 +55,8 @@ ssl_crl_cache, ssl_crl_cache_api, ssl_crl_hash_dir, + %% Logging + ssl_logger, %% App structure ssl_app, ssl_sup, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 03a1e40bfc..2c3f8bc20f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -51,11 +51,12 @@ %% SSL/TLS protocol handling -export([cipher_suites/0, cipher_suites/1, cipher_suites/2, filter_cipher_suites/2, prepend_cipher_suites/2, append_cipher_suites/2, - eccs/0, eccs/1, versions/0, + eccs/0, eccs/1, versions/0, groups/0, groups/1, format_error/1, renegotiate/1, prf/5, negotiated_protocol/1, connection_information/1, connection_information/2]). %% Misc --export([handle_options/2, tls_version/1, new_ssl_options/3, suite_to_str/1]). +-export([handle_options/2, tls_version/1, new_ssl_options/3, suite_to_str/1, + set_log_level/1]). -deprecated({ssl_accept, 1, eventually}). -deprecated({ssl_accept, 2, eventually}). @@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ stop() -> application:stop(ssl). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + -spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()]) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. -spec connect(host() | port(), [connect_option()] | inet:port_number(), @@ -209,6 +211,8 @@ ssl_accept(Socket, SslOptions, Timeout) -> %% Description: Performs accept on an ssl listen socket. e.i. performs %% ssl handshake. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% Performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS server-side handshake. handshake(ListenSocket) -> handshake(ListenSocket, infinity). @@ -216,6 +220,12 @@ handshake(#sslsocket{} = Socket, Timeout) when (is_integer(Timeout) andalso Tim (Timeout == infinity) -> ssl_connection:handshake(Socket, Timeout); +%% If Socket is a ordinary socket(): upgrades a gen_tcp, or equivalent, socket to +%% an SSL socket, that is, performs the SSL/TLS server-side handshake and returns +%% the SSL socket. +%% +%% If Socket is an sslsocket(): provides extra SSL/TLS/DTLS options to those +%% specified in ssl:listen/2 and then performs the SSL/TLS/DTLS handshake. handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions) when is_port(ListenSocket) -> handshake(ListenSocket, SslOptions, infinity). @@ -478,9 +488,9 @@ cipher_suites(Base, Version) -> [ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite) || Suite <- supported_suites(Base, Version)]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()], +-spec filter_cipher_suites([ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()], [{key_exchange | cipher | mac | prf, fun()}] | []) -> - [ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()]. + [ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite() ] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% Description: Removes cipher suites if any of the filter functions returns false %% for any part of the cipher suite. This function also calls default filter functions %% to make sure the cipher suite are supported by crypto. @@ -568,6 +578,20 @@ eccs_filter_supported(Curves) -> Curves). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec groups() -> tls_v1:supported_groups(). +%% Description: returns all supported groups (TLS 1.3 and later) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +groups() -> + tls_v1:groups(4). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec groups(default) -> tls_v1:supported_groups(). +%% Description: returns the default groups (TLS 1.3 and later) +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +groups(default) -> + tls_v1:default_groups(4). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec getopts(#sslsocket{}, [gen_tcp:option_name()]) -> {ok, [gen_tcp:option()]} | {error, reason()}. %% @@ -821,6 +845,32 @@ suite_to_str(Cipher) -> ssl_cipher_format:suite_to_str(Cipher). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec set_log_level(atom()) -> ok | {error, term()}. +%% +%% Description: Set log level for the SSL application +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +set_log_level(Level) -> + case application:get_all_key(ssl) of + {ok, PropList} -> + Modules = proplists:get_value(modules, PropList), + set_module_level(Modules, Level); + undefined -> + {error, ssl_not_started} + end. + +set_module_level(Modules, Level) -> + Fun = fun (Module) -> + ok = logger:set_module_level(Module, Level) + end, + try lists:map(Fun, Modules) of + _ -> + ok + catch + error:{badmatch, Error} -> + Error + end. + %%%-------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -880,9 +930,10 @@ handle_options(Opts0, #ssl_options{protocol = Protocol, cacerts = CaCerts0, [] -> new_ssl_options(SslOpts1, NewVerifyOpts, RecordCB); Value -> - Versions = [RecordCB:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Value], + Versions0 = [RecordCB:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Value], + Versions1 = lists:sort(fun RecordCB:is_higher/2, Versions0), new_ssl_options(proplists:delete(versions, SslOpts1), - NewVerifyOpts#ssl_options{versions = Versions}, record_cb(Protocol)) + NewVerifyOpts#ssl_options{versions = Versions1}, record_cb(Protocol)) end; %% Handle all options in listen and connect @@ -901,12 +952,14 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> CertFile = handle_option(certfile, Opts, <<>>), RecordCb = record_cb(Opts), - Versions = case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of - [] -> - RecordCb:supported_protocol_versions(); - Vsns -> - [RecordCb:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns] - end, + [HighestVersion|_] = Versions = + case handle_option(versions, Opts, []) of + [] -> + RecordCb:supported_protocol_versions(); + Vsns -> + Versions0 = [RecordCb:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- Vsns], + lists:sort(fun RecordCb:is_higher/2, Versions0) + end, Protocol = handle_option(protocol, Opts, tls), @@ -917,7 +970,7 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> ok end, - SSLOptions = #ssl_options{ + SSLOptions0 = #ssl_options{ versions = Versions, verify = validate_option(verify, Verify), verify_fun = VerifyFun, @@ -938,13 +991,29 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> psk_identity = handle_option(psk_identity, Opts, undefined), srp_identity = handle_option(srp_identity, Opts, undefined), ciphers = handle_cipher_option(proplists:get_value(ciphers, Opts, []), - RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)), + HighestVersion), eccs = handle_eccs_option(proplists:get_value(eccs, Opts, eccs()), - RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions)), - signature_algs = handle_hashsigns_option(proplists:get_value(signature_algs, Opts, - default_option_role(server, - tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Versions), Role)), - tls_version(RecordCb:highest_protocol_version(Versions))), + HighestVersion), + supported_groups = handle_supported_groups_option( + proplists:get_value(supported_groups, Opts, groups(default)), + HighestVersion), + signature_algs = + handle_hashsigns_option( + proplists:get_value( + signature_algs, + Opts, + default_option_role_sign_algs(server, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs(HighestVersion), + Role, + HighestVersion)), + tls_version(HighestVersion)), + signature_algs_cert = + handle_signature_algorithms_option( + proplists:get_value( + signature_algs_cert, + Opts, + undefined), %% Do not send by default + tls_version(HighestVersion)), %% Server side option reuse_session = handle_option(reuse_session, Opts, ReuseSessionFun), reuse_sessions = handle_option(reuse_sessions, Opts, true), @@ -964,7 +1033,6 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> next_protocol_selector = make_next_protocol_selector( handle_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Opts, undefined)), - log_alert = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true), server_name_indication = handle_option(server_name_indication, Opts, default_option_role(client, server_name_indication_default(Host), Role)), @@ -990,6 +1058,10 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> handshake = handle_option(handshake, Opts, full), customize_hostname_check = handle_option(customize_hostname_check, Opts, []) }, + LogLevel = handle_option(log_alert, Opts, true), + SSLOptions = SSLOptions0#ssl_options{ + log_level = handle_option(log_level, Opts, LogLevel) + }, CbInfo = proplists:get_value(cb_info, Opts, default_cb_info(Protocol)), SslOptions = [protocol, versions, verify, verify_fun, partial_chain, @@ -1001,10 +1073,11 @@ handle_options(Opts0, Role, Host) -> cb_info, renegotiate_at, secure_renegotiate, hibernate_after, erl_dist, alpn_advertised_protocols, sni_hosts, sni_fun, alpn_preferred_protocols, next_protocols_advertised, - client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, + client_preferred_next_protocols, log_alert, log_level, server_name_indication, honor_cipher_order, padding_check, crl_check, crl_cache, - fallback, signature_algs, eccs, honor_ecc_order, beast_mitigation, - max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check], + fallback, signature_algs, signature_algs_cert, eccs, honor_ecc_order, + beast_mitigation, max_handshake_size, handshake, customize_hostname_check, + supported_groups], SockOpts = lists:foldl(fun(Key, PropList) -> proplists:delete(Key, PropList) end, Opts, SslOptions), @@ -1180,7 +1253,20 @@ validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, {Precedence, PreferredProtocols Value; validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, undefined) -> undefined; -validate_option(log_alert, Value) when is_boolean(Value) -> +validate_option(log_alert, true) -> + notice; +validate_option(log_alert, false) -> + warning; +validate_option(log_level, Value) when + is_atom(Value) andalso + (Value =:= emergency orelse + Value =:= alert orelse + Value =:= critical orelse + Value =:= error orelse + Value =:= warning orelse + Value =:= notice orelse + Value =:= info orelse + Value =:= debug) -> Value; validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) -> validate_binary_list(next_protocols_advertised, Value), @@ -1252,19 +1338,42 @@ validate_option(customize_hostname_check, Value) when is_list(Value) -> validate_option(Opt, Value) -> throw({error, {options, {Opt, Value}}}). +handle_hashsigns_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) + andalso Version >= {3, 4} -> + case tls_v1:signature_schemes(Version, Value) of + [] -> + throw({error, {options, + no_supported_signature_schemes, + {signature_algs, Value}}}); + _ -> + Value + end; handle_hashsigns_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) - andalso Version >= {3, 3} -> + andalso Version =:= {3, 3} -> case tls_v1:signature_algs(Version, Value) of [] -> throw({error, {options, no_supported_algorithms, {signature_algs, Value}}}); _ -> Value end; -handle_hashsigns_option(_, Version) when Version >= {3, 3} -> +handle_hashsigns_option(_, Version) when Version =:= {3, 3} -> handle_hashsigns_option(tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); handle_hashsigns_option(_, _Version) -> undefined. +handle_signature_algorithms_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) + andalso Version >= {3, 4} -> + case tls_v1:signature_schemes(Version, Value) of + [] -> + throw({error, {options, + no_supported_signature_schemes, + {signature_algs_cert, Value}}}); + _ -> + Value + end; +handle_signature_algorithms_option(_, _Version) -> + undefined. + validate_options([]) -> []; validate_options([{Opt, Value} | Tail]) -> @@ -1288,7 +1397,8 @@ validate_binary_list(Opt, List) -> end, List). validate_versions([], Versions) -> Versions; -validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; +validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; Version == 'tlsv1.1'; Version == tlsv1; Version == sslv3 -> @@ -1301,10 +1411,11 @@ validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) -> tls_validate_versions([], Versions) -> Versions; -tls_validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.2'; - Version == 'tlsv1.1'; - Version == tlsv1; - Version == sslv3 -> +tls_validate_versions([Version | Rest], Versions) when Version == 'tlsv1.3'; + Version == 'tlsv1.2'; + Version == 'tlsv1.1'; + Version == tlsv1; + Version == sslv3 -> tls_validate_versions(Rest, Versions); tls_validate_versions([Ver| _], Versions) -> throw({error, {options, {Ver, {versions, Versions}}}}). @@ -1410,6 +1521,16 @@ handle_eccs_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> error:_ -> throw({error, {options, {eccs, Value}}}) end. +handle_supported_groups_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> + {_Major, Minor} = tls_version(Version), + try tls_v1:groups(Minor, Value) of + Groups -> #supported_groups{supported_groups = Groups} + catch + exit:_ -> throw({error, {options, {supported_groups, Value}}}); + error:_ -> throw({error, {options, {supported_groups, Value}}}) + end. + + unexpected_format(Error) -> lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Unexpected error: ~p", [Error])). @@ -1555,8 +1676,10 @@ new_ssl_options([{next_protocols_advertised, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Op new_ssl_options([{client_preferred_next_protocols, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{next_protocol_selector = make_next_protocol_selector(validate_option(client_preferred_next_protocols, Value))}, RecordCB); -new_ssl_options([{log_alert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> - new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_alert = validate_option(log_alert, Value)}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{log_alert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_level = validate_option(log_alert, Value)}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{log_level, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{log_level = validate_option(log_level, Value)}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{server_name_indication, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{server_name_indication = validate_option(server_name_indication, Value)}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{honor_cipher_order, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> @@ -1569,12 +1692,26 @@ new_ssl_options([{eccs, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> handle_eccs_option(Value, RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()) }, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{supported_groups, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options(Rest, + Opts#ssl_options{supported_groups = + handle_supported_groups_option(Value, RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()) + }, + RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{signature_algs, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{signature_algs = handle_hashsigns_option(Value, tls_version(RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()))}, RecordCB); +new_ssl_options([{signature_algs_cert, Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, RecordCB) -> + new_ssl_options( + Rest, + Opts#ssl_options{signature_algs_cert = + handle_signature_algorithms_option( + Value, + tls_version(RecordCB:highest_protocol_version()))}, + RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{protocol, dtls = Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, dtls_record = RecordCB) -> new_ssl_options(Rest, Opts#ssl_options{protocol = Value}, RecordCB); new_ssl_options([{protocol, tls = Value} | Rest], #ssl_options{} = Opts, tls_record = RecordCB) -> @@ -1636,11 +1773,20 @@ handle_verify_options(Opts, CaCerts) -> throw({error, {options, {verify, Value}}}) end. +%% Added to handle default values for signature_algs in TLS 1.3 +default_option_role_sign_algs(_, Value, _, Version) when Version >= {3,4} -> + Value; +default_option_role_sign_algs(Role, Value, Role, _) -> + Value; +default_option_role_sign_algs(_, _, _, _) -> + undefined. + default_option_role(Role, Value, Role) -> Value; default_option_role(_,_,_) -> undefined. + default_cb_info(tls) -> {gen_tcp, tcp, tcp_closed, tcp_error}; default_cb_info(dtls) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl index 34e9797f1f..ed8156e0be 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.erl @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ description_txt(?USER_CANCELED) -> "User Canceled"; description_txt(?NO_RENEGOTIATION) -> "No Renegotiation"; +description_txt(?MISSING_EXTENSION) -> + "Missing extension"; description_txt(?UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION) -> "Unsupported Extension"; description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE) -> @@ -177,6 +179,8 @@ description_txt(?UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) -> "Unknown Psk Identity"; description_txt(?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK) -> "Inappropriate Fallback"; +description_txt(?CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) -> + "Certificate required"; description_txt(?NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) -> "No application protocol"; description_txt(Enum) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl index b23123905e..9b2322da17 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%% Alert protocol - RFC 2246 section 7.2 +%%% updated by RFC 8486 with +%%% missing_extension(109), +%%% certificate_required(116), %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %% AlertLevel @@ -100,12 +103,14 @@ -define(INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, 86). -define(USER_CANCELED, 90). -define(NO_RENEGOTIATION, 100). +-define(MISSING_EXTENSION, 109). -define(UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, 110). -define(CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE, 111). -define(UNRECOGNISED_NAME, 112). -define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, 113). -define(BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE, 114). -define(UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, 115). +-define(CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, 116). -define(NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, 120). -define(ALERT_REC(Level,Desc), #alert{level=Level,description=Desc,where={?FILE, ?LINE}}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl index 62e8765d4a..2a5047c75c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_app.erl @@ -29,9 +29,26 @@ -export([start/2, stop/1]). start(_Type, _StartArgs) -> + start_logger(), ssl_sup:start_link(). stop(_State) -> + stop_logger(), ok. +%% +%% Description: Start SSL logger +start_logger() -> + Config = #{level => debug, + filter_default => stop, + formatter => {ssl_logger, #{}}}, + Filter = {fun logger_filters:domain/2,{log,sub,[otp,ssl]}}, + logger:add_handler(ssl_handler, logger_std_h, Config), + logger:add_handler_filter(ssl_handler, filter_non_ssl, Filter). + +%% +%% Description: Stop SSL logger +stop_logger() -> + logger:remove_handler(ssl_handler). + diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl index 549e557beb..9997f5e0c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ trusted_cert_and_path(CertChain, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, PartialChainHandler) - case SignedAndIssuerID of {error, issuer_not_found} -> - %% The root CA was not sent and can not be found. + %% The root CA was not sent and cannot be found. handle_incomplete_chain(Path, PartialChainHandler); {self, _} when length(Path) == 1 -> {selfsigned_peer, Path}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index 54c04c13e5..c4b8e2172a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include("ssl_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). --export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, +-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, security_parameters_1_3/3, cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/5, aead_decrypt/6, suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0, chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1, @@ -42,7 +43,11 @@ filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2, hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1, random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4, - is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). + is_stream_ciphersuite/1, signature_scheme/1, + scheme_to_components/1, hash_size/1]). + +%% RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 +-export([generate_client_shares/1, generate_server_share/1]). -compile(inline). @@ -83,6 +88,24 @@ security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> prf_algorithm = prf_algorithm(PrfHashAlg, Version), hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}. +security_parameters_1_3(SecParams, ClientRandom, CipherSuite) -> + #{cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := PrfHashAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + SecParams#security_parameters{ + client_random = ClientRandom, + cipher_suite = CipherSuite, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), + cipher_type = type(Cipher), + key_size = effective_key_bits(Cipher), + expanded_key_material_length = expanded_key_material(Cipher), + key_material_length = key_material(Cipher), + iv_size = iv_size(Cipher), + mac_algorithm = mac_algorithm(Hash), + prf_algorithm =prf_algorithm(PrfHashAlg, {3,4}), + hash_size = hash_size(Hash), + compression_algorithm = 0}. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher_init(cipher_enum(), binary(), binary()) -> #cipher_state{}. %% @@ -159,7 +182,7 @@ block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0, Mac, Fragment, {3, N}) - when N == 2; N == 3 -> + when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 -> NextIV = random_iv(IV), L0 = build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment), L = [NextIV|L0], @@ -288,6 +311,8 @@ anonymous_suites({3, N}) -> srp_suites_anon() ++ anonymous_suites(N); anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) -> dtls_v1:anonymous_suites(Version); +anonymous_suites(4) -> + []; %% Raw public key negotiation may be used instead anonymous_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> psk_suites_anon(N) ++ @@ -322,6 +347,8 @@ anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0; %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- psk_suites({3, N}) -> psk_suites(N); +psk_suites(4) -> + []; %% TODO Add new PSK, PSK_(EC)DHE suites psk_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> [ @@ -412,11 +439,12 @@ rc4_suites({3, Minor}) -> rc4_suites(0) -> [?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5]; -rc4_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> +rc4_suites(N) when N =< 4 -> [?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. %% @@ -451,7 +479,7 @@ rsa_suites(0) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ]; -rsa_suites(N) when N =< 3 -> +rsa_suites(N) when N =< 4 -> [ ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, @@ -644,6 +672,29 @@ is_stream_ciphersuite(#{cipher := rc4_128}) -> true; is_stream_ciphersuite(_) -> false. + +-spec hash_size(atom()) -> integer(). +hash_size(null) -> + 0; +%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context +%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3. +hash_size(aead) -> + 0; +hash_size(md5) -> + 16; +hash_size(sha) -> + 20; +%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it +%hash_size(sha224) -> +% 28; +hash_size(sha256) -> + 32; +hash_size(sha384) -> + 48. +%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it +%hash_size(sha512) -> +% 64. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -653,7 +704,7 @@ mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type, mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) -> ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment); mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) - when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3 -> + when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3; N =:= 4 -> tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version, Length, Fragment). @@ -801,26 +852,58 @@ sign_algorithm(?ECDSA) -> ecdsa; sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 4) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned; sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other. -hash_size(null) -> - 0; -%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context -%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3. -hash_size(aead) -> - 0; -hash_size(md5) -> - 16; -hash_size(sha) -> - 20; -%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it -%hash_size(sha224) -> -% 28; -hash_size(sha256) -> - 32; -hash_size(sha384) -> - 48. -%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it -%hash_size(sha512) -> -% 64. + +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> ?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> ?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> ?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512; +signature_scheme(ed25519) -> ?ED25519; +signature_scheme(ed448) -> ?ED448; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384; +signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512; +signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1; +signature_scheme(ecdsa_sha1) -> ?ECDSA_SHA1; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha512; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256) -> ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384) -> ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512) -> ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha512; +signature_scheme(?ED25519) -> ed25519; +signature_scheme(?ED448) -> ed448; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha256; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha384; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha512; +signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha1; +signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SHA1) -> ecdsa_sha1; +signature_scheme(_) -> unassigned. +%% TODO: reserved code points? + +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> {sha256, ecdsa, secp256r1}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> {sha384, ecdsa, secp384r1}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> {sha512, ecdsa, secp521r1}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined}; +%% scheme_to_components(ed25519) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined}; +%% scheme_to_components(ed448) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_pss, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> {sha1, rsa_pkcs1, undefined}; +scheme_to_components(ecdsa_sha1) -> {sha1, ecdsa, undefined}. %% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2. CBC Block Cipher %% @@ -858,7 +941,7 @@ generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize) next_iv = IV}; generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize) - when N == 2; N == 3 -> + when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 -> Sz1 = byte_size(T) - 1, <<_:Sz1/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength)>> = T, IVLength = byte_size(IV), @@ -1126,3 +1209,36 @@ filter_keyuse_suites(Use, KeyUse, CipherSuits, Suites) -> false -> CipherSuits -- Suites end. + +generate_server_share(Group) -> + Key = generate_key_exchange(Group), + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = Key + }}. + +generate_client_shares([]) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = []}; +generate_client_shares(Groups) -> + generate_client_shares(Groups, []). +%% +generate_client_shares([], Acc) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = lists:reverse(Acc)}; +generate_client_shares([Group|Groups], Acc) -> + Key = generate_key_exchange(Group), + KeyShareEntry = #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = Key + }, + generate_client_shares(Groups, [KeyShareEntry|Acc]). + + +generate_key_exchange(secp256r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp256r1}); +generate_key_exchange(secp384r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp384r1}); +generate_key_exchange(secp521r1) -> + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp521r1}); +generate_key_exchange(FFDHE) -> + public_key:generate_key(ssl_dh_groups:dh_params(FFDHE)). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl index 2371e8bd32..5891f3a7cc 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl @@ -611,4 +611,21 @@ %% TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0xcc, 0x15} -define(TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#CC), ?BYTE(16#15)>>). +%%% TLS 1.3 cipher suites RFC8446 + +%% TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x13,0x01} +-define(TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13), ?BYTE(16#01)>>). + +%% TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x13,0x02} +-define(TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#02)>>). + +%% TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = {0x13,0x03} +-define(TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#03)>>). + +%% %% TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0x13,0x04} +%% -define(TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13), ?BYTE(16#04)>>). + +%% %% TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0x13,0x05} +%% -define(TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#13),?BYTE(16#05)>>). + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_cipher). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl index c311c0d097..6e480eef45 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher_format.erl @@ -36,7 +36,14 @@ -type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. -type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. -type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. +-type key_algo() :: null | + rsa | + dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | + ecdhe_ecdsa | ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa | + srp_rsa| srp_dss | + psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | + dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon | + any. %% TLS 1.3 -type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := key_algo(), cipher := cipher(), mac := hash() | aead, @@ -62,6 +69,12 @@ suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := null, mac := null, prf := null}) -> "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"; +suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := aead, + prf := PRF}) -> + "TLS_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(Cipher)) ++ + "_" ++ string:to_upper(atom_to_list(PRF)); suite_to_str(#{key_exchange := Kex, cipher := Cipher, mac := aead, @@ -802,7 +815,34 @@ suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, cipher => chacha20_poly1305, mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +suite_definition(?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => aead, + prf => sha384}; +suite_definition(?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => any, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => aead, prf => sha256}. +%% suite_definition(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => any, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, +%% mac => aead, +%% prf => sha256}; +%% suite_definition(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => any, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm_8, +%% mac => aead, +%% prf => sha256}. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). @@ -1427,8 +1467,33 @@ suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, cipher := chacha20_poly1305, mac := aead, prf := sha256}) -> - ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. - + ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +suite(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := aead, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := any, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := aead, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. +%% suite(#{key_exchange := any, +%% cipher := aes_128_ccm, +%% mac := aead, +%% prf := sha256}) -> +%% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; +%% suite(#{key_exchange := any, +%% cipher := aes_128_ccm_8, +%% mac := aead, +%% prf := sha256}) -> +%% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec openssl_suite(openssl_cipher_suite()) -> cipher_suite(). %% @@ -1582,7 +1647,20 @@ openssl_suite("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256") -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; openssl_suite("ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384") -> - ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. + ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; + +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +openssl_suite("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256") -> + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +openssl_suite("TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384") -> + ?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; +openssl_suite("TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256") -> + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. +%% openssl_suite("TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256") -> +%% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; +%% openssl_suite("TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256") -> +%% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec openssl_suite_name(cipher_suite()) -> openssl_cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite(). @@ -1759,6 +1837,18 @@ openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> openssl_suite_name(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; +%% TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites RFC8446 +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"; +openssl_suite_name(?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> + "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"; +%% openssl_suite(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> +%% "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256"; +%% openssl_suite(?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> +%% "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256"; + %% No oppenssl name openssl_suite_name(Cipher) -> suite_definition(Cipher). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index 4b406b4c1e..5d5fd6e450 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Setup @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl -export([handle_session/7, ssl_config/3, - prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3, map_extensions/1]). + prepare_connection/2, hibernate_after/3]). %% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument %% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine @@ -344,7 +345,9 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, _, StateName, ignore end, try %% Try to tell the local user - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = Role}), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, + Alert#alert{role = Role}), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert,StateName, State) catch _:_ -> ok @@ -375,9 +378,10 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, protocol_cb = Connection, ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> + role = Role, socket_options = Opts, + tracker = Tracker} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), Pids = Connection:pids(State), alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), @@ -391,7 +395,7 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); @@ -400,7 +404,7 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), State = Connection:reinit_handshake_data(State0), @@ -410,8 +414,9 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, renegotiation = {true, From}, protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, + Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), gen_statem:reply(From, {error, renegotiation_rejected}), %% Go back to connection! State = Connection:reinit(State0#state{renegotiation = undefined}), @@ -420,8 +425,9 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, %% Gracefully log and ignore all other warning alerts handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, #state{ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, role = Role} = State) -> - log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, - Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), + log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Role, + Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, + Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), Connection:next_event(StateName, no_record, State). %%==================================================================== @@ -848,7 +854,9 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, role = client, ssl_options = #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}, negotiated_version = Version} = State, Connection) -> - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, ssl:tls_version(Version)) of + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(CertRequest, Cert, + SupportedHashSigns, + ssl:tls_version(Version)) of #alert {} = Alert -> handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); NegotiatedHashSign -> @@ -1279,7 +1287,7 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), - error_logger:error_report(Report), + ?LOG_ERROR(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), stop(normal, State); @@ -1323,7 +1331,7 @@ handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, _RecvFrom}, StateName, State) -> handle_info(Msg, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = Tag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Got unexpected info: ~p ~n", [{Msg, Tag, Socket}]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), {next_state, StateName, State}. %%==================================================================== @@ -1438,17 +1446,22 @@ security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> ssl_record:current_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), [{client_random, ClientRand}, {server_random, ServerRand}, {master_secret, MasterSecret}]. -do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols} = +do_server_hello(Type, #{next_protocol_negotiation := NextProtocols} = ServerHelloExt, #state{negotiated_version = Version, session = #session{session_id = SessId}, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{versions = [HighestVersion|_]}} = State0, Connection) when is_atom(Type) -> - + %% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 + %% Override server random values for TLS 1.3 downgrade protection mechanism. + ConnectionStates1 = update_server_random(ConnectionStates0, Version, HighestVersion), + State1 = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates1}, ServerHello = - ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, ssl:tls_version(Version), ConnectionStates0, ServerHelloExt), + ssl_handshake:server_hello(SessId, ssl:tls_version(Version), + ConnectionStates1, ServerHelloExt), State = server_hello(ServerHello, - State0#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = + State1#state{expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocols =/= undefined}, Connection), case Type of new -> @@ -1457,6 +1470,60 @@ do_server_hello(Type, #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocol resumed_server_hello(State, Connection) end. +update_server_random(#{pending_read := #{security_parameters := ReadSecParams0} = + ReadState0, + pending_write := #{security_parameters := WriteSecParams0} = + WriteState0} = ConnectionStates, + Version, HighestVersion) -> + ReadRandom = override_server_random( + ReadSecParams0#security_parameters.server_random, + Version, + HighestVersion), + WriteRandom = override_server_random( + WriteSecParams0#security_parameters.server_random, + Version, + HighestVersion), + ReadSecParams = ReadSecParams0#security_parameters{server_random = ReadRandom}, + WriteSecParams = WriteSecParams0#security_parameters{server_random = WriteRandom}, + ReadState = ReadState0#{security_parameters => ReadSecParams}, + WriteState = WriteState0#{security_parameters => WriteSecParams}, + + ConnectionStates#{pending_read => ReadState, pending_write => WriteState}. + +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last eight bytes +%% of their Random value to the bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST and TLS 1.2 +%% servers SHOULD set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the +%% bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 +override_server_random(<<Random0:24/binary,_:8/binary>> = Random, {M,N}, {Major,Minor}) + when Major > 3 orelse Major =:= 3 andalso Minor >= 4 -> %% TLS 1.3 or above + if M =:= 3 andalso N =:= 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.2 + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + M =:= 3 andalso N < 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + true -> + Random + end; +override_server_random(<<Random0:24/binary,_:8/binary>> = Random, {M,N}, {Major,Minor}) + when Major =:= 3 andalso Minor =:= 3 -> %% TLS 1.2 + if M =:= 3 andalso N < 3 -> %% Negotating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down = ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, + <<Random0/binary,Down/binary>>; + true -> + Random + end; +override_server_random(Random, _, _) -> + Random. + new_server_hello(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, session_id = SessionId}, @@ -2296,22 +2363,6 @@ hibernate_after(connection = StateName, hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions) -> {next_state, StateName, State, Actions}. -map_extensions(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - signature_algs = SigAlg, - alpn = Alpn, - next_protocol_negotiation = Next, - srp = SRP, - ec_point_formats = ECPointFmt, - elliptic_curves = ECCCurves, - sni = SNI}) -> - #{renegotiation_info => ssl_handshake:extension_value(RenegotiationInfo), - signature_algs => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SigAlg), - alpn => ssl_handshake:extension_value(Alpn), - srp => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SRP), - next_protocol => ssl_handshake:extension_value(Next), - ec_point_formats => ssl_handshake:extension_value(ECPointFmt), - elliptic_curves => ssl_handshake:extension_value(ECCCurves), - sni => ssl_handshake:extension_value(SNI)}. terminate_alert(normal) -> ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY); @@ -2328,7 +2379,7 @@ handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{ssl_options = handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{cert_db_ref = Ref, cert_db = CertDb, ssl_options = #ssl_options{cacertfile = <<>>}}) when CertDb =/= undefined -> - %% Certs provided as DER directly can not be shared + %% Certs provided as DER directly cannot be shared %% with other connections and it is safe to delete them when the connection ends. ssl_pkix_db:remove_trusted_certs(Ref, CertDb); handle_trusted_certs_db(#state{file_ref_db = undefined}) -> @@ -2648,14 +2699,14 @@ alert_user(Pids, Transport, Tracker, Socket, Active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Con Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), ReasonCode}) end. -log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> +log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, #alert{role = Role} = Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:own_alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); -log_alert(true, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> + Report = io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]), + ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report); +log_alert(Level, Role, ProtocolName, StateName, Alert) -> Txt = ssl_alert:alert_txt(Alert), - error_logger:info_report(io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt])); -log_alert(false, _, _, _, _) -> - ok. + Report = io_lib:format("~s ~p: In state ~p ~s\n", [ProtocolName, Role, StateName, Txt]), + ssl_logger:notice(Level, Report). invalidate_session(client, Host, Port, Session) -> ssl_manager:invalidate_session(Host, Port, Session); diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index 66e3182313..91467e9b26 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ %% The mecahnism is also usefull in TLS although we do not %% need to worry about packet loss in TLS. In DTLS we need to track DTLS handshake seqnr flight_state = reliable, %% reliable | {retransmit, integer()}| {waiting, ref(), integer()} - last two is used in DTLS over udp. - protocol_specific = #{} :: map() + protocol_specific = #{} :: map(), + key_share }). -define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PARAMS, #'DHParameter'{prime = ?DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl index bb62737232..9478ff9b78 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_crl_hash_dir.erl @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ -module(ssl_crl_hash_dir). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). -behaviour(ssl_crl_cache_api). @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ select(Issuer, {_DbHandle, [{dir, Dir}]}) -> %% is happy with that, but if it's true, this is an error. []; {error, Error} -> - error_logger:error_report( + ?LOG_ERROR( [{cannot_find_crl, Error}, {dir, Dir}, {module, ?MODULE}, @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ find_crls(Issuer, Hash, Dir, N, Acc) -> error:Error -> %% Something is wrong with the file. Report %% it, and try the next one. - error_logger:error_report( + ?LOG_ERROR( [{crl_parse_error, Error}, {filename, Filename}, {module, ?MODULE}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..20d53de430 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dh_groups.erl @@ -0,0 +1,467 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_dh_groups). + +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +-export([modp2048_generator/0, modp2048_prime/0, + ffdhe2048_generator/0, ffdhe2048_prime/0, + ffdhe3072_generator/0, ffdhe3072_prime/0, + ffdhe4096_generator/0, ffdhe4096_prime/0, + ffdhe6144_generator/0, ffdhe6144_prime/0, + ffdhe8192_generator/0, ffdhe8192_prime/0, + dh_params/1]). + +%% RFC3526 - 2048-bit MODP Group +%% This group is assigned id 14. +%% +%% This prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 } +%% +%% Its hexadecimal value is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 +%% 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD +%% EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 +%% E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED +%% EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D +%% C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F +%% 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D +%% 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B +%% E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 +%% DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 +%% 15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: 2. +modp2048_generator() -> + 2. + +modp2048_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%% RFC8446 - TLS 1.3 +%%% RFC7919 - Negotiated FFDHE for TLS +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +%% ffdhe2048 +%% --------- +%% The 2048-bit group has registry value 256 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^2048 - 2^1984 + {[2^1918 * e] + 560316 } * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 61285C97 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 103 +%% bits. +ffdhe2048_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe2048_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "61285C97" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe3072 +%% --------- +%% The 3072-bit prime has registry value 257 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^3072 - 2^3008 + {[2^2942 * e] + 2625351} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 66C62E37 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 125 +%% bits. +ffdhe3072_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe3072_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "66C62E37" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe4096 +%% --------- +%% The 4096-bit group has registry value 258 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^4096 - 2^4032 + {[2^3966 * e] + 5736041} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E655F6A +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 150 +%% bits. +ffdhe4096_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe4096_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E655F6A" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe6144 +%% --------- +%% The 6144-bit group has registry value 259 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^6144 - 2^6080 + {[2^6014 * e] + 15705020} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E0DD902 +%% 0BFD64B6 45036C7A 4E677D2C 38532A3A 23BA4442 CAF53EA6 +%% 3BB45432 9B7624C8 917BDD64 B1C0FD4C B38E8C33 4C701C3A +%% CDAD0657 FCCFEC71 9B1F5C3E 4E46041F 388147FB 4CFDB477 +%% A52471F7 A9A96910 B855322E DB6340D8 A00EF092 350511E3 +%% 0ABEC1FF F9E3A26E 7FB29F8C 183023C3 587E38DA 0077D9B4 +%% 763E4E4B 94B2BBC1 94C6651E 77CAF992 EEAAC023 2A281BF6 +%% B3A739C1 22611682 0AE8DB58 47A67CBE F9C9091B 462D538C +%% D72B0374 6AE77F5E 62292C31 1562A846 505DC82D B854338A +%% E49F5235 C95B9117 8CCF2DD5 CACEF403 EC9D1810 C6272B04 +%% 5B3B71F9 DC6B80D6 3FDD4A8E 9ADB1E69 62A69526 D43161C1 +%% A41D570D 7938DAD4 A40E329C D0E40E65 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 175 +%% bits. +ffdhe6144_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe6144_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E0DD902" + "0BFD64B6" "45036C7A" "4E677D2C" "38532A3A" "23BA4442" "CAF53EA6" + "3BB45432" "9B7624C8" "917BDD64" "B1C0FD4C" "B38E8C33" "4C701C3A" + "CDAD0657" "FCCFEC71" "9B1F5C3E" "4E46041F" "388147FB" "4CFDB477" + "A52471F7" "A9A96910" "B855322E" "DB6340D8" "A00EF092" "350511E3" + "0ABEC1FF" "F9E3A26E" "7FB29F8C" "183023C3" "587E38DA" "0077D9B4" + "763E4E4B" "94B2BBC1" "94C6651E" "77CAF992" "EEAAC023" "2A281BF6" + "B3A739C1" "22611682" "0AE8DB58" "47A67CBE" "F9C9091B" "462D538C" + "D72B0374" "6AE77F5E" "62292C31" "1562A846" "505DC82D" "B854338A" + "E49F5235" "C95B9117" "8CCF2DD5" "CACEF403" "EC9D1810" "C6272B04" + "5B3B71F9" "DC6B80D6" "3FDD4A8E" "9ADB1E69" "62A69526" "D43161C1" + "A41D570D" "7938DAD4" "A40E329C" "D0E40E65" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + + +%% ffdhe8192 +%% --------- +%% The 8192-bit group has registry value 260 and is calculated from the +%% following formula: +%% +%% The modulus is: +%% +%% p = 2^8192 - 2^8128 + {[2^8062 * e] + 10965728} * 2^64 - 1 +%% +%% The hexadecimal representation of p is: +%% +%% FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF ADF85458 A2BB4A9A AFDC5620 273D3CF1 +%% D8B9C583 CE2D3695 A9E13641 146433FB CC939DCE 249B3EF9 +%% 7D2FE363 630C75D8 F681B202 AEC4617A D3DF1ED5 D5FD6561 +%% 2433F51F 5F066ED0 85636555 3DED1AF3 B557135E 7F57C935 +%% 984F0C70 E0E68B77 E2A689DA F3EFE872 1DF158A1 36ADE735 +%% 30ACCA4F 483A797A BC0AB182 B324FB61 D108A94B B2C8E3FB +%% B96ADAB7 60D7F468 1D4F42A3 DE394DF4 AE56EDE7 6372BB19 +%% 0B07A7C8 EE0A6D70 9E02FCE1 CDF7E2EC C03404CD 28342F61 +%% 9172FE9C E98583FF 8E4F1232 EEF28183 C3FE3B1B 4C6FAD73 +%% 3BB5FCBC 2EC22005 C58EF183 7D1683B2 C6F34A26 C1B2EFFA +%% 886B4238 611FCFDC DE355B3B 6519035B BC34F4DE F99C0238 +%% 61B46FC9 D6E6C907 7AD91D26 91F7F7EE 598CB0FA C186D91C +%% AEFE1309 85139270 B4130C93 BC437944 F4FD4452 E2D74DD3 +%% 64F2E21E 71F54BFF 5CAE82AB 9C9DF69E E86D2BC5 22363A0D +%% ABC52197 9B0DEADA 1DBF9A42 D5C4484E 0ABCD06B FA53DDEF +%% 3C1B20EE 3FD59D7C 25E41D2B 669E1EF1 6E6F52C3 164DF4FB +%% 7930E9E4 E58857B6 AC7D5F42 D69F6D18 7763CF1D 55034004 +%% 87F55BA5 7E31CC7A 7135C886 EFB4318A ED6A1E01 2D9E6832 +%% A907600A 918130C4 6DC778F9 71AD0038 092999A3 33CB8B7A +%% 1A1DB93D 7140003C 2A4ECEA9 F98D0ACC 0A8291CD CEC97DCF +%% 8EC9B55A 7F88A46B 4DB5A851 F44182E1 C68A007E 5E0DD902 +%% 0BFD64B6 45036C7A 4E677D2C 38532A3A 23BA4442 CAF53EA6 +%% 3BB45432 9B7624C8 917BDD64 B1C0FD4C B38E8C33 4C701C3A +%% CDAD0657 FCCFEC71 9B1F5C3E 4E46041F 388147FB 4CFDB477 +%% A52471F7 A9A96910 B855322E DB6340D8 A00EF092 350511E3 +%% 0ABEC1FF F9E3A26E 7FB29F8C 183023C3 587E38DA 0077D9B4 +%% 763E4E4B 94B2BBC1 94C6651E 77CAF992 EEAAC023 2A281BF6 +%% B3A739C1 22611682 0AE8DB58 47A67CBE F9C9091B 462D538C +%% D72B0374 6AE77F5E 62292C31 1562A846 505DC82D B854338A +%% E49F5235 C95B9117 8CCF2DD5 CACEF403 EC9D1810 C6272B04 +%% 5B3B71F9 DC6B80D6 3FDD4A8E 9ADB1E69 62A69526 D43161C1 +%% A41D570D 7938DAD4 A40E329C CFF46AAA 36AD004C F600C838 +%% 1E425A31 D951AE64 FDB23FCE C9509D43 687FEB69 EDD1CC5E +%% 0B8CC3BD F64B10EF 86B63142 A3AB8829 555B2F74 7C932665 +%% CB2C0F1C C01BD702 29388839 D2AF05E4 54504AC7 8B758282 +%% 2846C0BA 35C35F5C 59160CC0 46FD8251 541FC68C 9C86B022 +%% BB709987 6A460E74 51A8A931 09703FEE 1C217E6C 3826E52C +%% 51AA691E 0E423CFC 99E9E316 50C1217B 624816CD AD9A95F9 +%% D5B80194 88D9C0A0 A1FE3075 A577E231 83F81D4A 3F2FA457 +%% 1EFC8CE0 BA8A4FE8 B6855DFE 72B0A66E DED2FBAB FBE58A30 +%% FAFABE1C 5D71A87E 2F741EF8 C1FE86FE A6BBFDE5 30677F0D +%% 97D11D49 F7A8443D 0822E506 A9F4614E 011E2A94 838FF88C +%% D68C8BB7 C5C6424C FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF +%% +%% The generator is: g = 2 +%% +%% The group size is: q = (p-1)/2 +%% +%% The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength of this group is 192 +%% bits. +ffdhe8192_generator() -> + 2. + +ffdhe8192_prime() -> + P = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "ADF85458" "A2BB4A9A" "AFDC5620" "273D3CF1" + "D8B9C583" "CE2D3695" "A9E13641" "146433FB" "CC939DCE" "249B3EF9" + "7D2FE363" "630C75D8" "F681B202" "AEC4617A" "D3DF1ED5" "D5FD6561" + "2433F51F" "5F066ED0" "85636555" "3DED1AF3" "B557135E" "7F57C935" + "984F0C70" "E0E68B77" "E2A689DA" "F3EFE872" "1DF158A1" "36ADE735" + "30ACCA4F" "483A797A" "BC0AB182" "B324FB61" "D108A94B" "B2C8E3FB" + "B96ADAB7" "60D7F468" "1D4F42A3" "DE394DF4" "AE56EDE7" "6372BB19" + "0B07A7C8" "EE0A6D70" "9E02FCE1" "CDF7E2EC" "C03404CD" "28342F61" + "9172FE9C" "E98583FF" "8E4F1232" "EEF28183" "C3FE3B1B" "4C6FAD73" + "3BB5FCBC" "2EC22005" "C58EF183" "7D1683B2" "C6F34A26" "C1B2EFFA" + "886B4238" "611FCFDC" "DE355B3B" "6519035B" "BC34F4DE" "F99C0238" + "61B46FC9" "D6E6C907" "7AD91D26" "91F7F7EE" "598CB0FA" "C186D91C" + "AEFE1309" "85139270" "B4130C93" "BC437944" "F4FD4452" "E2D74DD3" + "64F2E21E" "71F54BFF" "5CAE82AB" "9C9DF69E" "E86D2BC5" "22363A0D" + "ABC52197" "9B0DEADA" "1DBF9A42" "D5C4484E" "0ABCD06B" "FA53DDEF" + "3C1B20EE" "3FD59D7C" "25E41D2B" "669E1EF1" "6E6F52C3" "164DF4FB" + "7930E9E4" "E58857B6" "AC7D5F42" "D69F6D18" "7763CF1D" "55034004" + "87F55BA5" "7E31CC7A" "7135C886" "EFB4318A" "ED6A1E01" "2D9E6832" + "A907600A" "918130C4" "6DC778F9" "71AD0038" "092999A3" "33CB8B7A" + "1A1DB93D" "7140003C" "2A4ECEA9" "F98D0ACC" "0A8291CD" "CEC97DCF" + "8EC9B55A" "7F88A46B" "4DB5A851" "F44182E1" "C68A007E" "5E0DD902" + "0BFD64B6" "45036C7A" "4E677D2C" "38532A3A" "23BA4442" "CAF53EA6" + "3BB45432" "9B7624C8" "917BDD64" "B1C0FD4C" "B38E8C33" "4C701C3A" + "CDAD0657" "FCCFEC71" "9B1F5C3E" "4E46041F" "388147FB" "4CFDB477" + "A52471F7" "A9A96910" "B855322E" "DB6340D8" "A00EF092" "350511E3" + "0ABEC1FF" "F9E3A26E" "7FB29F8C" "183023C3" "587E38DA" "0077D9B4" + "763E4E4B" "94B2BBC1" "94C6651E" "77CAF992" "EEAAC023" "2A281BF6" + "B3A739C1" "22611682" "0AE8DB58" "47A67CBE" "F9C9091B" "462D538C" + "D72B0374" "6AE77F5E" "62292C31" "1562A846" "505DC82D" "B854338A" + "E49F5235" "C95B9117" "8CCF2DD5" "CACEF403" "EC9D1810" "C6272B04" + "5B3B71F9" "DC6B80D6" "3FDD4A8E" "9ADB1E69" "62A69526" "D43161C1" + "A41D570D" "7938DAD4" "A40E329C" "CFF46AAA" "36AD004C" "F600C838" + "1E425A31" "D951AE64" "FDB23FCE" "C9509D43" "687FEB69" "EDD1CC5E" + "0B8CC3BD" "F64B10EF" "86B63142" "A3AB8829" "555B2F74" "7C932665" + "CB2C0F1C" "C01BD702" "29388839" "D2AF05E4" "54504AC7" "8B758282" + "2846C0BA" "35C35F5C" "59160CC0" "46FD8251" "541FC68C" "9C86B022" + "BB709987" "6A460E74" "51A8A931" "09703FEE" "1C217E6C" "3826E52C" + "51AA691E" "0E423CFC" "99E9E316" "50C1217B" "624816CD" "AD9A95F9" + "D5B80194" "88D9C0A0" "A1FE3075" "A577E231" "83F81D4A" "3F2FA457" + "1EFC8CE0" "BA8A4FE8" "B6855DFE" "72B0A66E" "DED2FBAB" "FBE58A30" + "FAFABE1C" "5D71A87E" "2F741EF8" "C1FE86FE" "A6BBFDE5" "30677F0D" + "97D11D49" "F7A8443D" "0822E506" "A9F4614E" "011E2A94" "838FF88C" + "D68C8BB7" "C5C6424C" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF", + list_to_integer(P, 16). + +dh_params(ffdhe2048) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe2048_prime(), + base = ffdhe2048_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe3072) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe3072_prime(), + base = ffdhe3072_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe4096) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe4096_prime(), + base = ffdhe4096_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe6144) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe6144_prime(), + base = ffdhe6144_generator()}; +dh_params(ffdhe8192) -> + #'DHParameter'{ + prime = ffdhe8192_prime(), + base = ffdhe8192_generator()}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 14df1d2e02..417e5d9eb6 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -export_type([ssl_handshake/0, ssl_handshake_history/0, @@ -53,14 +54,14 @@ -export([certify/7, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, master_secret/4, server_key_exchange_hash/2, verify_connection/6, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, verify_server_key/5, - select_version/3, extension_value/1 + select_version/3, select_supported_version/2, extension_value/1 ]). %% Encode --export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, +-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_hello_extensions/1, encode_extensions/1, encode_extensions/2, encode_client_protocol_negotiation/2, encode_protocols_advertised_on_server/1]). %% Decode --export([decode_handshake/3, decode_hello_extensions/1, +-export([decode_handshake/3, decode_vector/1, decode_hello_extensions/3, decode_extensions/3, decode_server_key/3, decode_client_key/3, decode_suites/2 ]). @@ -71,13 +72,15 @@ premaster_secret/2, premaster_secret/3, premaster_secret/4]). %% Extensions handling --export([client_hello_extensions/5, +-export([client_hello_extensions/6, handle_client_hello_extensions/9, %% Returns server hello extensions handle_server_hello_extensions/9, select_curve/2, select_curve/3, select_hashsign/4, select_hashsign/5, - select_hashsign_algs/3 + select_hashsign_algs/3, empty_extensions/2, add_server_share/2 ]). +-export([get_cert_params/1]). + %%==================================================================== %% Create handshake messages %%==================================================================== @@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ hello_request() -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec server_hello(#session{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - #hello_extensions{}) -> #server_hello{}. + Extension::map()) -> #server_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a server hello message. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -504,6 +507,21 @@ verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params_bin = EncParams, select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions) -> do_select_version(RecordCB, ClientVersion, Versions). + +%% Called by TLS 1.2/1.3 Server when "supported_versions" is present +%% in ClientHello. +%% Input lists are ordered (highest first) +select_supported_version([], _ServerVersions) -> + undefined; +select_supported_version([ClientVersion|T], ServerVersions) -> + case lists:member(ClientVersion, ServerVersions) of + true -> + ClientVersion; + false -> + select_supported_version(T, ServerVersions) + end. + + %%==================================================================== %% Encode handshake %%==================================================================== @@ -517,7 +535,7 @@ encode_handshake(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Comp_method, - extensions = #hello_extensions{} = Extensions}, _Version) -> + extensions = Extensions}, _Version) -> SID_length = byte_size(Session_ID), ExtensionsBin = encode_hello_extensions(Extensions), {?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, @@ -567,71 +585,126 @@ encode_handshake(#certificate_verify{signature = BinSig, hashsign_algorithm = Ha encode_handshake(#finished{verify_data = VerifyData}, _Version) -> {?FINISHED, VerifyData}. -encode_hello_extensions(#hello_extensions{} = Extensions) -> - encode_hello_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>). -encode_hello_extensions([], <<>>) -> +encode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> + encode_extensions(hello_extensions_list(Extensions), <<>>). + +encode_extensions(Exts) -> + encode_extensions(Exts, <<>>). + +encode_extensions([], <<>>) -> <<>>; -encode_hello_extensions([], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([], Acc) -> Size = byte_size(Acc), <<?UINT16(Size), Acc/binary>>; - -encode_hello_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> - Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), +encode_extensions([#alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> + Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), ExtLen = Len + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(ExtensionData), - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) -> - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = undefined} | Rest], Acc) -> + encode_extensions(Rest, Acc); +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = ?byte(0) = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> Len = byte_size(Info), - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = Info} | Rest], Acc) -> InfoLen = byte_size(Info), Len = InfoLen +1, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(InfoLen), Info/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = EllipticCurves} | Rest], Acc) -> EllipticCurveList = << <<(tls_v1:oid_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- EllipticCurves>>, ListLen = byte_size(EllipticCurveList), Len = ListLen + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#supported_groups{supported_groups = SupportedGroups} | Rest], Acc) -> + + SupportedGroupList = << <<(tls_v1:group_to_enum(X)):16>> || X <- SupportedGroups>>, + ListLen = byte_size(SupportedGroupList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), + SupportedGroupList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ECPointFormats} | Rest], Acc) -> ECPointFormatList = list_to_binary(ECPointFormats), ListLen = byte_size(ECPointFormatList), Len = ListLen + 1, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(ListLen), ECPointFormatList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#srp{username = UserName} | Rest], Acc) -> SRPLen = byte_size(UserName), Len = SRPLen + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), UserName/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos} | Rest], Acc) -> SignAlgoList = << <<(ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash)):8, (ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)):8>> || {Hash, Sign} <- HashSignAlgos >>, ListLen = byte_size(SignAlgoList), Len = ListLen + 2, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignAlgoList/binary, Acc/binary>>); -encode_hello_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> +encode_extensions([#signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes} | Rest], Acc) -> + SignSchemeList = << <<(ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignatureScheme)):16 >> || + SignatureScheme <- SignatureSchemes >>, + ListLen = byte_size(SignSchemeList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignSchemeList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes} | Rest], Acc) -> + SignSchemeList = << <<(ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignatureScheme)):16 >> || + SignatureScheme <- SignatureSchemes >>, + ListLen = byte_size(SignSchemeList), + Len = ListLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), SignSchemeList/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#sni{hostname = Hostname} | Rest], Acc) -> HostLen = length(Hostname), HostnameBin = list_to_binary(Hostname), % Hostname type (1 byte) + Hostname length (2 bytes) + Hostname (HostLen bytes) ServerNameLength = 1 + 2 + HostLen, % ServerNameListSize (2 bytes) + ServerNameLength ExtLength = 2 + ServerNameLength, - encode_hello_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLength), - ?UINT16(ServerNameLength), - ?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), - ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, - Acc/binary>>). + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLength), + ?UINT16(ServerNameLength), + ?BYTE(?SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME), + ?UINT16(HostLen), HostnameBin/binary, + Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#client_hello_versions{versions = Versions0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Versions = encode_versions(Versions0), + VerLen = byte_size(Versions), + Len = VerLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(VerLen), Versions/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Version = encode_versions([Version0]), + Len = byte_size(Version), %% 2 + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), Version/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares0} | Rest], Acc) -> + ClientShares = encode_client_shares(ClientShares0), + ClientSharesLen = byte_size(ClientShares), + Len = ClientSharesLen + 2, + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ClientSharesLen), + ClientShares/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare0} | Rest], Acc) -> + ServerShare = encode_key_share_entry(ServerShare0), + Len = byte_size(ServerShare), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(Len), ServerShare/binary, Acc/binary>>); +encode_extensions([#key_share_hello_retry_request{selected_group = Group0} | Rest], Acc) -> + Group = tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group0), + encode_extensions(Rest, <<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), + ?UINT16(2), ?UINT16(Group), Acc/binary>>). + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(undefined, _) -> undefined; @@ -657,7 +730,7 @@ decode_handshake(_, ?NEXT_PROTOCOL, <<?BYTE(SelectedProtocolLength), ?BYTE(PaddingLength), _Padding:PaddingLength/binary>>) -> #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, +decode_handshake(Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method)>>) -> #server_hello{ @@ -666,14 +739,14 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:3 session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suite = Cipher_suite, compression_method = Comp_method, - extensions = #hello_extensions{}}; + extensions = empty_extensions(Version, server_hello)}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, +decode_handshake(Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, Cipher_suite:2/binary, ?BYTE(Comp_method), ?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) -> - HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions), + HelloExtensions = decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, Version, server_hello), #server_hello{ server_version = {Major,Minor}, @@ -716,17 +789,41 @@ decode_handshake(_Version, ?FINISHED, VerifyData) -> decode_handshake(_, Message, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, {unknown_or_malformed_handshake, Message})). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_vector(binary()) -> binary(). +%% +%% Description: Remove length tag from TLS Vector type. Needed +%% for client hello when extensions in older versions may be empty. +%% +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_vector(<<>>) -> + <<>>; +decode_vector(<<?UINT16(Len), Vector:Len/binary>>) -> + Vector. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_hello_extensions({client, binary()} | binary()) -> #hello_extensions{}. +-spec decode_hello_extensions(binary(), ssl_record:ssl_version(), atom()) -> map(). %% %% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_hello_extensions({client, <<>>}) -> - #hello_extensions{}; -decode_hello_extensions({client, <<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>}) -> - decode_hello_extensions(Extensions); -decode_hello_extensions(Extensions) -> - dec_hello_extensions(Extensions, #hello_extensions{}). +decode_hello_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType0) -> + %% Convert legacy atoms + MessageType = + case MessageType0 of + client -> client_hello; + server -> server_hello; + T -> T + end, + decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType, empty_extensions(Version, MessageType)). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_extensions(binary(),tuple(), atom()) -> map(). +%% +%% Description: Decodes TLS hello extensions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType) -> + decode_extensions(Extensions, Version, MessageType, empty_extensions()). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec decode_server_key(binary(), ssl_cipher_format:key_algo(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> @@ -936,56 +1033,170 @@ premaster_secret(EncSecret, #{algorithm := rsa} = Engine) -> %%==================================================================== %% Extensions handling %%==================================================================== -client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, - #ssl_options{signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, - eccs = SupportedECCs} = SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation) -> - {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = - case advertises_ec_ciphers(lists:map(fun ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition/1, CipherSuites)) of - true -> - client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); - false -> - {undefined, undefined} - end, +client_hello_extensions(Version, CipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation, KeyShare) -> + HelloExtensions0 = add_tls12_extensions(Version, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + HelloExtensions1 = add_common_extensions(Version, HelloExtensions0, CipherSuites, SslOpts), + maybe_add_tls13_extensions(Version, HelloExtensions1, SslOpts, KeyShare). + + +add_tls12_extensions(_Version, + SslOpts, + ConnectionStates, + Renegotiation) -> SRP = srp_user(SslOpts), + #{renegotiation_info => renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + srp => SRP, + alpn => encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), + next_protocol_negotiation => + encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, + Renegotiation), + sni => sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication) + }. - #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(tls_record, client, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version), - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = encode_alpn(SslOpts#ssl_options.alpn_advertised_protocols, Renegotiation), - next_protocol_negotiation = - encode_client_protocol_negotiation(SslOpts#ssl_options.next_protocol_selector, - Renegotiation), - sni = sni(SslOpts#ssl_options.server_name_indication)}. + +add_common_extensions({3,4}, + HelloExtensions, + _CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{eccs = SupportedECCs, + supported_groups = Groups, + signature_algs = SignatureSchemes}) -> + {EcPointFormats, _} = + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs), + HelloExtensions#{ec_point_formats => EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves => Groups, + signature_algs => signature_algs_ext(SignatureSchemes)}; + +add_common_extensions(Version, + HelloExtensions, + CipherSuites, + #ssl_options{eccs = SupportedECCs, + signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}) -> + + {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves} = + case advertises_ec_ciphers( + lists:map(fun ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition/1, + CipherSuites)) of + true -> + client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs); + false -> + {undefined, undefined} + end, + HelloExtensions#{ec_point_formats => EcPointFormats, + elliptic_curves => EllipticCurves, + signature_algs => available_signature_algs(SupportedHashSigns, Version)}. + + +maybe_add_tls13_extensions({3,4}, + HelloExtensions0, + #ssl_options{signature_algs_cert = SignatureSchemes, + versions = SupportedVersions}, + KeyShare) -> + HelloExtensions = + HelloExtensions0#{client_hello_versions => + #client_hello_versions{versions = SupportedVersions}, + signature_algs_cert => + signature_algs_cert(SignatureSchemes)}, + maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, KeyShare); +maybe_add_tls13_extensions(_, HelloExtensions, _, _) -> + HelloExtensions. + + +%% TODO: Add support for PSK key establishment + +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) - 4.2.8. Key Share +%% +%% 4.2.8.1. Diffie-Hellman Parameters +%% Diffie-Hellman [DH76] parameters for both clients and servers are +%% encoded in the opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a +%% KeyShare structure. The opaque value contains the Diffie-Hellman +%% public value (Y = g^X mod p) for the specified group (see [RFC7919] +%% for group definitions) encoded as a big-endian integer and padded to +%% the left with zeros to the size of p in bytes. +%% +%% 4.2.8.2. ECDHE Parameters +%% +%% ECDHE parameters for both clients and servers are encoded in the +%% opaque key_exchange field of a KeyShareEntry in a KeyShare structure. +%% +%% For secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1, the contents are the +%% serialized value of the following struct: +%% +%% struct { +%% uint8 legacy_form = 4; +%% opaque X[coordinate_length]; +%% opaque Y[coordinate_length]; +%% } UncompressedPointRepresentation; +%% +%% X and Y, respectively, are the binary representations of the x and y +%% values in network byte order. There are no internal length markers, +%% so each number representation occupies as many octets as implied by +%% the curve parameters. For P-256, this means that each of X and Y use +%% 32 octets, padded on the left by zeros if necessary. For P-384, they +%% take 48 octets each. For P-521, they take 66 octets each. +maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, undefined) -> + HelloExtensions; +maybe_add_key_share(HelloExtensions, KeyShare) -> + #key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares0} = KeyShare, + %% Keep only public keys + ClientShares = lists:map(fun kse_remove_private_key/1, ClientShares0), + HelloExtensions#{key_share => #key_share_client_hello{ + client_shares = ClientShares}}. + +add_server_share(Extensions, KeyShare) -> + #key_share_server_hello{server_share = ServerShare0} = KeyShare, + %% Keep only public keys + ServerShare = kse_remove_private_key(ServerShare0), + Extensions#{key_share => #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = ServerShare}}. + +kse_remove_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = + #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = PublicKey}}) -> + #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = PublicKey}; +kse_remove_private_key(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = + {PublicKey, _}}) -> + #key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = PublicKey}. + +signature_algs_ext(undefined) -> + undefined; +signature_algs_ext(SignatureSchemes) -> + #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes}. + +signature_algs_cert(undefined) -> + undefined; +signature_algs_cert(SignatureSchemes) -> + #signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = SignatureSchemes}. handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, - #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, - srp = SRP, - ec_point_formats = ECCFormat, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, + Exts, Version, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, alpn_preferred_protocols = ALPNPreferredProtocols} = Opts, #session{cipher_suite = NegotiatedCipherSuite, compression_method = Compression} = Session0, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - Session = handle_srp_extension(SRP, Session0), - ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, Info, + Session = handle_srp_extension(maps:get(srp, Exts, undefined), Session0), + ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(server, RecordCB, Version, maps:get(renegotiation_info, Exts, undefined), Random, NegotiatedCipherSuite, ClientCipherSuites, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), - ServerHelloExtensions = #hello_extensions{ - renegotiation_info = renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, - ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), - ec_point_formats = server_ecc_extension(Version, ECCFormat) - }, - + Empty = empty_extensions(Version, server_hello), + ServerHelloExtensions = Empty#{renegotiation_info => renegotiation_info(RecordCB, server, + ConnectionStates, Renegotiation), + ec_point_formats => server_ecc_extension(Version, maps:get(ec_point_formats, Exts, undefined)) + }, + %% If we receive an ALPN extension and have ALPN configured for this connection, %% we handle it. Otherwise we check for the NPN extension. + ALPN = maps:get(alpn, Exts, undefined), if ALPN =/= undefined, ALPNPreferredProtocols =/= undefined -> case handle_alpn_extension(ALPNPreferredProtocols, decode_alpn(ALPN)) of @@ -993,35 +1204,36 @@ handle_client_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, ClientCipherSuites, Alert; Protocol -> {Session, ConnectionStates, Protocol, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{alpn=encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}} + ServerHelloExtensions#{alpn => encode_alpn([Protocol], Renegotiation)}} end; true -> + NextProtocolNegotiation = maps:get(next_protocol_negotiation, Exts, undefined), ProtocolsToAdvertise = handle_next_protocol_extension(NextProtocolNegotiation, Renegotiation, Opts), {Session, ConnectionStates, undefined, - ServerHelloExtensions#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation= - encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} + ServerHelloExtensions#{next_protocol_negotiation => + encode_protocols_advertised_on_server(ProtocolsToAdvertise)}} end. handle_server_hello_extensions(RecordCB, Random, CipherSuite, Compression, - #hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = Info, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}, Version, + Exts, Version, #ssl_options{secure_renegotiate = SecureRenegotation, next_protocol_selector = NextProtoSelector}, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation) -> - ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, Info, Random, + ConnectionStates = handle_renegotiation_extension(client, RecordCB, Version, maps:get(renegotiation_info, Exts, undefined), Random, CipherSuite, undefined, Compression, ConnectionStates0, Renegotiation, SecureRenegotation), %% If we receive an ALPN extension then this is the protocol selected, %% otherwise handle the NPN extension. + ALPN = maps:get(alpn, Exts, undefined), case decode_alpn(ALPN) of %% ServerHello contains exactly one protocol: the one selected. %% We also ignore the ALPN extension during renegotiation (see encode_alpn/2). [Protocol] when not Renegotiation -> {ConnectionStates, alpn, Protocol}; undefined -> + NextProtocolNegotiation = maps:get(next_protocol_negotiation, Exts, undefined), case handle_next_protocol(NextProtocolNegotiation, NextProtoSelector, Renegotiation) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; @@ -1070,26 +1282,50 @@ select_hashsign(_, _, KeyExAlgo, _, _Version) when KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; {null, anon}; %% The signature_algorithms extension was introduced with TLS 1.2. Ignore it if we have %% negotiated a lower version. -select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, - undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlgo, tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); -select_hashsign(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, - {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> - is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); - (_) -> - false - end, HashSigns) of - [] -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); - [HashSign | _] -> - HashSign +select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, + Cert, KeyExAlgo, undefined, {Major, Minor} = Version) + when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> + select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, Cert, KeyExAlgo, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs(Version), Version); +select_hashsign({#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = ClientHashSigns}, + ClientSignatureSchemes0}, + Cert, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) + when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3 -> + ClientSignatureSchemes = get_signature_scheme(ClientSignatureSchemes0), + {SignAlgo0, Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + SignAlgo = sign_algo(SignAlgo0), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + %% RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) + %% If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all + %% certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a + %% hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension. + %% + %% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) + %% TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature + %% algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The + %% "signature_algorithms_cert" extension applies to signatures in + %% certificates and the "signature_algorithms" extension, which + %% originally appeared in TLS 1.2, applies to signatures in + %% CertificateVerify messages. + %% + %% If no "signature_algorithms_cert" extension is + %% present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to + %% signatures appearing in certificates. + case is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, Param, ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes) of + true -> + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == PublicKeyAlgo -> + is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, KeyExAlgo, SupportedHashSigns); + (_) -> + false + end, ClientHashSigns) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + [HashSign | _] -> + HashSign + end; + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), @@ -1103,21 +1339,23 @@ select_hashsign(_, Cert, _, _, Version) -> %% %% Description: Handles signature algorithms selection for certificate requests (client) %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, - certificate_types = Types}, Cert, SupportedHashSigns, +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{ + hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{ + hash_sign_algos = HashSigns}, + certificate_types = Types}, + Cert, + SupportedHashSigns, {Major, Minor}) when Major >= 3 andalso Minor >= 3-> - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, - signatureAlgorithm = {_,SignAlgo, _}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), - #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, SubjAlgo, _}} = - TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, - - Sign = sign_algo(SignAlgo), - SubSign = sign_algo(SubjAlgo), - - case is_acceptable_cert_type(SubSign, HashSigns, Types) andalso is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) of + {SignAlgo0, Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + SignAlgo = sign_algo(SignAlgo0), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + case is_acceptable_cert_type(PublicKeyAlgo, Types) andalso + %% certificate_request has no "signature_algorithms_cert" + %% extension in TLS 1.2. + is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, Param, HashSigns, undefined) of true -> - case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == SubSign -> + case lists:filter(fun({_, S} = Algos) when S == PublicKeyAlgo -> is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns); (_) -> false @@ -1130,8 +1368,38 @@ select_hashsign(#certificate_request{hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) end; -select_hashsign(#certificate_request{}, Cert, _, Version) -> - select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version). +select_hashsign(#certificate_request{certificate_types = Types}, Cert, _, Version) -> + {_, _, PublicKeyAlgo0} = get_cert_params(Cert), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + + %% Check cert even for TLS 1.0/1.1 + case is_acceptable_cert_type(PublicKeyAlgo, Types) of + true -> + select_hashsign(undefined, Cert, undefined, [], Version); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm) + end. + + +%% Gets the relevant parameters of a certificate: +%% - signature algorithm +%% - parameters of the signature algorithm +%% - public key algorithm (key type) +get_cert_params(Cert) -> + #'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate = TBSCert, + signatureAlgorithm = + {_,SignAlgo, Param}} = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(Cert, otp), + #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{algorithm = {_, PublicKeyAlgo, _}} = + TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo, + {SignAlgo, Param, PublicKeyAlgo}. + + +get_signature_scheme(undefined) -> + undefined; +get_signature_scheme(#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + ClientSignatureSchemes. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec select_hashsign_algs({atom(), atom()}| undefined, oid(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> @@ -1180,6 +1448,8 @@ extension_value(#ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = List}) -> List; extension_value(#elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = List}) -> List; +extension_value(#supported_groups{supported_groups = SupportedGroups}) -> + SupportedGroups; extension_value(#hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = Algos}) -> Algos; extension_value(#alpn{extension_data = Data}) -> @@ -1200,33 +1470,30 @@ int_to_bin(I) -> L = (length(integer_to_list(I, 16)) + 1) div 2, <<I:(L*8)>>. -certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> - case proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, - proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of - true -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - false -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> - end; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> - <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; - -certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> - <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; +%% TLS 1.0+ +%% The end-entity certificate provided by the client MUST contain a +%% key that is compatible with certificate_types. +certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 1 -> + ECDSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(ecdsa, ?ECDSA_SIGN), + RSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(rsa, ?RSA_SIGN), + DSS = supported_cert_type_or_empty(dss, ?DSS_SIGN), + <<ECDSA/binary,RSA/binary,DSS/binary>>; +%% SSL 3.0 certificate_types(_, _) -> - <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. + RSA = supported_cert_type_or_empty(rsa, ?RSA_SIGN), + DSS = supported_cert_type_or_empty(dss, ?DSS_SIGN), + <<RSA/binary,DSS/binary>>. + +%% Returns encoded certificate_type if algorithm is supported +supported_cert_type_or_empty(Algo, Type) -> + case proplists:get_bool( + Algo, + proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports())) of + true -> + <<?BYTE(Type)>>; + false -> + <<>> + end. certificate_authorities(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> Authorities = certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef), @@ -1769,16 +2036,32 @@ encode_alpn(undefined, _) -> encode_alpn(Protocols, _) -> #alpn{extension_data = lists:foldl(fun encode_protocol/2, <<>>, Protocols)}. -hello_extensions_list(#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = RenegotiationInfo, - srp = SRP, - signature_algs = HashSigns, - ec_point_formats = EcPointFormats, - elliptic_curves = EllipticCurves, - alpn = ALPN, - next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation, - sni = Sni}) -> - [Ext || Ext <- [RenegotiationInfo, SRP, HashSigns, - EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves, ALPN, NextProtocolNegotiation, Sni], Ext =/= undefined]. + +encode_versions(Versions) -> + encode_versions(lists:reverse(Versions), <<>>). +%% +encode_versions([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_versions([{M,N}|T], Acc) -> + encode_versions(T, <<?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),Acc/binary>>). + +encode_client_shares(ClientShares) -> + encode_client_shares(ClientShares, <<>>). +%% +encode_client_shares([], Acc) -> + Acc; +encode_client_shares([KeyShareEntry0|T], Acc) -> + KeyShareEntry = encode_key_share_entry(KeyShareEntry0), + encode_client_shares(T, <<Acc/binary,KeyShareEntry/binary>>). + +encode_key_share_entry(#key_share_entry{ + group = Group, + key_exchange = KeyExchange}) -> + Len = byte_size(KeyExchange), + <<?UINT16((tls_v1:group_to_enum(Group))),?UINT16(Len),KeyExchange/binary>>. + +hello_extensions_list(HelloExtensions) -> + [Ext || {_, Ext} <- maps:to_list(HelloExtensions), Ext =/= undefined]. %%-------------Decode handshakes--------------------------------- dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, @@ -1918,16 +2201,19 @@ dec_server_key_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) -> dec_server_key_signature(_, _, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, failed_to_decrypt_server_key_sign)). -dec_hello_extensions(<<>>, Acc) -> +decode_extensions(<<>>, _Version, _MessageType, Acc) -> Acc; -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) - when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen -> +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ALPN_EXT), ?UINT16(ExtLen), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Len + 2 =:= ExtLen -> ALPN = #alpn{extension_data = ExtensionData}, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{alpn = ALPN}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{alpn => ALPN}); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?NEXTPROTONEG_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtensionData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> NextP = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtensionData}, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = NextP}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{next_protocol_negotiation => NextP}); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + Info:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> RenegotiateInfo = case Len of 1 -> % Initial handshake Info; % should be <<0>> will be matched in handle_renegotiation_info @@ -1936,25 +2222,54 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Info:Len/binar <<?BYTE(VerifyLen), VerifyInfo/binary>> = Info, VerifyInfo end, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{renegotiation_info = - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = - RenegotiateInfo}}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{renegotiation_info => + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = + RenegotiateInfo}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SRP_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?BYTE(SRPLen), + SRP:SRPLen/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len == SRPLen + 2 -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{srp = #srp{username = SRP}}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc#{srp => #srp{username = SRP}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version < {3,4} -> SignAlgoListLen = Len - 2, <<?UINT16(SignAlgoListLen), SignAlgoList/binary>> = ExtData, HashSignAlgos = [{ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(Hash), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(Sign)} || <<?BYTE(Hash), ?BYTE(Sign)>> <= SignAlgoList], - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{signature_algs = - #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}}); - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs => + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = + HashSignAlgos}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + SignSchemeListLen = Len - 2, + <<?UINT16(SignSchemeListLen), SignSchemeList/binary>> = ExtData, + SignSchemes = [ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignScheme) || + <<?UINT16(SignScheme)>> <= SignSchemeList], + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs => + #signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = SignSchemes}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + SignSchemeListLen = Len - 2, + <<?UINT16(SignSchemeListLen), SignSchemeList/binary>> = ExtData, + SignSchemes = [ssl_cipher:signature_scheme(SignScheme) || + <<?UINT16(SignScheme)>> <= SignSchemeList], + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{signature_algs_cert => + #signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = SignSchemes}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version < {3,4} -> <<?UINT16(_), EllipticCurveList/binary>> = ExtData, %% Ignore unknown curves Pick = fun(Enum) -> @@ -1966,31 +2281,103 @@ dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), end end, EllipticCurves = lists:filtermap(Pick, [ECC || <<ECC:16>> <= EllipticCurveList]), - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = - EllipticCurves}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{elliptic_curves => + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = + EllipticCurves}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + <<?UINT16(_), GroupList/binary>> = ExtData, + %% Ignore unknown curves + Pick = fun(Enum) -> + case tls_v1:enum_to_group(Enum) of + undefined -> + false; + Group -> + {true, Group} + end + end, + SupportedGroups = lists:filtermap(Pick, [Group || <<Group:16>> <= GroupList]), + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{elliptic_curves => + #supported_groups{supported_groups = + SupportedGroups}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> <<?BYTE(_), ECPointFormatList/binary>> = ExtData, ECPointFormats = binary_to_list(ECPointFormatList), - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{ec_point_formats = - #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = - ECPointFormats}}); + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{ec_point_formats => + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = + ECPointFormats}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len == 0 -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{sni => #sni{hostname = ""}}); %% Server may send an empy SNI + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(_), NameList/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{sni => dec_sni(NameList)}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) when Len > 2 -> + <<?UINT16(_),Versions/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{client_hello_versions => + #client_hello_versions{ + versions = decode_versions(Versions)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ?UINT16(SelectedVersion), Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) + when Len =:= 2, SelectedVersion =:= 16#0304 -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{server_hello_selected_version => + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = + {3,4}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = client_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(_),ClientShares/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_client_hello{ + client_shares = decode_client_shares(ClientShares)}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = server_hello, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Group),?UINT16(KeyLen),KeyExchange:KeyLen/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = + #key_share_entry{ + group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group), + key_exchange = KeyExchange}}}); + +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(?KEY_SHARE_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), + ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, + Version, MessageType = hello_retry_request, Acc) -> + <<?UINT16(Group),Rest/binary>> = ExtData, + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, + Acc#{key_share => + #key_share_hello_retry_request{ + selected_group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group)}}); -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), Rest/binary>>, Acc) when Len == 0 -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = ""}}); %% Server may send an empy SNI -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), - ExtData:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - <<?UINT16(_), NameList/binary>> = ExtData, - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc#hello_extensions{sni = dec_sni(NameList)}); %% Ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e., %% extensions) if not understood. - -dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> - dec_hello_extensions(Rest, Acc); +decode_extensions(<<?UINT16(_), ?UINT16(Len), _Unknown:Len/binary, Rest/binary>>, Version, MessageType, Acc) -> + decode_extensions(Rest, Version, MessageType, Acc); %% This theoretically should not happen if the protocol is followed, but if it does it is ignored. -dec_hello_extensions(_, Acc) -> +decode_extensions(_, _, _, Acc) -> Acc. dec_hashsign(<<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo)>>) -> @@ -2008,6 +2395,26 @@ decode_alpn(undefined) -> decode_alpn(#alpn{extension_data=Data}) -> decode_protocols(Data, []). +decode_versions(Versions) -> + decode_versions(Versions, []). +%% +decode_versions(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_versions(<<?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_versions(Rest, [{M,N}|Acc]). + + +decode_client_shares(ClientShares) -> + decode_client_shares(ClientShares, []). +%% +decode_client_shares(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_client_shares(<<?UINT16(Group),?UINT16(Len),KeyExchange:Len/binary,Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + decode_client_shares(Rest, [#key_share_entry{ + group = tls_v1:enum_to_group(Group), + key_exchange= KeyExchange + }|Acc]). + decode_next_protocols({next_protocol_negotiation, Protocols}) -> decode_protocols(Protocols, []). @@ -2265,17 +2672,6 @@ handle_srp_extension(undefined, Session) -> handle_srp_extension(#srp{username = Username}, Session) -> Session#session{srp_username = Username}. - -sign_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> - rsa; -sign_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> - ecdsa; -sign_algo(?'id-dsa') -> - dsa; -sign_algo(Alg) -> - {_, Sign} =public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg), - Sign. - is_acceptable_hash_sign( _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == psk; KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; @@ -2291,15 +2687,80 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos,_, SupportedHashSigns) -> is_acceptable_hash_sign(Algos, SupportedHashSigns) -> lists:member(Algos, SupportedHashSigns). -is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, _HashSigns, Types) -> +is_acceptable_cert_type(Sign, Types) -> lists:member(sign_type(Sign), binary_to_list(Types)). -is_supported_sign(Sign, HashSigns) -> - [] =/= lists:dropwhile(fun({_, S}) when S =/= Sign -> - true; - (_)-> - false - end, HashSigns). +%% signature_algorithms_cert = undefined +is_supported_sign(SignAlgo, _, HashSigns, undefined) -> + lists:member(SignAlgo, HashSigns); + +%% {'SignatureAlgorithm',{1,2,840,113549,1,1,11},'NULL'} +is_supported_sign({Hash, Sign}, 'NULL', _, SignatureSchemes) -> + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) -> + {H0, S0, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + S1 = case S0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> rsa; + S -> S + end, + H1 = case H0 of + sha1 -> sha; + H -> H + end, + Acc orelse (Sign =:= S1 andalso + Hash =:= H1) + end, + lists:foldl(Fun, false, SignatureSchemes); + +%% TODO: Implement validation for the curve used in the signature +%% RFC 3279 - 2.2.3 ECDSA Signature Algorithm +%% When the ecdsa-with-SHA1 algorithm identifier appears as the +%% algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MUST omit the +%% parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a +%% SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA1. +%% +%% The elliptic curve parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of +%% the certificate of the issuer SHALL apply to the verification of the +%% signature. +is_supported_sign({Hash, Sign}, _Param, _, SignatureSchemes) -> + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) -> + {H0, S0, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + S1 = case S0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> rsa; + S -> S + end, + H1 = case H0 of + sha1 -> sha; + H -> H + end, + Acc orelse (Sign =:= S1 andalso + Hash =:= H1) + end, + lists:foldl(Fun, false, SignatureSchemes). + +%% SupportedPublicKeyAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY-ALGORITHM-CLASS ::= { +%% dsa | rsa-encryption | dh | kea | ec-public-key } +public_key_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> + rsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> + ecdsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-dsa') -> + dsa. + +%% SupportedSignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM-CLASS ::= { +%% dsa-with-sha1 | dsaWithSHA1 | md2-with-rsa-encryption | +%% md5-with-rsa-encryption | sha1-with-rsa-encryption | sha-1with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha224-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha256-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha384-with-rsa-encryption | +%% sha512-with-rsa-encryption | +%% ecdsa-with-sha1 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha224 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha256 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha384 | +%% ecdsa-with-sha512 } +sign_algo(Alg) -> + public_key:pkix_sign_types(Alg). + sign_type(rsa) -> ?RSA_SIGN; sign_type(dsa) -> @@ -2318,6 +2779,11 @@ client_ecc_extensions(SupportedECCs) -> CryptoSupport = proplists:get_value(public_keys, crypto:supports()), case proplists:get_bool(ecdh, CryptoSupport) of true -> + %% RFC 8422 - 5.1. Client Hello Extensions + %% Clients SHOULD send both the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension and the + %% Supported Point Formats Extension. If the Supported Point Formats + %% Extension is indeed sent, it MUST contain the value 0 (uncompressed) + %% as one of the items in the list of point formats. EcPointFormats = #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]}, EllipticCurves = SupportedECCs, {EcPointFormats, EllipticCurves}; @@ -2485,4 +2951,51 @@ cert_curve(Cert, ECCCurve0, CipherSuite) -> {ECCCurve0, CipherSuite} end. - +empty_extensions() -> + #{}. + +empty_extensions({3,4}, client_hello) -> + #{ + sni => undefined, + %% max_fragment_length => undefined, + %% status_request => undefined, + elliptic_curves => undefined, + signature_algs => undefined, + %% use_srtp => undefined, + %% heartbeat => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + %% signed_cert_timestamp => undefined, + %% client_cert_type => undefined, + %% server_cert_type => undefined, + %% padding => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined, + %% psk_key_exhange_modes => undefined, + %% early_data => undefined, + %% cookie => undefined, + client_hello_versions => undefined, + %% cert_authorities => undefined, + %% post_handshake_auth => undefined, + signature_algs_cert => undefined + }; +empty_extensions({3, 3}, client_hello) -> + Ext = empty_extensions({3,2}, client_hello), + Ext#{signature_algs => undefined}; +empty_extensions(_, client_hello) -> + #{renegotiation_info => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + next_protocol_negotiation => undefined, + srp => undefined, + ec_point_formats => undefined, + elliptic_curves => undefined, + sni => undefined}; +empty_extensions({3,4}, server_hello) -> + #{server_hello_selected_version => undefined, + key_share => undefined, + pre_shared_key => undefined + }; +empty_extensions(_, server_hello) -> + #{renegotiation_info => undefined, + alpn => undefined, + next_protocol_negotiation => undefined, + ec_point_formats => undefined}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl index a191fcf766..d4233bea9b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl @@ -52,9 +52,8 @@ -define(NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES, 32). % TSL 1.1 & SSL 3 -define(NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES, 48). --define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, 2). --define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, - 16#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). +-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GENERATOR, ssl_dh_groups:modp2048_generator()). +-define(DEFAULT_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PRIME, ssl_dh_groups:modp2048_prime()). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%% Handsake protocol - RFC 4346 section 7.4 @@ -105,7 +104,11 @@ srp, ec_point_formats, elliptic_curves, - sni + sni, + client_hello_versions, + server_hello_selected_version, + signature_algs_cert, + key_share }). -record(server_hello, { @@ -313,12 +316,12 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXT, 13). --record(hash_sign_algos, { - hash_sign_algos - }). +-record(hash_sign_algos, {hash_sign_algos}). +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) +-record(signature_algorithms, {signature_scheme_list}). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation RFC 7301 +%% RFC 7301 Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -define(ALPN_EXT, 16). @@ -338,9 +341,8 @@ -record(next_protocol, {selected_protocol}). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% ECC Extensions RFC 4492 section 4 and 5 +%% ECC Extensions RFC 8422 section 4 and 5 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -define(ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT, 10). -define(EC_POINT_FORMATS_EXT, 11). @@ -348,11 +350,18 @@ elliptic_curve_list }). +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) renamed the "elliptic_curve" extension. +-record(supported_groups, { + supported_groups + }). + -record(ec_point_formats, { ec_point_format_list }). -define(ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED, 0). +%% Defined in RFC 4492, deprecated by RFC 8422 +%% RFC 8422 compliant implementations MUST not support the two formats below -define(ECPOINT_ANSIX962_COMPRESSED_PRIME, 1). -define(ECPOINT_ANSIX962_COMPRESSED_CHAR2, 2). @@ -365,10 +374,11 @@ -define(NAMED_CURVE, 3). %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%% Server name indication RFC 6066 section 3 +%% RFC 6066 Server name indication %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% --define(SNI_EXT, 16#0000). +%% section 3 +-define(SNI_EXT, 0). %% enum { host_name(0), (255) } NameType; -define(SNI_NAMETYPE_HOST_NAME, 0). @@ -377,4 +387,56 @@ hostname = undefined }). +%% Other possible values from RFC 6066, not supported +-define(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, 1). +-define(CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_URL, 2). +-define(TRUSTED_CA_KEYS, 3). +-define(TRUNCATED_HMAC, 4). +-define(STATUS_REQUEST, 5). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7250 Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) +%% and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, 19). +-define(SERVER_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, 20). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 6520 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and +%% Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(HS_HEARTBEAT, 15). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(SIGNED_CERTIFICATE_TIMESTAMP, 18). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% RFC 7685 A Transport Layer Security (TLS) ClientHello Padding Extension +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Not supported +-define(PADDING, 21). + + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Supported Versions RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) section 4.2.1 also affects TLS-1.2 +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +-define(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT, 43). + +-record(client_hello_versions, {versions}). +-record(server_hello_selected_version, {selected_version}). + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Signature Algorithms RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) section 4.2.3 also affects TLS-1.2 +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +-define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT, 50). + +-record(signature_algorithms_cert, {signature_scheme_list}). + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_handshake). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl index 63e751440a..a079c6a796 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-define(VSN, "8.2.6"). -define(SECRET_PRINTOUT, "***"). -type reason() :: term(). @@ -72,14 +73,39 @@ -define(FALSE, 1). %% sslv3 is considered insecure due to lack of padding check (Poodle attack) -%% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default --define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). +%% Keep as interop with legacy software but do not support as default +%% tlsv1.3 is under development (experimental). +-define(ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.3', 'tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). -define(ALL_AVAILABLE_DATAGRAM_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). +%% Defines the default versions when not specified by an ssl option. -define(ALL_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). -define(MIN_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.1', tlsv1]). + +%% Versions allowed in TLSCiphertext.version (TLS 1.2 and prior) and +%% TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version (TLS 1.3). +%% TLS 1.3 sets TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version to 0x0303 for all records +%% generated other than an than an initial ClientHello, where it MAY also be 0x0301. +%% Thus, the allowed range is limited to 0x0300 - 0x0303. +-define(ALL_TLS_RECORD_VERSIONS, ['tlsv1.2', 'tlsv1.1', tlsv1, sslv3]). + -define(ALL_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ['dtlsv1.2', dtlsv1]). -define(MIN_DATAGRAM_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, [dtlsv1]). +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last eight bytes +%% of their Random value to the bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 +%% +%% If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST and TLS 1.2 +%% servers SHOULD set the last eight bytes of their Random value to the +%% bytes: +%% +%% 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 +-define(RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12, <<16#44,16#4F,16#57,16#4E,16#47,16#52,16#44,16#01>>). +-define(RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11, <<16#44,16#4F,16#57,16#4E,16#47,16#52,16#44,16#00>>). + -define('24H_in_msec', 86400000). -define('24H_in_sec', 86400). @@ -128,7 +154,7 @@ alpn_preferred_protocols = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocols_advertised = undefined :: [binary()] | undefined, next_protocol_selector = undefined, %% fun([binary()]) -> binary()) - log_alert :: boolean(), + log_level = notice :: atom(), server_name_indication = undefined, sni_hosts :: [{inet:hostname(), [tuple()]}], sni_fun :: function() | undefined, @@ -143,7 +169,9 @@ crl_check :: boolean() | peer | best_effort, crl_cache, signature_algs, + signature_algs_cert, eccs, + supported_groups, %% RFC 8422, RFC 8446 honor_ecc_order :: boolean(), max_handshake_size :: integer(), handshake, @@ -181,6 +209,8 @@ -type gen_fsm_state_return() :: {next_state, state_name(), term()} | {next_state, state_name(), term(), timeout()} | {stop, term(), term()}. +-type ssl_options() :: #ssl_options{}. + -endif. % -ifdef(ssl_internal). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35c8dcfd48 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_logger.erl @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_logger). + +-export([debug/3, + format/2, + notice/2]). + +-define(DEC2HEX(X), + if ((X) >= 0) andalso ((X) =< 9) -> (X) + $0; + ((X) >= 10) andalso ((X) =< 15) -> (X) + $a - 10 + end). + +-define(rec_info(T,R),lists:zip(record_info(fields,T),tl(tuple_to_list(R)))). + +-include("tls_record.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% External API +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% SSL log formatter +format(#{level:= _Level, msg:= {report, Msg}, meta:= _Meta}, _Config0) -> + #{direction := Direction, + protocol := Protocol, + message := BinMsg0} = Msg, + case Protocol of + 'tls_record' -> + BinMsg = lists:flatten(BinMsg0), + format_tls_record(Direction, BinMsg); + 'handshake' -> + format_handshake(Direction, BinMsg0); + _Other -> + [] + end. + +%% Stateful logging +debug(Level, Report, Meta) -> + case logger:compare_levels(Level, debug) of + lt -> + ?LOG_DEBUG(Report, Meta); + eq -> + ?LOG_DEBUG(Report, Meta); + _ -> + ok + end. + +%% Stateful logging +notice(Level, Report) -> + case logger:compare_levels(Level, notice) of + lt -> + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report); + eq -> + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report); + _ -> + ok + end. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Handshake Protocol +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +format_handshake(Direction, BinMsg) -> + {Header, Message} = parse_handshake(Direction, BinMsg), + io_lib:format("~s~n~s~n", [Header, Message]). + + +parse_handshake(Direction, #client_hello{ + client_version = Version + } = ClientHello) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s ~s Handshake, ClientHello", + [header_prefix(Direction), + version(Version)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(client_hello, ClientHello)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_hello{ + server_version = Version + } = ServerHello) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s ~s Handshake, ServerHello", + [header_prefix(Direction), + version(Version)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_hello, ServerHello)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate{} = Certificate) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, Certificate", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate, Certificate)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_key_exchange{} = ServerKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_key_exchange, ServerKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_key_params{} = ServerKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_key_params, ServerKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_request{} = CertificateRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_request, CertificateRequest)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #server_hello_done{} = ServerHelloDone) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ServerHelloDone", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(server_hello_done, ServerHelloDone)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #client_key_exchange{} = ClientKeyExchange) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, ClientKeyExchange", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(client_key_exchange, ClientKeyExchange)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #certificate_verify{} = CertificateVerify) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, CertificateVerify", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(certificate_verify, CertificateVerify)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #finished{} = Finished) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, Finished", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(finished, Finished)]), + {Header, Message}; +parse_handshake(Direction, #hello_request{} = HelloRequest) -> + Header = io_lib:format("~s Handshake, HelloRequest", + [header_prefix(Direction)]), + Message = io_lib:format("~p", [?rec_info(hello_request, HelloRequest)]), + {Header, Message}. + + +version({3,3}) -> + "TLS 1.2"; +version({3,2}) -> + "TLS 1.1"; +version({3,1}) -> + "TLS 1.0"; +version({3,0}) -> + "SSL 3.0"; +version({M,N}) -> + io_lib:format("TLS [0x0~B0~B]", [M,N]). + + +header_prefix(inbound) -> + "<<<"; +header_prefix(outbound) -> + ">>>". + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS Record Protocol +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +format_tls_record(Direction, BinMsg) -> + {Message, Size} = convert_to_hex('tls_record', BinMsg), + Header = io_lib:format("~s (~B bytes) ~s~n", + [header_prefix_tls_record(Direction), + Size, + tls_record_version(BinMsg)]), + Header ++ Message. + + +header_prefix_tls_record(inbound) -> + "reading"; +header_prefix_tls_record(outbound) -> + "writing". + + +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(3),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.2 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(2),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.1 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(1),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS 1.0 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(3),?BYTE(0),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("SSL 3.0 Record Protocol, ~s", [msg_type(B)]); +tls_record_version([<<?BYTE(B),?BYTE(M),?BYTE(N),_/binary>>|_]) -> + io_lib:format("TLS [0x0~B0~B] Record Protocol, ~s", [M, N, msg_type(B)]). + + +msg_type(20) -> "change_cipher_spec"; +msg_type(21) -> "alert"; +msg_type(22) -> "handshake"; +msg_type(23) -> "application_data"; +msg_type(_) -> unknown. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Hex encoding functions +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +convert_to_hex(Protocol, BinMsg) -> + convert_to_hex(Protocol, BinMsg, [], [], 0). +%% +convert_to_hex(P, [], Row0, Acc, C) when C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + Row = lists:reverse(end_row(P, Row0)), + {lists:reverse(Acc) ++ Row ++ io_lib:nl(), C}; +convert_to_hex(P, [], Row0, Acc, C) -> + Row = lists:reverse(end_row(P, Row0)), + Padding = calculate_padding(Row0, Acc), + PaddedRow = string:pad(Row, Padding, leading, $ ), + {lists:reverse(Acc) ++ PaddedRow ++ io_lib:nl(), C}; +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_list(H) -> + convert_to_hex(P, H ++ T, Row, Acc, C); +convert_to_hex(P, [<<>>|T], Row, Acc, C) -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, Row, Acc, C); + +%% First line +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_first_row(P, A, B, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% New line +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, []), + prepend_row(P, A, B, Row, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% Add 8th hex with extra whitespace +%% 0000 - 16 03 02 00 bd 01 00 00 b9 ... +%% ^^^^ +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) when C rem 8 =:= 7 -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_eighths_hex(A, B, Acc), + C + 1); +convert_to_hex(P, [<<A:4,B:4,R/binary>>|T], Row, Acc, C) -> + convert_to_hex(P, [<<R/binary>>|T], + update_row(<<A:4,B:4>>, Row), + prepend_hex(A, B, Acc), + C + 1); +%% First line +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_first_row(P, H, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% New line +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C rem 16 =:= 0 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, []), + prepend_row(P, H, Row, Acc, C), + C + 1); +%% Add 8th hex with extra whitespace +%% 0000 - 16 03 02 00 bd 01 00 00 b9 ... +%% ^^^^ +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H), C rem 8 =:= 7 -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_eighths_hex(H, Acc), + C + 1); +convert_to_hex(P, [H|T], Row, Acc, C) when is_integer(H) -> + convert_to_hex(P, T, + update_row(H, Row), + prepend_hex(H, Acc), + C + 1). + + +row_prefix(tls_record, N) -> + S = string:pad(string:to_lower(erlang:integer_to_list(N, 16)),4,leading,$0), + lists:reverse(lists:flatten(S ++ " - ")). + + +end_row(tls_record, Row) -> + Row ++ " ". + + +%% Calculate padding of the "printable character" lines in order to be +%% visually aligned. +calculate_padding(Row, Acc) -> + %% Number of new line characters + NNL = (length(Acc) div 75) * length(io_lib:nl()), + %% Length of the last printed line + Length = (length(Acc) - NNL) rem 75, + %% Adjusted length of the last printed line + PaddedLength = 75 - (16 - length(Row)), %% Length + %% Padding + PaddedLength - Length. + + +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Functions operating on reversed lists +%%------------------------------------------------------------------------- +update_row(B, Row) when is_binary(B) -> + case binary_to_list(B) of + [C] when 32 =< C, C =< 126 -> + [C|Row]; + _Else -> + [$.|Row] + end; +update_row(C, Row) when 32 =< C, C =< 126 -> + [C|Row]; +update_row(_, Row) -> + [$.|Row]. + + +prepend_first_row(P, A, B, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(A, B,row_prefix(P, C) ++ Acc). +%% +prepend_first_row(P, N, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(N,row_prefix(P, C) ++ Acc). + +prepend_row(P, A, B, Row, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(A, B,row_prefix(P, C) ++ io_lib:nl() ++ end_row(P, Row) ++ Acc). +%% +prepend_row(P, N, Row, Acc, C) -> + prepend_hex(N,row_prefix(P, C) ++ io_lib:nl() ++ end_row(P, Row) ++ Acc). + + + +prepend_hex(A, B, Acc) -> + [$ ,?DEC2HEX(B),?DEC2HEX(A)|Acc]. +%% +prepend_hex(N, Acc) -> + " " ++ number_to_hex(N) ++ Acc. + + +prepend_eighths_hex(A, B, Acc) -> + [$ ,$ ,?DEC2HEX(B),?DEC2HEX(A)|Acc]. +%% +prepend_eighths_hex(N, Acc) -> + " " ++ number_to_hex(N) ++ Acc. + +number_to_hex(N) -> + case string:to_lower(erlang:integer_to_list(N, 16)) of + H when length(H) < 2 -> + lists:append(H, "0"); + H -> + lists:reverse(H) + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl index 4b735b2400..c938772bc1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl @@ -505,10 +505,10 @@ last_delay_timer({{_,_},_}, TRef, {LastServer, _}) -> last_delay_timer({_,_}, TRef, {_, LastClient}) -> {TRef, LastClient}. -%% If we can not generate a not allready in use session ID in +%% If we cannot generate a not allready in use session ID in %% ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES we make the new session uncacheable The %% value of ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES is stolen from open SSL which -%% states : "If we can not find a session id in +%% states : "If we cannot find a session id in %% ?GEN_UNIQUE_ID_MAX_TRIES either the RAND code is broken or someone %% is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL %% sessions to our server" @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ new_id(Port, Tries, Cache, CacheCb) -> case CacheCb:lookup(Cache, {Port, Id}) of undefined -> Now = erlang:monotonic_time(), - %% New sessions can not be set to resumable + %% New sessions cannot be set to resumable %% until handshake is compleate and the %% other session values are set. CacheCb:update(Cache, {Port, Id}, #session{session_id = Id, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl index f7ddbd060e..dec48fa914 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_pkix_db.erl @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/file.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). -export([create/1, create_pem_cache/1, add_crls/3, remove_crls/2, remove/1, add_trusted_certs/3, @@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ decode_certs(Ref, Cert) -> error:_ -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL WARNING: Ignoring a CA cert as " "it could not be correctly decoded.~n", []), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + ?LOG_NOTICE(Report), undefined end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl index b9d1320ef3..ddc83821b4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl @@ -278,13 +278,12 @@ compress(?NULL, Data, CS) -> {Data, CS}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec compressions() -> [binary()]. +-spec compressions() -> [integer()]. %% %% Description: return a list of compressions supported (currently none) %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- compressions() -> - [?byte(?NULL)]. - + [?NULL]. %%==================================================================== %% Payload encryption/decryption diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl index ed007f58d7..4cb19d9d0d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.hrl @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ -define(INITIAL_BYTES, 5). -define(MAX_SEQENCE_NUMBER, 18446744073709551615). %% (1 bsl 64) - 1 = 18446744073709551615 -%% Sequence numbers can not wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate. +%% Sequence numbers cannot wrap so when max is about to be reached we should renegotiate. %% We will renegotiate a little before so that there will be sequence numbers left %% for the rehandshake and a little data. Currently we decided to renegotiate a little more %% often as we can have a cheaper test to check if it is time to renegotiate. It will still @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ -define(ALERT, 21). -define(HANDSHAKE, 22). -define(APPLICATION_DATA, 23). +-define(HEARTBEAT, 24). -define(MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, 16384). -define(MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH+1024)). -define(MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH, (?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH+2048)). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index 0f986b5e21..ae784380c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ -include("ssl_api.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_srp.hrl"). --include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Internal application API @@ -68,9 +69,26 @@ -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states hello/3, user_hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states connection/3]). +%% TLS 1.3 state functions (server) +-export([start/3, %% common state with client + negotiated/3, + recvd_ch/3, + wait_cert/3, %% common state with client + wait_cv/3, %% common state with client + wait_eoed/3, + wait_finished/3, %% common state with client + wait_flight2/3, + connected/3 %% common state with client + ]). +%% TLS 1.3 state functions (client) +-export([wait_cert_cr/3, + wait_ee/3, + wait_sh/3 + ]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([callback_mode/0, terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]). +-export([encode_handshake/4]). -define(DIST_CNTRL_SPAWN_OPTS, [{priority, max}]). @@ -151,8 +169,10 @@ next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = [CT | Rest]} = Buffers, connection_states = ConnStates0, + negotiated_version = Version, ssl_options = #ssl_options{padding_check = Check}} = State) -> - case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(CT, ConnStates0, Check) of + + case tls_record:decode_cipher_text(Version, CT, ConnStates0, Check) of {Plain, ConnStates} -> {Plain, State#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_cipher_texts = Rest}, @@ -206,7 +226,8 @@ handle_common_event(internal, #ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, fragment = Data}, negotiated_version = Version, ssl_options = Options} = State0) -> try - {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version,Data,Buf0, Options), + EffectiveVersion = effective_version(Version, Options), + {Packets, Buf} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(EffectiveVersion,Data,Buf0, Options), State = State0#state{protocol_buffers = Buffers#protocol_buffers{tls_handshake_buffer = Buf}}, @@ -287,9 +308,19 @@ send_handshake(Handshake, State) -> queue_handshake(Handshake, #state{negotiated_version = Version, tls_handshake_history = Hist0, flight_buffer = Flight0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> {BinHandshake, ConnectionStates, Hist} = encode_handshake(Handshake, Version, ConnectionStates0, Hist0), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinHandshake}, + HandshakeMsg = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'handshake', + message => Handshake}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, HandshakeMsg, #{domain => [otp,ssl,handshake]}), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), + State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, tls_handshake_history = Hist, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinHandshake]}. @@ -301,10 +332,15 @@ send_handshake_flight(#state{socket = Socket, {State0#state{flight_buffer = []}, []}. queue_change_cipher(Msg, #state{negotiated_version = Version, - flight_buffer = Flight0, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State0) -> + flight_buffer = Flight0, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> {BinChangeCipher, ConnectionStates} = encode_change_cipher(Msg, Version, ConnectionStates0), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinChangeCipher}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, flight_buffer = Flight0 ++ [BinChangeCipher]}. @@ -324,8 +360,8 @@ reinit_handshake_data(State) -> tls_handshake_history = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history() }. -select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = HelloExtensions}) -> - HelloExtensions#hello_extensions.sni; +select_sni_extension(#client_hello{extensions = #{sni := SNI}}) -> + SNI; select_sni_extension(_) -> undefined. @@ -335,6 +371,7 @@ empty_connection_state(ConnectionEnd, BeastMitigation) -> %%==================================================================== %% Alert and close handling %%==================================================================== + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec encode_alert(#alert{}, ssl_record:ssl_version(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. @@ -347,10 +384,14 @@ encode_alert(#alert{} = Alert, Version, ConnectionStates) -> send_alert(Alert, #state{negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> - {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = - encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = StateData0) -> + {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinMsg}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), StateData0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. %% If an ALERT sent in the connection state, should cause the TLS @@ -438,24 +479,34 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb } = State0) -> + KeyShare = maybe_generate_client_shares(SslOpts), Timer = ssl_connection:start_or_recv_cancel_timer(Timeout, From), Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates0, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), - - Version = Hello#client_hello.client_version, - HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(Version, SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, KeyShare), + + HelloVersion = tls_record:hello_version(SslOpts#ssl_options.versions), Handshake0 = ssl_handshake:init_handshake_history(), {BinMsg, ConnectionStates, Handshake} = encode_handshake(Hello, HelloVersion, ConnectionStates0, Handshake0), send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinMsg}, + HelloMsg = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'handshake', + message => Hello}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, HelloMsg, #{domain => [otp,ssl,handshake]}), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), State = State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, %% Requested version + negotiated_version = HelloVersion, %% Requested version session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}, tls_handshake_history = Handshake, start_or_recv_from = From, - timer = Timer}, + timer = Timer, + key_share = KeyShare}, next_event(hello, no_record, State); + init(Type, Event, State) -> gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). @@ -484,13 +535,13 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, hello = Hello}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; hello(internal, #server_hello{extensions = Extensions} = Hello, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{handshake = hello}, start_or_recv_from = From} = State) -> {next_state, user_hello, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, hello = Hello}, - [{reply, From, {ok, ssl_connection:map_extensions(Extensions)}}]}; + [{reply, From, {ok, Extensions}}]}; hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, @@ -500,25 +551,36 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol, key_algorithm = KeyExAlg, ssl_options = SslOpts} = State) -> - case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, SslOpts, {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, - ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, Renegotiation) of - #alert{} = Alert -> - ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, - State#state{negotiated_version - = ClientVersion}); - {Version, {Type, Session}, - ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> - Protocol = case Protocol0 of - undefined -> CurrentProtocol; - _ -> Protocol0 - end, - gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - client_hello_version = ClientVersion, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + case choose_tls_version(SslOpts, Hello) of + 'tls_v1.3' -> + %% Continue in TLS 1.3 'start' state + {next_state, start, State, [{next_event, internal, Hello}]}; + 'tls_v1.2' -> + case tls_handshake:hello(Hello, + SslOpts, + {Port, Session0, Cache, CacheCb, + ConnectionStates0, Cert, KeyExAlg}, + Renegotiation) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, ClientVersion, hello, + State#state{negotiated_version + = ClientVersion}); + {Version, {Type, Session}, + ConnectionStates, Protocol0, ServerHelloExt, HashSign} -> + Protocol = case Protocol0 of + undefined -> CurrentProtocol; + _ -> Protocol0 + end, + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, + internal, + {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + end end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -589,7 +651,7 @@ connection(internal, #hello_request{}, ssl_options = SslOpts, connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State0) -> Hello = tls_handshake:client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert), + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, Cert, undefined), {State, Actions} = send_handshake(Hello, State0), next_event(hello, no_record, State#state{session = Session0#session{session_id = Hello#client_hello.session_id}}, Actions); @@ -627,6 +689,117 @@ connection(Type, Event, State) -> downgrade(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.3 state functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec start(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +start(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +start(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec negotiated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +negotiated(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +negotiated(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec recvd_ch(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +recvd_ch(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +recvd_ch(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cert(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cert(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cert(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cv(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cv(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cv(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_eoed(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_eoed(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_eoed(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_finished(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_finished(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_finished(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_flight2(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_flight2(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_flight2(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec connected(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +connected(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +connected(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_cert_cr(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_cert_cr(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_cert_cr(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_ee(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_ee(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_ee(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec wait_sh(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +wait_sh(info, Event, State) -> + gen_info_1_3(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +wait_sh(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake_1_3(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + %-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% gen_statem callbacks %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -657,7 +830,6 @@ initial_state(Role, Sender, Host, Port, Socket, {SSLOptions, SocketOptions, Trac #ssl_options{beast_mitigation = BeastMitigation, erl_dist = IsErlDist} = SSLOptions, ConnectionStates = tls_record:init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation), - ErlDistData = erl_dist_data(IsErlDist), SessionCacheCb = case application:get_env(ssl, session_cb) of {ok, Cb} when is_atom(Cb) -> @@ -717,7 +889,8 @@ initialize_tls_sender(#state{role = Role, protocol_cb = Connection, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, - ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}, connection_states = #{current_write := ConnectionWriteState}, protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> Init = #{current_write => ConnectionWriteState, @@ -728,16 +901,17 @@ initialize_tls_sender(#state{role = Role, protocol_cb => Connection, transport_cb => Transport, negotiated_version => Version, - renegotiate_at => RenegotiateAt}, + renegotiate_at => RenegotiateAt, + log_level => LogLevel}, tls_sender:initialize(Sender, Init). next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_record_buffer = Buf0, - tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers} - = State0) -> - case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, + tls_cipher_texts = CT0} = Buffers, + ssl_options = SslOpts} = State0) -> + case tls_record:get_tls_records(Data, acceptable_record_versions(StateName, State0), - Buf0) of + Buf0, SslOpts) of {Records, Buf1} -> CT1 = CT0 ++ Records, next_record(State0#state{protocol_buffers = @@ -748,10 +922,18 @@ next_tls_record(Data, StateName, #state{protocol_buffers = end. +%% TLS 1.3 Client/Server +%% - Ignore TLSPlaintext.legacy_record_version +%% - Verify that TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version is set to 0x0303 for all records +%% other than an initial ClientHello, where it MAY also be 0x0301. acceptable_record_versions(hello, _) -> - [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_AVAILABLE_VERSIONS]; + [tls_record:protocol_version(Vsn) || Vsn <- ?ALL_TLS_RECORD_VERSIONS]; +acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = {Major, Minor}}) + when Major > 3; Major =:= 3, Minor >= 4 -> + [{3, 3}]; acceptable_record_versions(_, #state{negotiated_version = Version}) -> [Version]. + handle_record_alert(Alert, _) -> Alert. @@ -850,6 +1032,18 @@ gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, Version, StateName, State) end. +gen_handshake_1_3(StateName, Type, Event, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try tls_connection_1_3:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of Result -> @@ -871,6 +1065,29 @@ gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> malformed_handshake_data), Version, StateName, State) end. + +gen_info_1_3(Event, connected = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, + malformed_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end; + +gen_info_1_3(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + unprocessed_events(Events) -> %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately @@ -915,3 +1132,34 @@ ensure_sender_terminate(_, #state{protocol_specific = #{sender := Sender}}) -> end end, spawn(Kill). + +maybe_generate_client_shares(#ssl_options{ + versions = [Version|_], + supported_groups = + #supported_groups{ + supported_groups = Groups}}) + when Version =:= {3,4} -> + ssl_cipher:generate_client_shares(Groups); +maybe_generate_client_shares(_) -> + undefined. + +choose_tls_version(#ssl_options{versions = Versions}, + #client_hello{ + extensions = #{client_hello_versions := + #client_hello_versions{versions = ClientVersions} + } + }) -> + case ssl_handshake:select_supported_version(ClientVersions, Versions) of + {3,4} -> + 'tls_v1.3'; + _Else -> + 'tls_v1.2' + end; +choose_tls_version(_, _) -> + 'tls_v1.2'. + + +effective_version(undefined, #ssl_options{versions = [Version|_]}) -> + Version; +effective_version(Version, _) -> + Version. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04bcea1e1b --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: TODO +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% RFC 8446 +%% A.1. Client +%% +%% START <----+ +%% Send ClientHello | | Recv HelloRetryRequest +%% [K_send = early data] | | +%% v | +%% / WAIT_SH ----+ +%% | | Recv ServerHello +%% | | K_recv = handshake +%% Can | V +%% send | WAIT_EE +%% early | | Recv EncryptedExtensions +%% data | +--------+--------+ +%% | Using | | Using certificate +%% | PSK | v +%% | | WAIT_CERT_CR +%% | | Recv | | Recv CertificateRequest +%% | | Certificate | v +%% | | | WAIT_CERT +%% | | | | Recv Certificate +%% | | v v +%% | | WAIT_CV +%% | | | Recv CertificateVerify +%% | +> WAIT_FINISHED <+ +%% | | Recv Finished +%% \ | [Send EndOfEarlyData] +%% | K_send = handshake +%% | [Send Certificate [+ CertificateVerify]] +%% Can send | Send Finished +%% app data --> | K_send = K_recv = application +%% after here v +%% CONNECTED +%% +%% A.2. Server +%% +%% START <-----+ +%% Recv ClientHello | | Send HelloRetryRequest +%% v | +%% RECVD_CH ----+ +%% | Select parameters +%% v +%% NEGOTIATED +%% | Send ServerHello +%% | K_send = handshake +%% | Send EncryptedExtensions +%% | [Send CertificateRequest] +%% Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] +%% app data | Send Finished +%% after --> | K_send = application +%% here +--------+--------+ +%% No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT +%% | | +%% K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data +%% [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ +%% | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData +%% | | early data | | K_recv = handshake +%% | +------------+ | +%% | | +%% +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ +%% | +%% +--------+--------+ +%% No auth | | Client auth +%% | | +%% | v +%% | WAIT_CERT +%% | Recv | | Recv Certificate +%% | empty | v +%% | Certificate | WAIT_CV +%% | | | Recv +%% | v | CertificateVerify +%% +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ +%% | Recv Finished +%% | K_recv = application +%% v +%% CONNECTED + +-module(tls_connection_1_3). + +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_connection.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). + +%% gen_statem helper functions +-export([start/4, + negotiated/4 + ]). + +start(internal, + #client_hello{} = Hello, + #state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{ciphers = _ServerCiphers, + signature_algs = _ServerSignAlgs, + signature_algs_cert = _SignatureSchemes, %% TODO: Check?? + supported_groups = _ServerGroups0, + versions = _Versions} = SslOpts, + session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}} = State0, + _Module) -> + + Env = #{cert => Cert}, + case tls_handshake_1_3:handle_client_hello(Hello, SslOpts, Env) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(Alert, {3,4}, start, State0); + M -> + %% update connection_states with cipher + State = update_state(State0, M), + {next_state, negotiated, State, [{next_event, internal, M}]} + + end. + +%% TODO: move these functions +update_state(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + session = Session} = State, + #{client_random := ClientRandom, + cipher := Cipher, + key_share := KeyShare, + session_id := SessionId}) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParamsR0} = PendingRead = + maps:get(pending_read, ConnectionStates0), + #{security_parameters := SecParamsW0} = PendingWrite = + maps:get(pending_write, ConnectionStates0), + SecParamsR = ssl_cipher:security_parameters_1_3(SecParamsR0, ClientRandom, Cipher), + SecParamsW = ssl_cipher:security_parameters_1_3(SecParamsW0, ClientRandom, Cipher), + ConnectionStates = + ConnectionStates0#{pending_read => PendingRead#{security_parameters => SecParamsR}, + pending_write => PendingWrite#{security_parameters => SecParamsW}}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + key_share = KeyShare, + session = Session#session{session_id = SessionId}}. + + +negotiated(internal, + Map, + #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{session_id = SessionId}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{} = SslOpts, + key_share = KeyShare, + tls_handshake_history = HHistory0, + transport_cb = Transport, + socket = Socket}, _Module) -> + + %% Create server_hello + %% Extensions: supported_versions, key_share, (pre_shared_key) + ServerHello = tls_handshake_1_3:server_hello(SessionId, KeyShare, + ConnectionStates0, Map), + + %% Update handshake_history (done in encode!) + %% Encode handshake + {BinMsg, _ConnectionStates, _HHistory} = + tls_connection:encode_handshake(ServerHello, {3,4}, ConnectionStates0, HHistory0), + %% Send server_hello + tls_connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinMsg}, + Msg = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'handshake', + message => ServerHello}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Msg, #{domain => [otp,ssl,handshake]}), + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), + ok. + + %% K_send = handshake ??? + %% (Send EncryptedExtensions) + %% ([Send CertificateRequest]) + %% [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + %% Send Finished + %% K_send = application ??? + + %% Will be called implicitly + %% {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2#state{session = Session}), + %% Connection:next_event(wait_flight2, Record, State, Actions), + %% OR + %% Connection:next_event(WAIT_EOED, Record, State, Actions) diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index 19a5eb0348..5aca4bf8c8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -26,14 +26,16 @@ -module(tls_handshake). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). -include("tls_record.hrl"). -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Handshake handling --export([client_hello/8, hello/4]). +-export([client_hello/9, hello/4]). %% Handshake encoding -export([encode_handshake/2]). @@ -48,7 +50,8 @@ %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec client_hello(host(), inet:port_number(), ssl_record:connection_states(), - #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert()) -> + #ssl_options{}, integer(), atom(), boolean(), der_cert(), + #key_share_client_hello{} | undefined) -> #client_hello{}. %% %% Description: Creates a client hello message. @@ -58,19 +61,32 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ciphers = UserSuites, fallback = Fallback } = SslOpts, - Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert) -> + Cache, CacheCb, Renegotiation, OwnCert, KeyShare) -> Version = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), + + %% In TLS 1.3, the client indicates its version preferences in the + %% "supported_versions" extension (Section 4.2.1) and the + %% legacy_version field MUST be set to 0x0303, which is the version + %% number for TLS 1.2. + LegacyVersion = + case tls_record:is_higher(Version, {3,2}) of + true -> + {3,3}; + false -> + Version + end, #{security_parameters := SecParams} = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), AvailableCipherSuites = ssl_handshake:available_suites(UserSuites, Version), Extensions = ssl_handshake:client_hello_extensions(Version, AvailableCipherSuites, SslOpts, ConnectionStates, - Renegotiation), + Renegotiation, + KeyShare), CipherSuites = ssl_handshake:cipher_suites(AvailableCipherSuites, Renegotiation, Fallback), Id = ssl_session:client_id({Host, Port, SslOpts}, Cache, CacheCb, OwnCert), #client_hello{session_id = Id, - client_version = Version, + client_version = LegacyVersion, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = ssl_record:compressions(), random = SecParams#security_parameters.client_random, @@ -87,11 +103,69 @@ client_hello(Host, Port, ConnectionStates, ssl_record:connection_states(), alpn | npn, binary() | undefined}| {tls_record:tls_version(), {resumed | new, #session{}}, ssl_record:connection_states(), binary() | undefined, - #hello_extensions{}, {ssl_cipher_format:hash(), ssl_cipher_format:sign_algo()} | + HelloExt::map(), {ssl_cipher_format:hash(), ssl_cipher_format:sign_algo()} | undefined} | #alert{}. %% %% Description: Handles a received hello message %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +%% TLS 1.3 - Section 4.1.3 +%% TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below +%% MUST check that the last eight bytes are not equal to either of these +%% values. +hello(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = <<_:24/binary,Down:8/binary>>}, + #ssl_options{versions = [{M,N}|_]}, _, _) + when (M > 3 orelse M =:= 3 andalso N >= 4) andalso %% TLS 1.3 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor =:= 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.2 + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS12) orelse + + (M > 3 orelse M =:= 3 andalso N >= 4) andalso %% TLS 1.3 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor < 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + +%% TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last eight bytes are not +%% equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or below. +hello(#server_hello{server_version = {Major, Minor}, + random = <<_:24/binary,Down:8/binary>>}, + #ssl_options{versions = [{M,N}|_]}, _, _) + when (M =:= 3 andalso N =:= 3) andalso %% TLS 1.2 client + (Major =:= 3 andalso Minor < 3 andalso %% Negotiating TLS 1.1 or prior + Down =:= ?RANDOM_OVERRIDE_TLS11) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + + +%% TLS 1.3 - 4.2.1. Supported Versions +%% If the "supported_versions" extension in the ServerHello contains a +%% version not offered by the client or contains a version prior to TLS +%% 1.3, the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" +%% alert. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 Client +%% +%% - If "supported_version" is present (ServerHello): +%% - Abort handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert +hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, + extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version := + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version}} + }, + #ssl_options{versions = SupportedVersions}, + _ConnectionStates0, _Renegotiation) -> + case tls_record:is_higher({3,4}, Version) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + false -> + case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, SupportedVersions) of + true -> + %% Implement TLS 1.3 statem ??? + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION); + false -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) + end + end; + hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, cipher_suite = CipherSuite, compression_method = Compression, @@ -106,6 +180,36 @@ hello(#server_hello{server_version = Version, random = Random, false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION) end; + + +%% TLS 1.2 Server +%% - If "supported_versions" is present (ClientHello): +%% - Select version from "supported_versions" (ignore ClientHello.legacy_version) +%% - If server only supports versions greater than "supported_versions": +%% - Abort handshake with a "protocol_version" alert (*) +%% - If "supported_versions" is absent (ClientHello): +%% - Negotiate the minimum of ClientHello.legacy_version and TLS 1.2 (**) +%% - If server only supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version: +%% - Abort handshake with a "protocol_version" alert +%% +%% (*) Sends alert even if there is a gap in supported versions +%% e.g. Server 1.0,1.2 Client 1.1,1.3 +%% (**) Current implementation can negotiate a version not supported by the client +%% e.g. Server 1.0,1.2 Client 1.1 -> ServerHello 1.0 +hello(#client_hello{client_version = _ClientVersion, + cipher_suites = CipherSuites, + extensions = #{client_hello_versions := + #client_hello_versions{versions = ClientVersions} + }} = Hello, + #ssl_options{versions = Versions} = SslOpts, + Info, Renegotiation) -> + try + Version = ssl_handshake:select_supported_version(ClientVersions, Versions), + do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + catch + _:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data) + end; hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, cipher_suites = CipherSuites} = Hello, @@ -113,18 +217,7 @@ hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion, Info, Renegotiation) -> try Version = ssl_handshake:select_version(tls_record, ClientVersion, Versions), - case ssl_cipher:is_fallback(CipherSuites) of - true -> - Highest = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), - case tls_record:is_higher(Highest, Version) of - true -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - false -> - handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) - end; - false -> - handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) - end + do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) catch error:{case_clause,{asn1, Asn1Reason}} -> %% ASN-1 decode of certificate somehow failed @@ -175,10 +268,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, cipher_suites = CipherSuites, compression_methods = Compressions, random = Random, - extensions = - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = Curves, - signature_algs = ClientHashSigns} - = HelloExt}, + extensions = HelloExt}, #ssl_options{versions = Versions, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns, eccs = SupportedECCs, @@ -187,6 +277,9 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, Renegotiation) -> case tls_record:is_acceptable_version(Version, Versions) of true -> + Curves = maps:get(elliptic_curves, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientHashSigns = maps:get(signature_algs, HelloExt, undefined), + ClientSignatureSchemes = maps:get(signature_algs_cert, HelloExt, undefined), AvailableHashSigns = ssl_handshake:available_signature_algs( ClientHashSigns, SupportedHashSigns, Cert, Version), ECCCurve = ssl_handshake:select_curve(Curves, SupportedECCs, ECCOrder), @@ -200,8 +293,10 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, - SupportedHashSigns, Version) of + case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({ClientHashSigns, ClientSignatureSchemes}, + Cert, KeyExAlg, + SupportedHashSigns, + Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> Alert; HashSign -> @@ -244,8 +339,26 @@ handle_server_hello_extensions(Version, SessionId, Random, CipherSuite, {ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} -> {Version, SessionId, ConnectionStates, ProtoExt, Protocol} end. + + +do_hello(undefined, _Versions, _CipherSuites, _Hello, _SslOpts, _Info, _Renegotiation) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?PROTOCOL_VERSION); +do_hello(Version, Versions, CipherSuites, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) -> + case ssl_cipher:is_fallback(CipherSuites) of + true -> + Highest = tls_record:highest_protocol_version(Versions), + case tls_record:is_higher(Highest, Version) of + true -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + false -> + handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + end; + false -> + handle_client_hello(Version, Hello, SslOpts, Info, Renegotiation) + end. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, _Version) -> +enc_handshake(#hello_request{}, {3, N}) when N < 4 -> {?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>}; enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, random = Random, @@ -264,7 +377,8 @@ enc_handshake(#client_hello{client_version = {Major, Minor}, ?BYTE(SIDLength), SessionID/binary, ?UINT16(CsLength), BinCipherSuites/binary, ?BYTE(CmLength), BinCompMethods/binary, ExtensionsBin/binary>>}; - +enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, {3, 4}) -> + tls_handshake_1_3:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg); enc_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version) -> ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, Version). @@ -275,6 +389,10 @@ get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Raw = <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), Body/binary>>, try decode_handshake(Version, Type, Body) of Handshake -> + Report = #{direction => inbound, + protocol => 'handshake', + message => Handshake}, + ssl_logger:debug(Opts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,handshake]}), get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, Rest, Opts, [{Handshake,Raw} | Acc]) catch _:_ -> @@ -283,24 +401,25 @@ get_tls_handshake_aux(Version, <<?BYTE(Type), ?UINT24(Length), get_tls_handshake_aux(_Version, Data, _, Acc) -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}. -decode_handshake(_, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) -> +decode_handshake({3, N}, ?HELLO_REQUEST, <<>>) when N < 4 -> #hello_request{}; -decode_handshake(_Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, +decode_handshake(Version, ?CLIENT_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, ?BYTE(SID_length), Session_ID:SID_length/binary, ?UINT16(Cs_length), CipherSuites:Cs_length/binary, ?BYTE(Cm_length), Comp_methods:Cm_length/binary, Extensions/binary>>) -> - DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions({client, Extensions}), + Exts = ssl_handshake:decode_vector(Extensions), + DecodedExtensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Exts, Version, client_hello), #client_hello{ client_version = {Major,Minor}, random = Random, session_id = Session_ID, cipher_suites = ssl_handshake:decode_suites('2_bytes', CipherSuites), - compression_methods = Comp_methods, + compression_methods = erlang:binary_to_list(Comp_methods), extensions = DecodedExtensions }; +decode_handshake({3, 4}, Tag, Msg) -> + tls_handshake_1_3:decode_handshake(Tag, Msg); decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg) -> ssl_handshake:decode_handshake(Version, Tag, Msg). - - diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f381e038cf --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Help funtions for handling the TLS 1.3 (specific parts of) +%%% TLS handshake protocol +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-module(tls_handshake_1_3). + +-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_record.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +%% Encode +-export([encode_handshake/1, decode_handshake/2]). + +%% Handshake +-export([handle_client_hello/3]). + +%% Create handshake messages +-export([server_hello/4]). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Create handshake messages +%%==================================================================== + +server_hello(SessionId, KeyShare, ConnectionStates, _Map) -> + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), + Extensions = server_hello_extensions(KeyShare), + #server_hello{server_version = {3,3}, %% legacy_version + cipher_suite = SecParams#security_parameters.cipher_suite, + compression_method = + SecParams#security_parameters.compression_algorithm, + random = SecParams#security_parameters.server_random, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions + }. + +server_hello_extensions(KeyShare) -> + SupportedVersions = #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}, + Extensions = #{server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions}, + ssl_handshake:add_server_share(Extensions, KeyShare). + + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encode handshake +%%==================================================================== + +encode_handshake(#certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + extensions = Exts})-> + EncContext = encode_cert_req_context(Context), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + {?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<EncContext/binary, BinExts/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + entries = Entries}) -> + EncContext = encode_cert_req_context(Context), + EncEntries = encode_cert_entries(Entries), + {?CERTIFICATE, <<EncContext/binary, EncEntries/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#encrypted_extensions{extensions = Exts})-> + {?ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, encode_extensions(Exts)}; +encode_handshake(#new_session_ticket{ + ticket_lifetime = LifeTime, + ticket_age_add = Age, + ticket_nonce = Nonce, + ticket = Ticket, + extensions = Exts}) -> + TicketSize = byte_size(Ticket), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + {?NEW_SESSION_TICKET, <<?UINT32(LifeTime), ?UINT32(Age), + ?BYTE(Nonce), ?UINT16(TicketSize), Ticket/binary, + BinExts/binary>>}; +encode_handshake(#end_of_early_data{}) -> + {?END_OF_EARLY_DATA, <<>>}; +encode_handshake(#key_update{request_update = Update}) -> + {?KEY_UPDATE, <<?BYTE(Update)>>}; +encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg) -> + ssl_handshake:encode_handshake(HandshakeMsg, {3,4}). + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Decode handshake +%%==================================================================== + +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(0), ?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(EncExts, certificate_request), + #certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(CSize), Context:CSize/binary, + ?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(EncExts, certificate_request), + #certificate_request_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE, <<?BYTE(0), ?UINT24(Size), Certs:Size/binary>>) -> + CertList = decode_cert_entries(Certs), + #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = <<>>, + entries = CertList + }; +decode_handshake(?CERTIFICATE, <<?BYTE(CSize), Context:CSize/binary, + ?UINT24(Size), Certs:Size/binary>>) -> + CertList = decode_cert_entries(Certs), + #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = Context, + entries = CertList + }; +decode_handshake(?ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, <<?UINT16(Size), EncExts:Size/binary>>) -> + #encrypted_extensions{ + extensions = decode_extensions(EncExts, encrypted_extensions) + }; +decode_handshake(?NEW_SESSION_TICKET, <<?UINT32(LifeTime), ?UINT32(Age), + ?BYTE(Nonce), ?UINT16(TicketSize), Ticket:TicketSize/binary, + BinExts/binary>>) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(BinExts, encrypted_extensions), + #new_session_ticket{ticket_lifetime = LifeTime, + ticket_age_add = Age, + ticket_nonce = Nonce, + ticket = Ticket, + extensions = Exts}; +decode_handshake(?END_OF_EARLY_DATA, _) -> + #end_of_early_data{}; +decode_handshake(?KEY_UPDATE, <<?BYTE(Update)>>) -> + #key_update{request_update = Update}; +decode_handshake(Tag, HandshakeMsg) -> + ssl_handshake:decode_handshake({3,4}, Tag, HandshakeMsg). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_cert_req_context(<<>>) -> + <<?BYTE(0)>>; +encode_cert_req_context(Bin) -> + Size = byte_size(Bin), + <<?BYTE(Size), Bin/binary>>. + +encode_cert_entries(Entries) -> + CertEntryList = encode_cert_entries(Entries, []), + Size = byte_size(CertEntryList), + <<?UINT24(Size), CertEntryList/binary>>. + +encode_cert_entries([], Acc) -> + iolist_to_binary(lists:reverse(Acc)); +encode_cert_entries([#certificate_entry{data = Data, + extensions = Exts} | Rest], Acc) -> + DSize = byte_size(Data), + BinExts = encode_extensions(Exts), + ExtSize = byte_size(BinExts), + encode_cert_entries(Rest, + [<<?UINT24(DSize), Data/binary, ?UINT16(ExtSize), BinExts/binary>> | Acc]). + +decode_cert_entries(Entries) -> + decode_cert_entries(Entries, []). + +decode_cert_entries(<<>>, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +decode_cert_entries(<<?UINT24(DSize), Data:DSize/binary, ?UINT16(Esize), BinExts:Esize/binary, + Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + Exts = decode_extensions(BinExts, certificate_request), + decode_cert_entries(Rest, [#certificate_entry{data = Data, + extensions = Exts} | Acc]). + +encode_extensions(Exts)-> + ssl_handshake:encode_extensions(extensions_list(Exts)). +decode_extensions(Exts, MessageType) -> + ssl_handshake:decode_extensions(Exts, {3,4}, MessageType). + +extensions_list(HelloExtensions) -> + [Ext || {_, Ext} <- maps:to_list(HelloExtensions)]. + + +%%==================================================================== +%% Handle handshake messages +%%==================================================================== + +handle_client_hello(#client_hello{cipher_suites = ClientCiphers, + random = Random, + session_id = SessionId, + extensions = Extensions} = _Hello, + #ssl_options{ciphers = ServerCiphers, + signature_algs = ServerSignAlgs, + signature_algs_cert = _SignatureSchemes, %% TODO: Check?? + supported_groups = ServerGroups0} = _SslOpts, + Env) -> + + Cert = maps:get(cert, Env, undefined), + + ClientGroups0 = maps:get(elliptic_curves, Extensions, undefined), + ClientGroups = get_supported_groups(ClientGroups0), + ServerGroups = get_supported_groups(ServerGroups0), + + ClientShares0 = maps:get(key_share, Extensions, undefined), + ClientShares = get_key_shares(ClientShares0), + + ClientSignAlgs = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs, Extensions, undefined)), + ClientSignAlgsCert = get_signature_scheme_list( + maps:get(signature_algs_cert, Extensions, undefined)), + + %% TODO: use library function if it exists + %% Init the maybe "monad" + {Ref,Maybe} = maybe(), + + try + %% If the server does not select a PSK, then the server independently selects a + %% cipher suite, an (EC)DHE group and key share for key establishment, + %% and a signature algorithm/certificate pair to authenticate itself to + %% the client. + Cipher = Maybe(select_cipher_suite(ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers)), + Group = Maybe(select_server_group(ServerGroups, ClientGroups)), + Maybe(validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares)), + _ClientPubKey = Maybe(get_client_public_key(Group, ClientShares)), + + %% Handle certificate + {PublicKeyAlgo, SignAlgo} = get_certificate_params(Cert), + + %% Check if client supports signature algorithm of server certificate + Maybe(check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, ClientSignAlgsCert)), + + %% Check if server supports + SelectedSignAlg = Maybe(select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgs)), + + %% Generate server_share + KeyShare = ssl_cipher:generate_server_share(Group), + + _Ret = #{cipher => Cipher, + group => Group, + sign_alg => SelectedSignAlg, + %% client_share => ClientPubKey, + key_share => KeyShare, + client_random => Random, + session_id => SessionId} + + %% TODO: + %% - session handling + %% - handle extensions: ALPN + %% (do not handle: NPN, srp, renegotiation_info, ec_point_formats) + + catch + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_groups); + {Ref, illegal_parameter} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + {Ref, {client_hello_retry_request, _Group0}} -> + %% TODO + exit({client_hello_retry_request, not_implemented}); + {Ref, no_suitable_cipher} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_cipher); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_signature_algorithm); + {Ref, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}} -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_public_key) + end. + + +%% If there is no overlap between the received +%% "supported_groups" and the groups supported by the server, then the +%% server MUST abort the handshake with a "handshake_failure" or an +%% "insufficient_security" alert. +select_server_group(_, []) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_groups}}; +select_server_group(ServerGroups, [C|ClientGroups]) -> + case lists:member(C, ServerGroups) of + true -> + {ok, C}; + false -> + select_server_group(ServerGroups, ClientGroups) + end. + + +%% RFC 8446 - 4.2.8. Key Share +%% This vector MAY be empty if the client is requesting a +%% HelloRetryRequest. Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond to a +%% group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST appear in +%% the same order. However, the values MAY be a non-contiguous subset +%% of the "supported_groups" extension and MAY omit the most preferred +%% groups. +%% +%% Clients can offer as many KeyShareEntry values as the number of +%% supported groups it is offering, each representing a single set of +%% key exchange parameters. +%% +%% Clients MUST NOT offer multiple KeyShareEntry values +%% for the same group. Clients MUST NOT offer any KeyShareEntry values +%% for groups not listed in the client's "supported_groups" extension. +%% Servers MAY check for violations of these rules and abort the +%% handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert if one is violated. +validate_key_share(_ ,[]) -> + ok; +validate_key_share([], _) -> + {error, illegal_parameter}; +validate_key_share([G|ClientGroups], [{_, G, _}|ClientShares]) -> + validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares); +validate_key_share([_|ClientGroups], [_|_] = ClientShares) -> + validate_key_share(ClientGroups, ClientShares). + + +get_client_public_key(Group, ClientShares) -> + case lists:keysearch(Group, 2, ClientShares) of + {value, {_, _, ClientPublicKey}} -> + {ok, ClientPublicKey}; + false -> + %% ClientHelloRetryRequest + {error, {client_hello_retry_request, Group}} + end. + +select_cipher_suite([], _) -> + {error, no_suitable_cipher}; +select_cipher_suite([Cipher|ClientCiphers], ServerCiphers) -> + case lists:member(Cipher, ServerCiphers) of + true -> + {ok, Cipher}; + false -> + select_cipher_suite(ClientCiphers, ServerCiphers) + end. + +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) +%% TLS 1.3 provides two extensions for indicating which signature +%% algorithms may be used in digital signatures. The +%% "signature_algorithms_cert" extension applies to signatures in +%% certificates and the "signature_algorithms" extension, which +%% originally appeared in TLS 1.2, applies to signatures in +%% CertificateVerify messages. +%% +%% If no "signature_algorithms_cert" extension is +%% present, then the "signature_algorithms" extension also applies to +%% signatures appearing in certificates. +check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, undefined) -> + maybe_lists_member(SignAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, + {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}); +check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, _, ClientSignAlgsCert) -> + maybe_lists_member(SignAlgo, ClientSignAlgsCert, + {insufficient_security, no_suitable_signature_algorithm}). + + +%% DSA keys are not supported by TLS 1.3 +select_sign_algo(dsa, _ClientSignAlgs, _ServerSignAlgs) -> + {error, {insufficient_security, no_suitable_public_key}}; +%% TODO: Implement check for ellipctic curves! +select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, [C|ClientSignAlgs], ServerSignAlgs) -> + {_, S, _} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(C), + case PublicKeyAlgo =:= rsa andalso + ((S =:= rsa_pkcs1) orelse (S =:= rsa_pss_rsae) orelse (S =:= rsa_pss_pss)) andalso + lists:member(C, ServerSignAlgs) of + true -> + {ok, C}; + false -> + select_sign_algo(PublicKeyAlgo, ClientSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgs) + end. + + +maybe_lists_member(Elem, List, Error) -> + case lists:member(Elem, List) of + true -> + ok; + false -> + {error, Error} + end. + +%% TODO: test with ecdsa, rsa_pss_rsae, rsa_pss_pss +get_certificate_params(Cert) -> + {SignAlgo0, _Param, PublicKeyAlgo0} = ssl_handshake:get_cert_params(Cert), + SignAlgo = public_key:pkix_sign_types(SignAlgo0), + PublicKeyAlgo = public_key_algo(PublicKeyAlgo0), + Scheme = sign_algo_to_scheme(SignAlgo), + {PublicKeyAlgo, Scheme}. + +sign_algo_to_scheme({Hash0, Sign0}) -> + SupportedSchemes = tls_v1:default_signature_schemes({3,4}), + Hash = case Hash0 of + sha -> + sha1; + H -> + H + end, + Sign = case Sign0 of + rsa -> + rsa_pkcs1; + S -> + S + end, + sign_algo_to_scheme(Hash, Sign, SupportedSchemes). +%% +sign_algo_to_scheme(_, _, []) -> + not_found; +sign_algo_to_scheme(H, S, [Scheme|T]) -> + {Hash, Sign, _Curve} = ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + case H =:= Hash andalso S =:= Sign of + true -> + Scheme; + false -> + sign_algo_to_scheme(H, S, T) + end. + + +%% Note: copied from ssl_handshake +public_key_algo(?rsaEncryption) -> + rsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-ecPublicKey') -> + ecdsa; +public_key_algo(?'id-dsa') -> + dsa. + +get_signature_scheme_list(undefined) -> + undefined; +get_signature_scheme_list(#signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + ClientSignatureSchemes; +get_signature_scheme_list(#signature_algorithms{ + signature_scheme_list = ClientSignatureSchemes}) -> + ClientSignatureSchemes. + +get_supported_groups(#supported_groups{supported_groups = Groups}) -> + Groups. + +get_key_shares(#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = ClientShares}) -> + ClientShares. + +maybe() -> + Ref = erlang:make_ref(), + Ok = fun(ok) -> ok; + ({ok,R}) -> R; + ({error,Reason}) -> + throw({Ref,Reason}) + end, + {Ref,Ok}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ef5364399 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Record and constant defenitions for the TLS-handshake protocol +%% see RFC 8446. Also includes supported hello extensions. +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-ifndef(tls_handshake_1_3). +-define(tls_handshake_1_3, true). + +%% Common to TLS-1.3 and previous TLS versions +%% Some defenitions may not exist in TLS-1.3 this is +%% handled elsewhere +-include("tls_handshake.hrl"). + +%% New handshake types in TLS-1.3 RFC 8446 B.3 +-define(NEW_SESSION_TICKET, 4). +-define(END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 5). +-define(ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 8). +-define(KEY_UPDATE, 24). +%% %% Not really a message but special way to handle handshake hashes +%% %% when a "hello-retry-request" (special server_hello) is sent +-define(MESSAGE_HASH, 254). + +%% %% RFC 8446 B.3.1. +%% %% New extension types in TLS-1.3 +-define(PRE_SHARED_KEY_EXT, 41). +-define(EARLY_DATA_EXT, 42). +%%-define(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_EXT, 43). %% Updates TLS 1.2 so defined in ssl_handshake.hrl +-define(COOKIE_EXT, 44). +-define(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES_EXT, 45). +-define(CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES_EXT, 47). +-define(OID_FILTERS_EXT, 48). +-define(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXT, 49). +%% -define(SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_CERT_EXT, 50). %% Updates TLS 1.2 so defined in ssl_handshake.hrl +-define(KEY_SHARE_EXT, 51). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1 +-record(key_share_entry, { + group, %NamedGroup + key_exchange %key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(key_share_client_hello, { + client_shares %% KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(key_share_hello_retry_request, { + selected_group %% NamedGroup + }). +-record(key_share_server_hello, { + server_share %% KeyShareEntry server_share; + }). + +-record(uncompressed_point_representation, { + legacy_form = 4, % uint8 legacy_form = 4; + x, % opaque X[coordinate_length]; + y % opaque Y[coordinate_length]; + }). + +-define(PSK_KE, 0). +-define(PSK_DHE_KE, 1). + +-record(psk_keyexchange_modes, { + ke_modes % ke_modes<1..255> + }). +-record(empty, { + }). +-record(early_data_indication, { + indication % uint32 max_early_data_size (new_session_ticket) | + %% #empty{} (client_hello, encrypted_extensions) + }). +-record(psk_identity, { + identity, % opaque identity<1..2^16-1> + obfuscated_ticket_age % uint32 + }). +-record(offered_psks, { + psk_identity, %identities<7..2^16-1>; + psk_binder_entry %binders<33..2^16-1>, opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255> + }). +-record(pre_shared_keyextension,{ + extension %OfferedPsks (client_hello) | uint16 selected_identity (server_hello) + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.2. +-record(cookie, { + cookie %cookie<1..2^16-1>; + }). + +%%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.3. Signature Algorithm Extension +%% Signature Schemes +%% RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, 16#0401). +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, 16#0501). +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, 16#0601). + +%% ECDSA algorithms +-define(ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, 16#0403). +-define(ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, 16#0503). +-define(ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, 16#0603). + +%% RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, 16#0804). +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, 16#0805). +-define(RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, 16#0806). + +%% EdDSA algorithms +-define(ED25519, 16#0807). +-define(ED448, 16#0808). + +%% RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256, 16#0809). +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384, 16#080a). +-define(RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512, 16#080b). + +%% Legacy algorithms +-define(RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, 16#201). +-define(ECDSA_SHA1, 16#0203). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.1.4. Supported Groups Extension +%% Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) +-define(SECP256R1, 16#0017). +-define(SECP384R1, 16#0018). +-define(SECP521R1, 16#0019). +-define(X25519, 16#001D). +-define(X448, 16#001E). + +%% RFC 8446 Finite Field Groups (DHE) +-define(FFDHE2048, 16#0100). +-define(FFDHE3072, 16#0101). +-define(FFDHE4096, 16#0102). +-define(FFDHE6144, 16#0103). +-define(FFDHE8192 ,16#0104). + +-record(named_group_list, { + named_group_list %named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.2 Server Parameters Messages +%% opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;XS +-record(certificate_authoritie_sextension, { + authorities %DistinguishedName authorities<3..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(oid_filter, { + certificate_extension_oid, % opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; + certificate_extension_values % opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(oid_filter_extension, { + filters %OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1>; + }). +-record(post_handshake_auth, { + }). + +-record(encrypted_extensions, { + extensions %extensions<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(certificate_request_1_3, { + certificate_request_context, % opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + extensions %Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.3 Authentication Messages + +%% Certificate Type +-define(X509, 0). +-define(OpenPGP_RESERVED, 1). +-define(RawPublicKey, 2). + +-record(certificate_entry, { + data, + %% select (certificate_type) { + %% case RawPublicKey: + %% /* From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo */ + %% opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + + %% case X509: + %% opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + %% }; + extensions %% Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + }). + +-record(certificate_1_3, { + certificate_request_context, % opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + entries % CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.4. Ticket Establishment +-record(new_session_ticket, { + ticket_lifetime, %unit32 + ticket_age_add, %unit32 + ticket_nonce, %opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + ticket, %opaque ticket<1..2^16-1> + extensions %extensions<0..2^16-2> + }). + +%% RFC 8446 B.3.5. Updating Keys +-record(end_of_early_data, { + }). + +-define(UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED, 0). +-define(UPDATE_REQUESTED, 1). + +-record(key_update, { + request_update + }). + +-endif. % -ifdef(tls_handshake_1_3). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl index cf0690f2a5..ed7b475619 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl @@ -30,9 +30,10 @@ -include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). -include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). +-include_lib("kernel/include/logger.hrl"). %% Handling of incoming data --export([get_tls_records/3, init_connection_states/2]). +-export([get_tls_records/4, init_connection_states/2]). %% Encoding TLS records -export([encode_handshake/3, encode_alert_record/3, @@ -40,13 +41,13 @@ -export([encode_plain_text/4]). %% Decoding --export([decode_cipher_text/3]). +-export([decode_cipher_text/4]). %% Protocol version handling -export([protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/1, lowest_protocol_version/2, highest_protocol_version/1, highest_protocol_version/2, is_higher/2, supported_protocol_versions/0, - is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/2]). + is_acceptable_version/1, is_acceptable_version/2, hello_version/1]). -export_type([tls_version/0, tls_atom_version/0]). @@ -75,24 +76,24 @@ init_connection_states(Role, BeastMitigation) -> pending_write => Pending}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec get_tls_records(binary(), [tls_version()], binary()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. +-spec get_tls_records(binary(), [tls_version()], binary(), ssl_options()) -> {[binary()], binary()} | #alert{}. %% %% and returns it as a list of tls_compressed binaries also returns leftover %% Description: Given old buffer and new data from TCP, packs up a records %% data %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> +get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer, SslOpts) -> BinData = list_to_binary([Buffer, Data]), case erlang:byte_size(BinData) of N when N >= 3 -> case assert_version(BinData, Versions) of true -> - get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []); + get_tls_records_aux(BinData, [], SslOpts); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC) end; _ -> - get_tls_records_aux(BinData, []) + get_tls_records_aux(BinData, [], SslOpts) end. %%==================================================================== @@ -105,6 +106,8 @@ get_tls_records(Data, Versions, Buffer) -> % %% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_handshake(Frag, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_handshake(Frag, ConnectionStates); encode_handshake(Frag, Version, #{current_write := #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, @@ -125,6 +128,8 @@ encode_handshake(Frag, Version, %% %% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_alert_record(Alert, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_handshake(Alert, ConnectionStates); encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> encode_plain_text(?ALERT, Version, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>, @@ -145,6 +150,8 @@ encode_change_cipher_spec(Version, ConnectionStates) -> %% %% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_data(Data, {3, 4}, ConnectionStates) -> + tls_record_1_3:encode_data(Data, ConnectionStates); encode_data(Frag, Version, #{current_write := #{beast_mitigation := BeastMitigation, security_parameters := @@ -158,12 +165,14 @@ encode_data(Frag, Version, %%==================================================================== %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> +-spec decode_cipher_text(tls_version(), #ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states(), boolean()) -> {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. %% %% Description: Decode cipher text %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, +decode_cipher_text({3,4}, CipherTextRecord, ConnectionStates, _) -> + tls_record_1_3:decode_cipher_text(CipherTextRecord, ConnectionStates); +decode_cipher_text(_, #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, #{current_read := #{compression_state := CompressionS0, @@ -192,7 +201,7 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, Alert end; -decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, +decode_cipher_text(_, #ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, fragment = CipherFragment} = CipherText, #{current_read := #{compression_state := CompressionS0, @@ -230,6 +239,8 @@ decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, version = Version, %% Description: Creates a protocol version record from a version atom %% or vice versa. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +protocol_version('tlsv1.3') -> + {3, 4}; protocol_version('tlsv1.2') -> {3, 3}; protocol_version('tlsv1.1') -> @@ -240,6 +251,8 @@ protocol_version(sslv3) -> {3, 0}; protocol_version(sslv2) -> %% Backwards compatibility {2, 0}; +protocol_version({3, 4}) -> + 'tlsv1.3'; protocol_version({3, 3}) -> 'tlsv1.2'; protocol_version({3, 2}) -> @@ -373,10 +386,10 @@ is_acceptable_version({N,_} = Version, Versions) is_acceptable_version(_,_) -> false. --spec hello_version(tls_version(), [tls_version()]) -> tls_version(). -hello_version(Version, _) when Version >= {3, 3} -> - Version; -hello_version(_, Versions) -> +-spec hello_version([tls_version()]) -> tls_version(). +hello_version([Highest|_]) when Highest >= {3,3} -> + Highest; +hello_version(Versions) -> lowest_protocol_version(Versions). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -400,33 +413,61 @@ assert_version(<<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), _/binary>>, Versions) - get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> + Acc, SslOpts) -> + RawTLSRecord = <<?BYTE(?APPLICATION_DATA),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary>>, + Report = #{direction => inbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => [RawTLSRecord]}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); + fragment = Data} | Acc], + SslOpts); get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), - ?UINT16(Length), - Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + ?UINT16(Length), + Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, Acc, SslOpts) -> + RawTLSRecord = <<?BYTE(?HANDSHAKE),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary>>, + Report = #{direction => inbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => [RawTLSRecord]}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?HANDSHAKE, version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); + fragment = Data} | Acc], + SslOpts); get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, - Rest/binary>>, Acc) -> + Rest/binary>>, Acc, SslOpts) -> + RawTLSRecord = <<?BYTE(?ALERT),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary>>, + Report = #{direction => inbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => [RawTLSRecord]}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?ALERT, version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); + fragment = Data} | Acc], + SslOpts); get_tls_records_aux(<<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary, Rest/binary>>, - Acc) -> + Acc, SslOpts) -> + RawTLSRecord = <<?BYTE(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC),?BYTE(MajVer),?BYTE(MinVer), + ?UINT16(Length), Data:Length/binary>>, + Report = #{direction => inbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => [RawTLSRecord]}, + ssl_logger:debug(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_level, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), get_tls_records_aux(Rest, [#ssl_tls{type = ?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, version = {MajVer, MinVer}, - fragment = Data} | Acc]); + fragment = Data} | Acc], + SslOpts); get_tls_records_aux(<<0:1, _CT:7, ?BYTE(_MajVer), ?BYTE(_MinVer), ?UINT16(Length), _/binary>>, - _Acc) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> + _Acc, _SslOpts) when Length > ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?RECORD_OVERFLOW); -get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc) -> +get_tls_records_aux(Data, Acc, _SslOpts) -> case size(Data) =< ?MAX_CIPHER_TEXT_LENGTH + ?INITIAL_BYTES of true -> {lists:reverse(Acc), Data}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d424336187 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.erl @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% + +-module(tls_record_1_3). + +-include("tls_record.hrl"). +-include("tls_record_1_3.hrl"). +-include("ssl_internal.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include("ssl_cipher.hrl"). + +%% Encoding +-export([encode_handshake/2, encode_alert_record/2, + encode_data/2]). +-export([encode_plain_text/3]). + +%% Decoding +-export([decode_cipher_text/2]). + +%%==================================================================== +%% Encoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_handshake(iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +% +%% Description: Encodes a handshake message to send on the tls-1.3-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_handshake(Frag, ConnectionStates) -> + case iolist_size(Frag) of + N when N > ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH -> + %% TODO: Consider padding here + Data = split_bin(iolist_to_binary(Frag), ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH), + encode_iolist(?HANDSHAKE, Data, ConnectionStates); + _ -> + encode_plain_text(?HANDSHAKE, Frag, ConnectionStates) + end. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_alert_record(#alert{}, ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +%% +%% Description: Encodes an alert message to send on the ssl-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_alert_record(#alert{level = Level, description = Description}, + ConnectionStates) -> + encode_plain_text(?ALERT, <<?BYTE(Level), ?BYTE(Description)>>, + ConnectionStates). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec encode_data(binary(), ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {iolist(), ssl_record:connection_states()}. +%% +%% Description: Encodes data to send on the ssl-socket. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +encode_data(Frag, ConnectionStates) -> + Data = split_bin(Frag, ?MAX_PLAIN_TEXT_LENGTH, {3,4}), + encode_iolist(?APPLICATION_DATA, Data, ConnectionStates). + +encode_plain_text(Type, Data0, #{current_write := Write0} = ConnectionStates) -> + PadLen = 0, %% TODO where to specify PadLen? + Data = inner_plaintext(Type, Data0, PadLen), + {CipherFragment, Write1} = encode_plain_text(Data, Write0), + {CipherText, Write} = encode_tls_cipher_text(CipherFragment, Write1), + {CipherText, ConnectionStates#{current_write => Write}}. + +encode_iolist(Type, Data, ConnectionStates0) -> + {ConnectionStates, EncodedMsg} = + lists:foldl(fun(Text, {CS0, Encoded}) -> + {Enc, CS1} = + encode_plain_text(Type, Text, CS0), + {CS1, [Enc | Encoded]} + end, {ConnectionStates0, []}, Data), + {lists:reverse(EncodedMsg), ConnectionStates}. + +%%==================================================================== +%% Decoding +%%==================================================================== + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()) -> + {#ssl_tls{}, ssl_record:connection_states()}| #alert{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode cipher text, use legacy type ssl_tls instead of tls_cipher_text +%% in decoding context so that we can reuse the code from erlier versions. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = ?OPAQUE_TYPE, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = CipherFragment}, + #{current_read := + #{sequence_number := Seq, + cipher_state := CipherS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD, + bulk_cipher_algorithm = + BulkCipherAlgo} + } = ReadState0} = ConnectionStates0) -> + AAD = start_additional_data(), + CipherS1 = ssl_cipher:nonce_seed(<<?UINT64(Seq)>>, CipherS0), + case decipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS1, AAD, CipherFragment) of + {PlainFragment, CipherS1} -> + ConnectionStates = + ConnectionStates0#{current_read => + ReadState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1, + sequence_number => Seq + 1}}, + decode_inner_plaintext(PlainFragment, ConnectionStates); + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert + end; +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + fragment = CipherFragment}, + #{current_read := + #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_suite = ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL} + }} = ConnnectionStates0) -> + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = CipherFragment}, ConnnectionStates0}; +decode_cipher_text(#ssl_tls{type = Type}, _) -> + %% Version mismatch is already asserted + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, {record_typ_mismatch, Type}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Internal functions +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize) -> + split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []). +split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, _) -> + do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, []). + +do_split_bin(<<>>, _, Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +do_split_bin(Bin, ChunkSize, Acc) -> + case Bin of + <<Chunk:ChunkSize/binary, Rest/binary>> -> + do_split_bin(Rest, ChunkSize, [Chunk | Acc]); + _ -> + lists:reverse(Acc, [Bin]) + end. + +inner_plaintext(Type, Data, Length) -> + #inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type, + zeros = zero_padding(Length) + }. +zero_padding(Length)-> + binary:copy(<<?BYTE(0)>>, Length). + +encode_plain_text(#inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type, + zeros = Zeros + }, #{cipher_state := CipherS0, + sequence_number := Seq, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_type = ?AEAD} + } = WriteState0) -> + PlainText = <<Data/binary, ?BYTE(Type), Zeros/binary>>, + AAD = start_additional_data(), + CipherS1 = ssl_cipher:nonce_seed(<<?UINT64(Seq)>>, CipherS0), + {Encoded, WriteState} = cipher_aead(PlainText, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}, AAD), + {#tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = Type, + legacy_version = {3,3}, + encoded_record = Encoded}, WriteState}; +encode_plain_text(#inner_plaintext{ + content = Data, + type = Type + }, #{security_parameters := + #security_parameters{ + cipher_suite = ?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL} + } = WriteState0) -> + %% RFC8446 - 5.1. Record Layer + %% When record protection has not yet been engaged, TLSPlaintext + %% structures are written directly onto the wire. + {#tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = Type, + legacy_version = {3,3}, + encoded_record = Data}, WriteState0}; + +encode_plain_text(_, CS) -> + exit({cs, CS}). + +start_additional_data() -> + {MajVer, MinVer} = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + <<?BYTE(?OPAQUE_TYPE), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer)>>. + +end_additional_data(AAD, Len) -> + <<AAD/binary, ?UINT16(Len)>>. + +nonce(#cipher_state{nonce = Nonce, iv = IV}) -> + Len = size(IV), + crypto:exor(<<Nonce:Len/bytes>>, IV). + +cipher_aead(Fragment, + #{cipher_state := CipherS0, + security_parameters := + #security_parameters{bulk_cipher_algorithm = + BulkCipherAlgo} + } = WriteState0, AAD) -> + {CipherFragment, CipherS1} = + cipher_aead(BulkCipherAlgo, CipherS0, AAD, Fragment), + {CipherFragment, WriteState0#{cipher_state => CipherS1}}. + +cipher_aead(Type, #cipher_state{key=Key} = CipherState, AAD0, Fragment) -> + AAD = end_additional_data(AAD0, erlang:iolist_size(Fragment)), + Nonce = nonce(CipherState), + {Content, CipherTag} = ssl_cipher:aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AAD), + {<<Content/binary, CipherTag/binary>>, CipherState}. + +encode_tls_cipher_text(#tls_cipher_text{opaque_type = Type, + legacy_version = {MajVer, MinVer}, + encoded_record = Encoded}, #{sequence_number := Seq} = Write) -> + Length = erlang:iolist_size(Encoded), + {[<<?BYTE(Type), ?BYTE(MajVer), ?BYTE(MinVer), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Encoded], + Write#{sequence_number => Seq +1}}. + +decipher_aead(Type, #cipher_state{key = Key} = CipherState, AAD0, CipherFragment) -> + try + Nonce = nonce(CipherState), + {AAD, CipherText, CipherTag} = aead_ciphertext_split(CipherState, CipherFragment, AAD0), + case ssl_cipher:aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AAD) of + Content when is_binary(Content) -> + {Content, CipherState}; + _ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end + catch + _:_ -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed) + end. + +aead_ciphertext_split(#cipher_state{tag_len = Len}, CipherTextFragment, AAD) -> + CipherLen = size(CipherTextFragment) - Len, + <<CipherText:CipherLen/bytes, CipherTag:Len/bytes>> = CipherTextFragment, + {end_additional_data(AAD, CipherLen), CipherText, CipherTag}. + +decode_inner_plaintext(PlainText, ConnnectionStates) -> + case remove_padding(PlainText) of + #alert{} = Alert -> + Alert; + {Data, Type} -> + {#ssl_tls{type = Type, + version = {3,4}, %% Internally use real version + fragment = Data}, ConnnectionStates} + end. + +remove_padding(PlainText)-> + case binary:split(PlainText, <<0>>, [global, trim]) of + [] -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, padding_error); + [Content] -> + Type = binary:last(Content), + split_content(Type, Content, erlang:byte_size(Content) - 1) + end. + +split_content(?HANDSHAKE, _, 0) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, empty_handshake); +split_content(?ALERT, _, 0) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, empty_alert); +%% For special middlebox compatible case! +split_content(?CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, _, 0) -> + ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, empty_change_cipher_spec); +split_content(?APPLICATION_DATA = Type, _, 0) -> + {Type, <<>>}; +split_content(Type, Content, N) -> + <<Data:N/bytes, ?BYTE(Type)>> = Content, + {Type, Data}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..273427a34e --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_record_1_3.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Purpose: Record and constant defenitions for the TLS-1.3-record protocol +%% see RFC 8446 not present in earlier versions +%%---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +-ifndef(tls_record_1_3). +-define(tls_record_1_3, true). + +%% enum { +%% invalid(0), +%% %% defined in ssl_record.hrl +%% change_cipher_spec(20), +%% alert(21), +%% handshake(22), +%% application_data(23), +%% heartbeat(24), /* RFC 6520 */ +%% (255) +%% } ContentType; + +-define(INVALID, 0). +-define(LEGACY_VERSION, {3,3}). +-define(OPAQUE_TYPE, 23). + +-record(inner_plaintext, { + content, %% data + type, %% Contentype + zeros %% padding "uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]" + }). +-record(tls_cipher_text, { %% Equivalent of encrypted version of #ssl_tls from previous versions + %% decrypted version will still use #ssl_tls for code reuse purposes + %% with real values for content type and version + opaque_type = ?OPAQUE_TYPE, + legacy_version = ?LEGACY_VERSION, + encoded_record + }). + +-endif. % -ifdef(tls_record_1_3). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl index ee2b7be4f4..0631ed808a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ negotiated_version, renegotiate_at, connection_monitor, - dist_handle + dist_handle, + log_level }). %%%=================================================================== @@ -171,7 +172,8 @@ init({call, From}, {Pid, #{current_write := WriteState, protocol_cb := Connection, transport_cb := Transport, negotiated_version := Version, - renegotiate_at := RenegotiateAt}}, + renegotiate_at := RenegotiateAt, + log_level := LogLevel}}, #data{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = StateData0) -> Monitor = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), StateData = @@ -186,7 +188,8 @@ init({call, From}, {Pid, #{current_write := WriteState, protocol_cb = Connection, transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, - renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt}, + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel}, {next_state, handshake, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; init(info, Msg, StateData) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, StateData). @@ -351,10 +354,15 @@ send_tls_alert(Alert, #data{negotiated_version = Version, socket = Socket, protocol_cb = Connection, transport_cb = Transport, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = StateData0) -> + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + log_level = LogLevel} = StateData0) -> {BinMsg, ConnectionStates} = Connection:encode_alert(Alert, Version, ConnectionStates0), Connection:send(Transport, Socket, BinMsg), + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => BinMsg}, + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}. send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, @@ -365,7 +373,8 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, protocol_cb = Connection, transport_cb = Transport, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, - renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt} = StateData0) -> + renegotiate_at = RenegotiateAt, + log_level = LogLevel} = StateData0) -> case time_to_renegotiate(Data, ConnectionStates0, RenegotiateAt) of true -> ssl_connection:internal_renegotiation(Pid, ConnectionStates0), @@ -378,10 +387,18 @@ send_application_data(Data, From, StateName, StateData = StateData0#data{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, case Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of ok when DistHandle =/= undefined -> + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => Msgs}, + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), {next_state, StateName, StateData, []}; Reason when DistHandle =/= undefined -> {next_state, death_row, StateData, [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}; ok -> + Report = #{direction => outbound, + protocol => 'tls_record', + message => Msgs}, + ssl_logger:debug(LogLevel, Report, #{domain => [otp,ssl,tls_record]}), {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Result -> {next_state, StateName, StateData, [{reply, From, Result}]} diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl index 1bfd9a8b6d..83dd7585dd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ -export([master_secret/4, finished/5, certificate_verify/3, mac_hash/7, hmac_hash/3, setup_keys/8, suites/1, prf/5, ecc_curves/1, ecc_curves/2, oid_to_enum/1, enum_to_oid/1, - default_signature_algs/1, signature_algs/2]). + default_signature_algs/1, signature_algs/2, + default_signature_schemes/1, signature_schemes/2, + groups/1, groups/2, group_to_enum/1, enum_to_group/1, default_groups/1]). + +-export([derive_secret/4, hkdf_expand_label/5, hkdf_extract/3, hkdf_expand/4]). -type named_curve() :: sect571r1 | sect571k1 | secp521r1 | brainpoolP512r1 | sect409k1 | sect409r1 | brainpoolP384r1 | secp384r1 | @@ -41,12 +45,53 @@ sect193r1 | sect193r2 | secp192k1 | secp192r1 | sect163k1 | sect163r1 | sect163r2 | secp160k1 | secp160r1 | secp160r2. -type curves() :: [named_curve()]. --export_type([curves/0, named_curve/0]). +-type group() :: secp256r1 | secp384r1 | secp521r1 | ffdhe2048 | + ffdhe3072 | ffdhe4096 | ffdhe6144 | ffdhe8192. +-type supported_groups() :: [group()]. +-export_type([curves/0, named_curve/0, group/0, supported_groups/0]). %%==================================================================== %% Internal application API %%==================================================================== +%% TLS 1.3 --------------------------------------------------- +-spec derive_secret(Secret::binary(), Label::binary(), + Messages::binary(), Algo::ssl_cipher_format:hash()) -> Key::binary(). +derive_secret(Secret, Label, Messages, Algo) -> + Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(Algo), Messages), + hkdf_expand_label(Secret, Label, + Hash, ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo), Algo). + +-spec hkdf_expand_label(Secret::binary(), Label0::binary(), + Context::binary(), Length::integer(), + Algo::ssl_cipher_format:hash()) -> KeyingMaterial::binary(). +hkdf_expand_label(Secret, Label0, Context, Length, Algo) -> + %% struct { + %% uint16 length = Length; + %% opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; + %% opaque context<0..255> = Context; + %% } HkdfLabel; + Content = << <<"tls13">>/binary, Label0/binary, Context/binary>>, + Len = size(Content), + HkdfLabel = <<?UINT16(Len), Content/binary>>, + hkdf_expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length, Algo). + +-spec hkdf_extract(MacAlg::ssl_cipher_format:hash(), Salt::binary(), + KeyingMaterial::binary()) -> PseudoRandKey::binary(). + +hkdf_extract(MacAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial) -> + hmac_hash(MacAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial). + + +-spec hkdf_expand(PseudoRandKey::binary(), ContextInfo::binary(), + Length::integer(), Algo::ssl_cipher_format:hash()) -> KeyingMaterial::binary(). + +hkdf_expand(PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, Algo) -> + Iterations = erlang:ceil(Length / ssl_cipher:hash_size(Algo)), + hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, 1, Iterations, <<>>, <<>>). +%% TLS 1.3 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec master_secret(integer(), binary(), binary(), binary()) -> binary(). master_secret(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> @@ -56,9 +101,10 @@ master_secret(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, ClientRandom, ServerRandom) -> prf(PrfAlgo, PreMasterSecret, <<"master secret">>, [ClientRandom, ServerRandom], 48). +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec finished(client | server, integer(), integer(), binary(), [binary()]) -> binary(). - +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) when Version == 1; Version == 2; PrfAlgo == ?MD5SHA -> %% RFC 2246 & 4346 - 7.4.9. Finished @@ -72,7 +118,9 @@ finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), prf(?MD5SHA, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), [MD5, SHA], 12); +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) when Version == 3 -> %% RFC 5246 - 7.4.9. Finished @@ -84,21 +132,28 @@ finished(Role, Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake) %% PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages)) [0..11]; Hash = crypto:hash(mac_algo(PrfAlgo), Handshake), prf(PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, finished_label(Role), Hash, 12). +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TODO 1.3 finished -spec certificate_verify(md5sha | sha, integer(), [binary()]) -> binary(). +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(md5sha, _Version, Handshake) -> MD5 = crypto:hash(md5, Handshake), SHA = crypto:hash(sha, Handshake), <<MD5/binary, SHA/binary>>; +%% TLS 1.0 -1.1 --------------------------------------------------- +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- certificate_verify(HashAlgo, _Version, Handshake) -> crypto:hash(HashAlgo, Handshake). +%% TLS 1.2 --------------------------------------------------- -spec setup_keys(integer(), integer(), binary(), binary(), binary(), integer(), integer(), integer()) -> {binary(), binary(), binary(), binary(), binary(), binary()}. - +%% TLS v1.0 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) when Version == 1 -> @@ -123,8 +178,9 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; +%% TLS v1.0 --------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.1 +%% TLS v1.1 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) when Version == 2 -> @@ -150,11 +206,12 @@ setup_keys(Version, _PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}; +%% TLS v1.1 --------------------------------------------------- -%% TLS v1.2 +%% TLS v1.2 --------------------------------------------------- setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, KeyMatLen, IVSize) - when Version == 3 -> + when Version == 3; Version == 4 -> %% RFC 5246 - 6.3. Key calculation %% key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, %% "key expansion", @@ -176,8 +233,10 @@ setup_keys(Version, PrfAlgo, MasterSecret, ServerRandom, ClientRandom, HashSize, ClientIV:IVSize/binary, ServerIV:IVSize/binary>> = KeyBlock, {ClientWriteMacSecret, ServerWriteMacSecret, ClientWriteKey, ServerWriteKey, ClientIV, ServerIV}. +%% TLS v1.2 --------------------------------------------------- --spec mac_hash(integer(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_record:tls_version(), +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- +-spec mac_hash(integer() | atom(), binary(), integer(), integer(), tls_record:tls_version(), integer(), binary()) -> binary(). mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, @@ -191,8 +250,11 @@ mac_hash(Method, Mac_write_secret, Seq_num, Type, {Major, Minor}, ?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), ?UINT16(Length)>>, Fragment]), Mac. +%% TLS 1.0 -1.2 --------------------------------------------------- + +%% TODO 1.3 same as above? --spec suites(1|2|3) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. +-spec suites(1|2|3|4) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]. suites(Minor) when Minor == 1; Minor == 2 -> [ @@ -244,8 +306,19 @@ suites(3) -> %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, %% ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, %% ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ] ++ suites(2). - + ] ++ suites(2); + +suites(4) -> + [?TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + %% Not supported + %% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + %% ?TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ] ++ suites(3). + +signature_algs({3, 4}, HashSigns) -> + signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns); signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) -> CryptoSupports = crypto:supports(), Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports), @@ -273,6 +346,8 @@ signature_algs({3, 3}, HashSigns) -> end, [], HashSigns), lists:reverse(Supported). +default_signature_algs({3, 4} = Version) -> + default_signature_schemes(Version); default_signature_algs({3, 3} = Version) -> Default = [%% SHA2 {sha512, ecdsa}, @@ -291,15 +366,81 @@ default_signature_algs({3, 3} = Version) -> default_signature_algs(_) -> undefined. + +signature_schemes(Version, SignatureSchemes) when is_tuple(Version) + andalso Version >= {3, 3} -> + CryptoSupports = crypto:supports(), + Hashes = proplists:get_value(hashs, CryptoSupports), + PubKeys = proplists:get_value(public_keys, CryptoSupports), + Curves = proplists:get_value(curves, CryptoSupports), + Fun = fun (Scheme, Acc) -> + {Hash0, Sign0, Curve} = + ssl_cipher:scheme_to_components(Scheme), + Sign = case Sign0 of + rsa_pkcs1 -> rsa; + S -> S + end, + Hash = case Hash0 of + sha1 -> sha; + H -> H + end, + case proplists:get_bool(Sign, PubKeys) + andalso proplists:get_bool(Hash, Hashes) + andalso (Curve =:= undefined orelse + proplists:get_bool(Curve, Curves)) + andalso is_pair(Hash, Sign, Hashes) + of + true -> + [Scheme | Acc]; + false -> + Acc + end + end, + Supported = lists:foldl(Fun, [], SignatureSchemes), + lists:reverse(Supported); +signature_schemes(_, _) -> + []. + +default_signature_schemes(Version) -> + Default = [ + rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, + %% ed25519, + %% ed448, + rsa_pss_pss_sha256, + rsa_pss_pss_sha384, + rsa_pss_pss_sha512, + rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ecdsa_sha1 + ], + signature_schemes(Version, Default). + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, N, N, Prev, Acc) -> + Keyingmaterial = hmac_hash(Algo, PseudoRandKey, <<Prev/binary, ContextInfo/binary, ?BYTE(N)>>), + binary:part(<<Acc/binary, Keyingmaterial/binary>>, {0, Length}); +hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, M, N, Prev, Acc) -> + Keyingmaterial = hmac_hash(Algo, PseudoRandKey, <<Prev/binary, ContextInfo/binary, ?BYTE(M)>>), + hkdf_expand(Algo, PseudoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, M + 1, N, Keyingmaterial, <<Acc/binary, Keyingmaterial/binary>>). + %%%% HMAC and the Pseudorandom Functions RFC 2246 & 4346 - 5.%%%% hmac_hash(?NULL, _, _) -> <<>>; hmac_hash(Alg, Key, Value) -> crypto:hmac(mac_algo(Alg), Key, Value). +mac_algo(Alg) when is_atom(Alg) -> + Alg; mac_algo(?MD5) -> md5; mac_algo(?SHA) -> sha; mac_algo(?SHA256) -> sha256; @@ -395,6 +536,7 @@ ecc_curves(all) -> sect239k1,sect233k1,sect233r1,secp224k1,secp224r1, sect193r1,sect193r2,secp192k1,secp192r1,sect163k1, sect163r1,sect163r2,secp160k1,secp160r1,secp160r2]; + ecc_curves(Minor) -> TLSCurves = ecc_curves(all), ecc_curves(Minor, TLSCurves). @@ -409,6 +551,53 @@ ecc_curves(_Minor, TLSCurves) -> end end, [], TLSCurves). +-spec groups(4 | all | default) -> [group()]. +groups(all) -> + [secp256r1, + secp384r1, + secp521r1, + ffdhe2048, + ffdhe3072, + ffdhe4096, + ffdhe6144, + ffdhe8192]; +groups(default) -> + [secp256r1, + secp384r1, + secp521r1, + ffdhe2048]; +groups(Minor) -> + TLSGroups = groups(all), + groups(Minor, TLSGroups). +%% +-spec groups(4, [group()]) -> [group()]. +groups(_Minor, TLSGroups) -> + %% TODO: Adding FFDHE groups to crypto? + CryptoGroups = crypto:ec_curves() ++ [ffdhe2048,ffdhe3072,ffdhe4096,ffdhe6144,ffdhe8192], + lists:filter(fun(Group) -> proplists:get_bool(Group, CryptoGroups) end, TLSGroups). + +default_groups(Minor) -> + TLSGroups = groups(default), + groups(Minor, TLSGroups). + +group_to_enum(secp256r1) -> 23; +group_to_enum(secp384r1) -> 24; +group_to_enum(secp521r1) -> 25; +group_to_enum(ffdhe2048) -> 256; +group_to_enum(ffdhe3072) -> 257; +group_to_enum(ffdhe4096) -> 258; +group_to_enum(ffdhe6144) -> 259; +group_to_enum(ffdhe8192) -> 260. + +enum_to_group(23) -> secp256r1; +enum_to_group(24) -> secp384r1; +enum_to_group(25) -> secp521r1; +enum_to_group(256) -> ffdhe2048; +enum_to_group(257) -> ffdhe3072; +enum_to_group(258) -> ffdhe4096; +enum_to_group(259) -> ffdhe6144; +enum_to_group(260) -> ffdhe8192; +enum_to_group(_) -> undefined. %% ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) oid_to_enum(?sect163k1) -> 1; diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile index 9dfb2eba53..a4adc7561b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ MODULES = \ ssl_ECC\ ssl_upgrade_SUITE\ ssl_sni_SUITE \ + ssl_eqc_SUITE \ + ssl_rfc_5869_SUITE \ make_certs\ x509_test @@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ release_tests_spec: opt $(INSTALL_DATA) $(ERL_FILES) $(HRL_FILES) $(HRL_FILES_NEEDED_IN_TEST) $(COVER_FILE) "$(RELSYSDIR)" $(INSTALL_DATA) ssl.spec ssl_bench.spec ssl.cover "$(RELSYSDIR)" chmod -R u+w "$(RELSYSDIR)" - @tar cf - *_SUITE_data | (cd "$(RELSYSDIR)"; tar xf -) + @tar cf - *_SUITE_data property_test | (cd "$(RELSYSDIR)"; tar xf -) release_docs_spec: diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/make_certs.erl b/lib/ssl/test/make_certs.erl index 8fe7c54549..578f6a731a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/make_certs.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/make_certs.erl @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ req_cnf(Root, C) -> "default_bits = ", integer_to_list(C#config.default_bits), "\n" "RANDFILE = $ROOTDIR/RAND\n" "encrypt_key = no\n" - "default_md = md5\n" + "default_md = sha1\n" "#string_mask = pkix\n" "x509_extensions = ca_ext\n" "prompt = no\n" @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ ca_cnf( ["crl_extensions = crl_ext\n" || C#config.v2_crls], "unique_subject = no\n" "default_days = 3600\n" - "default_md = md5\n" + "default_md = sha1\n" "preserve = no\n" "policy = policy_match\n" "\n" @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ ca_cnf( ["crl_extensions = crl_ext\n" || C#config.v2_crls], "unique_subject = no\n" "default_days = 3600\n" - "default_md = md5\n" + "default_md = sha1\n" "preserve = no\n" "policy = policy_match\n" "\n" diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/property_test/ssl_eqc_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/test/property_test/ssl_eqc_handshake.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ffb6d311f --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/property_test/ssl_eqc_handshake.erl @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, +%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the +%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be +%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. +%% +%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" +%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See +%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations +%% under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +%% + +-module(ssl_eqc_handshake). + +-compile(export_all). + +-proptest(eqc). +-proptest([triq,proper]). + +-ifndef(EQC). +-ifndef(PROPER). +-ifndef(TRIQ). +-define(EQC,true). +-endif. +-endif. +-endif. + +-ifdef(EQC). +-include_lib("eqc/include/eqc.hrl"). +-define(MOD_eqc,eqc). + +-else. +-ifdef(PROPER). +-include_lib("proper/include/proper.hrl"). +-define(MOD_eqc,proper). + +-else. +-ifdef(TRIQ). +-define(MOD_eqc,triq). +-include_lib("triq/include/triq.hrl"). + +-endif. +-endif. +-endif. + +-include_lib("kernel/include/inet.hrl"). +-include_lib("ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.hrl"). +-include_lib("ssl/src/tls_handshake.hrl"). +-include_lib("ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl"). +-include_lib("ssl/src/ssl_alert.hrl"). +-include_lib("ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl"). + +-define('TLS_v1.3', {3,4}). +-define('TLS_v1.2', {3,3}). +-define('TLS_v1.1', {3,2}). +-define('TLS_v1', {3,1}). +-define('SSL_v3', {3,0}). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Properties -------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +prop_tls_hs_encode_decode() -> + ?FORALL({Handshake, TLSVersion}, ?LET(Version, tls_version(), {tls_msg(Version), Version}), + try + [Type, _Length, Data] = tls_handshake:encode_handshake(Handshake, TLSVersion), + case tls_handshake:decode_handshake(TLSVersion, Type, Data) of + Handshake -> + true; + _ -> + false + end + catch + throw:#alert{} -> + true + end + ). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Message Generators ----------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +tls_msg(?'TLS_v1.3'= Version) -> + oneof([client_hello(Version), + server_hello(Version), + %%new_session_ticket() + #end_of_early_data{}, + encrypted_extensions(), + certificate_1_3(), + %%certificate_request_1_3, + %%certificate_verify() + finished(), + key_update() + ]); +tls_msg(Version) -> + oneof([ + #hello_request{}, + client_hello(Version), + server_hello(Version), + certificate(), + %%server_key_exchange() + certificate_request(Version), + #server_hello_done{}, + %%certificate_verify() + %%client_key_exchange() + finished() + ]). + +%% +%% Shared messages +%% +client_hello(?'TLS_v1.3' = Version) -> + #client_hello{session_id = session_id(), + client_version = ?'TLS_v1.2', + cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Version), + compression_methods = compressions(Version), + random = client_random(Version), + extensions = client_hello_extensions(Version) + }; +client_hello(Version) -> + #client_hello{session_id = session_id(), + client_version = Version, + cipher_suites = cipher_suites(Version), + compression_methods = compressions(Version), + random = client_random(Version), + extensions = client_hello_extensions(Version) + }. + +server_hello(?'TLS_v1.3' = Version) -> + #server_hello{server_version = ?'TLS_v1.2', + session_id = session_id(), + random = server_random(Version), + cipher_suite = cipher_suite(Version), + compression_method = compression(Version), + extensions = server_hello_extensions(Version) + }; +server_hello(Version) -> + #server_hello{server_version = Version, + session_id = session_id(), + random = server_random(Version), + cipher_suite = cipher_suite(Version), + compression_method = compression(Version), + extensions = server_hello_extensions(Version) + }. + +certificate() -> + #certificate{ + asn1_certificates = certificate_chain() + }. + +certificate_1_3() -> + ?LET(Certs, certificate_chain(), + #certificate_1_3{ + certificate_request_context = certificate_request_context(), + entries = certificate_entries(Certs, []) + }). + +finished() -> + ?LET(Size, digest_size(), + #finished{verify_data = crypto:strong_rand_bytes(Size)}). + +%% +%% TLS 1.0-1.2 messages +%% + + + +%% +%% TLS 1.3 messages +%% + +encrypted_extensions() -> + ?LET(Exts, extensions(?'TLS_v1.3', encrypted_extensions), + #encrypted_extensions{extensions = Exts}). + + +key_update() -> + #key_update{request_update = request_update()}. + + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Messge Data Generators ------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +tls_version() -> + oneof([?'TLS_v1.3', ?'TLS_v1.2', ?'TLS_v1.1', ?'TLS_v1', ?'SSL_v3']). + +cipher_suite(Version) -> + oneof(cipher_suites(Version)). + +cipher_suites(Version) -> + ssl_cipher:suites(Version). + +session_id() -> + crypto:strong_rand_bytes(?NUM_OF_SESSION_ID_BYTES). + +compression(Version) -> + oneof(compressions(Version)). + +compressions(_) -> + ssl_record:compressions(). + +client_random(_) -> + crypto:strong_rand_bytes(32). + +server_random(_) -> + crypto:strong_rand_bytes(32). + + +client_hello_extensions(Version) -> + ?LET(Exts, extensions(Version, client_hello), + maps:merge(ssl_handshake:empty_extensions(Version, client_hello), + Exts)). + +server_hello_extensions(Version) -> + ?LET(Exts, extensions(Version, server_hello), + maps:merge(ssl_handshake:empty_extensions(Version, server_hello), + Exts)). + +key_share_client_hello() -> + oneof([undefined]). + %%oneof([#key_share_client_hello{}, undefined]). + +key_share_server_hello() -> + oneof([undefined]). + %%oneof([#key_share_server_hello{}, undefined]). + +pre_shared_keyextension() -> + oneof([undefined]). + %%oneof([#pre_shared_keyextension{},undefined]). + +%% +--------------------------------------------------+-------------+ +%% | Extension | TLS 1.3 | +%% +--------------------------------------------------+-------------+ +%% | server_name [RFC6066] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | max_fragment_length [RFC6066] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | status_request [RFC6066] | CH, CR, CT | +%% | | | +%% | supported_groups [RFC7919] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | signature_algorithms (RFC 8446) | CH, CR | +%% | | | +%% | use_srtp [RFC5764] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | heartbeat [RFC6520] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | application_layer_protocol_negotiation [RFC7301] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | signed_certificate_timestamp [RFC6962] | CH, CR, CT | +%% | | | +%% | client_certificate_type [RFC7250] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | server_certificate_type [RFC7250] | CH, EE | +%% | | | +%% | padding [RFC7685] | CH | +%% | | | +%% | key_share (RFC 8446) | CH, SH, HRR | +%% | | | +%% | pre_shared_key (RFC 8446) | CH, SH | +%% | | | +%% | psk_key_exchange_modes (RFC 8446) | CH | +%% | | | +%% | early_data (RFC 8446) | CH, EE, NST | +%% | | | +%% | cookie (RFC 8446) | CH, HRR | +%% | | | +%% | supported_versions (RFC 8446) | CH, SH, HRR | +%% | | | +%% | certificate_authorities (RFC 8446) | CH, CR | +%% | | | +%% | oid_filters (RFC 8446) | CR | +%% | | | +%% | post_handshake_auth (RFC 8446) | CH | +%% | | | +%% | signature_algorithms_cert (RFC 8446) | CH, CR | +%% +--------------------------------------------------+-------------+ +extensions(?'TLS_v1.3' = Version, client_hello) -> + ?LET({ + ServerName, + %% MaxFragmentLength, + %% StatusRequest, + SupportedGroups, + SignatureAlgorithms, + %% UseSrtp, + %% Heartbeat, + ALPN, + %% SignedCertTimestamp, + %% ClientCertiticateType, + %% ServerCertificateType, + %% Padding, + KeyShare, + %% PreSharedKey, + %% PSKKeyExchangeModes, + %% EarlyData, + %% Cookie, + SupportedVersions, + %% CertAuthorities, + %% PostHandshakeAuth, + SignatureAlgorithmsCert + }, + { + oneof([server_name(), undefined]), + %% oneof([max_fragment_length(), undefined]), + %% oneof([status_request(), undefined]), + oneof([supported_groups(Version), undefined]), + oneof([signature_algs(Version), undefined]), + %% oneof([use_srtp(), undefined]), + %% oneof([heartbeat(), undefined]), + oneof([alpn(), undefined]), + %% oneof([signed_cert_timestamp(), undefined]), + %% oneof([client_cert_type(), undefined]), + %% oneof([server_cert_type(), undefined]), + %% oneof([padding(), undefined]), + oneof([key_share(client_hello), undefined]), + %% oneof([pre_shared_key(), undefined]), + %% oneof([psk_key_exchange_modes(), undefined]), + %% oneof([early_data(), undefined]), + %% oneof([cookie(), undefined]), + oneof([client_hello_versions(Version), undefined]), + %% oneof([cert_authorities(), undefined]), + %% oneof([post_handshake_auth(), undefined]), + oneof([signature_algs_cert(), undefined]) + }, + maps:filter(fun(_, undefined) -> + false; + (_,_) -> + true + end, + #{ + sni => ServerName, + %% max_fragment_length => MaxFragmentLength, + %% status_request => StatusRequest, + elliptic_curves => SupportedGroups, + signature_algs => SignatureAlgorithms, + %% use_srtp => UseSrtp, + %% heartbeat => Heartbeat, + alpn => ALPN, + %% signed_cert_timestamp => SignedCertTimestamp, + %% client_cert_type => ClientCertificateType, + %% server_cert_type => ServerCertificateType, + %% padding => Padding, + key_share => KeyShare, + %% pre_shared_key => PreSharedKey, + %% psk_key_exhange_modes => PSKKeyExchangeModes, + %% early_data => EarlyData, + %% cookie => Cookie, + client_hello_versions => SupportedVersions, + %% cert_authorities => CertAuthorities, + %% post_handshake_auth => PostHandshakeAuth, + signature_algs_cert => SignatureAlgorithmsCert + })); +extensions(?'SSL_v3', client_hello) -> + #{}; +extensions(Version, client_hello) -> + ?LET({ + SNI, + ECPoitF, + ECCurves, + ALPN, + NextP, + SRP + %% RenegotiationInfo + }, + { + oneof([sni(), undefined]), + oneof([ec_point_formats(), undefined]), + oneof([elliptic_curves(Version), undefined]), + oneof([alpn(), undefined]), + oneof([next_protocol_negotiation(), undefined]), + oneof([srp(), undefined]) + %% oneof([renegotiation_info(), undefined]) + }, + maps:filter(fun(_, undefined) -> + false; + (_,_) -> + true + end, + #{ + sni => SNI, + ec_point_formats => ECPoitF, + elliptic_curves => ECCurves, + alpn => ALPN, + next_protocol_negotiation => NextP, + srp => SRP + %% renegotiation_info => RenegotiationInfo + })); +extensions(?'TLS_v1.3' = Version, server_hello) -> + ?LET({ + KeyShare, + %% PreSharedKeys, + SupportedVersions + }, + { + oneof([key_share(server_hello), undefined]), + %% oneof([pre_shared_keys(), undefined]), + oneof([server_hello_selected_version(), undefined]) + }, + maps:filter(fun(_, undefined) -> + false; + (_,_) -> + true + end, + #{ + key_share => KeyShare, + %% pre_shared_keys => PreSharedKeys, + server_hello_selected_version => SupportedVersions + })); +extensions(Version, server_hello) -> + ?LET({ + ECPoitF, + ALPN, + NextP + %% RenegotiationInfo, + }, + { + oneof([ec_point_formats(), undefined]), + oneof([alpn(), undefined]), + oneof([next_protocol_negotiation(), undefined]) + %% oneof([renegotiation_info(), undefined]), + }, + maps:filter(fun(_, undefined) -> + false; + (_,_) -> + true + end, + #{ + ec_point_formats => ECPoitF, + alpn => ALPN, + next_protocol_negotiation => NextP + %% renegotiation_info => RenegotiationInfo + })); +extensions(?'TLS_v1.3' = Version, encrypted_extensions) -> + ?LET({ + ServerName, + %% MaxFragmentLength, + SupportedGroups, + %% UseSrtp, + %% Heartbeat, + ALPN + %% ClientCertiticateType, + %% ServerCertificateType, + %% EarlyData + }, + { + oneof([server_name(), undefined]), + %% oneof([max_fragment_length(), undefined]), + oneof([supported_groups(Version), undefined]), + %% oneof([use_srtp(), undefined]), + %% oneof([heartbeat(), undefined]), + oneof([alpn(), undefined]) + %% oneof([client_cert_type(), undefined]), + %% oneof([server_cert_type(), undefined]), + %% oneof([early_data(), undefined]) + }, + maps:filter(fun(_, undefined) -> + false; + (_,_) -> + true + end, + #{ + sni => ServerName, + %% max_fragment_length => MaxFragmentLength, + elliptic_curves => SupportedGroups, + %% use_srtp => UseSrtp, + %% heartbeat => Heartbeat, + alpn => ALPN + %% client_cert_type => ClientCertificateType, + %% server_cert_type => ServerCertificateType, + %% early_data => EarlyData + })). + +server_name() -> + ?LET(ServerName, sni(), + ServerName). + %% sni(). + +signature_algs_cert() -> + ?LET(List, sig_scheme_list(), + #signature_algorithms_cert{signature_scheme_list = List}). + +signature_algorithms() -> + ?LET(List, sig_scheme_list(), + #signature_algorithms{signature_scheme_list = List}). + +sig_scheme_list() -> + oneof([[rsa_pkcs1_sha256], + [rsa_pkcs1_sha256, ecdsa_sha1], + [rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, + rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, + rsa_pss_pss_sha256, + rsa_pss_pss_sha384, + rsa_pss_pss_sha512, + rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ecdsa_sha1] + ]). + +client_hello_versions(?'TLS_v1.3') -> + ?LET(SupportedVersions, + oneof([[{3,4}], + [{3,3},{3,4}], + [{3,4},{3,3},{3,2},{3,1},{3,0}] + ]), + #client_hello_versions{versions = SupportedVersions}); +client_hello_versions(_) -> + ?LET(SupportedVersions, + oneof([[{3,3}], + [{3,3},{3,2}], + [{3,3},{3,2},{3,1},{3,0}] + ]), + #client_hello_versions{versions = SupportedVersions}). + +server_hello_selected_version() -> + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = {3,4}}. + +request_update() -> + oneof([?UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED, ?UPDATE_REQUESTED]). + +certificate_chain()-> + Conf = cert_conf(), + ?LET(Chain, + choose_certificate_chain(Conf), + Chain). + +choose_certificate_chain(#{server_config := ServerConf, + client_config := ClientConf}) -> + oneof([certificate_chain(ServerConf), certificate_chain(ClientConf)]). + +certificate_request_context() -> + <<>>. +certificate_entries([], Acc) -> + lists:reverse(Acc); +certificate_entries([Cert | Rest], Acc) -> + certificate_entries(Rest, [certificate_entry(Cert) | Acc]). + +certificate_entry(Cert) -> + #certificate_entry{data = Cert, + extensions = certificate_entry_extensions() + }. +certificate_entry_extensions() -> + #{}. + +certificate_chain(Conf) -> + CAs = proplists:get_value(cacerts, Conf), + Cert = proplists:get_value(cert, Conf), + %% Middle argument are of correct type but will not be used + {ok, _, Chain} = ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(Cert, ets:new(foo, []), make_ref(), CAs), + Chain. + +cert_conf()-> + Hostname = net_adm:localhost(), + {ok, #hostent{h_addr_list = [_IP |_]}} = inet:gethostbyname(net_adm:localhost()), + public_key:pkix_test_data(#{server_chain => + #{root => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(1)}], + intermediates => [[{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(2)}]], + peer => [{extensions, [#'Extension'{extnID = + ?'id-ce-subjectAltName', + extnValue = [{dNSName, Hostname}], + critical = false}]}, + {key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(3)} + ]}, + client_chain => + #{root => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(4)}], + intermediates => [[{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(5)}]], + peer => [{key, ssl_test_lib:hardcode_rsa_key(6)}]}}). + +certificate_request(Version) -> + #certificate_request{certificate_types = certificate_types(Version), + hashsign_algorithms = hashsign_algorithms(Version), + certificate_authorities = certificate_authorities()}. + +certificate_types(?'TLS_v1.3') -> + iolist_to_binary([<<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>, <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>]); +certificate_types(?'TLS_v1.2') -> + iolist_to_binary([<<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>, <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>, <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>]); +certificate_types(_) -> + iolist_to_binary([<<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>, <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>, <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>]). + + + +signature_algs({3,4}) -> + ?LET(Algs, signature_algorithms(), + Algs); +signature_algs({3,3} = Version) -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = hash_alg_list(Version)}; +signature_algs(Version) when Version < {3,3} -> + undefined. + + + +hashsign_algorithms({_, N} = Version) when N >= 3 -> + #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = hash_alg_list(Version)}; +hashsign_algorithms(_) -> + undefined. + +hash_alg_list(Version) -> + ?LET(NumOf, choose(1,15), + ?LET(List, [hash_alg(Version) || _ <- lists:seq(1,NumOf)], + lists:usort(List) + )). + +hash_alg(Version) -> + ?LET(Alg, sign_algorithm(Version), + {hash_algorithm(Version, Alg), Alg} + ). + +hash_algorithm(?'TLS_v1.3', _) -> + oneof([sha, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512]); +hash_algorithm(?'TLS_v1.2', rsa) -> + oneof([sha, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512]); +hash_algorithm(_, rsa) -> + oneof([md5, sha, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512]); +hash_algorithm(_, ecdsa) -> + oneof([sha, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512]); +hash_algorithm(_, dsa) -> + sha. + +sign_algorithm(?'TLS_v1.3') -> + oneof([rsa, ecdsa]); +sign_algorithm(_) -> + oneof([rsa, dsa, ecdsa]). + +certificate_authorities() -> + #{server_config := ServerConf} = cert_conf(), + Authorities = proplists:get_value(cacerts, ServerConf), + Enc = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{tbsCertificate=TBSCert}) -> + OTPSubj = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subject, + DNEncodedBin = public_key:pkix_encode('Name', OTPSubj, otp), + DNEncodedLen = byte_size(DNEncodedBin), + <<?UINT16(DNEncodedLen), DNEncodedBin/binary>> + end, + list_to_binary([Enc(public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DERCert, otp)) || DERCert <- Authorities]). + +digest_size()-> + oneof([160,224,256,384,512]). + +key_share_entry() -> + undefined. + %%#key_share_entry{}. + +server_hello_selected_version(Version) -> + #server_hello_selected_version{selected_version = Version}. + +sni() -> + #sni{hostname = net_adm:localhost()}. + +ec_point_formats() -> + #ec_point_formats{ec_point_format_list = ec_point_format_list()}. + +ec_point_format_list() -> + [?ECPOINT_UNCOMPRESSED]. + +elliptic_curves({_, Minor}) when Minor < 4 -> + Curves = tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor), + #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = Curves}. + +%% RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) renamed the "elliptic_curve" extension. +supported_groups({_, Minor}) when Minor >= 4 -> + SupportedGroups = tls_v1:groups(Minor), + #supported_groups{supported_groups = SupportedGroups}. + + +alpn() -> + ?LET(ExtD, alpn_protocols(), #alpn{extension_data = ExtD}). + +alpn_protocols() -> + oneof([<<"spdy/2">>, <<"spdy/3">>, <<"http/2">>, <<"http/1.0">>, <<"http/1.1">>]). + +next_protocol_negotiation() -> + %% Predecessor to APLN + ?LET(ExtD, alpn_protocols(), #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = ExtD}). + +srp() -> + ?LET(Name, gen_name(), #srp{username = list_to_binary(Name)}). + +renegotiation_info() -> + #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = 0}. + +gen_name() -> + ?LET(Size, choose(1,10), gen_string(Size)). + +gen_char() -> + choose($a,$z). + +gen_string(N) -> + gen_string(N, []). + +gen_string(0, Acc) -> + Acc; +gen_string(N, Acc) -> + ?LET(Char, gen_char(), gen_string(N-1, [Char | Acc])). + +key_share(client_hello) -> + ?LET(ClientShares, key_share_entry_list(), + #key_share_client_hello{ + client_shares = ClientShares}); +key_share(server_hello) -> + ?LET([ServerShare], key_share_entry_list(1), + #key_share_server_hello{ + server_share = ServerShare}). + +key_share_entry_list() -> + Max = length(ssl:groups()), + ?LET(Size, choose(1,Max), key_share_entry_list(Size)). +%% +key_share_entry_list(N) -> + key_share_entry_list(N, ssl:groups(), []). +%% +key_share_entry_list(0, _Pool, Acc) -> + Acc; +key_share_entry_list(N, Pool, Acc) -> + R = rand:uniform(length(Pool)), + G = lists:nth(R, Pool), + P = generate_public_key(G), + KeyShareEntry = + #key_share_entry{ + group = G, + key_exchange = P}, + key_share_entry_list(N - 1, Pool -- [G], [KeyShareEntry|Acc]). + +generate_public_key(Group) + when Group =:= secp256r1 orelse + Group =:= secp384r1 orelse + Group =:= secp521r1 -> + #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = PublicKey} = + public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp256r1}), + PublicKey; +generate_public_key(Group) -> + {PublicKey, _} = + public_key:generate_key(ssl_dh_groups:dh_params(Group)), + PublicKey. + +groups() -> + Max = length(ssl:groups()), + ?LET(Size, choose(1,Max), group_list(Size)). + +group_list(N) -> + group_list(N, ssl:groups(), []). +%% +group_list(0, _Pool, Acc) -> + Acc; +group_list(N, Pool, Acc) -> + R = rand:uniform(length(Pool)), + G = lists:nth(R, Pool), + group_list(N - 1, Pool -- [G], [G|Acc]). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec index cb54168d36..5e65bfcfe6 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ -{suites,"../ssl_test",all}. -{skip_suites, "../ssl_test", - [ssl_bench_SUITE, ssl_dist_bench_SUITE], - "Benchmarks run separately"}. +% {merge_tests,false}. +{alias,dir,"../ssl_test"}. + +{suites,dir,all}. +{skip_groups,dir,ssl_bench_SUITE,setup,"Benchmarks run separately"}. +{skip_groups,dir,ssl_bench_SUITE,pem_cache,"Benchmarks run separately"}. +{skip_groups,dir,ssl_dist_bench_SUITE,setup,"Benchmarks run separately"}. +{skip_groups,dir,ssl_dist_bench_SUITE,throughput,"Benchmarks run separately"}. + diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl index 9633800da5..c2ce6df59b 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl @@ -3532,7 +3532,7 @@ honor_cipher_order(Config, Honor, ServerCiphers, ClientCiphers, Expected) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- tls_ciphersuite_vs_version() -> - [{doc,"Test a SSLv3 client can not negotiate a TLSv* cipher suite."}]. + [{doc,"Test a SSLv3 client cannot negotiate a TLSv* cipher suite."}]. tls_ciphersuite_vs_version(Config) when is_list(Config) -> {_ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), @@ -3575,14 +3575,14 @@ conf_signature_algs(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ssl_test_lib:start_server([{node, ServerNode}, {port, 0}, {from, self()}, {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result, []}}, - {options, [{active, false}, {signature_algs, [{sha256, rsa}]} | ServerOpts]}]), + {options, [{active, false}, {signature_algs, [{sha, rsa}]} | ServerOpts]}]), Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), Client = ssl_test_lib:start_client([{node, ClientNode}, {port, Port}, {host, Hostname}, {from, self()}, {mfa, {ssl_test_lib, send_recv_result, []}}, - {options, [{active, false}, {signature_algs, [{sha256, rsa}]} | ClientOpts]}]), + {options, [{active, false}, {signature_algs, [{sha, rsa}]} | ClientOpts]}]), ct:log("Testcase ~p, Client ~p Server ~p ~n", [self(), Client, Server]), diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl index 588ca153a9..bddcc2514d 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE.erl @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ verify_fun_always_run_client(Config) when is_list(Config) -> Port = ssl_test_lib:inet_port(Server), %% If user verify fun is called correctly we fail the connection. - %% otherwise we can not tell this case apart form where we miss + %% otherwise we cannot tell this case apart form where we miss %% to call users verify fun FunAndState = {fun(_,{extension, _}, UserState) -> {unknown, UserState}; @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ verify_fun_always_run_server(Config) when is_list(Config) -> {ClientNode, ServerNode, Hostname} = ssl_test_lib:run_where(Config), %% If user verify fun is called correctly we fail the connection. - %% otherwise we can not tell this case apart form where we miss + %% otherwise we cannot tell this case apart form where we miss %% to call users verify fun FunAndState = {fun(_,{extension, _}, UserState) -> {unknown, UserState}; diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl index 7409b69639..d9d9c4e473 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ -export( [setup/1, roundtrip/1, + sched_utilization/1, throughput_0/1, throughput_64/1, throughput_1024/1, @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ groups() -> %% {setup, [{repeat, 1}], [setup]}, {roundtrip, [{repeat, 1}], [roundtrip]}, + {sched_utilization,[{repeat, 1}], [sched_utilization]}, {throughput, [{repeat, 1}], [throughput_0, throughput_64, @@ -69,7 +71,9 @@ groups() -> all_groups() -> [{group, setup}, {group, roundtrip}, - {group, throughput}]. + {group, throughput}, + {group, sched_utilization} + ]. init_per_suite(Config) -> Digest = sha1, @@ -351,6 +355,99 @@ roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N) -> roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N - 1) end. +%%--------------------------------------- +%% Scheduler utilization at constant load + + +sched_utilization(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + sched_utilization(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, proplists:get_value(ssl_dist, Config)) + end, Config). + +sched_utilization(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, SSL) -> + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + {ClientMsacc, ServerMsacc, Msgs} = + ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> sched_util_runner(A, B, SSL) end), + [B] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [A] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + msacc:print(ClientMsacc), + msacc:print(ServerMsacc), + ct:pal("Got ~p msgs",[length(Msgs)]), + report(Prefix++" Sched Utilization Client", + 10000 * msacc:stats(system_runtime,ClientMsacc) / + msacc:stats(system_realtime,ClientMsacc), "util 0.01 %"), + report(Prefix++" Sched Utilization Server", + 10000 * msacc:stats(system_runtime,ServerMsacc) / + msacc:stats(system_realtime,ServerMsacc), "util 0.01 %"), + ok. + +%% Runs on node A and spawns a server on node B +%% We want to avoid getting busy_dist_port as it hides the true SU usage +%% of the receiver and sender. +sched_util_runner(A, B, true) -> + sched_util_runner(A, B, 50); +sched_util_runner(A, B, false) -> + sched_util_runner(A, B, 250); +sched_util_runner(A, B, Senders) -> + Payload = payload(5), + [A] = rpc:call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + ServerPid = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun () -> throughput_server() end), + ServerMsacc = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun() -> + receive + {start,Pid} -> + msacc:start(10000), + Pid ! {ServerPid,msacc:stats()} + end + end), + spawn_link( + fun() -> + %% We spawn 250 senders which should mean that we + %% have a load of 250 msgs/msec + [spawn_link( + fun() -> + throughput_client(ServerPid,Payload) + end) || _ <- lists:seq(1, Senders)] + end), + + erlang:system_monitor(self(),[busy_dist_port]), + ServerMsacc ! {start,self()}, + msacc:start(10000), + ClientMsaccStats = msacc:stats(), + ServerMsaccStats = receive {ServerPid,Stats} -> Stats end, + {ClientMsaccStats,ServerMsaccStats, flush()}. + +flush() -> + receive + M -> + [M | flush()] + after 0 -> + [] + end. + +throughput_server() -> + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + receive _ -> ok end, + throughput_server(). + +throughput_client(Pid, Payload) -> + Pid ! Payload, + receive after 1 -> throughput_client(Pid, Payload) end. %%----------------- %% Throughput speed diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl index 1b9c853fc4..b8b805b2c4 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl @@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args) -> ++ integer_to_list(ListenPort) ++ " " ++ Args ++ " " ++ "-env ERL_CRASH_DUMP " ++ Pwd ++ "/erl_crash_dump." ++ Name ++ " " + ++ "-kernel inet_dist_connect_options \"[{recbuf,12582912},{sndbuf,12582912},{high_watermark,8388608},{low_watermark,4194304}]\" " + ++ "-kernel inet_dist_listen_options \"[{recbuf,12582912},{sndbuf,12582912},{high_watermark,8388608},{low_watermark,4194304}]\" " ++ "-kernel error_logger \"{file,\\\"" ++ Pwd ++ "/error_log." ++ Name ++ "\\\"}\" " ++ "-setcookie " ++ atom_to_list(erlang:get_cookie()). @@ -179,8 +181,9 @@ check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin) -> Parent = self(), Go = make_ref(), %% Spawn connection handler on test server side - Pid = spawn_link( + Pid = spawn( fun () -> + link(group_leader()), receive Go -> ok end, process_flag(trap_exit, true), tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_eqc_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_eqc_SUITE.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bd36d35c02 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_eqc_SUITE.erl @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015-2015. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% The contents of this file are subject to the Erlang Public License, +%% Version 1.1, (the "License"); you may not use this file except in +%% compliance with the License. You should have received a copy of the +%% Erlang Public License along with this software. If not, it can be +%% retrieved online at http://www.erlang.org/. +%% +%% Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" +%% basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See +%% the License for the specific language governing rights and limitations +%% under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +%% + +-module(ssl_eqc_SUITE). + +-compile(export_all). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Common Test interface functions ----------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +all() -> + [ + tls_handshake_encoding + ]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init_per_suite(Config) -> + ct_property_test:init_per_suite(Config). +end_per_suite(Config) -> + Config. + +init_per_group(_GroupName, Config) -> + Config. + +end_per_group(_,Config) -> + Config. + +init_per_testcase(_, Config0) -> + Config0. + +end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) -> + Config. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Test Cases -------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +tls_handshake_encoding(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% manual test: proper:quickcheck(ssl_eqc_handshake:prop_tls_hs_encode_decode()). + true = ct_property_test:quickcheck(ssl_eqc_handshake:prop_tls_hs_encode_decode(), + Config). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_handshake_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_handshake_SUITE.erl index b8b9989d30..e39313e5cd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_handshake_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_handshake_SUITE.erl @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ -compile(export_all). -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). +-include("ssl_alert.hrl"). -include("ssl_internal.hrl"). -include("tls_handshake.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). @@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ all() -> [decode_hello_handshake, decode_empty_server_sni_correctly, select_proper_tls_1_2_rsa_default_hashsign, ignore_hassign_extension_pre_tls_1_2, - unorded_chain]. + unorded_chain, signature_algorithms]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- init_per_suite(Config) -> @@ -55,7 +56,9 @@ init_per_group(_GroupName, Config) -> end_per_group(_,Config) -> Config. -init_per_testcase(ignore_hassign_extension_pre_tls_1_2, Config0) -> +init_per_testcase(TC, Config0) when + TC =:= ignore_hassign_extension_pre_tls_1_2 orelse + TC =:= signature_algorithms -> catch crypto:stop(), try crypto:start() of ok -> @@ -104,15 +107,13 @@ decode_hello_handshake(_Config) -> #ssl_options{}), {Hello, _Data} = hd(Records), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>} - = (Hello#server_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.renegotiation_info. - + Extensions = Hello#server_hello.extensions, + #{renegotiation_info := #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>}} = Extensions. decode_single_hello_extension_correctly(_Config) -> Renegotiation = <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(1), 0>>, - Extensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Renegotiation), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>} - = Extensions#hello_extensions.renegotiation_info. + Extensions = ssl_handshake:decode_extensions(Renegotiation, {3,3}, undefined), + #{renegotiation_info := #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>}} = Extensions. decode_supported_elliptic_curves_hello_extension_correctly(_Config) -> % List of supported and unsupported curves (RFC4492:S5.1.1) @@ -123,37 +124,34 @@ decode_supported_elliptic_curves_hello_extension_correctly(_Config) -> Len = ListLen + 2, Extension = <<?UINT16(?ELLIPTIC_CURVES_EXT), ?UINT16(Len), ?UINT16(ListLen), EllipticCurveList/binary>>, % after decoding we should see only valid curves - #hello_extensions{elliptic_curves = DecodedCurves} = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extension), - #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = [?sect233k1, ?sect193r2]} = DecodedCurves. + Extensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(Extension, {3,2}, client), + #{elliptic_curves := #elliptic_curves{elliptic_curve_list = [?sect233k1, ?sect193r2]}} = Extensions. decode_unknown_hello_extension_correctly(_Config) -> FourByteUnknown = <<16#CA,16#FE, ?UINT16(4), 3, 0, 1, 2>>, Renegotiation = <<?UINT16(?RENEGOTIATION_EXT), ?UINT16(1), 0>>, - Extensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(<<FourByteUnknown/binary, Renegotiation/binary>>), - #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>} - = Extensions#hello_extensions.renegotiation_info. + Extensions = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(<<FourByteUnknown/binary, Renegotiation/binary>>, {3,2}, client), + #{renegotiation_info := #renegotiation_info{renegotiated_connection = <<0>>}} = Extensions. + encode_single_hello_sni_extension_correctly(_Config) -> - Exts = #hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = "test.com"}}, SNI = <<16#00, 16#00, 16#00, 16#0d, 16#00, 16#0b, 16#00, 16#00, 16#08, $t, $e, $s, $t, $., $c, $o, $m>>, ExtSize = byte_size(SNI), HelloExt = <<ExtSize:16/unsigned-big-integer, SNI/binary>>, - Encoded = ssl_handshake:encode_hello_extensions(Exts), + Encoded = ssl_handshake:encode_extensions([#sni{hostname = "test.com"}]), HelloExt = Encoded. decode_single_hello_sni_extension_correctly(_Config) -> - Exts = #hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = "test.com"}}, SNI = <<16#00, 16#00, 16#00, 16#0d, 16#00, 16#0b, 16#00, 16#00, 16#08, $t, $e, $s, $t, $., $c, $o, $m>>, - Decoded = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(SNI), - Exts = Decoded. + Decoded = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(SNI, {3,3}, client), + #{sni := #sni{hostname = "test.com"}} = Decoded. decode_empty_server_sni_correctly(_Config) -> - Exts = #hello_extensions{sni = #sni{hostname = ""}}, SNI = <<?UINT16(?SNI_EXT),?UINT16(0)>>, - Decoded = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(SNI), - Exts = Decoded. + Decoded = ssl_handshake:decode_hello_extensions(SNI, {3,3}, server), + #{sni := #sni{hostname = ""}} = Decoded. select_proper_tls_1_2_rsa_default_hashsign(_Config) -> @@ -168,11 +166,11 @@ ignore_hassign_extension_pre_tls_1_2(Config) -> Opts = proplists:get_value(server_opts, Config), CertFile = proplists:get_value(certfile, Opts), [{_, Cert, _}] = ssl_test_lib:pem_to_der(CertFile), - HashSigns = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = [{sha512, rsa}, {sha, dsa}]}, - {sha512, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), {3,3}), + HashSigns = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = [{sha512, rsa}, {sha, dsa}, {sha, rsa}]}, + {sha512, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({HashSigns, undefined}, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), {3,3}), %%% Ignore - {md5sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,2}), {3,2}), - {md5sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(HashSigns, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,0}), {3,0}). + {md5sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({HashSigns, undefined}, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,2}), {3,2}), + {md5sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign({HashSigns, undefined}, Cert, ecdhe_rsa, tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,0}), {3,0}). unorded_chain(Config) when is_list(Config) -> DefConf = ssl_test_lib:default_cert_chain_conf(), @@ -193,6 +191,55 @@ unorded_chain(Config) when is_list(Config) -> ssl_certificate:certificate_chain(PeerCert, ets:new(foo, []), ExtractedCerts, UnordedChain). +signature_algorithms(Config) -> + Opts = proplists:get_value(server_opts, Config), + CertFile = proplists:get_value(certfile, Opts), + io:format("Cert = ~p~n", [CertFile]), + [{_, Cert, _}] = ssl_test_lib:pem_to_der(CertFile), + HashSigns0 = #hash_sign_algos{ + hash_sign_algos = [{sha512, rsa}, + {sha, dsa}, + {sha, rsa}]}, + Schemes0 = #signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = [rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ecdsa_sha1]}, + {sha512, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign( + {HashSigns0, Schemes0}, + Cert, ecdhe_rsa, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), + {3,3}), + HashSigns1 = #hash_sign_algos{ + hash_sign_algos = [{sha, dsa}, + {sha, rsa}]}, + {sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign( + {HashSigns1, Schemes0}, + Cert, ecdhe_rsa, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), + {3,3}), + Schemes1 = #signature_algorithms_cert{ + signature_scheme_list = [rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + ecdsa_sha1]}, + %% Signature not supported + #alert{} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign( + {HashSigns1, Schemes1}, + Cert, ecdhe_rsa, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), + {3,3}), + %% No scheme, hashsign is used + {sha, rsa} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign( + {HashSigns1, undefined}, + Cert, ecdhe_rsa, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), + {3,3}), + HashSigns2 = #hash_sign_algos{ + hash_sign_algos = [{sha, dsa}]}, + %% Signature not supported + #alert{} = ssl_handshake:select_hashsign( + {HashSigns2, Schemes1}, + Cert, ecdhe_rsa, + tls_v1:default_signature_algs({3,3}), + {3,3}). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Internal functions ------------------------------------------------ %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_hello_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_hello_SUITE.erl index 35af666e9e..46734ba180 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_hello_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_hello_SUITE.erl @@ -71,44 +71,46 @@ encode_and_decode_client_hello_test(Config) -> Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), {[{DecodedHandshakeMessage, _Raw}], _} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version, list_to_binary(HandShakeData), <<>>, #ssl_options{}), - NextProtocolNegotiation = (DecodedHandshakeMessage#client_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation, - NextProtocolNegotiation = undefined. + Extensions = DecodedHandshakeMessage#client_hello.extensions, + #{next_protocol_negotiation := undefined} = Extensions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_and_decode_npn_client_hello_test(Config) -> HandShakeData = create_client_handshake(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>}), Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), {[{DecodedHandshakeMessage, _Raw}], _} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version, list_to_binary(HandShakeData), <<>>, #ssl_options{}), - NextProtocolNegotiation = (DecodedHandshakeMessage#client_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation, - NextProtocolNegotiation = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>}. + Extensions = DecodedHandshakeMessage#client_hello.extensions, + #{next_protocol_negotiation := #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<>>}} = Extensions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_and_decode_server_hello_test(Config) -> HandShakeData = create_server_handshake(undefined), Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), {[{DecodedHandshakeMessage, _Raw}], _} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version, list_to_binary(HandShakeData), <<>>, #ssl_options{}), - NextProtocolNegotiation = (DecodedHandshakeMessage#server_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation, - NextProtocolNegotiation = undefined. + Extensions = DecodedHandshakeMessage#server_hello.extensions, + #{next_protocol_negotiation := undefined} = Extensions. + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- encode_and_decode_npn_server_hello_test(Config) -> HandShakeData = create_server_handshake(#next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<6, "spdy/2">>}), Version = ssl_test_lib:protocol_version(Config), {[{DecodedHandshakeMessage, _Raw}], _} = tls_handshake:get_tls_handshake(Version, list_to_binary(HandShakeData), <<>>, #ssl_options{}), - NextProtocolNegotiation = (DecodedHandshakeMessage#server_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation, - ct:log("~p ~n", [NextProtocolNegotiation]), - NextProtocolNegotiation = #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<6, "spdy/2">>}. + Extensions = DecodedHandshakeMessage#server_hello.extensions, + ct:log("~p ~n", [Extensions]), + #{next_protocol_negotiation := #next_protocol_negotiation{extension_data = <<6, "spdy/2">>}} = Extensions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- create_server_hello_with_no_advertised_protocols_test(_Config) -> - Hello = ssl_handshake:server_hello(<<>>, {3, 0}, create_connection_states(), #hello_extensions{}), - undefined = (Hello#server_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation. + Hello = ssl_handshake:server_hello(<<>>, {3, 0}, create_connection_states(), #{}), + Extensions = Hello#server_hello.extensions, + #{} = Extensions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- create_server_hello_with_advertised_protocols_test(_Config) -> Hello = ssl_handshake:server_hello(<<>>, {3, 0}, create_connection_states(), - #hello_extensions{next_protocol_negotiation = [<<"spdy/1">>, <<"http/1.0">>, <<"http/1.1">>]}), - [<<"spdy/1">>, <<"http/1.0">>, <<"http/1.1">>] = - (Hello#server_hello.extensions)#hello_extensions.next_protocol_negotiation. + #{next_protocol_negotiation => [<<"spdy/1">>, <<"http/1.0">>, <<"http/1.1">>]}), + Extensions = Hello#server_hello.extensions, + #{next_protocol_negotiation := [<<"spdy/1">>, <<"http/1.0">>, <<"http/1.1">>]} = Extensions. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Internal functions ------------------------------------------------ %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -120,9 +122,8 @@ create_client_handshake(Npn) -> session_id = <<>>, cipher_suites = [?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA], compression_methods = "", - extensions = #hello_extensions{ - next_protocol_negotiation = Npn, - renegotiation_info = #renegotiation_info{}} + extensions = #{next_protocol_negotiation => Npn, + renegotiation_info => #renegotiation_info{}} }, Vsn). create_server_handshake(Npn) -> @@ -133,9 +134,8 @@ create_server_handshake(Npn) -> session_id = <<>>, cipher_suite = ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, compression_method = 1, - extensions = #hello_extensions{ - next_protocol_negotiation = Npn, - renegotiation_info = #renegotiation_info{}} + extensions = #{next_protocol_negotiation => Npn, + renegotiation_info => #renegotiation_info{}} }, Vsn). create_connection_states() -> @@ -146,5 +146,5 @@ create_connection_states() -> } }, current_read => #{secure_renegotiation => false - } + } }. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_rfc_5869_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_rfc_5869_SUITE.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b2d1c2082 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_rfc_5869_SUITE.erl @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2018-2018. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +%% +-module(ssl_rfc_5869_SUITE). + +%% Note: This directive should only be used in test suites. +-compile(export_all). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Common Test interface functions ----------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +all() -> + [sha_256_basic, + sha_256_long, + sha_256_no_salt, + sha_basic, + sha_long, + sha_no_salt, + sha_default_salt + ]. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init_per_suite(Config) -> + catch crypto:stop(), + try crypto:start() of + ok -> + Config + catch _:_ -> + {skip, "Crypto did not start"} + end. + +end_per_suite(_Config) -> + application:stop(crypto). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +init_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) -> + ct:timetrap({seconds, 5}), + Config. + +end_per_testcase(_TestCase, Config) -> + Config. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% Test Cases -------------------------------------------------------- +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + +sha_256_basic() -> + [{doc, "Basic test case with SHA-256"}]. +sha_256_basic(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-256 + %% IKM = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b (22 octets) + %% salt = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c (13 octets) + %% info = 0xf0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9 (10 octets) + %% L = 42 + %% PRK = 0x077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba63 + %% 90b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5 (32 octets) + %% OKM = 0x3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a + %% 2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf + %% 34007208d5b887185865 (42 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), + Salt = hexstr2bin("000102030405060708090a0b0c"), + Info = hexstr2bin("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9"), + PRK = hexstr2bin("077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba63" + "90b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a" + "2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf" + "34007208d5b887185865"), + hkdf_test(sha256, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 42, OKM). + +sha_256_long() -> + [{doc, "Test with SHA-256 and longer inputs/outputs"}]. +sha_256_long(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-256 + %% IKM = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f + %% 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f + %% 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f + %% 303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f + %% 404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f (80 octets) + %% salt = 0x606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f + %% 707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f + %% 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f + %% 909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f + %% a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf (80 octets) + %% info = 0xb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf + %% c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf + %% d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf + %% e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef + %% f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff (80 octets) + %% L = 82 + + %% PRK = 0x06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45c + %% ef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244 (32 octets) + %% OKM = 0xb11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a4934 + %% 4f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c + %% 59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09 + %% da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71 + %% cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f + %% 1d87 (82 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" + "101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" + "202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f" + "303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f" + "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f" + ), + Salt = hexstr2bin("606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f" + "707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f" + "808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f" + "909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f" + "a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf" + ), + Info = hexstr2bin("b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf" + "c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf" + "d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" + "e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef" + "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff" + ), + PRK = hexstr2bin("06a6b88c5853361a06104c9ceb35b45c" + "ef760014904671014a193f40c15fc244"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("b11e398dc80327a1c8e7f78c596a4934" + "4f012eda2d4efad8a050cc4c19afa97c" + "59045a99cac7827271cb41c65e590e09" + "da3275600c2f09b8367793a9aca3db71" + "cc30c58179ec3e87c14c01d5c1f3434f" + "1d87" + ), + hkdf_test(sha256, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 82, OKM). +sha_256_no_salt() -> + [{doc, "Test with SHA-256 and zero-length salt/info"}]. +sha_256_no_salt(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-256 + %% IKM = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b (22 octets) + %% salt = (0 octets) + %% info = (0 octets) + %% L = 42 + + %% PRK = 0x19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf + %% 96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04 (32 octets) + %% OKM = 0x8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31 + %% b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d + %% 9d201395faa4b61a96c8 (42 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), + Salt = <<>>, + Info = <<>>, + PRK = hexstr2bin("19ef24a32c717b167f33a91d6f648bdf" + "96596776afdb6377ac434c1c293ccb04"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31" + "b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d" + "9d201395faa4b61a96c8"), + hkdf_test(sha256, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 42, OKM). + +sha_basic() -> + [{doc, " Basic test case with SHA-1"}]. +sha_basic(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-1 + %% IKM = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b (11 octets) + %% salt = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c (13 octets) + %% info = 0xf0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9 (10 octets) + %% L = 42 + + %% PRK = 0x9b6c18c432a7bf8f0e71c8eb88f4b30baa2ba243 (20 octets) + %% OKM = 0x085a01ea1b10f36933068b56efa5ad81 + %% a4f14b822f5b091568a9cdd4f155fda2 + %% c22e422478d305f3f896 (42 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), + Salt = hexstr2bin("000102030405060708090a0b0c"), + Info = hexstr2bin("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9"), + PRK = hexstr2bin("077709362c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba63" + "90b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a" + "2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf" + "34007208d5b887185865"), + hkdf_test(sha256, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 42, OKM). + +sha_long() -> + [{doc, "Test with SHA-1 and longer inputs/outputs"}]. +sha_long(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-1 + %% IKM = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f + %% 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f + %% 202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f + %% 303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f + %% 404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f (80 octets) + %% salt = 0x606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f + %% 707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f + %% 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f + %% 909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f + %% a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf (80 octets) + %% info = 0xb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf + %% c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf + %% d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf + %% e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef + %% f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff (80 octets) + %% L = 82 + + %% PRK = 0x8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6 (20 octets) + %% OKM = 0x0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06eb + %% ff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe + %% 8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c + %% 486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e + %% 927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52 + %% d3b4 (82 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f" + "101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f" + "202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f" + "303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f" + "404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f" + ), + Salt = hexstr2bin("606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f" + "707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f" + "808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f" + "909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f" + "a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf" + ), + Info = hexstr2bin("b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebf" + "c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf" + "d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedf" + "e0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeef" + "f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff" + ), + PRK = hexstr2bin("8adae09a2a307059478d309b26c4115a224cfaf6"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("0bd770a74d1160f7c9f12cd5912a06eb" + "ff6adcae899d92191fe4305673ba2ffe" + "8fa3f1a4e5ad79f3f334b3b202b2173c" + "486ea37ce3d397ed034c7f9dfeb15c5e" + "927336d0441f4c4300e2cff0d0900b52" + "d3b4" + ), + hkdf_test(sha, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 82, OKM). + +sha_no_salt() -> + [{doc, "Test with SHA-1 and zero-length salt/info"}]. +sha_no_salt(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-1 + %% IKM = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b (22 octets) + %% salt = (0 octets) + %% info = (0 octets) + %% L = 42 + + %% PRK = 0xda8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01 (20 octets) + %% OKM = 0x0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506 + %% b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0 + %% ea00033de03984d34918 (42 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b"), + Salt = <<>>, + Info = <<>>, + PRK = hexstr2bin("da8c8a73c7fa77288ec6f5e7c297786aa0d32d01"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("0ac1af7002b3d761d1e55298da9d0506" + "b9ae52057220a306e07b6b87e8df21d0" + "ea00033de03984d34918"), + hkdf_test(sha, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 42, OKM). + + +sha_default_salt() -> + [{doc, "Test with SHA-1, salt not provided (defaults to HashLen zero octets), + zero-length info"}]. +sha_default_salt(Config) when is_list(Config) -> + %% Hash = SHA-1 + %% IKM = 0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c (22 octets) + %% salt = not provided (defaults to HashLen zero octets) + %% info = (0 octets) + %% L = 42 + + %% PRK = 0x2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd (20 octets) + %% OKM = 0x2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0a + %% b3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5 + %% 673a081d70cce7acfc48 (42 octets) + IKM = hexstr2bin("0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c"), + Salt = binary:copy(<<0>>, 20), + Info = <<>>, + PRK = hexstr2bin("2adccada18779e7c2077ad2eb19d3f3e731385dd"), + OKM = hexstr2bin("2c91117204d745f3500d636a62f64f0a" + "b3bae548aa53d423b0d1f27ebba6f5e5" + "673a081d70cce7acfc48"), + hkdf_test(sha, Salt, IKM, PRK, Info, 42, OKM). + +hkdf_test(HashAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial, PsedoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, Key) -> + PsedoRandKey = tls_v1:hkdf_extract(HashAlg, Salt, KeyingMaterial), + Key = tls_v1:hkdf_expand(PsedoRandKey, ContextInfo, Length, HashAlg). + +hexstr2bin(S) when is_binary(S) -> + list_to_binary(hexstr2list(binary_to_list(S))); +hexstr2bin(S) -> + list_to_binary(hexstr2list(S)). + +hexstr2list([$ |T]) -> + hexstr2list(T); +hexstr2list([X,Y|T]) -> + [mkint(X)*16 + mkint(Y) | hexstr2list(T)]; +hexstr2list([]) -> + []. +mkint(C) when $0 =< C, C =< $9 -> + C - $0; +mkint(C) when $A =< C, C =< $F -> + C - $A + 10; +mkint(C) when $a =< C, C =< $f -> + C - $a + 10. |