diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/ssl')
32 files changed, 3720 insertions, 1616 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml index 4c6a204e63..37c916e585 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml @@ -27,6 +27,81 @@ </header> <p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p> +<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so + that sessions where client hostname verification would + fail can not connect reusing a session created when the + server name verification succeeded.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14632</p> + </item> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> + If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address + also check for IP-address match. This check is not as + good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using + IP-address are not recommended.</p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14655</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title> @@ -175,9 +250,59 @@ </item> </list> </section> - </section> +<section><title>SSL 8.1.3.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> +</section> <section><title>SSL 8.1.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -556,6 +681,60 @@ </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.2</title> + + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3</title> <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> @@ -585,7 +764,59 @@ </list> </section> + <section><title>SSL 7.3.3.0.1</title> + <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title> + <list> + <item> + <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites + using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive + Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack) + against RSA, which when exploited, may result in + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a + Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not + having gained access to the server’s private key + itself. <url + href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url> + </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform + plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most + practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext + only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions + established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this + attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct + a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the + initial attack, which may require thousands of server + requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted + session within the window of the configured handshake + timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS + session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites + using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server. + The limited window of opportunity, limitations in + bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly + more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is + enabled by default although least prioritized if server + order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it + must also be supported by the client and probably the + only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions + encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are + not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this + vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher + suite configuration was used you can configure the server + to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like + this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p> + that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p> + <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- + ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]). + </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and + Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p> + <p> + Own Id: OTP-14748</p> + </item> + </list> + </section> + + </section> <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title> <list> <item> diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml index ac5a69c69b..8fcda78ed5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ <tag><c>{certfile, path()}</c></tag> <item><p>Path to a file containing the user certificate.</p></item> - <tag><c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' + <tag> + <marker id="key_option_def"/> + <c>{key, {'RSAPrivateKey'| 'DSAPrivateKey' | 'ECPrivateKey' |'PrivateKeyInfo', public_key:der_encoded()} | #{algorithm := rsa | dss | ecdsa, engine := crypto:engine_ref(), key_id := crypto:key_id(), password => crypto:password()}</c></tag> <item><p>The DER-encoded user's private key or a map refering to a crypto diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml index 61f88e3860..7f8a08f704 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml +++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_distribution.xml @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ <chapter> <header> <copyright> - <year>2000</year><year>2016</year> + <year>2000</year><year>2017</year> <holder>Ericsson AB. All Rights Reserved.</holder> </copyright> <legalnotice> @@ -180,10 +180,96 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) <section> <title>Specifying SSL Options</title> - <p>For SSL to work, at least - a public key and a certificate must be specified for the server - side. In the following example, the PEM-files consist of two - entries, the server certificate and its private key.</p> + + <p> + The SSL distribution options can be written into a file + that is consulted when the node is started. This file name + is then specified with the command line argument + <c>-ssl_dist_optfile</c>. + </p> + <p> + Any available SSL option can be specified in an options file, + but note that options that take a <c>fun()</c> has to use + the syntax <c>fun Mod:Func/Arity</c> since a function + body can not be compiled when consulting a file. + </p> + <p> + Do not tamper with the socket options + <c>list</c>, <c>binary</c>, <c>active</c>, <c>packet</c>, + <c>nodelay</c> and <c>deliver</c> since they are used + by the distribution protocol handler itself. + Other raw socket options such as <c>packet_size</c> may + interfere severely, so beware! + </p> + <p> + For SSL to work, at least a public key and a certificate + must be specified for the server side. + In the following example, the PEM file + <c>"/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"</c> contains both + the server certificate and its private key. + </p> + <p> + Create a file named for example + <c>"/home/me/ssl/[email protected]"</c>: + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ +[{server, + [{certfile, "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"}, + {secure_renegotiate, true}]}, + {client, + [{secure_renegotiate, true}]}].]]> + </code> + <p> + And then start the node like this + (line breaks in the command are for readability, + and shall not be there when typed): + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ +$ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet_tls + -ssl_dist_optfile "/home/me/ssl/[email protected]" + -sname ssl_test]]> + </code> + <p> + The options in the <c>{server, Opts}</c> tuple are used + when calling <c>ssl:ssl_accept/3</c>, and the options in the + <c>{client, Opts}</c> tuple are used when calling + <c>ssl:connect/4</c>. + </p> + <p> + For the client, the option + <c>{server_name_indication, atom_to_list(TargetNode)}</c> + is added when connecting. + This makes it possible to use the client option + <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c>, + and the client will verify that the certificate matches + the node name you are connecting to. + This only works if the the server certificate is issued + to the name <c>atom_to_list(TargetNode)</c>. + </p> + <p> + For the server it is also possible to use the option + <c>{verify, verify_peer}</c> and the server will only accept + client connections with certificates that are trusted by + a root certificate that the server knows. + A client that presents an untrusted certificate will be rejected. + This option is preferably combined with + <c>{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true}</c> or a client will + still be accepted if it does not present any certificate. + </p> + <p> + A node started in this way is fully functional, using SSL + as the distribution protocol. + </p> + </section> + + <section> + <title>Specifying SSL Options (Legacy)</title> + + <p> + As in the previous section the PEM file + <c>"/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem"</c> contains both + the server certificate and its private key. + </p> <p>On the <c>erl</c> command line you can specify options that the SSL distribution adds when creating a socket.</p> @@ -226,24 +312,26 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) SSL options and their values. Argument <c>-ssl_dist_opt</c> can be repeated any number of times.</p> - <p>An example command line can now look as follows + <p> + An example command line doing the same as the example + in the previous section can now look as follows (line breaks in the command are for readability, - and are not be there when typed):</p> - <code type="none"> + and shall not be there when typed): + </p> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ $ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet_tls - -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" + -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" -ssl_dist_opt server_secure_renegotiate true client_secure_renegotiate true -sname ssl_test Erlang (BEAM) emulator version 5.0 [source] - + Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) -(ssl_test@myhost)1> </code> - <p>A node started in this way is fully functional, using SSL - as the distribution protocol.</p> +(ssl_test@myhost)1>]]> + </code> </section> <section> - <title>Setting up Environment to Always Use SSL</title> + <title>Setting up Environment to Always Use SSL (Legacy)</title> <p>A convenient way to specify arguments to Erlang is to use environment variable <c>ERL_FLAGS</c>. All the flags needed to use the SSL distribution can be specified in that variable and are @@ -285,15 +373,11 @@ Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) variable.</p> <p>An example command line with this option would look like this:</p> - <code type="none"> + <code type="none"><![CDATA[ $ erl -boot /home/me/ssl/start_ssl -proto_dist inet6_tls - -ssl_dist_opt server_certfile "/home/me/ssl/erlserver.pem" - -ssl_dist_opt server_secure_renegotiate true client_secure_renegotiate true - -sname ssl_test -Erlang (BEAM) emulator version 5.0 [source] - -Eshell V5.0 (abort with ^G) -(ssl_test@myhost)1> </code> + -ssl_dist_optfile "/home/me/ssl/[email protected]" + -sname ssl_test]]> + </code> <p>A node started in this way will only be able to communicate with other nodes using SSL distribution over IPv6.</p> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile index 2e7df9792e..8eba5cf347 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/src/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # # %CopyrightBegin% # -# Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2016. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright Ericsson AB 1999-2017. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -87,8 +87,7 @@ MODULES= \ ssl_v2 \ ssl_v3 \ tls_v1 \ - dtls_v1 \ - ssl_tls_dist_proxy + dtls_v1 INTERNAL_HRL_FILES = \ ssl_alert.hrl ssl_cipher.hrl \ diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl index bff35acb0b..e5760e7951 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl @@ -232,8 +232,6 @@ next_event(StateName, Record, #alert{} = Alert -> {next_state, StateName, State0, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]} end. -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). handle_common_event(internal, #alert{} = Alert, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> @@ -446,21 +444,20 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State3), next_event(hello, Record, State, Actions); init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server, transport_cb = gen_udp} = State) -> - Result = ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, - protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), - previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, - ignored_alerts => 0, - max_ignored_alerts => 10}}, - ?MODULE), + Result = gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + State#state{flight_state = {retransmit, ?INITIAL_RETRANSMIT_TIMEOUT}, + protocol_specific = #{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), + previous_cookie_secret => <<>>, + ignored_alerts => 0, + max_ignored_alerts => 10}}), erlang:send_after(dtls_v1:cookie_timeout(), self(), new_cookie_secret), Result; init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server} = State) -> %% I.E. DTLS over sctp - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}); init(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -470,9 +467,10 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> error(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -567,11 +565,11 @@ hello(internal, {handshake, {#hello_verify_request{} = Handshake, _}}, State) -> %% hello_verify should not be in handshake history {next_state, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{next_event, internal, Handshake}]}; hello(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -581,21 +579,21 @@ abbreviated(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), ConnectionStates = dtls_record:next_epoch(ConnectionStates1, read), - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}); abbreviated(internal = Type, #finished{} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, - prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - flight_state = connection}), ?MODULE); + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, + prepare_flight(State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + flight_state = connection})); abbreviated(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). @@ -604,13 +602,13 @@ certify(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; certify(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal = Type, #server_hello_done{} = Event, State) -> ssl_connection:certify(Type, Event, prepare_flight(State), ?MODULE); certify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -620,7 +618,7 @@ cipher(enter, _, State0) -> {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), {keep_state, State, Actions}; cipher(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(internal = Type, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>} = Event, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates1 = dtls_record:save_current_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), @@ -644,7 +642,7 @@ cipher(Type, Event, State) -> connection(enter, _, State) -> {keep_state, State}; connection(info, Event, State) -> - handle_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); connection(internal, #hello_request{}, #state{host = Host, port = Port, session = #session{own_certificate = Cert} = Session0, session_cache = Cache, session_cache_cb = CacheCb, @@ -807,6 +805,7 @@ handle_client_hello(#client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, State = prepare_flight(State0#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, negotiated_version = Version, hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, session = Session, negotiated_protocol = Protocol}), @@ -823,7 +822,7 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, _, _, Data}, StateName, next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, @@ -848,7 +847,7 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, ok end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final DTLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again @@ -863,7 +862,7 @@ handle_info(new_cookie_secret, StateName, CookieInfo#{current_cookie_secret => dtls_v1:cookie_secret(), previous_cookie_secret => Secret}}}; handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State). + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, #state{flight_state = {retransmit, NextTimeout}} = State0) -> @@ -874,7 +873,7 @@ handle_state_timeout(flight_retransmission_timeout, StateName, handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); @@ -906,6 +905,39 @@ encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, Epoch, ConnectionStates) -> decode_alerts(Bin) -> ssl_alert:decode(Bin). +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, + #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. + +gen_info(Event, connection = StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INTERNAL_ERROR, + malformed_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end; + +gen_info(Event, StateName, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + try handle_info(Event, StateName, State) of + Result -> + Result + catch + _:_ -> + ssl_connection:handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + malformed_handshake_data), + Version, StateName, State) + end. unprocessed_events(Events) -> %% The first handshake event will be processed immediately %% as it is entered first in the event queue and diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl index 1d6f0a42c8..5e8f5c2ca0 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_handshake.erl @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, TLSVersion) of #alert{} = Alert -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl index c789a32087..c9e04767aa 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_udp_listener.erl @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ -record(state, {port, - listner, + listener, dtls_options, emulated_options, dtls_msq_queues = kv_new(), @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ init([Port, EmOpts, InetOptions, DTLSOptions]) -> first = true, dtls_options = DTLSOptions, emulated_options = EmOpts, - listner = Socket, + listener = Socket, close = false}} catch _:_ -> {error, closed} @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ handle_call({accept, _}, _, #state{close = true} = State) -> handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{first = true, accepters = Accepters, - listner = Socket} = State0) -> + listener = Socket} = State0) -> next_datagram(Socket), State = State0#state{first = false, accepters = queue:in({Accepter, From}, Accepters)}, @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{first = true, handle_call({accept, Accepter}, From, #state{accepters = Accepters} = State0) -> State = State0#state{accepters = queue:in({Accepter, From}, Accepters)}, {noreply, State}; -handle_call(sockname, _, #state{listner = Socket} = State) -> +handle_call(sockname, _, #state{listener = Socket} = State) -> Reply = inet:sockname(Socket), {reply, Reply, State}; handle_call(close, _, #state{dtls_processes = Processes, @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ handle_call(close, _, #state{dtls_processes = Processes, end, queue:to_list(Accepters)), {reply, ok, State#state{close = true, accepters = queue:new()}} end; -handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listner = Socket, +handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listener = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) -> case get_socket_opts(Socket, SocketOptNames) of {ok, Opts} -> @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ handle_call({get_sock_opts, {SocketOptNames, EmOptNames}}, _, #state{listner = S handle_call(get_all_opts, _, #state{dtls_options = DTLSOptions, emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) -> {reply, {ok, EmOpts, DTLSOptions}, State}; -handle_call({set_sock_opts, {SocketOpts, NewEmOpts}}, _, #state{listner = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts0} = State) -> +handle_call({set_sock_opts, {SocketOpts, NewEmOpts}}, _, #state{listener = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts0} = State) -> set_socket_opts(Socket, SocketOpts), EmOpts = do_set_emulated_opts(NewEmOpts, EmOpts0), {reply, ok, State#state{emulated_options = EmOpts}}. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ handle_cast({active_once, Client, Pid}, State0) -> State = handle_active_once(Client, Pid, State0), {noreply, State}. -handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listner = Socket} = State0) -> +handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listener = Socket} = State0) -> State = handle_datagram({IP, InPortNo}, Msg, State0), next_datagram(Socket), {noreply, State}; @@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ handle_info({udp, Socket, IP, InPortNo, _} = Msg, #state{listner = Socket} = Sta %% UDP socket does not have a connection and should not receive an econnreset %% This does however happens on on some windows versions. Just ignoring it %% appears to make things work as expected! -handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listner = Socket} = State) -> +handle_info({udp_error, Socket, econnreset = Error}, #state{listener = Socket} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("Ignore SSL UDP Listener: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {noreply, State}; -handle_info({udp_error, Socket, Error}, #state{listner = Socket} = State) -> +handle_info({udp_error, Socket, Error}, #state{listener = Socket} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL UDP Listener shutdown: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Error]), error_logger:info_report(Report), {noreply, State#state{close=true}}; @@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ setup_new_connection(User, From, Client, Msg, #state{dtls_processes = Processes, dtls_msq_queues = MsgQueues, dtls_options = DTLSOpts, port = Port, - listner = Socket, + listener = Socket, emulated_options = EmOpts} = State) -> ConnArgs = [server, "localhost", Port, {self(), {Client, Socket}}, - {DTLSOpts, EmOpts, udp_listner}, User, dtls_socket:default_cb_info()], + {DTLSOpts, EmOpts, udp_listener}, User, dtls_socket:default_cb_info()], case dtls_connection_sup:start_child(ConnArgs) of {ok, Pid} -> erlang:monitor(process, Pid), diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl index ffd7296f93..96ce4d493a 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet6_tls_dist.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2015-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ %% -module(inet6_tls_dist). --export([childspecs/0, listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5, +-export([childspecs/0]). +-export([listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5, setup/5, close/1, select/1]). childspecs() -> @@ -43,4 +44,4 @@ setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) -> inet_tls_dist:gen_setup(inet6_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime). close(Socket) -> - inet_tls_dist:close(Socket). + inet_tls_dist:gen_close(inet6_tcp, Socket). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl index 78094c474b..8e605bec65 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -21,17 +21,26 @@ %% -module(inet_tls_dist). --export([childspecs/0, listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5, +-export([childspecs/0]). +-export([listen/1, accept/1, accept_connection/5, setup/5, close/1, select/1, is_node_name/1]). %% Generalized dist API -export([gen_listen/2, gen_accept/2, gen_accept_connection/6, - gen_setup/6, gen_select/2]). + gen_setup/6, gen_close/2, gen_select/2]). + +-export([split_node/1, nodelay/0]). + +-export([dbg/0]). % Debug -include_lib("kernel/include/net_address.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/dist.hrl"). -include_lib("kernel/include/dist_util.hrl"). +-include("ssl_api.hrl"). + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + childspecs() -> {ok, [{ssl_dist_sup,{ssl_dist_sup, start_link, []}, permanent, infinity, supervisor, [ssl_dist_sup]}]}. @@ -40,123 +49,398 @@ select(Node) -> gen_select(inet_tcp, Node). gen_select(Driver, Node) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [_, Host] -> - case inet:getaddr(Host, Driver:family()) of + case split_node(Node) of + false -> + false; + Host -> + case Driver:getaddr(Host) of {ok, _} -> true; _ -> false - end; - _ -> - false + end end. -is_node_name(Node) when is_atom(Node) -> - select(Node); -is_node_name(_) -> - false. +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +is_node_name(Node) -> + case split_node(Node) of + false -> + false; + _Host -> + true + end. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +hs_data_common(#sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket) -> + #hs_data{ + f_send = + fun (Ctrl, Packet) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_send(SslSocket, Packet) + end, + f_recv = + fun (Ctrl, Length, Timeout) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) + end, + f_setopts_pre_nodeup = + fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_setopts_pre_nodeup(SslSocket) + end, + f_setopts_post_nodeup = + fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> +%%% sys:trace(Ctrl, true), + f_setopts_post_nodeup(SslSocket) + end, + f_getll = + fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_getll(DistCtrl) + end, + f_address = + fun (Ctrl, Node) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_address(SslSocket, Node) + end, + mf_tick = + fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + mf_tick(DistCtrl) + end, + mf_getstat = + fun (Ctrl) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + mf_getstat(SslSocket) + end, + mf_setopts = + fun (Ctrl, Opts) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + mf_setopts(SslSocket, Opts) + end, + mf_getopts = + fun (Ctrl, Opts) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + mf_getopts(SslSocket, Opts) + end, + f_handshake_complete = + fun (Ctrl, Node, DHandle) when Ctrl == DistCtrl -> + f_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle) + end}. + +f_send(SslSocket, Packet) -> + ssl:send(SslSocket, Packet). + +f_recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) -> + case ssl:recv(SslSocket, Length, Timeout) of + {ok, Bin} when is_binary(Bin) -> + {ok, binary_to_list(Bin)}; + Other -> + Other + end. + +f_setopts_pre_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> + ok. + +f_setopts_post_nodeup(_SslSocket) -> + ok. + +f_getll(DistCtrl) -> + {ok, DistCtrl}. + +f_address(SslSocket, Node) -> + case ssl:peername(SslSocket) of + {ok, Address} -> + case split_node(Node) of + false -> + {error, no_node}; + Host -> + #net_address{ + address=Address, host=Host, + protocol=tls, family=inet} + end + end. + +mf_tick(DistCtrl) -> + DistCtrl ! tick, + ok. + +mf_getstat(SslSocket) -> + case ssl:getstat( + SslSocket, [recv_cnt, send_cnt, send_pend]) of + {ok, Stat} -> + split_stat(Stat,0,0,0); + Error -> + Error + end. + +mf_setopts(SslSocket, Opts) -> + case setopts_filter(Opts) of + [] -> + ssl:setopts(SslSocket, Opts); + Opts1 -> + {error, {badopts,Opts1}} + end. + +mf_getopts(SslSocket, Opts) -> + ssl:getopts(SslSocket, Opts). + +f_handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle) -> + ssl_connection:handshake_complete(DistCtrl, Node, DHandle). + + +setopts_filter(Opts) -> + [Opt || {K,_} = Opt <- Opts, + K =:= active orelse K =:= deliver orelse K =:= packet]. + +split_stat([{recv_cnt, R}|Stat], _, W, P) -> + split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); +split_stat([{send_cnt, W}|Stat], R, _, P) -> + split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); +split_stat([{send_pend, P}|Stat], R, W, _) -> + split_stat(Stat, R, W, P); +split_stat([], R, W, P) -> + {ok, R, W, P}. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- listen(Name) -> gen_listen(inet_tcp, Name). gen_listen(Driver, Name) -> - ssl_tls_dist_proxy:listen(Driver, Name). + case inet_tcp_dist:gen_listen(Driver, Name) of + {ok, {Socket, Address, Creation}} -> + inet:setopts(Socket, [{packet, 4}]), + {ok, {Socket, Address#net_address{protocol=tls}, Creation}}; + Other -> + Other + end. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- accept(Listen) -> gen_accept(inet_tcp, Listen). gen_accept(Driver, Listen) -> - ssl_tls_dist_proxy:accept(Driver, Listen). + Kernel = self(), + monitor_pid( + spawn_opt( + fun () -> + accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) + end, + [link, {priority, max}])). -accept_connection(AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> - gen_accept_connection(inet_tcp, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime). +accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel) -> + case Driver:accept(Listen) of + {ok, Socket} -> + Opts = get_ssl_options(server), + wait_for_code_server(), + case ssl:ssl_accept( + Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 4}] ++ Opts, + net_kernel:connecttime()) of + {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> + monitor_pid(DistCtrl), + trace( + Kernel ! + {accept, self(), DistCtrl, + Driver:family(), tls}), + receive + {Kernel, controller, Pid} -> + ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, Pid), + trace( + Pid ! {self(), controller}); + {Kernel, unsupported_protocol} -> + exit(trace(unsupported_protocol)) + end, + accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel); + {error, {options, _}} = Error -> + %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. + %% Let's log that. + error_logger:error_msg( + "Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", + [ssl:format_error(Error)]), + _ = trace(Error), + gen_tcp:close(Socket); + Other -> + _ = trace(Other), + gen_tcp:close(Socket) + end; + Error -> + exit(trace(Error)) + end, + accept_loop(Driver, Listen, Kernel). + +wait_for_code_server() -> + %% This is an ugly hack. Upgrading a socket to TLS requires the + %% crypto module to be loaded. Loading the crypto module triggers + %% its on_load function, which calls code:priv_dir/1 to find the + %% directory where its NIF library is. However, distribution is + %% started earlier than the code server, so the code server is not + %% necessarily started yet, and code:priv_dir/1 might fail because + %% of that, if we receive an incoming connection on the + %% distribution port early enough. + %% + %% If the on_load function of a module fails, the module is + %% unloaded, and the function call that triggered loading it fails + %% with 'undef', which is rather confusing. + %% + %% Thus, the accept process will terminate, and be + %% restarted by ssl_dist_sup. However, it won't have any memory + %% of being asked by net_kernel to listen for incoming + %% connections. Hence, the node will believe that it's open for + %% distribution, but it actually isn't. + %% + %% So let's avoid that by waiting for the code server to start. + case whereis(code_server) of + undefined -> + timer:sleep(10), + wait_for_code_server(); + Pid when is_pid(Pid) -> + ok + end. -gen_accept_connection(Driver, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +accept_connection(AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> + gen_accept_connection( + inet_tcp, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime). + +gen_accept_connection( + Driver, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> Kernel = self(), - spawn_link(fun() -> do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, - MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) end). + monitor_pid( + spawn_opt( + fun() -> + do_accept( + Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, + MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) + end, + [link, {priority, max}])). + +do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, DistCtrl, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> + SslSocket = ssl_connection:get_sslsocket(DistCtrl), + receive + {AcceptPid, controller} -> + Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime), + case check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) of + true -> + HSData0 = hs_data_common(SslSocket), + HSData = + HSData0#hs_data{ + kernel_pid = Kernel, + this_node = MyNode, + socket = DistCtrl, + timer = Timer, + this_flags = 0, + allowed = Allowed}, + link(DistCtrl), + dist_util:handshake_other_started(trace(HSData)); + {false,IP} -> + error_logger:error_msg( + "** Connection attempt from " + "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), + ?shutdown2(no_node, trace({disallowed, IP})) + end + end. -setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) -> - gen_setup(inet_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime). -gen_setup(Driver, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames,SetupTime) -> + +setup(Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> + gen_setup(inet_tcp, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime). + +gen_setup(Driver, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> Kernel = self(), - spawn_opt(fun() -> do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) end, [link, {priority, max}]). - + monitor_pid( + spawn_opt( + fun() -> + do_setup( + Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, + MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) + end, + [link, {priority, max}])). + do_setup(Driver, Kernel, Node, Type, MyNode, LongOrShortNames, SetupTime) -> [Name, Address] = splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames), - case inet:getaddr(Address, Driver:family()) of + case Driver:getaddr(Address) of {ok, Ip} -> - Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime), + Timer = trace(dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime)), ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), case ErlEpmd:port_please(Name, Ip) of {port, TcpPort, Version} -> - ?trace("port_please(~p) -> version ~p~n", - [Node,Version]), + Opts = + trace( + connect_options( + [{server_name_indication, atom_to_list(Node)} + |get_ssl_options(client)])), dist_util:reset_timer(Timer), - case ssl_tls_dist_proxy:connect(Driver, Address, TcpPort) of - {ok, Socket} -> - HSData = connect_hs_data(Kernel, Node, MyNode, Socket, - Timer, Version, Ip, TcpPort, Address, - Type), - dist_util:handshake_we_started(HSData); + case ssl:connect( + Address, TcpPort, + [binary, {active, false}, {packet, 4}, + Driver:family(), nodelay()] ++ Opts, + net_kernel:connecttime()) of + {ok, #sslsocket{pid = DistCtrl} = SslSocket} -> + monitor_pid(DistCtrl), + ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, self()), + HSData0 = hs_data_common(SslSocket), + HSData = + HSData0#hs_data{ + kernel_pid = Kernel, + other_node = Node, + this_node = MyNode, + socket = DistCtrl, + timer = Timer, + this_flags = 0, + other_version = Version, + request_type = Type}, + link(DistCtrl), + dist_util:handshake_we_started(trace(HSData)); Other -> %% Other Node may have closed since %% port_please ! - ?trace("other node (~p) " - "closed since port_please.~n", - [Node]), - ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {connect_failed, Other}}) + ?shutdown2( + Node, + trace( + {ssl_connect_failed, Ip, TcpPort, Other})) end; Other -> - ?trace("port_please (~p) " - "failed.~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {port_please_failed, Other}}) + ?shutdown2( + Node, + trace( + {port_please_failed, ErlEpmd, Name, Ip, Other})) end; Other -> - ?trace("inet_getaddr(~p) " - "failed (~p).~n", [Node,Other]), - ?shutdown2(Node, {shutdown, {inet_getaddr_failed, Other}}) + ?shutdown2( + Node, + trace({getaddr_failed, Driver, Address, Other})) end. close(Socket) -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - ok. + gen_close(inet, Socket). + +gen_close(Driver, Socket) -> + trace(Driver:close(Socket)). -do_accept(Driver, Kernel, AcceptPid, Socket, MyNode, Allowed, SetupTime) -> - process_flag(priority, max), - receive - {AcceptPid, controller} -> - Timer = dist_util:start_timer(SetupTime), - case check_ip(Driver, Socket) of - true -> - HSData = accept_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, Allowed), - dist_util:handshake_other_started(HSData); - {false,IP} -> - error_logger:error_msg("** Connection attempt from " - "disallowed IP ~w ** ~n", [IP]), - ?shutdown(no_node) - end - end. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ %% Do only accept new connection attempts from nodes at our %% own LAN, if the check_ip environment parameter is true. %% ------------------------------------------------------------ -check_ip(Driver, Socket) -> +check_ip(Driver, SslSocket) -> case application:get_env(check_ip) of {ok, true} -> - case get_ifs(Socket) of + case get_ifs(SslSocket) of {ok, IFs, IP} -> check_ip(Driver, IFs, IP); - _ -> - ?shutdown(no_node) + Other -> + ?shutdown2( + no_node, trace({check_ip_failed, SslSocket, Other})) end; _ -> true end. -get_ifs(Socket) -> +check_ip(Driver, [{OwnIP, _, Netmask}|IFs], PeerIP) -> + case {Driver:mask(Netmask, PeerIP), Driver:mask(Netmask, OwnIP)} of + {M, M} -> true; + _ -> check_ip(IFs, PeerIP) + end; +check_ip(_Driver, [], PeerIP) -> + {false, PeerIP}. + +get_ifs(#sslsocket{fd = {gen_tcp, Socket, _}}) -> case inet:peername(Socket) of {ok, {IP, _}} -> + %% XXX this is seriously broken for IPv6 case inet:getif(Socket) of {ok, IFs} -> {ok, IFs, IP}; Error -> Error @@ -165,125 +449,217 @@ get_ifs(Socket) -> Error end. -check_ip(Driver, [{OwnIP, _, Netmask}|IFs], PeerIP) -> - case {Driver:mask(Netmask, PeerIP), Driver:mask(Netmask, OwnIP)} of - {M, M} -> true; - _ -> check_ip(IFs, PeerIP) - end; -check_ip(_Driver, [], PeerIP) -> - {false, PeerIP}. - %% If Node is illegal terminate the connection setup!! splitnode(Driver, Node, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(atom_to_list(Node), $@, []) of - [Name|Tail] when Tail =/= [] -> - Host = lists:append(Tail), + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Host =/= [] -> check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames); [_] -> - error_logger:error_msg("** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", - [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node); + error_logger:error_msg( + "** Nodename ~p illegal, no '@' character **~n", + [Node]), + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_n@me, Node})); _ -> - error_logger:error_msg("** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), - ?shutdown(Node) + error_logger:error_msg( + "** Nodename ~p illegal **~n", [Node]), + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({illegal_node_name, Node})) end. check_node(Driver, Name, Node, Host, LongOrShortNames) -> - case split_node(Host, $., []) of + case string:split(Host, ".") of [_] when LongOrShortNames == longnames -> case Driver:parse_address(Host) of {ok, _} -> [Name, Host]; _ -> - error_logger:error_msg("** System running to use " - "fully qualified " - "hostnames **~n" - "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", - [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node) + error_logger:error_msg( + "** System running to use " + "fully qualified hostnames **~n" + "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", + [Host]), + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_longnames, Host})) end; - [_, _ | _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> - error_logger:error_msg("** System NOT running to use fully qualified " - "hostnames **~n" - "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", - [Host]), - ?shutdown(Node); + [_, _] when LongOrShortNames == shortnames -> + error_logger:error_msg( + "** System NOT running to use " + "fully qualified hostnames **~n" + "** Hostname ~s is illegal **~n", + [Host]), + ?shutdown2(Node, trace({not_shortnames, Host})); _ -> [Name, Host] end. -split_node([Chr|T], Chr, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)|split_node(T, Chr, [])]; -split_node([H|T], Chr, Ack) -> - split_node(T, Chr, [H|Ack]); -split_node([], _, Ack) -> - [lists:reverse(Ack)]. - -connect_hs_data(Kernel, Node, MyNode, Socket, Timer, Version, Ip, TcpPort, Address, Type) -> - common_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, - #hs_data{other_node = Node, - other_version = Version, - f_address = - fun(_,_) -> - #net_address{address = {Ip,TcpPort}, - host = Address, - protocol = proxy, - family = inet} - end, - request_type = Type - }). - -accept_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, Allowed) -> - common_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, #hs_data{ - allowed = Allowed, - f_address = fun get_remote_id/2 - }). - -common_hs_data(Kernel, MyNode, Socket, Timer, HsData) -> - HsData#hs_data{ - kernel_pid = Kernel, - this_node = MyNode, - socket = Socket, - timer = Timer, - this_flags = 0, - f_send = - fun(S,D) -> - gen_tcp:send(S,D) - end, - f_recv = - fun(S,N,T) -> - gen_tcp:recv(S,N,T) - end, - f_setopts_pre_nodeup = - fun(S) -> - inet:setopts(S, [{active, false}, {packet, 4}]) - end, - f_setopts_post_nodeup = - fun(S) -> - inet:setopts(S, [{deliver, port},{active, true}]) - end, - f_getll = - fun(S) -> - inet:getll(S) - end, - mf_tick = - fun(S) -> - gen_tcp:send(S, <<>>) - end, - mf_getstat = - fun(S) -> - {ok, Stats} = inet:getstat(S, [recv_cnt, send_cnt, send_pend]), - R = proplists:get_value(recv_cnt, Stats, 0), - W = proplists:get_value(send_cnt, Stats, 0), - P = proplists:get_value(send_pend, Stats, 0), - {ok, R,W,P} - end}. - -get_remote_id(Socket, _Node) -> - case ssl_tls_dist_proxy:get_tcp_address(Socket) of - {ok, Address} -> - Address; - {error, _Reason} -> - ?shutdown(no_node) +split_node(Node) when is_atom(Node) -> + case string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@") of + [Name, Host] when Name =/= [], Host =/= [] -> + Host; + _ -> + false + end; +split_node(_) -> + false. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +connect_options(Opts) -> + case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_connect_options) of + {ok,ConnectOpts} -> + lists:ukeysort(1, ConnectOpts ++ Opts); + _ -> + Opts + end. + +%% we may not always want the nodelay behaviour +%% for performance reasons +nodelay() -> + case application:get_env(kernel, dist_nodelay) of + undefined -> + {nodelay, true}; + {ok, true} -> + {nodelay, true}; + {ok, false} -> + {nodelay, false}; + _ -> + {nodelay, true} end. + + +get_ssl_options(Type) -> + try ets:lookup(ssl_dist_opts, Type) of + [{Type, Opts}] -> + [{erl_dist, true} | Opts]; + _ -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + catch + error:badarg -> + get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) + end. + +get_ssl_dist_arguments(Type) -> + case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_opt) of + {ok, Args} -> + [{erl_dist, true} | ssl_options(Type, lists:append(Args))]; + _ -> + [{erl_dist, true}] + end. + +ssl_options(_,[]) -> + []; +ssl_options(server, ["client_" ++ _, _Value |T]) -> + ssl_options(server,T); +ssl_options(client, ["server_" ++ _, _Value|T]) -> + ssl_options(client,T); +ssl_options(server, ["server_certfile", Value|T]) -> + [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_certfile", Value | T]) -> + [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> + [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> + [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_keyfile", Value|T]) -> + [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_keyfile", Value|T]) -> + [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_password", Value|T]) -> + [{password, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_password", Value|T]) -> + [{password, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_verify", Value|T]) -> + [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_verify", Value|T]) -> + [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> + [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> + [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_check", Value|T]) -> + [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_check", Value|T]) -> + [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> + [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> + [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> + [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> + [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> + [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> + [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_depth", Value|T]) -> + [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_depth", Value|T]) -> + [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> + [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> + [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_ciphers", Value|T]) -> + [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(client, ["client_ciphers", Value|T]) -> + [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_dhfile", Value|T]) -> + [{dhfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(server, ["server_fail_if_no_peer_cert", Value|T]) -> + [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; +ssl_options(Type, Opts) -> + error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Type, Opts]). + +atomize(List) when is_list(List) -> + list_to_atom(List); +atomize(Atom) when is_atom(Atom) -> + Atom. + +termify(String) when is_list(String) -> + {ok, Tokens, _} = erl_scan:string(String ++ "."), + {ok, Term} = erl_parse:parse_term(Tokens), + Term. + +verify_fun(Value) -> + case termify(Value) of + {Mod, Func, State} when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> + Fun = fun Mod:Func/3, + {Fun, State}; + _ -> + error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Value]) + end. + +%% ------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +%% Trace point +trace(Term) -> Term. + +%% Keep an eye on distribution Pid:s we know of +monitor_pid(Pid) -> + %%spawn( + %% fun () -> + %% MRef = erlang:monitor(process, Pid), + %% receive + %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, normal} -> + %% error_logger:error_report( + %% [dist_proc_died, + %% {reason, normal}, + %% {pid, Pid}]); + %% {'DOWN', MRef, _, _, Reason} -> + %% error_logger:info_report( + %% [dist_proc_died, + %% {reason, Reason}, + %% {pid, Pid}]) + %% end + %% end), + Pid. + +dbg() -> + dbg:stop(), + dbg:tracer(), + dbg:p(all, c), + dbg:tpl(?MODULE, cx), + dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_get_data_notification, cx), + dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_get_data, cx), + dbg:tpl(erlang, dist_ctrl_put_data, cx), + ok. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src index 51407ef3b9..c5b55641a1 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ %% Erlang Distribution over SSL/TLS inet_tls_dist, inet6_tls_dist, - ssl_tls_dist_proxy, ssl_dist_sup, ssl_dist_connection_sup, ssl_dist_admin_sup, @@ -63,7 +62,5 @@ {applications, [crypto, public_key, kernel, stdlib]}, {env, []}, {mod, {ssl_app, []}}, - {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.2","public_key-1.5","kernel-3.0", - "erts-7.0","crypto-3.3", "inets-5.10.7"]}]}. - - + {runtime_dependencies, ["stdlib-3.2","public_key-1.5","kernel-6.0", + "erts-10.0","crypto-3.3", "inets-5.10.7"]}]}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl index 4007e44a83..656ed94ea5 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl @@ -374,13 +374,12 @@ negotiated_protocol(#sslsocket{pid = Pid}) -> ssl_connection:negotiated_protocol(Pid). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites() -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite()] | [string()]. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites() -> cipher_suites(erlang). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:erl_cipher_suite()] | - [string()]. +-spec cipher_suites(erlang | openssl | all) -> [ssl_cipher:old_erl_cipher_suite() | string()]. %% Description: Returns all supported cipher suites. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- cipher_suites(erlang) -> @@ -992,17 +991,21 @@ validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, Value) when is_list(Value) -> Value; validate_option(next_protocols_advertised, undefined) -> undefined; -validate_option(server_name_indication = Opt, Value) when is_list(Value) -> +validate_option(server_name_indication, Value) when is_list(Value) -> %% RFC 6066, Section 3: Currently, the only server names supported are %% DNS hostnames - case inet_parse:domain(Value) of - false -> - throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); - true -> - Value - end; -validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined = Value) -> + %% case inet_parse:domain(Value) of + %% false -> + %% throw({error, {options, {{Opt, Value}}}}); + %% true -> + %% Value + %% end; + %% + %% But the definition seems very diffuse, so let all strings through + %% and leave it up to public_key to decide... Value; +validate_option(server_name_indication, undefined) -> + undefined; validate_option(server_name_indication, disable) -> disable; @@ -1149,9 +1152,8 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, []) -> %% not require explicit configuration ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:suites(tls_version(Version))); binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Tuple|_] = Ciphers0) when is_tuple(Tuple) -> - Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(C) || C <- Ciphers0], + Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:suite(tuple_to_map(C)) || C <- Ciphers0], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers); - binary_cipher_suites(Version, [Cipher0 | _] = Ciphers0) when is_binary(Cipher0) -> All = ssl_cipher:all_suites(tls_version(Version)), case [Cipher || Cipher <- Ciphers0, lists:member(Cipher, All)] of @@ -1171,6 +1173,17 @@ binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers0) -> Ciphers = [ssl_cipher:openssl_suite(C) || C <- string:lexemes(Ciphers0, ":")], binary_cipher_suites(Version, Ciphers). +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => default_prf}; +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac, Prf}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => Prf}. + handle_eccs_option(Value, Version) when is_list(Value) -> {_Major, Minor} = tls_version(Version), try tls_v1:ecc_curves(Minor, Value) of diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl index 50c5f0d755..b0e38fb9ad 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl @@ -44,20 +44,21 @@ is_stream_ciphersuite/1]). -export_type([cipher_suite/0, - erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, + erl_cipher_suite/0, old_erl_cipher_suite/0, openssl_cipher_suite/0, hash/0, key_algo/0, sign_algo/0]). --type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' - | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. +-type cipher() :: null |rc4_128 | des_cbc | '3des_ede_cbc' | aes_128_cbc | aes_256_cbc | aes_128_gcm | aes_256_gcm | chacha20_poly1305. -type hash() :: null | md5 | sha | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512. -type sign_algo() :: rsa | dsa | ecdsa. --type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | - psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. --type erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 - %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf - | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. - - +-type key_algo() :: null | rsa | dhe_rsa | dhe_dss | ecdhe_ecdsa| ecdh_ecdsa | ecdh_rsa| srp_rsa| srp_dss | psk | dhe_psk | rsa_psk | dh_anon | ecdh_anon | srp_anon. +-type erl_cipher_suite() :: #{key_exchange := key_algo(), + cipher := cipher(), + mac := hash(), + prf := hash() | default_prf %% Old cipher suites, version dependent + }. +-type old_erl_cipher_suite() :: {key_algo(), cipher(), hash()} % Pre TLS 1.2 + %% TLS 1.2, internally PRE TLS 1.2 will use default_prf + | {key_algo(), cipher(), hash(), hash() | default_prf}. -type cipher_suite() :: binary(). -type cipher_enum() :: integer(). -type openssl_cipher_suite() :: string(). @@ -83,7 +84,8 @@ security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) -> %% cipher values has been updated according to <CipherSuite> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) -> - { _, Cipher, Hash, PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash, + prf := PrfHashAlg} = suite_definition(CipherSuite), SecParams#security_parameters{ cipher_suite = CipherSuite, bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher), @@ -375,30 +377,38 @@ psk_suites({3, N}) -> psk_suites(N) when N >= 3 -> [ + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ] ++ psk_suites(0); psk_suites(_) -> - [?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + [?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA]. @@ -457,314 +467,740 @@ des_suites(_)-> %%------------------------------------------------------------------- %% TLS v1.1 suites suite_definition(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) -> - {null, null, null, null}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; %% RFC 5746 - Not a real cipher suite used to signal empty "renegotiation_info" extension %% to avoid handshake failure from old servers that do not ignore %% hello extension data as they should. suite_definition(?TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) -> - {null, null, null, null}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5) -> -%% {rsa, null, md5, default_prf}; -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => null, + cipher => null, + mac => null, + prf => null}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% TLS v1.2 suites - %% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> %% {rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %% not defined YET: %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_128_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_DSS AES_256_CBC SHA256 %% TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DH_RSA AES_256_CBC SHA256 - %%% DH-ANON deprecated by TLS spec and not available %%% by default, but good for testing purposes. suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5) -> - {dh_anon, rc4_128, md5, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => md5, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, des_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => des_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 +suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {dhe_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha256, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> - {rsa_psk, null, sha384, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => rsa_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, + mac => sha256, + prf => default_prf}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => null, mac => sha384, + prf => default_prf}; +%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; +suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; +%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_128_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf =>sha256}; +%% suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256) -> +%% #{key_exchange => ecdhe_psk, +%% cipher => aes_256_ccm, +%% mac => null, +%% prf => sha256}; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => srp_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => srp_dss, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, null, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => null, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => rc4_128, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => '3des_ede_cbc', + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha, default_prf}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA) -> - {ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha, default_prf}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha, + prf => default_prf}; %% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_cbc, + mac => sha256, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_cbc, + mac => sha384, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dhe_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => dh_dss, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => dh_anon, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_128_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) -> - {ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}; - + #{key_exchange => ecdh_rsa, + cipher => aes_256_gcm, + mac => null, + prf => sha384}; %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}; + #{key_exchange => ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}; suite_definition(?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) -> - {dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}. + #{key_exchange => dhe_rsa, + cipher => chacha20_poly1305, + mac => null, + prf => sha256}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- --spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite()) -> erl_cipher_suite(). +-spec erl_suite_definition(cipher_suite() | erl_cipher_suite()) -> old_erl_cipher_suite(). %% %% Description: Return erlang cipher suite definition. Filters last value %% for now (compatibility reasons). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -erl_suite_definition(S) -> - case suite_definition(S) of - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, default_prf} -> +erl_suite_definition(Bin) when is_binary(Bin) -> + erl_suite_definition(suite_definition(Bin)); +erl_suite_definition(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, prf := Prf}) -> + case Prf of + default_prf -> {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}; - Suite -> - Suite + _ -> + {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -772,288 +1208,607 @@ erl_suite_definition(S) -> %% %% Description: Return TLS cipher suite definition. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- - %% TLS v1.1 suites -%%suite({rsa, null, md5}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5; -%%suite({rsa, null, sha}) -> -%% ?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, rc4_128, md5}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= rc4_128, + mac := md5}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5; -suite({dh_anon, des_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= des_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher:= '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; - %%% TSL V1.1 AES suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %% TLS v1.2 suites - -%% suite_definition(?TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA) -> -%% {rsa, null, sha, sha256}; -suite({rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256; - %%% PSK Cipher Suites RFC 4279 - -suite({psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, rc4_128,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, '3des_ede_cbc',sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc,sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - +%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA; %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 - -suite({psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - -suite({psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_128_cbc, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, aes_256_cbc, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - -suite({psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({dhe_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; -suite({rsa_psk, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; - +%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher :='3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := null, + mac := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384; +%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> + ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_128_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256; + %% suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_psk, + %% cipher := aes_256_ccm, + %% mac := null, + %% prf := sha256}) -> + %% ?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256; %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 - -suite({srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; -suite({srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := srp_dss, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 4492 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdhe_rsa, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - -suite({ecdh_anon, null, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := null, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, rc4_128, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := rc4_128, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := '3des_ede_cbc', + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA; -suite({ecdh_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA; - %%% RFC 5289 EC TLS suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac:= sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha256, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_cbc, + mac := sha256, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha384, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_cbc, + mac := sha384, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384; - %% RFC 5288 AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dhe_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_dss, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_dss, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_dss, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({dh_anon, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({dh_anon, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dh_anon, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - %% RFC 5289 ECC AES-GCM Cipher Suites -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_ecdsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_128_gcm, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_128_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256; -suite({ecdh_rsa, aes_256_gcm, null, sha384}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa, + cipher := aes_256_gcm, + mac := null, + prf := sha384}) -> ?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; - - %% draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04 Chacha20/Poly1305 Suites -suite({ecdhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({ecdhe_ecdsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256; -suite({dhe_rsa, chacha20_poly1305, null, sha256}) -> +suite(#{key_exchange := dhe_rsa, + cipher := chacha20_poly1305, + mac := null, + prf := sha256}) -> ?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1430,14 +2185,13 @@ filter(DerCert, Ciphers) -> %% %% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto. %%------------------------------------------------------------------- -filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_tuple(Value) -> +filter_suites(Suites = [Value|_]) when is_map(Value) -> Algos = crypto:supports(), Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), - lists:filter(fun({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash}) -> - is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_hash(Hash, proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos)); - ({KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf}) -> + lists:filter(fun(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := Prf}) -> is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso @@ -1448,9 +2202,12 @@ filter_suites(Suites) -> Algos = crypto:supports(), Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos), lists:filter(fun(Suite) -> - {KeyExchange, Cipher, Hash, Prf} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(Suite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExchange, + cipher := Cipher, + mac := Hash, + prf := Prf} = suite_definition(Suite), is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos)) andalso - is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso + is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos)) andalso is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs) andalso is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Hashs) end, Suites). @@ -1467,7 +2224,8 @@ is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_dss, Algos) -> is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_rsa, Algos) -> proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos); -is_acceptable_keyexchange(ecdh_anon, Algos) -> +is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos); is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl index 8e8f3d9c67..e5462d8402 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.hrl @@ -399,6 +399,17 @@ %% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x95 }; -define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#95)>>). +%%% PSK NULL Cipher Suites RFC 4785 + +%% TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2C }; +-define(TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2C)>>). + +%% TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2D }; +-define(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2D)>>). + +%% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA = { 0x00, 0x2E }; +-define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#2E)>>). + %%% TLS 1.2 PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5487 %% TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8}; @@ -455,6 +466,46 @@ %% TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9}; -define(TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#00), ?BYTE(16#B9)>>). +%%% ECDHE PSK Cipher Suites RFC 5489 + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = {0xC0,0x33}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#33)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x34}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#34)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x35}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#35)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = {0xC0,0x36}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#36)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x37}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#37)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x38}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#38)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x3A}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#3A)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x3B}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#C0), ?BYTE(16#3B)>>). + +%%% ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05 + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#01)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#02)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#03)>>). + +%% TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05}; +-define(TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, <<?BYTE(16#D0), ?BYTE(16#05)>>). + %%% SRP Cipher Suites RFC 5054 %% TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A }; diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index 07df9bc93c..d046145dff 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ %% Alert and close handling -export([handle_own_alert/4, handle_alert/3, - handle_normal_shutdown/3 + handle_normal_shutdown/3, stop/2, stop_and_reply/3 ]). %% Data handling @@ -61,13 +61,14 @@ %% General gen_statem state functions with extra callback argument %% to determine if it is an SSL/TLS or DTLS gen_statem machine --export([init/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, connection/4, downgrade/4]). +-export([init/4, error/4, hello/4, abbreviated/4, certify/4, cipher/4, + connection/4, death_row/4, downgrade/4]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([terminate/3, format_status/2]). -%% TODO: do not export, call state function instead --export([handle_info/3, handle_call/5, handle_common_event/5]). +%% Erlang Distribution export +-export([get_sslsocket/1, handshake_complete/3]). %%==================================================================== %% Setup @@ -149,8 +150,8 @@ socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport) -> -spec socket_control(tls_connection | dtls_connection, port(), pid(), atom(), pid()| undefined) -> {ok, #sslsocket{}} | {error, reason()}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, udp_listner) -> - %% dtls listner process must have the socket control +socket_control(Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, udp_listener) -> + %% dtls listener process must have the socket control {ok, Connection:socket(Pid, Transport, Socket, Connection, undefined)}; socket_control(tls_connection = Connection, Socket, Pid, Transport, ListenTracker) -> @@ -275,6 +276,13 @@ peer_certificate(ConnectionPid) -> renegotiation(ConnectionPid) -> call(ConnectionPid, renegotiate). + +get_sslsocket(ConnectionPid) -> + call(ConnectionPid, get_sslsocket). + +handshake_complete(ConnectionPid, Node, DHandle) -> + call(ConnectionPid, {handshake_complete, Node, DHandle}). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec prf(pid(), binary() | 'master_secret', binary(), [binary() | ssl:prf_random()], non_neg_integer()) -> @@ -308,7 +316,7 @@ handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, catch _:_ -> ok end, - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}}. + stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State). handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, _, #state{socket = Socket, transport_cb = Transport, @@ -332,24 +340,24 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?FATAL} = Alert, StateName, protocol_cb = Connection, ssl_options = SslOpts, start_or_recv_from = From, host = Host, port = Port, session = Session, user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, - role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker}) -> + role = Role, socket_options = Opts, tracker = Tracker} = State) -> invalidate_session(Role, Host, Port, Session), log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, StateName, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection), - {stop, normal}; + stop(normal, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY} = Alert, StateName, State) -> handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{role = Role, ssl_options = SslOpts, protocol_cb = Connection, renegotiation = {true, internal}} = State) -> log_alert(SslOpts#ssl_options.log_alert, Role, Connection:protocol_name(), StateName, Alert#alert{role = opposite_role(Role)}), handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, peer_close}}; + stop({shutdown, peer_close}, State); handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING, description = ?NO_RENEGOTIATION} = Alert, StateName, #state{role = Role, @@ -374,7 +382,7 @@ handle_alert(#alert{level = ?WARNING} = Alert, StateName, %%==================================================================== %% Data handling %%==================================================================== -write_application_data(Data0, From, +write_application_data(Data0, {FromPid, _} = From, #state{socket = Socket, negotiated_version = Version, protocol_cb = Connection, @@ -389,10 +397,19 @@ write_application_data(Data0, From, Connection:renegotiate(State#state{renegotiation = {true, internal}}, [{next_event, {call, From}, {application_data, Data0}}]); false -> - {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), - Result = Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs), - ssl_connection:hibernate_after(connection, State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, - [{reply, From, Result}]) + {Msgs, ConnectionStates} = + Connection:encode_data(Data, Version, ConnectionStates0), + NewState = State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}, + case Connection:send(Transport, Socket, Msgs) of + ok when FromPid =:= self() -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, []); + Error when FromPid =:= self() -> + stop({shutdown, Error}, NewState); + ok -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, ok}]); + Result -> + hibernate_after(connection, NewState, [{reply, From, Result}]) + end end. read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, @@ -412,30 +429,57 @@ read_application_data(Data, #state{user_application = {_Mon, Pid}, end, case get_data(SOpts, BytesToRead, Buffer1) of {ok, ClientData, Buffer} -> % Send data - SocketOpt = deliver_app_data(Transport, Socket, SOpts, - ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - cancel_timer(Timer), - State = State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer, - start_or_recv_from = undefined, - timer = undefined, - bytes_to_read = undefined, - socket_options = SocketOpt - }, - if - SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; Buffer =:= <<>> -> - %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv - %% Active and empty, get more data - Connection:next_record_if_active(State); - true -> %% We have more data - read_application_data(<<>>, State) - end; + case State0 of + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} -> + State = + State0#state{ + user_data_buffer = Buffer, + bytes_to_read = undefined}, + try erlang:dist_ctrl_put_data(DHandle, ClientData) of + _ + when SOpts#socket_options.active =:= false; + Buffer =:= <<>> -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + %% Active and empty, get more data + Connection:next_record_if_active(State); + _ -> %% We have more data + read_application_data(<<>>, State) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) + end; + _ -> + SocketOpt = + deliver_app_data( + Transport, Socket, SOpts, + ClientData, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), + cancel_timer(Timer), + State = + State0#state{ + user_data_buffer = Buffer, + start_or_recv_from = undefined, + timer = undefined, + bytes_to_read = undefined, + socket_options = SocketOpt + }, + if + SocketOpt#socket_options.active =:= false; + Buffer =:= <<>> -> + %% Passive mode, wait for active once or recv + %% Active and empty, get more data + Connection:next_record_if_active(State); + true -> %% We have more data + read_application_data(<<>>, State) + end + end; {more, Buffer} -> % no reply, we need more data Connection:next_record(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); {passive, Buffer} -> Connection:next_record_if_active(State0#state{user_data_buffer = Buffer}); {error,_Reason} -> %% Invalid packet in packet mode deliver_packet_error(Transport, Socket, SOpts, Buffer1, Pid, RecvFrom, Tracker, Connection), - {stop, normal, State0} + stop(normal, State0) end. %%==================================================================== %% Help functions for tls|dtls_connection.erl @@ -451,7 +495,7 @@ handle_session(#server_hello{cipher_suite = CipherSuite, #state{session = #session{session_id = OldId}, negotiated_version = ReqVersion, negotiated_protocol = CurrentProtocol} = State0) -> - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), PremasterSecret = make_premaster_secret(ReqVersion, KeyAlgorithm), @@ -527,11 +571,17 @@ init({call, From}, {start, {Opts, EmOpts}, Timeout}, socket_options = SockOpts} = State0, Connection) -> try SslOpts = ssl:handle_options(Opts, OrigSSLOptions), + case SslOpts of + #ssl_options{erl_dist = true} -> + process_flag(priority, max); + _ -> + ok + end, State = ssl_config(SslOpts, Role, State0), init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, State#state{ssl_options = SslOpts, socket_options = new_emulated(EmOpts, SockOpts)}, Connection) catch throw:Error -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}} + stop_and_reply(normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State0) end; init({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); @@ -539,6 +589,15 @@ init(_Type, _Event, _State, _Connection) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), + {start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}, + tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +error({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> + handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec hello(gen_statem:event_type(), #hello_request{} | #server_hello{} | term(), #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> @@ -679,7 +738,7 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, when Alg == dhe_dss; Alg == dhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_rsa; Alg == ecdhe_ecdsa; Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; - Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; + Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, Alg, ssl:tls_version(Version)), @@ -703,6 +762,14 @@ certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) end end; +certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, + #state{role = client, negotiated_version = Version, + key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _) + when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; + Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; + Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> + handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), + Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, #state{session = #session{own_certificate = Cert}, role = client, @@ -889,7 +956,7 @@ cipher(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -connection({call, From}, {application_data, Data}, +connection({call, {FromPid, _} = From}, {application_data, Data}, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State, Connection) -> %% We should look into having a worker process to do this to %% parallize send and receive decoding and not block the receiver @@ -897,7 +964,13 @@ connection({call, From}, {application_data, Data}, try write_application_data(Data, From, State) catch throw:Error -> - hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) + case self() of + FromPid -> + stop({shutdown, Error}, State); + _ -> + hibernate_after( + ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, Error}]) + end end; connection({call, RecvFrom}, {recv, N, Timeout}, #state{protocol_cb = Connection, socket_options = @@ -925,8 +998,64 @@ connection({call, From}, negotiated_protocol, #state{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol} = State, _) -> hibernate_after(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, [{reply, From, {ok, SelectedProtocol}}]); +connection( + {call, From}, {handshake_complete, _Node, DHandle}, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + socket_options = SockOpts, + protocol_specific = ProtocolSpecific} = State, + Connection) -> + %% From now on we execute on normal priority + process_flag(priority, normal), + try erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle) of + _ -> + NewState = + State#state{ + socket_options = + SockOpts#socket_options{active = true}, + protocol_specific = + ProtocolSpecific#{d_handle => DHandle}}, + {Record, NewerState} = Connection:next_record_if_active(NewState), + Connection:next_event(connection, Record, NewerState, [{reply, From, ok}]) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) + end; connection({call, From}, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection); +connection( + info, dist_data = Msg, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := DHandle}} = State, + _) -> + eat_msgs(Msg), + try send_dist_data(?FUNCTION_NAME, State, DHandle, []) + catch error:_ -> + death_row(State, disconnect) + end; +connection( + info, {send, From, Ref, Data}, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, + _) -> + %% This is for testing only! + %% + %% Needed by some OTP distribution + %% test suites... + From ! {Ref, ok}, + {keep_state_and_data, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, + {application_data, iolist_to_binary(Data)}}]}; +connection( + info, tick = Msg, + #state{ + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}, + protocol_specific = #{d_handle := _}}, + _) -> + eat_msgs(Msg), + {keep_state_and_data, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, <<>>}}]}; connection(info, Msg, State, _) -> handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); connection(internal, {recv, _}, State, Connection) -> @@ -935,6 +1064,32 @@ connection(Type, Msg, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec death_row(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), + #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% We just wait for the owner to die which triggers the monitor, +%% or the socket may die too +death_row( + info, {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, + #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}, + _) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +death_row( + info, {'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, #state{socket = Socket}, _) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +death_row(state_timeout, Reason, _State, _Connection) -> + {stop, {shutdown,Reason}}; +death_row(_Type, _Msg, _State, _Connection) -> + %% Waste all other events + keep_state_and_data. + +%% State entry function +death_row(State, Reason) -> + {next_state, death_row, State, + [{state_timeout, 5000, Reason}]}. + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}, tls_connection | dtls_connection) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). @@ -945,10 +1100,10 @@ downgrade(internal, #alert{description = ?CLOSE_NOTIFY}, tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active, false}, {packet, 0}, {mode, binary}]), Transport:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), gen_statem:reply(From, {ok, Socket}), - {stop, normal, State}; + stop(normal, State); downgrade(timeout, downgrade, #state{downgrade = {_, From}} = State, _) -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, timeout}), - {stop, normal, State}; + stop(normal, State); downgrade(Type, Event, State, Connection) -> handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State, Connection). @@ -963,7 +1118,7 @@ handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{} = Handshake, _}}, co handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {#hello_request{}, _}}, StateName, #state{role = client}, _) when StateName =/= connection -> {keep_state_and_data}; -handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, +handle_common_event(internal, {handshake, {Handshake, Raw}}, StateName, #state{tls_handshake_history = Hs0, ssl_options = #ssl_options{v2_hello_compatible = V2HComp}} = State0, Connection) -> @@ -982,8 +1137,8 @@ handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]}; handle_common_event(internal, {application_data, Data}, StateName, State0, Connection) -> case read_application_data(Data, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop-> + Stop; {Record, State} -> Connection:next_event(StateName, Record, State) end; @@ -1012,13 +1167,14 @@ handle_call({close, _} = Close, From, StateName, State, Connection) -> %% Run terminate before returning so that the reuseaddr %% inet-option works properly Result = Connection:terminate(Close, StateName, State#state{terminated = true}), - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, normal}, - {reply, From, Result}, State}; + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, normal}, + {reply, From, Result}, State); handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, #state{transport_cb = Transport, negotiated_version = Version, connection_states = ConnectionStates, - socket = Socket}, Connection) -> + socket = Socket} = State, Connection) -> case How0 of How when How == write; How == both -> Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?WARNING, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), @@ -1034,7 +1190,7 @@ handle_call({shutdown, How0}, From, _, {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, ok}]}; Error -> gen_statem:reply(From, {error, Error}), - {stop, normal} + stop(normal, State) end; handle_call({recv, _N, _Timeout}, From, _, #state{socket_options = @@ -1069,6 +1225,15 @@ handle_call({set_opts, Opts0}, From, StateName, handle_call(renegotiate, From, StateName, _, _) when StateName =/= connection -> {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, {error, already_renegotiating}}]}; + +handle_call( + get_sslsocket, From, _StateName, + #state{transport_cb = Transport, socket = Socket, tracker = Tracker}, + Connection) -> + SslSocket = + Connection:socket(self(), Transport, Socket, Connection, Tracker), + {keep_state_and_data, [{reply, From, SslSocket}]}; + handle_call({prf, Secret, Label, Seed, WantedLength}, From, _, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, negotiated_version = Version}, _) -> @@ -1105,29 +1270,50 @@ handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, econnaborted}, StateName, tracker = Tracker} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker,Socket, StartFrom, ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), Role, Connection), - {stop, normal, State}; + stop(normal, State); + handle_info({ErrorTag, Socket, Reason}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, error_tag = ErrorTag} = State) -> Report = io_lib:format("SSL: Socket error: ~p ~n", [Reason]), - error_logger:info_report(Report), + error_logger:error_report(Report), handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, normal, State}; -handle_info({'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, - State = #state{user_application={MonitorRef,_Pid}}) -> - {stop, normal, State}; + stop(normal, State); + +handle_info( + {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, Reason}, _, + #state{ + user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + {stop, {shutdown, Reason}}; +handle_info( + {'DOWN', MonitorRef, _, _, _}, _, + #state{user_application = {MonitorRef, _Pid}}) -> + {stop, normal}; +handle_info( + {'EXIT', Pid, _Reason}, StateName, + #state{user_application = {_MonitorRef, Pid}} = State) -> + %% It seems the user application has linked to us + %% - ignore that and let the monitor handle this + {next_state, StateName, State}; + %%% So that terminate will be run when supervisor issues shutdown handle_info({'EXIT', _Sup, shutdown}, _StateName, State) -> - {stop, shutdown, State}; + stop(shutdown, State); handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, normal}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> %% Handle as transport close" - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; + stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); +handle_info({'EXIT', Socket, Reason}, _StateName, #state{socket = Socket} = State) -> + stop({shutdown, Reason}, State); + handle_info(allow_renegotiate, StateName, State) -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{allow_renegotiate = true}}; handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, StartFrom}, StateName, #state{renegotiation = {false, first}} = State) when StateName =/= connection -> - {stop_and_reply, {shutdown, user_timeout}, - {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, State#state{timer = undefined}}; + stop_and_reply( + {shutdown, user_timeout}, + {reply, StartFrom, {error, timeout}}, + State#state{timer = undefined}); handle_info({cancel_start_or_recv, RecvFrom}, StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = RecvFrom} = State) when RecvFrom =/= undefined -> {next_state, StateName, State#state{start_or_recv_from = undefined, @@ -1220,9 +1406,9 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, negotiated_version = {_,_} = Version, ssl_options = Opts}) -> RecordCB = record_cb(Connection), - CipherSuiteDef = ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuite), - IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(element(1,CipherSuiteDef), - [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), + CipherSuiteDef = #{key_exchange := KexAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + IsNamedCurveSuite = lists:member(KexAlg, + [ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_anon]), CurveInfo = case ECCCurve of {namedCurve, Curve} when IsNamedCurveSuite -> [{ecc, {named_curve, pubkey_cert_records:namedCurves(Curve)}}]; @@ -1231,7 +1417,7 @@ connection_info(#state{sni_hostname = SNIHostname, end, [{protocol, RecordCB:protocol_version(Version)}, {session_id, SessionId}, - {cipher_suite, CipherSuiteDef}, + {cipher_suite, ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(CipherSuiteDef)}, {sni_hostname, SNIHostname} | CurveInfo] ++ ssl_options_list(Opts). security_info(#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates}) -> @@ -1299,7 +1485,7 @@ resumed_server_hello(#state{session = Session, server_hello(ServerHello, State0, Connection) -> CipherSuite = ServerHello#server_hello.cipher_suite, - {KeyAlgorithm, _, _, _} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), State = Connection:queue_handshake(ServerHello, State0), State#state{key_algorithm = KeyAlgorithm}. @@ -1313,8 +1499,8 @@ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State1 = State0#state{session = Session#session{peer_certificate = PeerCert}, public_key_info = PublicKeyInfo}, - {KeyAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), - State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlg, State1), + #{key_exchange := KeyAlgorithm} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + State2 = handle_peer_cert_key(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, KeyAlgorithm, State1), {Record, State} = Connection:next_record(State2), Connection:next_event(certify, Record, State). @@ -1395,8 +1581,25 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> request_client_cert(State2, Connection). certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, - #state{private_key = Key} = State, Connection) -> - PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key), + #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) -> + FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), + %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret + %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. + PremasterSecret = + try ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key) of + Secret when erlang:byte_size(Secret) == ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES -> + case Secret of + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> -> %% Correct + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>; + <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_), Rest/binary>> -> %% Version mismatch + <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>> + end; + _ -> %% erlang:byte_size(Secret) =/= ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES + FakeSecret + catch + #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} -> + FakeSecret + end, calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, #state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, @@ -1424,6 +1627,14 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup), calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); +certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, + #state{diffie_hellman_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey, + ssl_options = + #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = State, + Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = + ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerEcDhPrivateKey, PSKLookup), + calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, #state{private_key = Key, ssl_options = @@ -1442,6 +1653,7 @@ certify_server(#state{key_algorithm = Algo} = State, _) when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdh_anon; Algo == psk; Algo == dhe_psk; + Algo == ecdhe_psk; Algo == srp_anon -> State; certify_server(#state{cert_db = CertDbHandle, @@ -1543,6 +1755,27 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = dhe_psk, PrivateKey}), State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = DHKeys}; +key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, + ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = PskIdentityHint}, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSignAlgo, + private_key = PrivateKey, + session = #session{ecc = ECCCurve}, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0, + negotiated_version = Version + } = State0, Connection) -> + ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCCurve), + #{security_parameters := SecParams} = + ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates0, read), + #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, + server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, + Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(server, ssl:tls_version(Version), + {ecdhe_psk, + PskIdentityHint, ECDHKeys, + HashSignAlgo, ClientRandom, + ServerRandom, + PrivateKey}), + State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), + State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys}; key_exchange(#state{role = server, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, ssl_options = #ssl_options{psk_identity = undefined}} = State, _) -> State; @@ -1636,6 +1869,17 @@ key_exchange(#state{role = client, {dhe_psk, SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, DhPubKey}), Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); + +key_exchange(#state{role = client, + ssl_options = SslOpts, + key_algorithm = ecdhe_psk, + negotiated_version = Version, + diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys} = State0, Connection) -> + Msg = ssl_handshake:key_exchange(client, ssl:tls_version(Version), + {ecdhe_psk, + SslOpts#ssl_options.psk_identity, ECDHKeys}), + Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0); + key_exchange(#state{role = client, ssl_options = SslOpts, key_algorithm = rsa_psk, @@ -1690,6 +1934,12 @@ rsa_psk_key_exchange(Version, PskIdentity, PremasterSecret, rsa_psk_key_exchange(_, _, _, _) -> throw (?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, pub_key_is_not_rsa)). +request_client_cert(#state{key_algorithm = Alg} = State, _) + when Alg == dh_anon; Alg == ecdh_anon; + Alg == psk; Alg == dhe_psk; Alg == ecdhe_psk; Alg == rsa_psk; + Alg == srp_dss; Alg == srp_rsa; Alg == srp_anon -> + State; + request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{verify = verify_peer, signature_algs = SupportedHashSigns}, connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -1811,6 +2061,18 @@ calculate_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}, Connection, certify, certify); +calculate_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve}} = ServerKey, + #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{user_lookup_fun = PSKLookup}} = + State=#state{session=Session}, Connection) -> + ECDHKeys = public_key:generate_key(ECCurve), + + PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ServerKey, ECDHKeys, PSKLookup), + calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, + State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = ECDHKeys, + session = Session#session{ecc = ECCurve}}, + Connection, certify, certify); + calculate_secret(#server_srp_params{srp_n = Prime, srp_g = Generator} = ServerKey, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{srp_identity = SRPId}} = State, Connection) -> @@ -1895,6 +2157,7 @@ is_anonymous(Algo) when Algo == dh_anon; Algo == ecdh_anon; Algo == psk; Algo == dhe_psk; + Algo == ecdhe_psk; Algo == rsa_psk; Algo == srp_anon -> true; @@ -2194,8 +2457,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, connection = StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply}]); {next_state, StateName, State, Actions} -> hibernate_after(StateName, State, [{reply, To, Reply} | Actions]); - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State} + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop end; handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = State) -> %% Active once already set @@ -2204,8 +2467,8 @@ handle_active_option(_, StateName, To, Reply, #state{user_data_buffer = <<>>} = %% user_data_buffer =/= <<>> handle_active_option(_, StateName0, To, Reply, #state{protocol_cb = Connection} = State0) -> case read_application_data(<<>>, State0) of - {stop, Reason, State} -> - {stop, Reason, State}; + {stop, _, _} = Stop -> + Stop; {Record, State1} -> %% Note: Renogotiation may cause StateName0 =/= StateName case Connection:next_event(StateName0, Record, State1) of @@ -2363,7 +2626,8 @@ send_or_reply(_, Pid, _From, Data) -> send_user(Pid, Data). send_user(Pid, Msg) -> - Pid ! Msg. + Pid ! Msg, + ok. alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, connection, Opts, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection) -> alert_user(Transport, Tracker, Socket, Opts#socket_options.active, Pid, From, Alert, Role, Connection); @@ -2456,3 +2720,42 @@ new_emulated([], EmOpts) -> EmOpts; new_emulated(NewEmOpts, _) -> NewEmOpts. +%%---------------Erlang distribution -------------------------------------- + +send_dist_data(StateName, State, DHandle, Acc) -> + case erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data(DHandle) of + none -> + erlang:dist_ctrl_get_data_notification(DHandle), + hibernate_after(StateName, State, lists:reverse(Acc)); + Data -> + send_dist_data( + StateName, State, DHandle, + [{next_event, {call, {self(), undefined}}, {application_data, Data}} + |Acc]) + end. + +%% Overload mitigation +eat_msgs(Msg) -> + receive Msg -> eat_msgs(Msg) + after 0 -> ok + end. + +%% When acting as distribution controller map the exit reason +%% to follow the documented nodedown_reason for net_kernel +stop(Reason, State) -> + {stop, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), State}. + +stop_and_reply(Reason, Replies, State) -> + {stop_and_reply, erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, State), Replies, State}. + +erl_dist_stop_reason( + Reason, #state{ssl_options = #ssl_options{erl_dist = true}}) -> + case Reason of + normal -> + %% We can not exit with normal since that will not bring + %% down the rest of the distribution processes + {shutdown, normal}; + _ -> Reason + end; +erl_dist_stop_reason(Reason, _State) -> + Reason. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl index 3e26f67de1..f9d2149170 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ session_cache_cb :: atom(), crl_db :: term(), negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', + client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined', client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), key_algorithm :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(), hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined}, diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl index 690b896919..bea67935d8 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_dist_sup.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ %% Supervisor callback -export([init/1]). +%% Debug +-export([consult/1]). + %%%========================================================================= %%% API %%%========================================================================= @@ -37,7 +40,18 @@ -spec start_link() -> {ok, pid()} | ignore | {error, term()}. start_link() -> - supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []). + case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_optfile) of + {ok, [File]} -> + DistOpts = consult(File), + TabOpts = [set, protected, named_table], + Tab = ets:new(ssl_dist_opts, TabOpts), + true = ets:insert(Tab, DistOpts), + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []); + {ok, BadArg} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, BadArg}); + error -> + supervisor:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, []) + end. %%%========================================================================= %%% Supervisor callback @@ -46,8 +60,7 @@ start_link() -> init([]) -> AdminSup = ssl_admin_child_spec(), ConnectionSup = ssl_connection_sup(), - ProxyServer = proxy_server_child_spec(), - {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [AdminSup, ProxyServer, ConnectionSup]}}. + {ok, {{one_for_all, 10, 3600}, [AdminSup, ConnectionSup]}}. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %%% Internal functions @@ -70,11 +83,51 @@ ssl_connection_sup() -> Type = supervisor, {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}. -proxy_server_child_spec() -> - Name = ssl_tls_dist_proxy, - StartFunc = {ssl_tls_dist_proxy, start_link, []}, - Restart = permanent, - Shutdown = 4000, - Modules = [ssl_tls_dist_proxy], - Type = worker, - {Name, StartFunc, Restart, Shutdown, Type, Modules}. +consult(File) -> + case erl_prim_loader:get_file(File) of + {ok, Binary, _FullName} -> + Encoding = + case epp:read_encoding_from_binary(Binary) of + none -> latin1; + Enc -> Enc + end, + case unicode:characters_to_list(Binary, Encoding) of + {error, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_error, Rest}}); + {incomplete, _String, Rest} -> + error( + {bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {encoding_incomplete, Rest}}); + String when is_list(String) -> + consult_string(String) + end; + error -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, File}) + end. + +consult_string(String) -> + case erl_scan:string(String) of + {error, Info, Location} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {scan_error, Info, Location}}); + {ok, Tokens, _EndLocation} -> + consult_tokens(Tokens) + end. + +consult_tokens(Tokens) -> + case erl_parse:parse_exprs(Tokens) of + {error, Info} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Info}}); + {ok, [Expr]} -> + consult_expr(Expr); + {ok, Other} -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {parse_error, Other}}) + end. + +consult_expr(Expr) -> + {value, Value, Bs} = erl_eval:expr(Expr, erl_eval:new_bindings()), + case erl_eval:bindings(Bs) of + [] -> + Value; + Other -> + error({bad_ssl_dist_optfile, {bindings, Other}}) + end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index 560d5a3aaf..61d61b53dd 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, HashSigns, Version) -> {ecdh, #'ECPrivateKey'{}} | {psk, binary()} | {dhe_psk, binary(), binary()} | + {ecdhe_psk, binary(), #'ECPrivateKey'{}} | {srp, {binary(), binary()}, #srp_user{}, {HashAlgo::atom(), SignAlgo::atom()}, binary(), binary(), public_key:private_key()}) -> #client_key_exchange{} | #server_key_exchange{}. @@ -229,6 +230,13 @@ key_exchange(client, _Version, {dhe_psk, Identity, PublicKey}) -> dh_public = PublicKey} }; +key_exchange(client, _Version, {ecdhe_psk, Identity, #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey}}) -> + #client_key_exchange{ + exchange_keys = #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{ + identity = Identity, + dh_public = ECPublicKey} + }; + key_exchange(client, _Version, {psk_premaster_secret, PskIdentity, Secret, {_, PublicKey, _}}) -> EncPremasterSecret = encrypted_premaster_secret(Secret, PublicKey), @@ -275,6 +283,16 @@ key_exchange(server, Version, {dhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, {PublicKey, _}, enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerEDHPSKParams, HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey); +key_exchange(server, Version, {ecdhe_psk, PskIdentityHint, + #'ECPrivateKey'{publicKey = ECPublicKey, + parameters = ECCurve}, + HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> + ServerECDHEPSKParams = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = PskIdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{curve = ECCurve, public = ECPublicKey}}, + enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerECDHEPSKParams, HashSign, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey); + key_exchange(server, Version, {srp, {PublicKey, _}, #srp_user{generator = Generator, prime = Prime, salt = Salt}, @@ -732,6 +750,7 @@ decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> | #client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{} | #client_psk_identity{} | #client_dhe_psk_identity{} + | #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} | #client_rsa_psk_identity{} | #client_srp_public{}. %% @@ -871,9 +890,21 @@ premaster_secret(#server_dhe_psk_params{ LookupFun) -> PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Params), psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{ + public = ECServerPubKey}}, + PrivateEcDhKey, + LookupFun) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ECServerPubKey}, PrivateEcDhKey), + psk_secret(IdentityHint, LookupFun, PremasterSecret); premaster_secret({rsa_psk, PSKIdentity}, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret) -> - psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret). - + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, RSAPremasterSecret); +premaster_secret(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{ + identity = PSKIdentity, + dh_public = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey, PSKLookup) -> + PremasterSecret = premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = PublicEcDhPoint}, PrivateEcDhKey), + psk_secret(PSKIdentity, PSKLookup, PremasterSecret). premaster_secret(#client_dhe_psk_identity{ identity = PSKIdentity, dh_public = PublicDhKey}, PrivateKey, #'DHParameter'{} = Params, PSKLookup) -> @@ -1131,7 +1162,6 @@ select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?rsaEncryption, _) -> select_hashsign_algs(undefined, ?'id-dsa', _) -> {sha, dsa}. - srp_user(#ssl_options{srp_identity = {UserName, _}}) -> #srp{username = UserName}; srp_user(_) -> @@ -1155,23 +1185,22 @@ certificate_types(_, {N, M}) when N >= 3 andalso M >= 3 -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN), ?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>> end; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; - KeyExchange == dh_rsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == rsa; + KeyExchange == dh_rsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; - KeyExchange == dhe_dss; - KeyExchange == srp_dss -> +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; + KeyExchange == dhe_dss; + KeyExchange == srp_dss -> <<?BYTE(?DSS_SIGN)>>; -certificate_types({KeyExchange, _, _, _}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; - KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> +certificate_types(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange}, _) when KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> <<?BYTE(?ECDSA_SIGN)>>; - certificate_types(_, _) -> <<?BYTE(?RSA_SIGN)>>. @@ -1198,7 +1227,6 @@ certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) -> [], CertDbData). %%-------------Handle handshake messages -------------------------------- - validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) -> {fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) -> @@ -1569,6 +1597,18 @@ encode_server_key(#server_dhe_psk_params{ YLen = byte_size(Y), <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary, ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>; +encode_server_key(Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{hint = undefined}) -> + encode_server_key(Params#server_ecdhe_psk_params{hint = <<>>}); +encode_server_key(#server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = PskIdentityHint, + dh_params = #server_ecdh_params{ + curve = {namedCurve, ECCurve}, public = ECPubKey}}) -> + %%TODO: support arbitrary keys + Len = byte_size(PskIdentityHint), + KLen = size(ECPubKey), + <<?UINT16(Len), PskIdentityHint/binary, + ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16((tls_v1:oid_to_enum(ECCurve))), + ?BYTE(KLen), ECPubKey/binary>>; encode_server_key(#server_srp_params{srp_n = N, srp_g = G, srp_s = S, srp_b = B}) -> NLen = byte_size(N), GLen = byte_size(G), @@ -1601,6 +1641,12 @@ encode_client_key(#client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, Len = byte_size(Id), DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic), <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?UINT16(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>; +encode_client_key(Identity = #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) -> + encode_client_key(Identity#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version); +encode_client_key(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DHPublic}, _) -> + Len = byte_size(Id), + DHLen = byte_size(DHPublic), + <<?UINT16(Len), Id/binary, ?BYTE(DHLen), DHPublic/binary>>; encode_client_key(Identity = #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = undefined}, Version) -> encode_client_key(Identity#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = <<"psk_identity">>}, Version); encode_client_key(#client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, exchange_keys = ExchangeKeys}, Version) -> @@ -1721,6 +1767,22 @@ dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, params_bin = BinMsg, hashsign = HashSign, signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(Len), IdentityHint:Len/binary, + ?BYTE(?NAMED_CURVE), ?UINT16(CurveID), + ?BYTE(PointLen), ECPoint:PointLen/binary, + _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, Version) -> + DHParams = #server_ecdh_params{ + curve = {namedCurve, tls_v1:enum_to_oid(CurveID)}, + public = ECPoint}, + Params = #server_ecdhe_psk_params{ + hint = IdentityHint, + dh_params = DHParams}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_server_key_params(Len + 2 + PointLen + 4, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(NLen), N:NLen/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, ?BYTE(SLen), S:SLen/binary, @@ -1756,6 +1818,10 @@ dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, ?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, _) -> #client_dhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y}; +dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, + ?BYTE(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, _) -> + #client_ecdhe_psk_identity{identity = Id, dh_public = DH_Y}; dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(Len), Id:Len/binary, PKEPMS/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, {3, 0}) -> #client_rsa_psk_identity{identity = Id, @@ -1939,6 +2005,8 @@ key_exchange_alg(psk) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK; key_exchange_alg(dhe_psk) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK; +key_exchange_alg(ecdhe_psk) -> + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK; key_exchange_alg(rsa_psk) -> ?KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK; key_exchange_alg(Alg) @@ -1997,23 +2065,23 @@ handle_psk_identity(PSKIdentity, {Fun, UserState}) -> filter_hashsigns([], [], _, Acc) -> lists:reverse(Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_ecdsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa -> do_filter_hashsigns(ecdsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == rsa; KeyExchange == dhe_rsa; KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa; KeyExchange == srp_rsa; KeyExchange == rsa_psk -> do_filter_hashsigns(rsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dhe_dss; KeyExchange == srp_dss -> do_filter_hashsigns(dsa, Suite, Suites, Algos, HashSigns, Acc); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_dss; KeyExchange == dh_rsa; KeyExchange == dh_ecdsa; @@ -2023,12 +2091,13 @@ filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc %% algorithm pair appearing in the hash_sign extension. The names %% DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are historical. filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]); -filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [{KeyExchange,_,_,_} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when +filter_hashsigns([Suite | Suites], [#{key_exchange := KeyExchange} | Algos], HashSigns, Acc) when KeyExchange == dh_anon; KeyExchange == ecdh_anon; KeyExchange == srp_anon; KeyExchange == psk; - KeyExchange == dhe_psk -> + KeyExchange == dhe_psk; + KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk -> %% In this case hashsigns is not used as the kexchange is anonaymous filter_hashsigns(Suites, Algos, HashSigns, [Suite| Acc]). @@ -2167,6 +2236,7 @@ is_acceptable_hash_sign({_, ecdsa} = Algos, ecdsa, ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, Supported is_acceptable_hash_sign(_, _, _, KeyExAlgo, _) when KeyExAlgo == psk; KeyExAlgo == dhe_psk; + KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_psk; KeyExAlgo == srp_anon; KeyExAlgo == dh_anon; KeyExAlgo == ecdhe_anon @@ -2227,15 +2297,17 @@ handle_ecc_point_fmt_extension(_) -> advertises_ec_ciphers([]) -> false; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_ecdsa} | _]) -> + true; +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_ecdsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_ecdsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_rsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdhe_rsa} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_rsa, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([#{key_exchange := ecdh_anon} | _]) -> true; -advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdh_anon, _,_,_} | _]) -> +advertises_ec_ciphers([{ecdhe_psk, _,_,_} | _]) -> true; advertises_ec_ciphers([_| Rest]) -> advertises_ec_ciphers(Rest). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl index 324b7dbde3..a191fcf766 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, 1). -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, 6). -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, 2). +-define(KEY_EXCHANGE_EC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN_PSK, 7). -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, 3). -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, 4). -define(KEY_EXCHANGE_SRP, 5). @@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ dh_params }). +-record(server_ecdhe_psk_params, { + hint, + dh_params + }). + -record(server_srp_params, { srp_n, %% opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1> srp_g, %% opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1> @@ -254,6 +260,11 @@ dh_public }). +-record(client_ecdhe_psk_identity, { + identity, + dh_public + }). + -record(client_rsa_psk_identity, { identity, exchange_keys diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl deleted file mode 100644 index 08947f24dd..0000000000 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_tls_dist_proxy.erl +++ /dev/null @@ -1,479 +0,0 @@ -%% -%% %CopyrightBegin% -%% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2011-2016. All Rights Reserved. -%% -%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); -%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. -%% You may obtain a copy of the License at -%% -%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -%% -%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software -%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, -%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. -%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and -%% limitations under the License. -%% -%% %CopyrightEnd% -%% --module(ssl_tls_dist_proxy). - - --export([listen/2, accept/2, connect/3, get_tcp_address/1]). --export([init/1, start_link/0, handle_call/3, handle_cast/2, handle_info/2, - terminate/2, code_change/3, ssl_options/2]). - --include_lib("kernel/include/net_address.hrl"). - --record(state, - {listen, - accept_loop - }). - --define(PPRE, 4). --define(PPOST, 4). - - -%%==================================================================== -%% Internal application API -%%==================================================================== - -listen(Driver, Name) -> - gen_server:call(?MODULE, {listen, Driver, Name}, infinity). - -accept(Driver, Listen) -> - gen_server:call(?MODULE, {accept, Driver, Listen}, infinity). - -connect(Driver, Ip, Port) -> - gen_server:call(?MODULE, {connect, Driver, Ip, Port}, infinity). - - -do_listen(Options) -> - {First,Last} = case application:get_env(kernel,inet_dist_listen_min) of - {ok,N} when is_integer(N) -> - case application:get_env(kernel, - inet_dist_listen_max) of - {ok,M} when is_integer(M) -> - {N,M}; - _ -> - {N,N} - end; - _ -> - {0,0} - end, - do_listen(First, Last, listen_options([{backlog,128}|Options])). - -do_listen(First,Last,_) when First > Last -> - {error,eaddrinuse}; -do_listen(First,Last,Options) -> - case gen_tcp:listen(First, Options) of - {error, eaddrinuse} -> - do_listen(First+1,Last,Options); - Other -> - Other - end. - -listen_options(Opts0) -> - Opts1 = - case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_use_interface) of - {ok, Ip} -> - [{ip, Ip} | Opts0]; - _ -> - Opts0 - end, - case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_listen_options) of - {ok,ListenOpts} -> - ListenOpts ++ Opts1; - _ -> - Opts1 - end. - -connect_options(Opts) -> - case application:get_env(kernel, inet_dist_connect_options) of - {ok,ConnectOpts} -> - lists:ukeysort(1, ConnectOpts ++ Opts); - _ -> - Opts - end. - -%%==================================================================== -%% gen_server callbacks -%%==================================================================== - -start_link() -> - gen_server:start_link({local, ?MODULE}, ?MODULE, [], []). - -init([]) -> - process_flag(priority, max), - {ok, #state{}}. - -handle_call({listen, Driver, Name}, _From, State) -> - case gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}, {ip, loopback}]) of - {ok, Socket} -> - {ok, World} = do_listen([{active, false}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, {reuseaddr, true}, - Driver:family()]), - {ok, TcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(Socket), - {ok, WorldTcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(World), - {_,Port} = WorldTcpAddress#net_address.address, - ErlEpmd = net_kernel:epmd_module(), - case ErlEpmd:register_node(Name, Port, Driver) of - {ok, Creation} -> - {reply, {ok, {Socket, TcpAddress, Creation}}, - State#state{listen={Socket, World}}}; - {error, _} = Error -> - {reply, Error, State} - end; - Error -> - {reply, Error, State} - end; - -handle_call({accept, _Driver, Listen}, {From, _}, State = #state{listen={_, World}}) -> - Self = self(), - ErtsPid = spawn_link(fun() -> accept_loop(Self, erts, Listen, From) end), - WorldPid = spawn_link(fun() -> accept_loop(Self, world, World, Listen) end), - {reply, ErtsPid, State#state{accept_loop={ErtsPid, WorldPid}}}; - -handle_call({connect, Driver, Ip, Port}, {From, _}, State) -> - Me = self(), - Pid = spawn_link(fun() -> setup_proxy(Driver, Ip, Port, Me) end), - receive - {Pid, go_ahead, LPort} -> - Res = {ok, Socket} = try_connect(LPort), - case gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, From) of - {error, badarg} = Error -> {reply, Error, State}; % From is dead anyway. - ok -> - flush_old_controller(From, Socket), - {reply, Res, State} - end; - {Pid, Error} -> - {reply, Error, State} - end; - -handle_call(_What, _From, State) -> - {reply, ok, State}. - -handle_cast(_What, State) -> - {noreply, State}. - -handle_info(_What, State) -> - {noreply, State}. - -terminate(_Reason, _St) -> - ok. - -code_change(_OldVsn, St, _Extra) -> - {ok, St}. - -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -%%% Internal functions -%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -get_tcp_address(Socket) -> - case inet:sockname(Socket) of - {ok, Address} -> - {ok, Host} = inet:gethostname(), - NetAddress = #net_address{ - address = Address, - host = Host, - protocol = proxy, - family = inet - }, - {ok, NetAddress}; - {error, _} = Error -> Error - end. - -accept_loop(Proxy, erts = Type, Listen, Extra) -> - process_flag(priority, max), - case gen_tcp:accept(Listen) of - {ok, Socket} -> - Extra ! {accept,self(),Socket,inet,proxy}, - receive - {_Kernel, controller, Pid} -> - inet:setopts(Socket, [nodelay()]), - ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), - flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket), - Pid ! {self(), controller}; - {_Kernel, unsupported_protocol} -> - exit(unsupported_protocol) - end; - {error, closed} -> - %% The listening socket is closed: the proxy process is - %% shutting down. Exit normally, to avoid generating a - %% spurious error report. - exit(normal); - Error -> - exit(Error) - end, - accept_loop(Proxy, Type, Listen, Extra); - -accept_loop(Proxy, world = Type, Listen, Extra) -> - process_flag(priority, max), - case gen_tcp:accept(Listen) of - {ok, Socket} -> - Opts = get_ssl_options(server), - wait_for_code_server(), - case ssl:ssl_accept(Socket, Opts) of - {ok, SslSocket} -> - PairHandler = - spawn_link(fun() -> - setup_connection(SslSocket, Extra) - end), - ok = ssl:controlling_process(SslSocket, PairHandler), - flush_old_controller(PairHandler, SslSocket); - {error, {options, _}} = Error -> - %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. Let's log that. - error_logger:error_msg("Cannot accept TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", - [ssl:format_error(Error)]), - gen_tcp:close(Socket); - _ -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket) - end; - Error -> - exit(Error) - end, - accept_loop(Proxy, Type, Listen, Extra). - -wait_for_code_server() -> - %% This is an ugly hack. Upgrading a socket to TLS requires the - %% crypto module to be loaded. Loading the crypto module triggers - %% its on_load function, which calls code:priv_dir/1 to find the - %% directory where its NIF library is. However, distribution is - %% started earlier than the code server, so the code server is not - %% necessarily started yet, and code:priv_dir/1 might fail because - %% of that, if we receive an incoming connection on the - %% distribution port early enough. - %% - %% If the on_load function of a module fails, the module is - %% unloaded, and the function call that triggered loading it fails - %% with 'undef', which is rather confusing. - %% - %% Thus, the ssl_tls_dist_proxy process will terminate, and be - %% restarted by ssl_dist_sup. However, it won't have any memory - %% of being asked by net_kernel to listen for incoming - %% connections. Hence, the node will believe that it's open for - %% distribution, but it actually isn't. - %% - %% So let's avoid that by waiting for the code server to start. - case whereis(code_server) of - undefined -> - timer:sleep(10), - wait_for_code_server(); - Pid when is_pid(Pid) -> - ok - end. - -try_connect(Port) -> - case gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, false}, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]) of - R = {ok, _S} -> - R; - {error, _R} -> - try_connect(Port) - end. - -setup_proxy(Driver, Ip, Port, Parent) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - Opts = connect_options(get_ssl_options(client)), - case ssl:connect(Ip, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay(), - Driver:family()] ++ Opts) of - {ok, World} -> - {ok, ErtsL} = gen_tcp:listen(0, [{active, true}, {ip, loopback}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}]), - {ok, #net_address{address={_,LPort}}} = get_tcp_address(ErtsL), - Parent ! {self(), go_ahead, LPort}, - case gen_tcp:accept(ErtsL) of - {ok, Erts} -> - %% gen_tcp:close(ErtsL), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts); - Err -> - Parent ! {self(), Err} - end; - {error, {options, _}} = Err -> - %% Bad options: that's probably our fault. Let's log that. - error_logger:error_msg("Cannot open TLS distribution connection: ~s~n", - [ssl:format_error(Err)]), - Parent ! {self(), Err}; - Err -> - Parent ! {self(), Err} - end. - - -%% we may not always want the nodelay behaviour -%% %% for performance reasons - -nodelay() -> - case application:get_env(kernel, dist_nodelay) of - undefined -> - {nodelay, true}; - {ok, true} -> - {nodelay, true}; - {ok, false} -> - {nodelay, false}; - _ -> - {nodelay, true} - end. - -setup_connection(World, ErtsListen) -> - process_flag(trap_exit, true), - {ok, TcpAddress} = get_tcp_address(ErtsListen), - {_Addr,Port} = TcpAddress#net_address.address, - {ok, Erts} = gen_tcp:connect({127,0,0,1}, Port, [{active, true}, binary, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]), - ssl:setopts(World, [{active,true}, {packet,?PPRE}, nodelay()]), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts). - -loop_conn_setup(World, Erts) -> - receive - {ssl, World, Data = <<$a, _/binary>>} -> - gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data), - ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]), - inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]), - loop_conn(World, Erts); - {tcp, Erts, Data = <<$a, _/binary>>} -> - ssl:send(World, Data), - ssl:setopts(World, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]), - inet:setopts(Erts, [{packet,?PPOST}, nodelay()]), - loop_conn(World, Erts); - {ssl, World, Data = <<_, _/binary>>} -> - gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts); - {tcp, Erts, Data = <<_, _/binary>>} -> - ssl:send(World, Data), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts); - {ssl, World, Data} -> - gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts); - {tcp, Erts, Data} -> - ssl:send(World, Data), - loop_conn_setup(World, Erts); - {tcp_closed, Erts} -> - ssl:close(World); - {ssl_closed, World} -> - gen_tcp:close(Erts); - {ssl_error, World, _} -> - - ssl:close(World) - end. - -loop_conn(World, Erts) -> - receive - {ssl, World, Data} -> - gen_tcp:send(Erts, Data), - loop_conn(World, Erts); - {tcp, Erts, Data} -> - ssl:send(World, Data), - loop_conn(World, Erts); - {tcp_closed, Erts} -> - ssl:close(World); - {ssl_closed, World} -> - gen_tcp:close(Erts); - {ssl_error, World, _} -> - ssl:close(World) - end. - -get_ssl_options(Type) -> - case init:get_argument(ssl_dist_opt) of - {ok, Args} -> - [{erl_dist, true} | ssl_options(Type, lists:append(Args))]; - _ -> - [{erl_dist, true}] - end. - -ssl_options(_,[]) -> - []; -ssl_options(server, ["client_" ++ _, _Value |T]) -> - ssl_options(server,T); -ssl_options(client, ["server_" ++ _, _Value|T]) -> - ssl_options(client,T); -ssl_options(server, ["server_certfile", Value|T]) -> - [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_certfile", Value | T]) -> - [{certfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> - [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_cacertfile", Value|T]) -> - [{cacertfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_keyfile", Value|T]) -> - [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_keyfile", Value|T]) -> - [{keyfile, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_password", Value|T]) -> - [{password, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_password", Value|T]) -> - [{password, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_verify", Value|T]) -> - [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_verify", Value|T]) -> - [{verify, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> - [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_verify_fun", Value|T]) -> - [{verify_fun, verify_fun(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_check", Value|T]) -> - [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_check", Value|T]) -> - [{crl_check, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> - [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_crl_cache", Value|T]) -> - [{crl_cache, termify(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> - [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_reuse_sessions", Value|T]) -> - [{reuse_sessions, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> - [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_secure_renegotiate", Value|T]) -> - [{secure_renegotiate, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_depth", Value|T]) -> - [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_depth", Value|T]) -> - [{depth, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> - [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_hibernate_after", Value|T]) -> - [{hibernate_after, list_to_integer(Value)} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_ciphers", Value|T]) -> - [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(client, ["client_ciphers", Value|T]) -> - [{ciphers, Value} | ssl_options(client,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_dhfile", Value|T]) -> - [{dhfile, Value} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(server, ["server_fail_if_no_peer_cert", Value|T]) -> - [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, atomize(Value)} | ssl_options(server,T)]; -ssl_options(Type, Opts) -> - error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Type, Opts]). - -atomize(List) when is_list(List) -> - list_to_atom(List); -atomize(Atom) when is_atom(Atom) -> - Atom. - -termify(String) when is_list(String) -> - {ok, Tokens, _} = erl_scan:string(String ++ "."), - {ok, Term} = erl_parse:parse_term(Tokens), - Term. - -verify_fun(Value) -> - case termify(Value) of - {Mod, Func, State} when is_atom(Mod), is_atom(Func) -> - Fun = fun Mod:Func/3, - {Fun, State}; - _ -> - error(malformed_ssl_dist_opt, [Value]) - end. - -flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket) -> - receive - {tcp, Socket, Data} -> - Pid ! {tcp, Socket, Data}, - flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket); - {tcp_closed, Socket} -> - Pid ! {tcp_closed, Socket}, - flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket); - {ssl, Socket, Data} -> - Pid ! {ssl, Socket, Data}, - flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket); - {ssl_closed, Socket} -> - Pid ! {ssl_closed, Socket}, - flush_old_controller(Pid, Socket) - after 0 -> - ok - end. diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl index 23ba2ed7dc..406a095d2e 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ %% gen_statem state functions -export([init/3, error/3, downgrade/3, %% Initiation and take down states hello/3, certify/3, cipher/3, abbreviated/3, %% Handshake states - connection/3]). + connection/3, death_row/3]). %% gen_statem callbacks -export([callback_mode/0, terminate/3, code_change/4, format_status/2]). @@ -141,12 +141,14 @@ next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = end; next_record(#state{protocol_buffers = #protocol_buffers{tls_packets = [], tls_cipher_texts = []}, socket = Socket, + close_tag = CloseTag, transport_cb = Transport} = State) -> case tls_socket:setopts(Transport, Socket, [{active,once}]) of ok -> {no_record, State}; _ -> - {socket_closed, State} + self() ! {CloseTag, Socket}, + {no_record, State} end; next_record(State) -> {no_record, State}. @@ -154,15 +156,10 @@ next_record(State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State) -> next_event(StateName, Record, State, []). -next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, _) -> - ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}, State}; next_event(connection = StateName, no_record, State0, Actions) -> case next_record_if_active(State0) of {no_record, State} -> ssl_connection:hibernate_after(StateName, State, Actions); - {socket_closed, State} -> - next_event(StateName, socket_closed, State, Actions); {#ssl_tls{} = Record, State} -> {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, {protocol_record, Record}} | Actions]}; {#alert{} = Alert, State} -> @@ -431,7 +428,7 @@ init({call, From}, {start, Timeout}, {Record, State} = next_record(State1), next_event(hello, Record, State); init(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec error(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -440,9 +437,10 @@ init(Type, Event, State) -> %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- error({call, From}, {start, _Timeout}, {Error, State}) -> - {stop_and_reply, normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State}; -error({call, From}, Msg, State) -> - handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + ssl_connection:stop_and_reply( + normal, {reply, From, {error, Error}}, State); +error({call, _} = Call, Msg, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Call, Msg, State); error(_, _, _) -> {keep_state_and_data, [postpone]}. @@ -472,13 +470,13 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello, undefined -> CurrentProtocol; _ -> Protocol0 end, - - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, hello, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, - State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, - negotiated_version = Version, - hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, - session = Session, - negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt}, + State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates, + negotiated_version = Version, + hashsign_algorithm = HashSign, + client_hello_version = ClientVersion, + session = Session, + negotiated_protocol = Protocol}) end; hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0, @@ -496,7 +494,7 @@ hello(internal, #server_hello{} = Hello, hello(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); hello(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec abbreviated(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -505,7 +503,7 @@ hello(Type, Event, State) -> abbreviated(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -514,7 +512,7 @@ abbreviated(Type, Event, State) -> certify(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); certify(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> @@ -523,7 +521,7 @@ certify(Type, Event, State) -> cipher(info, Event, State) -> gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); cipher(Type, Event, State) -> - gen_handshake(ssl_connection, ?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec connection(gen_statem:event_type(), @@ -568,6 +566,13 @@ connection(Type, Event, State) -> ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec death_row(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +death_row(Type, Event, State) -> + ssl_connection:death_row(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec downgrade(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> gen_statem:state_function_result(). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -586,9 +591,6 @@ terminate(Reason, StateName, State) -> format_status(Type, Data) -> ssl_connection:format_status(Type, Data). -code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State0, {Direction, From, To}) -> - State = convert_state(State0, Direction, From, To), - {ok, StateName, State}; code_change(_OldVsn, StateName, State, _) -> {ok, StateName, State}. @@ -650,10 +652,7 @@ tls_handshake_events(Packets) -> {next_event, internal, {handshake, Packet}} end, Packets). -handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_call(Event, From, StateName, State, ?MODULE). - -%% raw data from socket, unpack records +%% raw data from socket, upack records handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, #state{data_tag = Protocol} = State0) -> case next_tls_record(Data, State0) of @@ -661,7 +660,7 @@ handle_info({Protocol, _, Data}, StateName, next_event(StateName, Record, State); #alert{} = Alert -> ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(Alert, StateName, State0), - {stop, {shutdown, own_alert}} + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, own_alert}, State0) end; handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, #state{socket = Socket, close_tag = CloseTag, @@ -688,7 +687,7 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, end, ssl_connection:handle_normal_shutdown(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?CLOSE_NOTIFY), StateName, State), - {stop, {shutdown, transport_closed}}; + ssl_connection:stop({shutdown, transport_closed}, State); true -> %% Fixes non-delivery of final TLS record in {active, once}. %% Basically allows the application the opportunity to set {active, once} again @@ -696,11 +695,11 @@ handle_info({CloseTag, Socket}, StateName, next_event(StateName, no_record, State) end; handle_info(Msg, StateName, State) -> - ssl_connection:handle_info(Msg, StateName, State). + ssl_connection:StateName(info, Msg, State, ?MODULE). handle_alerts([], Result) -> Result; -handle_alerts(_, {stop,_} = Stop) -> +handle_alerts(_, {stop, _, _} = Stop) -> Stop; handle_alerts([Alert | Alerts], {next_state, StateName, State}) -> handle_alerts(Alerts, ssl_connection:handle_alert(Alert, StateName, State)); @@ -720,9 +719,9 @@ encode_change_cipher(#change_cipher_spec{}, Version, ConnectionStates) -> decode_alerts(Bin) -> ssl_alert:decode(Bin). -gen_handshake(GenConnection, StateName, Type, Event, +gen_handshake(StateName, Type, Event, #state{negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> - try GenConnection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of + try ssl_connection:StateName(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE) of Result -> Result catch @@ -783,14 +782,3 @@ assert_buffer_sanity(Bin, _) -> throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, malformed_handshake_data)) end. - -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, up, "5.3.5", "5.3.6") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up)}; -convert_state(#state{ssl_options = Options} = State, down, "5.3.6", "5.3.5") -> - State#state{ssl_options = convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down)}. - -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, up) -> - {Head, Tail} = lists:split(5, tuple_to_list(Options)), - list_to_tuple(Head ++ [{partial_chain, fun(_) -> unknown_ca end}] ++ Tail); -convert_options_partial_chain(Options, down) -> - list_to_tuple(proplists:delete(partial_chain, tuple_to_list(Options))). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl index a38c5704a6..d59e817ffb 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ handle_client_hello(Version, no_suite -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY, no_suitable_ciphers); _ -> - {KeyExAlg,_,_,_} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), + #{key_exchange := KeyExAlg} = ssl_cipher:suite_definition(CipherSuite), case ssl_handshake:select_hashsign(ClientHashSigns, Cert, KeyExAlg, SupportedHashSigns, Version) of #alert{} = Alert -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile index aa01552c39..9347b56f39 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/Makefile +++ b/lib/ssl/test/Makefile @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ VSN=$(GS_VSN) MODULES = \ ssl_test_lib \ + ssl_bench_test_lib \ + ssl_dist_test_lib \ ssl_alpn_handshake_SUITE \ ssl_basic_SUITE \ ssl_bench_SUITE \ @@ -44,6 +46,7 @@ MODULES = \ ssl_certificate_verify_SUITE\ ssl_crl_SUITE\ ssl_dist_SUITE \ + ssl_dist_bench_SUITE \ ssl_engine_SUITE\ ssl_handshake_SUITE \ ssl_npn_hello_SUITE \ @@ -62,7 +65,8 @@ MODULES = \ ERL_FILES = $(MODULES:%=%.erl) -HRL_FILES = +HRL_FILES = \ + ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl HRL_FILES_SRC = \ ssl_api.hrl\ diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec index 0ad94e22bc..17b66aef40 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl.spec @@ -3,3 +3,6 @@ ssl_bench_SUITE, [setup_sequential, setup_concurrent, payload_simple, use_pem_cache, bypass_pem_cache], "Benchmarks run separately"}. +{skip_suites, "../ssl_test", + [ssl_dist_bench_SUITE], + "Benchmarks run separately"}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec index d2f75b4203..8b746c5ca9 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench.spec @@ -1 +1 @@ -{suites,"../ssl_test",[ssl_bench_SUITE]}. +{suites,"../ssl_test",[ssl_bench_SUITE, ssl_dist_bench_SUITE]}. diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl index ae2928b1c3..3fe6338d69 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ end_per_group(_GroupName, _Config) -> ok. init_per_suite(Config) -> - try - Server = setup(ssl, node()), - [{server_node, Server}|Config] - catch _:_ -> - {skipped, "Benchmark machines only"} + case node() of + nonode@nohost -> + {skipped, "Node not distributed"}; + _ -> + [{server_node, ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(perf_server)}|Config] end. end_per_suite(_Config) -> @@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ bypass_pem_cache(_Config) -> ssl() -> - test(ssl, ?COUNT, node()). + test(ssl, ?COUNT). -test(Type, Count, Host) -> - Server = setup(Type, Host), +test(Type, Count) -> + Server = ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(perf_server), (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count * 20, 1, Server)), (do_test(Type, setup_connection, Count, 100, Server)), (do_test(Type, payload, Count*300, 10, Server)), @@ -294,47 +294,6 @@ msg() -> "asdlkjsafsdfoierwlejsdlkfjsdf">>. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -setup(_Type, nonode@nohost) -> - exit(dist_not_enabled); -setup(Type, _This) -> - Host = case os:getenv(?remote_host) of - false -> - {ok, This} = inet:gethostname(), - This; - RemHost -> - RemHost - end, - Node = list_to_atom("perf_server@" ++ Host), - SlaveArgs = case init:get_argument(pa) of - {ok, PaPaths} -> - lists:append([" -pa " ++ P || [P] <- PaPaths]); - _ -> [] - end, - %% io:format("Slave args: ~p~n",[SlaveArgs]), - Prog = - case os:find_executable("erl") of - false -> "erl"; - P -> P - end, - io:format("Prog = ~p~n", [Prog]), - - case net_adm:ping(Node) of - pong -> ok; - pang -> - {ok, Node} = slave:start(Host, perf_server, SlaveArgs, no_link, Prog) - end, - Path = code:get_path(), - true = rpc:call(Node, code, set_path, [Path]), - ok = rpc:call(Node, ?MODULE, setup_server, [Type, node()]), - io:format("Client (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), - (Node =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(client), - Node. - -setup_server(_Type, ClientNode) -> - (ClientNode =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(server), - io:format("Server (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), - ok. - ensure_all_started(App, Ack) -> case application:start(App) of @@ -358,13 +317,6 @@ setup_server_init(Type, Tc, Loop, PC) -> unlink(Pid), Res. -restrict_schedulers(Type) -> - %% We expect this to run on 8 core machine - Extra0 = 1, - Extra = if (Type =:= server) -> -Extra0; true -> Extra0 end, - Scheds = erlang:system_info(schedulers), - erlang:system_flag(schedulers_online, (Scheds div 2) + Extra). - tc(Fun, Mod, Line) -> case timer:tc(Fun) of {_,{'EXIT',Reason}} -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e5cbb911bd --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_bench_test_lib.erl @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +-module(ssl_bench_test_lib). + +%% API +-export([setup/1]). + +%% Internal exports +-export([setup_server/1]). + +-define(remote_host, "NETMARKS_REMOTE_HOST"). + +setup(Name) -> + Host = case os:getenv(?remote_host) of + false -> + {ok, This} = inet:gethostname(), + This; + RemHost -> + RemHost + end, + Node = list_to_atom(atom_to_list(Name) ++ "@" ++ Host), + SlaveArgs = case init:get_argument(pa) of + {ok, PaPaths} -> + lists:append([" -pa " ++ P || [P] <- PaPaths]); + _ -> [] + end, + %% io:format("Slave args: ~p~n",[SlaveArgs]), + Prog = + case os:find_executable("erl") of + false -> "erl"; + P -> P + end, + io:format("Prog = ~p~n", [Prog]), + + case net_adm:ping(Node) of + pong -> ok; + pang -> + {ok, Node} = + slave:start(Host, Name, SlaveArgs, no_link, Prog) + end, + Path = code:get_path(), + true = rpc:call(Node, code, set_path, [Path]), + ok = rpc:call(Node, ?MODULE, setup_server, [node()]), + io:format("Client (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), + (Node =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(client), + Node. + +setup_server(ClientNode) -> + (ClientNode =:= node()) andalso restrict_schedulers(server), + io:format("Server (~p) using ~s~n",[node(), code:which(ssl)]), + ok. + +restrict_schedulers(Type) -> + %% We expect this to run on 8 core machine + Extra0 = 1, + Extra = if (Type =:= server) -> -Extra0; true -> Extra0 end, + Scheds = erlang:system_info(schedulers), + erlang:system_flag(schedulers_online, (Scheds div 2) + Extra). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl index 8740e8c8f0..c822a52d1f 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_SUITE.erl @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ %% %% %CopyrightBegin% %% -%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2016. All Rights Reserved. +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2017. All Rights Reserved. %% %% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); %% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ -include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). -include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include("ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl"). %% Note: This directive should only be used in test suites. -compile(export_all). @@ -30,12 +31,12 @@ -define(AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT, 30000). --record(node_handle, - {connection_handler, - socket, - name, - nodename} - ). +-import(ssl_dist_test_lib, + [tstsrvr_format/2, send_to_tstcntrl/1, + apply_on_ssl_node/4, apply_on_ssl_node/2, + stop_ssl_node/1]). +start_ssl_node_name(Name, Args) -> + ssl_dist_test_lib:start_ssl_node(Name, Args). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- %% Common Test interface functions ----------------------------------- @@ -140,11 +141,14 @@ basic_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> apply_on_ssl_node( NH1, fun () -> - tstsrvr_format("Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), - send_to_tstcntrl({Ref, self()}), + tstsrvr_format( + "Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), + send_to_tstcntrl( + {Ref, self()}), receive {From, ping} -> - tstsrvr_format("Received ping ~p!~n", [node()]), + tstsrvr_format( + "Received ping ~p!~n", [node()]), From ! {self(), pong} end end) @@ -154,7 +158,8 @@ basic_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> ok = apply_on_ssl_node( NH2, fun () -> - tstsrvr_format("Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), + tstsrvr_format( + "Hi from ~p!~n", [node()]), SslPid ! {self(), ping}, receive {SslPid, pong} -> @@ -183,7 +188,8 @@ payload_test(NH1, NH2, _) -> apply_on_ssl_node( NH1, fun () -> - send_to_tstcntrl({Ref, self()}), + send_to_tstcntrl( + {Ref, self()}), receive {From, Msg} -> From ! {self(), Msg} @@ -616,12 +622,6 @@ gen_dist_test(Test, Config) -> %% ssl_node side api %% -tstsrvr_format(Fmt, ArgList) -> - send_to_tstsrvr({format, Fmt, ArgList}). - -send_to_tstcntrl(Message) -> - send_to_tstsrvr({message, Message}). - try_setting_priority(TestFun, Config) -> Prio = 1, case gen_udp:open(0, [{priority,Prio}]) of @@ -653,44 +653,6 @@ inet_ports() -> %% test_server side api %% -apply_on_ssl_node(Node, M, F, A) when is_atom(M), is_atom(F), is_list(A) -> - Ref = make_ref(), - send_to_ssl_node(Node, {apply, self(), Ref, M, F, A}), - receive - {Ref, Result} -> - Result - end. - -apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Fun) when is_function(Fun, 0) -> - Ref = make_ref(), - send_to_ssl_node(Node, {apply, self(), Ref, Fun}), - receive - {Ref, Result} -> - Result - end. - -stop_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Handler, - socket = Socket, - name = Name}) -> - ?t:format("Trying to stop ssl node ~s.~n", [Name]), - Mon = erlang:monitor(process, Handler), - unlink(Handler), - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(stop)) of - ok -> - receive - {'DOWN', Mon, process, Handler, Reason} -> - case Reason of - normal -> - ok; - _ -> - ct:pal("Down ~p ~n", [Reason]) - end - end; - Error -> - erlang:demonitor(Mon, [flush]), - ct:pal("Warning ~p ~n", [Error]) - end. - start_ssl_node(Config) -> start_ssl_node(Config, ""). @@ -698,29 +660,8 @@ start_ssl_node(Config, XArgs) -> Name = mk_node_name(Config), SSL = proplists:get_value(ssl_opts, Config), SSLDistOpts = setup_dist_opts(Config), - start_ssl_node_raw(Name, SSL ++ " " ++ SSLDistOpts ++ XArgs). - -start_ssl_node_raw(Name, Args) -> - {ok, LSock} = gen_tcp:listen(0, - [binary, {packet, 4}, {active, false}]), - {ok, ListenPort} = inet:port(LSock), - CmdLine = mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args), - ?t:format("Attempting to start ssl node ~ts: ~ts~n", [Name, CmdLine]), - case open_port({spawn, CmdLine}, []) of - Port when is_port(Port) -> - unlink(Port), - erlang:port_close(Port), - case await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) of - #node_handle{} = NodeHandle -> - ?t:format("Ssl node ~s started.~n", [Name]), - NodeName = list_to_atom(Name ++ "@" ++ host_name()), - NodeHandle#node_handle{nodename = NodeName}; - Error -> - exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) - end; - Error -> - exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) - end. + start_ssl_node_name( + Name, SSL ++ " " ++ SSLDistOpts ++ XArgs). cache_crls_on_ssl_nodes(PrivDir, CANames, NHs) -> [begin @@ -739,11 +680,6 @@ cache_crls_on_ssl_nodes(PrivDir, CANames, NHs) -> %% command line creation %% -host_name() -> - [$@ | Host] = lists:dropwhile(fun ($@) -> false; (_) -> true end, - atom_to_list(node())), - Host. - mk_node_name(Config) -> N = erlang:unique_integer([positive]), Case = proplists:get_value(testcase, Config), @@ -753,225 +689,6 @@ mk_node_name(Config) -> ++ "_" ++ integer_to_list(N). -mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args) -> - Static = "-detached -noinput", - Pa = filename:dirname(code:which(?MODULE)), - Prog = case catch init:get_argument(progname) of - {ok,[[P]]} -> P; - _ -> exit(no_progname_argument_found) - end, - NameSw = case net_kernel:longnames() of - false -> "-sname "; - _ -> "-name " - end, - {ok, Pwd} = file:get_cwd(), - "\"" ++ Prog ++ "\" " - ++ Static ++ " " - ++ NameSw ++ " " ++ Name ++ " " - ++ "-pa " ++ Pa ++ " " - ++ "-run application start crypto -run application start public_key " - ++ "-eval 'net_kernel:verbose(1)' " - ++ "-run " ++ atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ " cnct2tstsrvr " - ++ host_name() ++ " " - ++ integer_to_list(ListenPort) ++ " " - ++ Args ++ " " - ++ "-env ERL_CRASH_DUMP " ++ Pwd ++ "/erl_crash_dump." ++ Name ++ " " - ++ "-kernel error_logger \"{file,\\\"" ++ Pwd ++ "/error_log." ++ Name ++ "\\\"}\" " - ++ "-setcookie " ++ atom_to_list(erlang:get_cookie()). - -%% -%% Connection handler test_server side -%% - -await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) -> - case gen_tcp:accept(LSock, ?AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT) of - timeout -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - ?t:format("Timeout waiting for ssl node ~s to come up~n", - [Name]), - timeout; - {ok, Socket} -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - case gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0) of - {ok, Bin} -> - check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin); - {error, closed} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node_before_up, Name}) - end; - {error, Error} -> - gen_tcp:close(LSock), - exit({accept_failed, Error}) - end. - -check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin) -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); - {ssl_node_up, NodeName} -> - case list_to_atom(Name++"@"++host_name()) of - NodeName -> - Parent = self(), - Go = make_ref(), - %% Spawn connection handler on test server side - Pid = spawn_link( - fun () -> - receive Go -> ok end, - tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) - end), - ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), - Pid ! Go, - #node_handle{connection_handler = Pid, - socket = Socket, - name = Name}; - _ -> - exit({unexpected_ssl_node_connected, NodeName}) - end; - Msg -> - exit({unexpected_msg_instead_of_ssl_node_up, Name, Msg}) - end. - -send_to_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr}, Term) -> - Hndlr ! {relay_to_ssl_node, term_to_binary(Term)}, - ok. - -tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) -> - inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), - receive - {relay_to_ssl_node, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of - ok -> - ok; - _Error -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({failed_to_relay_data_to_ssl_node, Name, Data}) - end; - {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); - {format, FmtStr, ArgList} -> - ?t:format(FmtStr, ArgList); - {message, Msg} -> - ?t:format("Got message ~p", [Msg]), - Parent ! Msg; - {apply_res, To, Ref, Res} -> - To ! {Ref, Res}; - bye -> - ?t:format("Ssl node ~s stopped.~n", [Name]), - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit(normal); - Unknown -> - exit({unexpected_message_from_ssl_node, Name, Unknown}) - end; - {tcp_closed, Socket} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node, Name}) - end, - tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent). - -%% -%% Connection handler ssl_node side -%% - -% cnct2tstsrvr() is called via command line arg -run ... -cnct2tstsrvr([Host, Port]) when is_list(Host), is_list(Port) -> - %% Spawn connection handler on ssl node side - ConnHandler - = spawn(fun () -> - case catch gen_tcp:connect(Host, - list_to_integer(Port), - [binary, - {packet, 4}, - {active, false}]) of - {ok, Socket} -> - notify_ssl_node_up(Socket), - ets:new(test_server_info, - [set, - public, - named_table, - {keypos, 1}]), - ets:insert(test_server_info, - {test_server_handler, self()}), - ssl_node_con_loop(Socket); - Error -> - halt("Failed to connect to test server " ++ - lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Host:~p ~n Port:~p~n Error:~p~n", - [Host, Port, Error]))) - end - end), - spawn(fun () -> - Mon = erlang:monitor(process, ConnHandler), - receive - {'DOWN', Mon, process, ConnHandler, Reason} -> - receive after 1000 -> ok end, - halt("test server connection handler terminated: " ++ - lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~p", [Reason]))) - end - end). - -notify_ssl_node_up(Socket) -> - case catch gen_tcp:send(Socket, - term_to_binary({ssl_node_up, node()})) of - ok -> ok; - _ -> halt("Failed to notify test server that I'm up") - end. - -send_to_tstsrvr(Term) -> - case catch ets:lookup_element(test_server_info, test_server_handler, 2) of - Hndlr when is_pid(Hndlr) -> - Hndlr ! {relay_to_test_server, term_to_binary(Term)}, ok; - _ -> - receive after 200 -> ok end, - send_to_tstsrvr(Term) - end. - -ssl_node_con_loop(Socket) -> - inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), - receive - {relay_to_test_server, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> - case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of - ok -> - ok; - _Error -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - halt("Failed to relay data to test server") - end; - {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> - case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of - {'EXIT', _} -> - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - halt("test server sent me bad data"); - {apply, From, Ref, M, F, A} -> - spawn_link( - fun () -> - send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, - From, - Ref, - (catch apply(M, F, A))}) - end); - {apply, From, Ref, Fun} -> - spawn_link(fun () -> - send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, - From, - Ref, - (catch Fun())}) - end); - stop -> - gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(bye)), - gen_tcp:close(Socket), - init:stop(), - receive after infinity -> ok end; - _Unknown -> - halt("test server sent me an unexpected message") - end; - {tcp_closed, Socket} -> - halt("Lost connection to test server") - end, - ssl_node_con_loop(Socket). - %% %% Setup ssl dist info %% diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d27564319 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_bench_SUITE.erl @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% +-module(ssl_dist_bench_SUITE). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct_event.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). + +%% CT meta +-export([suite/0, all/0, groups/0, + init_per_suite/1, end_per_suite/1, + init_per_group/2, end_per_group/2, + init_per_testcase/2, end_per_testcase/2]). + +%% Test cases +-export( + [setup/1, + roundtrip/1, + throughput_1024/1, + throughput_4096/1, + throughput_16384/1, + throughput_65536/1, + throughput_262144/1, + throughput_1048576/1]). + +%% Debug +-export([payload/1]). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- + +suite() -> [{ct_hooks, [{ts_install_cth, [{nodenames, 2}]}]}]. + +all() -> [{group, ssl}, {group, plain}]. + +groups() -> + [{ssl, all_groups()}, + {plain, all_groups()}, + %% + {setup, [{repeat, 1}], [setup]}, + {roundtrip, [{repeat, 1}], [roundtrip]}, + {throughput, [{repeat, 1}], + [throughput_1024, + throughput_4096, + throughput_16384, + throughput_65536, + throughput_262144, + throughput_1048576]}]. + +all_groups() -> + [{group, setup}, + {group, roundtrip}, + {group, throughput}]. + +init_per_suite(Config) -> + Digest = sha1, + ECCurve = secp521r1, + TLSVersion = 'tlsv1.2', + TLSCipher = {ecdhe_ecdsa,aes_128_cbc,sha256,sha256}, + %% + Node = node(), + try + Node =/= nonode@nohost orelse + throw({skipped,"Node not distributed"}), + {supported, SSLVersions} = + lists:keyfind(supported, 1, ssl:versions()), + lists:member(TLSVersion, SSLVersions) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(TLSVersion)}), + lists:member(ECCurve, ssl:eccs(TLSVersion)) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(ECCurve)}), + lists:member(TLSCipher, ssl:cipher_suites()) orelse + throw( + {skipped, + "SSL does not support " ++ term_to_string(TLSCipher)}) + of + _ -> + PrivDir = proplists:get_value(priv_dir, Config), + %% + [_, HostA] = string:split(atom_to_list(Node), "@"), + NodeAName = ?MODULE_STRING ++ "_node_a", + NodeAString = NodeAName ++ "@" ++ HostA, + NodeAConfFile = filename:join(PrivDir, NodeAString ++ ".conf"), + NodeA = list_to_atom(NodeAString), + %% + ServerNode = ssl_bench_test_lib:setup(dist_server), + [_, HostB] = string:split(atom_to_list(ServerNode), "@"), + NodeBName = ?MODULE_STRING ++ "_node_b", + NodeBString = NodeBName ++ "@" ++ HostB, + NodeBConfFile = filename:join(PrivDir, NodeBString ++ ".conf"), + NodeB = list_to_atom(NodeBString), + %% + CertOptions = + [{digest, Digest}, + {key, {namedCurve, ECCurve}}], + RootCert = + public_key:pkix_test_root_cert( + ?MODULE_STRING ++ " ROOT CA", CertOptions), + SSLConf = + [{verify, verify_peer}, + {versions, [TLSVersion]}, + {ciphers, [TLSCipher]}], + %% + write_node_conf( + NodeAConfFile, NodeA, + [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true} | SSLConf], SSLConf, + CertOptions, RootCert), + write_node_conf( + NodeBConfFile, NodeB, + [{fail_if_no_peer_cert, true} | SSLConf], SSLConf, + CertOptions, RootCert), + %% + [{node_a_name, NodeAName}, + {node_a, NodeA}, + {node_a_dist_args, + "-proto_dist inet_tls " + "-ssl_dist_optfile " ++ NodeAConfFile ++ " "}, + {node_b_name, NodeBName}, + {node_b, NodeB}, + {node_b_dist_args, + "-proto_dist inet_tls " + "-ssl_dist_optfile " ++ NodeBConfFile ++ " "}, + {server_node, ServerNode} + |Config] + catch + throw:Result -> + Result + end. + +end_per_suite(Config) -> + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + slave:stop(ServerNode). + +init_per_group(ssl, Config) -> + [{ssl_dist, true}, {ssl_dist_prefix, "SSL"}|Config]; +init_per_group(plain, Config) -> + [{ssl_dist, false}, {ssl_dist_prefix, "Plain"}|Config]; +init_per_group(_GroupName, Config) -> + Config. + +end_per_group(_GroupName, _Config) -> + ok. + +init_per_testcase(_Func, Conf) -> + Conf. + +end_per_testcase(_Func, _Conf) -> + ok. + +-define(COUNT, 400). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% CommonTest API helpers + +write_node_conf( + ConfFile, Node, ServerConf, ClientConf, CertOptions, RootCert) -> + Conf = + public_key:pkix_test_data( + #{root => RootCert, + peer => + [{extensions, + [#'Extension'{ + extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName', + extnValue = [{dNSName, atom_to_list(Node)}], + critical = false}]} | CertOptions]}), + NodeConf = + [{server, ServerConf ++ Conf}, {client, ClientConf ++ Conf}], + {ok, Fd} = file:open(ConfFile, [write]), + ok = file:change_mode(ConfFile, 8#400), + io:format(Fd, "~p.~n", [NodeConf]), + ok = file:close(Fd). + + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Test cases + +%%----------------------- +%% Connection setup speed + +setup(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test(fun setup/5, Config). + +setup(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + Rounds = 10, + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + {SetupTime, CycleTime} = + ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> setup_runner(A, B, Rounds) end), + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + SetupSpeed = round((Rounds*1000000*1000) / SetupTime), + CycleSpeed = round((Rounds*1000000*1000) / CycleTime), + _ = report(Prefix++" Setup", SetupSpeed, "setups/1000s"), + report(Prefix++" Setup Cycle", CycleSpeed, "cycles/1000s"). + +%% Runs on node A against rex in node B +setup_runner(A, B, Rounds) -> + StartTime = start_time(), + SetupTime = setup_loop(A, B, 0, Rounds), + {microseconds(SetupTime), microseconds(elapsed_time(StartTime))}. + +setup_loop(_A, _B, T, 0) -> + T; +setup_loop(A, B, T, N) -> + StartTime = start_time(), + [A] = rpc:block_call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = elapsed_time(StartTime), + [B] = erlang:nodes(), + Mref = erlang:monitor(process, {rex,B}), + true = net_kernel:disconnect(B), + receive + {'DOWN',Mref,process,_,_} -> + [] = erlang:nodes(), + setup_loop(A, B, Time + T, N - 1) + end. + + +%%---------------- +%% Roundtrip speed + +roundtrip(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test(fun roundtrip/5, Config). + +roundtrip(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + Rounds = 40000, + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> roundtrip_runner(A, B, Rounds) end), + [B] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [A] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Speed = round((Rounds*1000000) / Time), + report(Prefix++" Roundtrip", Speed, "pings/s"). + +%% Runs on node A and spawns a server on node B +roundtrip_runner(A, B, Rounds) -> + ClientPid = self(), + [A] = rpc:call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + ServerPid = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun () -> roundtrip_server(ClientPid, Rounds) end), + ServerMon = erlang:monitor(process, ServerPid), + microseconds( + roundtrip_client(ServerPid, ServerMon, start_time(), Rounds)). + +roundtrip_server(_Pid, 0) -> + ok; +roundtrip_server(Pid, N) -> + receive + N -> + Pid ! N, + roundtrip_server(Pid, N-1) + end. + +roundtrip_client(_Pid, Mon, StartTime, 0) -> + Time = elapsed_time(StartTime), + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, normal} -> + Time; + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, Other} -> + exit(Other) + end; +roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N) -> + Pid ! N, + receive + N -> + roundtrip_client(Pid, Mon, StartTime, N - 1) + end. + + +%%----------------- +%% Throughput speed + +throughput_1024(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 100000, 1024) + end, Config). + +throughput_4096(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 50000, 4096) + end, Config). + +throughput_16384(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 10000, 16384) + end, Config). + +throughput_65536(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 2000, 65536) + end, Config). + +throughput_262144(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 500, 262144) + end, Config). + +throughput_1048576(Config) -> + run_nodepair_test( + fun (A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) -> + throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, 200, 1048576) + end, Config). + +throughput(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB, Packets, Size) -> + [] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Time = + ssl_apply(HA, fun () -> throughput_runner(A, B, Packets, Size) end), + [B] = ssl_apply(HA, erlang, nodes, []), + [A] = ssl_apply(HB, erlang, nodes, []), + Speed = round((Packets*Size*1000000) / (1024*Time)), + report(Prefix++" Throughput_"++integer_to_list(Size), Speed, "kB/s"). + +%% Runs on node A and spawns a server on node B +throughput_runner(A, B, Rounds, Size) -> + Payload = payload(Size), + ClientPid = self(), + [A] = rpc:call(B, erlang, nodes, []), + ServerPid = + erlang:spawn( + B, + fun () -> throughput_server(ClientPid, Rounds) end), + ServerMon = erlang:monitor(process, ServerPid), + microseconds( + throughput_client( + ServerPid, ServerMon, Payload, start_time(), Rounds)). + +throughput_server(_Pid, 0) -> + ok; +throughput_server(Pid, N) -> + receive + [N|_] -> + throughput_server(Pid, N-1) + end. + +throughput_client(_Pid, Mon, _Payload, StartTime, 0) -> + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, normal} -> + elapsed_time(StartTime); + {'DOWN', Mon, _, _, Other} -> + exit(Other) + end; +throughput_client(Pid, Mon, Payload, StartTime, N) -> + Pid ! [N|Payload], + throughput_client(Pid, Mon, Payload, StartTime, N - 1). + +%%%------------------------------------------------------------------- +%%% Test cases helpers + +run_nodepair_test(TestFun, Config) -> + A = proplists:get_value(node_a, Config), + B = proplists:get_value(node_b, Config), + Prefix = proplists:get_value(ssl_dist_prefix, Config), + HA = start_ssl_node_a(Config), + HB = start_ssl_node_b(Config), + try TestFun(A, B, Prefix, HA, HB) + after + stop_ssl_node_a(HA), + stop_ssl_node_b(HB, Config), + ok + end. + +ssl_apply(Handle, M, F, Args) -> + case ssl_dist_test_lib:apply_on_ssl_node(Handle, M, F, Args) of + {'EXIT',Reason} -> + error(Reason); + Result -> + Result + end. + +ssl_apply(Handle, Fun) -> + case ssl_dist_test_lib:apply_on_ssl_node(Handle, Fun) of + {'EXIT',Reason} -> + error(Reason); + Result -> + Result + end. + +start_ssl_node_a(Config) -> + Name = proplists:get_value(node_a_name, Config), + Args = get_node_args(node_a_dist_args, Config), + ssl_dist_test_lib:start_ssl_node(Name, Args). + +start_ssl_node_b(Config) -> + Name = proplists:get_value(node_b_name, Config), + Args = get_node_args(node_b_dist_args, Config), + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + rpc:call( + ServerNode, ssl_dist_test_lib, start_ssl_node, [Name, Args]). + +stop_ssl_node_a(HA) -> + ssl_dist_test_lib:stop_ssl_node(HA). + +stop_ssl_node_b(HB, Config) -> + ServerNode = proplists:get_value(server_node, Config), + rpc:call(ServerNode, ssl_dist_test_lib, stop_ssl_node, [HB]). + +get_node_args(Tag, Config) -> + case proplists:get_value(ssl_dist, Config) of + true -> + proplists:get_value(Tag, Config); + false -> + "" + end. + + + +payload(Size) -> + iolist_to_binary( + [case Size bsr 8 of + 0 -> + []; + Blocks -> + payload(Blocks, create_binary(256)) + end | create_binary(Size band 255)]). +%% +payload(0, _) -> + []; +payload(Blocks, Block) -> + Half = payload(Blocks bsr 1, Block), + [Half, Half | + if + Blocks band 1 =:= 1 -> + Block; + true -> + [] + end]. + +create_binary(Size) -> + create_binary(Size, <<>>). +%% +create_binary(0, Bin) -> + Bin; +create_binary(Size, Bin) -> + NextSize = Size - 1, + create_binary(NextSize, <<Bin/binary, NextSize>>). + +start_time() -> + erlang:system_time(). + +elapsed_time(StartTime) -> + erlang:system_time() - StartTime. + +microseconds(Time) -> + erlang:convert_time_unit(Time, native, microsecond). + +report(Name, Value, Unit) -> + ct:pal("~s: ~w ~s", [Name, Value, Unit]), + ct_event:notify( + #event{ + name = benchmark_data, + data = [{value, Value}, {suite, "ssl_dist"}, {name, Name}]}), + {comment, term_to_string(Value) ++ " " ++ Unit}. + +term_to_string(Term) -> + unicode:characters_to_list( + io_lib:write(Term, [{encoding, unicode}])). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1b9c853fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.erl @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-module(ssl_dist_test_lib). + +-include_lib("common_test/include/ct.hrl"). +-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). +-include("ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl"). + +-export([tstsrvr_format/2, send_to_tstcntrl/1]). +-export([apply_on_ssl_node/4, apply_on_ssl_node/2]). +-export([stop_ssl_node/1, start_ssl_node/2]). +%% +-export([cnct2tstsrvr/1]). + +-define(AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT, 30000). + + + +%% ssl_node side api +%% + +tstsrvr_format(Fmt, ArgList) -> + send_to_tstsrvr({format, Fmt, ArgList}). + +send_to_tstcntrl(Message) -> + send_to_tstsrvr({message, Message}). + + +%% +%% test_server side api +%% + +apply_on_ssl_node( + #node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr} = Node, + M, F, A) when is_atom(M), is_atom(F), is_list(A) -> + Ref = erlang:monitor(process, Hndlr), + apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, {apply, self(), Ref, M, F, A}). + +apply_on_ssl_node( + #node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr} = Node, + Fun) when is_function(Fun, 0) -> + Ref = erlang:monitor(process, Hndlr), + apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, {apply, self(), Ref, Fun}). + +apply_on_ssl_node(Node, Ref, Msg) -> + send_to_ssl_node(Node, Msg), + receive + {'DOWN', Ref, process, Hndlr, Reason} -> + exit({handler_died, Hndlr, Reason}); + {Ref, Result} -> + Result + end. + +stop_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Handler, + socket = Socket, + name = Name}) -> + ?t:format("Trying to stop ssl node ~s.~n", [Name]), + Mon = erlang:monitor(process, Handler), + unlink(Handler), + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(stop)) of + ok -> + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, process, Handler, Reason} -> + case Reason of + normal -> + ok; + _ -> + ct:pal( + "stop_ssl_node/1 ~s Down ~p ~n", + [Name,Reason]) + end + end; + Error -> + erlang:demonitor(Mon, [flush]), + ct:pal("stop_ssl_node/1 ~s Warning ~p ~n", [Name,Error]) + end. + +start_ssl_node(Name, Args) -> + {ok, LSock} = gen_tcp:listen(0, + [binary, {packet, 4}, {active, false}]), + {ok, ListenPort} = inet:port(LSock), + CmdLine = mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args), + ?t:format("Attempting to start ssl node ~ts: ~ts~n", [Name, CmdLine]), + case open_port({spawn, CmdLine}, []) of + Port when is_port(Port) -> + unlink(Port), + erlang:port_close(Port), + case await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) of + #node_handle{} = NodeHandle -> + ?t:format("Ssl node ~s started.~n", [Name]), + NodeName = list_to_atom(Name ++ "@" ++ host_name()), + NodeHandle#node_handle{nodename = NodeName}; + Error -> + exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) + end; + Error -> + exit({failed_to_start_node, Name, Error}) + end. + +host_name() -> + [_, Host] = string:split(atom_to_list(node()), "@"), + %% [$@ | Host] = lists:dropwhile(fun ($@) -> false; (_) -> true end, + %% atom_to_list(node())), + Host. + +mk_node_cmdline(ListenPort, Name, Args) -> + Static = "-detached -noinput", + Pa = filename:dirname(code:which(?MODULE)), + Prog = case catch init:get_argument(progname) of + {ok,[[P]]} -> P; + _ -> exit(no_progname_argument_found) + end, + NameSw = case net_kernel:longnames() of + false -> "-sname "; + _ -> "-name " + end, + {ok, Pwd} = file:get_cwd(), + "\"" ++ Prog ++ "\" " + ++ Static ++ " " + ++ NameSw ++ " " ++ Name ++ " " + ++ "-pa " ++ Pa ++ " " + ++ "-run application start crypto -run application start public_key " + ++ "-eval 'net_kernel:verbose(1)' " + ++ "-run " ++ atom_to_list(?MODULE) ++ " cnct2tstsrvr " + ++ host_name() ++ " " + ++ integer_to_list(ListenPort) ++ " " + ++ Args ++ " " + ++ "-env ERL_CRASH_DUMP " ++ Pwd ++ "/erl_crash_dump." ++ Name ++ " " + ++ "-kernel error_logger \"{file,\\\"" ++ Pwd ++ "/error_log." ++ Name ++ "\\\"}\" " + ++ "-setcookie " ++ atom_to_list(erlang:get_cookie()). + +%% +%% Connection handler test_server side +%% + +await_ssl_node_up(Name, LSock) -> + case gen_tcp:accept(LSock, ?AWAIT_SSL_NODE_UP_TIMEOUT) of + {ok, Socket} -> + gen_tcp:close(LSock), + case gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0) of + {ok, Bin} -> + check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin); + {error, closed} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node_before_up, Name}) + end; + {error, Error} -> + gen_tcp:close(LSock), + ?t:format("Accept failed for ssl node ~s: ~p~n", [Name,Error]), + exit({accept_failed, Error}) + end. + +check_ssl_node_up(Socket, Name, Bin) -> + case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of + {'EXIT', _} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}); + {ssl_node_up, NodeName} -> + case list_to_atom(Name++"@"++host_name()) of + NodeName -> + Parent = self(), + Go = make_ref(), + %% Spawn connection handler on test server side + Pid = spawn_link( + fun () -> + receive Go -> ok end, + process_flag(trap_exit, true), + tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) + end), + ok = gen_tcp:controlling_process(Socket, Pid), + Pid ! Go, + #node_handle{connection_handler = Pid, + socket = Socket, + name = Name}; + _ -> + exit({unexpected_ssl_node_connected, NodeName}) + end; + Msg -> + exit({unexpected_msg_instead_of_ssl_node_up, Name, Msg}) + end. + +send_to_ssl_node(#node_handle{connection_handler = Hndlr}, Term) -> + Hndlr ! {relay_to_ssl_node, term_to_binary(Term)}, + ok. + +tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent) -> + ok = inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), + receive + {relay_to_ssl_node, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of + ok -> + ok; + _Error -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({failed_to_relay_data_to_ssl_node, Name, Data}) + end; + {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> + try binary_to_term(Bin) of + {format, FmtStr, ArgList} -> + ?t:format(FmtStr, ArgList); + {message, Msg} -> + ?t:format("Got message ~p", [Msg]), + Parent ! Msg; + {apply_res, To, Ref, Res} -> + To ! {Ref, Res}; + bye -> + {error, closed} = gen_tcp:recv(Socket, 0), + ?t:format("Ssl node ~s stopped.~n", [Name]), + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit(normal); + Unknown -> + exit({unexpected_message_from_ssl_node, Name, Unknown}) + catch + error : _ -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({bad_data_received_from_ssl_node, Name, Bin}) + end; + {tcp_closed, Socket} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + exit({lost_connection_with_ssl_node, Name}); + {'EXIT', Parent, Reason} -> + exit({'EXIT', parent, Reason}); + Unknown -> + exit({unknown, Unknown}) + end, + tstsrvr_con_loop(Name, Socket, Parent). + +%% +%% Connection handler ssl_node side +%% + +% cnct2tstsrvr() is called via command line arg -run ... +cnct2tstsrvr([Host, Port]) when is_list(Host), is_list(Port) -> + %% Spawn connection handler on ssl node side + ConnHandler + = spawn(fun () -> + case catch gen_tcp:connect(Host, + list_to_integer(Port), + [binary, + {packet, 4}, + {active, false}]) of + {ok, Socket} -> + notify_ssl_node_up(Socket), + ets:new(test_server_info, + [set, + public, + named_table, + {keypos, 1}]), + ets:insert(test_server_info, + {test_server_handler, self()}), + ssl_node_con_loop(Socket); + Error -> + halt("Failed to connect to test server " ++ + lists:flatten(io_lib:format("Host:~p ~n Port:~p~n Error:~p~n", + [Host, Port, Error]))) + end + end), + spawn(fun () -> + Mon = erlang:monitor(process, ConnHandler), + receive + {'DOWN', Mon, process, ConnHandler, Reason} -> + receive after 1000 -> ok end, + halt("test server connection handler terminated: " ++ + lists:flatten(io_lib:format("~p", [Reason]))) + end + end). + +notify_ssl_node_up(Socket) -> + case catch gen_tcp:send(Socket, + term_to_binary({ssl_node_up, node()})) of + ok -> ok; + _ -> halt("Failed to notify test server that I'm up") + end. + +send_to_tstsrvr(Term) -> + case catch ets:lookup_element(test_server_info, test_server_handler, 2) of + Hndlr when is_pid(Hndlr) -> + Hndlr ! {relay_to_test_server, term_to_binary(Term)}, ok; + _ -> + receive after 200 -> ok end, + send_to_tstsrvr(Term) + end. + +ssl_node_con_loop(Socket) -> + inet:setopts(Socket,[{active,once}]), + receive + {relay_to_test_server, Data} when is_binary(Data) -> + case gen_tcp:send(Socket, Data) of + ok -> + ok; + _Error -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + halt("Failed to relay data to test server") + end; + {tcp, Socket, Bin} -> + case catch binary_to_term(Bin) of + {'EXIT', _} -> + gen_tcp:close(Socket), + halt("test server sent me bad data"); + {apply, From, Ref, M, F, A} -> + spawn_link( + fun () -> + send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, + From, + Ref, + (catch apply(M, F, A))}) + end); + {apply, From, Ref, Fun} -> + spawn_link(fun () -> + send_to_tstsrvr({apply_res, + From, + Ref, + (catch Fun())}) + end); + stop -> + gen_tcp:send(Socket, term_to_binary(bye)), + init:stop(), + receive after infinity -> ok end; + _Unknown -> + halt("test server sent me an unexpected message") + end; + {tcp_closed, Socket} -> + halt("Lost connection to test server") + end, + ssl_node_con_loop(Socket). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..86b9b37026 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_dist_test_lib.hrl @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +%% +%% %CopyrightBegin% +%% +%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2017. All Rights Reserved. +%% +%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +%% You may obtain a copy of the License at +%% +%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +%% +%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +%% limitations under the License. +%% +%% %CopyrightEnd% +%% + +-record(node_handle, + {connection_handler, + socket, + name, + nodename} + ). diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl index 13265debb1..03c3ed9be3 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl @@ -1025,48 +1025,54 @@ string_regex_filter(_Str, _Search) -> false. anonymous_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites(Version))]. psk_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:psk_suites(Version))]. psk_anon_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [Suite || Suite <- psk_suites(Version), is_psk_anon_suite(Suite)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + [Suite || Suite <- psk_suites(Version), is_psk_anon_suite(Suite)]. srp_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}, - {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || + Suite <- + ssl_cipher:filter_suites([tuple_to_map(S) || + S <- [{srp_anon,'3des_ede_cbc', sha}, + {srp_rsa, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, + {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, + {srp_rsa, aes_128_cbc, sha}, + {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}, + {srp_rsa, aes_256_cbc, sha}]])]. srp_anon_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || + Suite <- + ssl_cipher:filter_suites([tuple_to_map(S) || + S <-[{srp_anon, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, + {srp_anon, aes_128_cbc, sha}, + {srp_anon, aes_256_cbc, sha}]])]. srp_dss_suites() -> - Suites = - [{srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, - {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}, - {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). - + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(Suite) || + Suite <- + ssl_cipher:filter_suites([tuple_to_map(S) || + S <- [{srp_dss, '3des_ede_cbc', sha}, + {srp_dss, aes_128_cbc, sha}, + {srp_dss, aes_256_cbc, sha}]])]. rc4_suites(Version) -> - Suites = [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:rc4_suites(Version)], - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:rc4_suites(Version))]. des_suites(Version) -> - Suites = ssl_cipher:des_suites(Version), - ssl_cipher:filter_suites(Suites). + [ssl_cipher:erl_suite_definition(S) || S <- ssl_cipher:filter_suites(ssl_cipher:des_suites(Version))]. + +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => default_prf}; +tuple_to_map({Kex, Cipher, Mac, Prf}) -> + #{key_exchange => Kex, + cipher => Cipher, + mac => Mac, + prf => Prf}. pem_to_der(File) -> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file(File), @@ -1533,10 +1539,14 @@ is_psk_anon_suite({psk, _,_}) -> true; is_psk_anon_suite({dhe_psk,_,_}) -> true; +is_psk_anon_suite({ecdhe_psk,_,_}) -> + true; is_psk_anon_suite({psk, _,_,_}) -> true; is_psk_anon_suite({dhe_psk, _,_,_}) -> true; +is_psk_anon_suite({ecdhe_psk, _,_,_}) -> + true; is_psk_anon_suite(_) -> false. diff --git a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk index bb77326751..cf6481d14c 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk +++ b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk @@ -1 +1 @@ -SSL_VSN = 8.2.1 +SSL_VSN = 8.2.2 |