diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/diameter/test/diameter_traffic_SUITE.erl | 208 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl | 112 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl | 188 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl | 9 |
5 files changed, 347 insertions, 183 deletions
diff --git a/lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl b/lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl index c0fccd8080..b5584ca0d0 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl +++ b/lib/diameter/src/base/diameter_service.erl @@ -2060,9 +2060,15 @@ request_cb({eval, RC, F}, App, Mask, T, TC, Fs, Pkt) -> %% protocol_error/5 protocol_error(RC, {_, OH, OR}, TPid, Fs, Pkt) -> - #diameter_packet{avps = Avps} = Pkt, + #diameter_packet{avps = Avps, errors = Es} = Pkt, ?LOG({error, RC}, Pkt), - reply(answer_message({OH, OR, RC}, Avps), ?BASE, TPid, Fs, Pkt). + reply(answer_message({OH, OR, RC}, Avps), + ?BASE, + TPid, + Fs, + Pkt#diameter_packet{errors = [RC | Es]}). +%% Note that reply/5 may set the result code once more. It's set in +%% answer_message/2 in case reply/5 doesn't. %% protocol_error/4 @@ -2175,7 +2181,8 @@ is_loop(Code, Vid, OH, Avps) -> %% %% Send a locally originating reply. -%% Skip the setting of Result-Code and Failed-AVP's below. +%% Skip the setting of Result-Code and Failed-AVP's below. This is +%% currently undocumented. reply([Msg], Dict, TPid, Fs, Pkt) when is_list(Msg); is_tuple(Msg) -> diff --git a/lib/diameter/test/diameter_traffic_SUITE.erl b/lib/diameter/test/diameter_traffic_SUITE.erl index b41d1a6f5c..b03a9ce4d1 100644 --- a/lib/diameter/test/diameter_traffic_SUITE.erl +++ b/lib/diameter/test/diameter_traffic_SUITE.erl @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ send_nok/1, send_eval/1, send_bad_answer/1, + send_protocol_error/1, send_arbitrary/1, send_unknown/1, send_unknown_mandatory/1, @@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ send_unsupported_app/1, send_error_bit/1, send_unsupported_version/1, + send_invalid_avp_bits/1, + send_invalid_avp_length/1, + send_invalid_reject/1, send_long/1, send_nopeer/1, send_noapp/1, @@ -113,12 +117,15 @@ %% Sequence mask for End-to-End and Hop-by-Hop identifiers. -define(CLIENT_MASK, {1,26}). %% 1 in top 6 bits -%% Run tests cases in different encoding variants. Send outgoing -%% messages as lists or records. +%% How to construct messages, as record or list. -define(ENCODINGS, [list, record]). -%% Identifers for client connections. --define(CONNECTIONS, [c1,c2,c3]). +%% How to send answers, in a diameter_packet or not. +-define(CONTAINERS, [pkt, msg]). + +%% Send over multiple connections that are mapped onto +%% [{E,P} || E <- ?ENCODINGS, P <- ?CONTAINERS]. +-define(CONNECTIONS, [c0,c1,c2,c3]). %% Not really what we should be setting unless the message is sent in %% the common application but diameter doesn't care. @@ -162,6 +169,8 @@ ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_REALM_NOT_SERVED'). -define(UNABLE_TO_DELIVER, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER'). +-define(INVALID_AVP_LENGTH, + ?'DIAMETER_BASE_RESULT-CODE_DIAMETER_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH'). -define(EVENT_RECORD, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_ACCOUNTING-RECORD-TYPE_EVENT_RECORD'). @@ -174,6 +183,8 @@ ?'DIAMETER_BASE_TERMINATION-CAUSE_DIAMETER_LOGOUT'). -define(BAD_ANSWER, ?'DIAMETER_BASE_TERMINATION-CAUSE_DIAMETER_BAD_ANSWER'). +-define(USER_MOVED, + ?'DIAMETER_BASE_TERMINATION-CAUSE_DIAMETER_USER_MOVED'). -define(A, list_to_atom). -define(L, atom_to_list). @@ -187,14 +198,17 @@ suite() -> all() -> [start, start_services, add_transports, result_codes] - ++ [{group, ?util:name([E,C]), P} || E <- ?ENCODINGS, - C <- ?CONNECTIONS, - P <- [[], [parallel]]] + ++ [{group, ?util:name([R,C,A]), P} || R <- ?ENCODINGS, + C <- ?CONTAINERS, + A <- ?ENCODINGS, + P <- [[], [parallel]]] ++ [remove_transports, stop_services, stop]. groups() -> Ts = tc(), - [{?util:name([E,C]), [], Ts} || E <- ?ENCODINGS, C <- ?CONNECTIONS]. + [{?util:name([R,C,A]), [], Ts} || R <- ?ENCODINGS, + C <- ?CONTAINERS, + A <- ?ENCODINGS]. init_per_group(Name, Config) -> [{group, Name} | Config]. @@ -215,6 +229,7 @@ tc() -> send_nok, send_eval, send_bad_answer, + send_protocol_error, send_arbitrary, send_unknown, send_unknown_mandatory, @@ -223,6 +238,9 @@ tc() -> send_unsupported_app, send_error_bit, send_unsupported_version, + send_invalid_avp_bits, + send_invalid_avp_length, + send_invalid_reject, send_long, send_nopeer, send_noapp, @@ -265,7 +283,9 @@ start_services(_Config) -> add_transports(Config) -> LRef = ?util:listen(?SERVER, tcp, [{capabilities_cb, fun capx/2}]), - Cs = [?util:connect(?CLIENT, tcp, LRef, [{id, C}]) || C <- ?CONNECTIONS], + Cs = [?util:connect(?CLIENT, tcp, LRef, [{id, C}, + {capabilities, [osi(C)]}]) + || C <- ?CONNECTIONS], ?util:write_priv(Config, "transport", [LRef | Cs]). remove_transports(Config) -> @@ -283,11 +303,15 @@ capx(_, #diameter_caps{origin_host = {OH,DH}}) -> io:format("connection: ~p -> ~p~n", [DH,OH]), ok. +osi(Id) -> + [$c,N] = atom_to_list(Id), + {'Origin-State-Id', N - $0}. + %% =========================================================================== %% Ensure that result codes have the expected values. result_codes(_Config) -> - {2001, 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3007, 3008, 3009, 5001, 5011} + {2001, 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3007, 3008, 3009, 5001, 5011, 5014} = {?SUCCESS, ?COMMAND_UNSUPPORTED, ?UNABLE_TO_DELIVER, @@ -297,13 +321,14 @@ result_codes(_Config) -> ?INVALID_HDR_BITS, ?INVALID_AVP_BITS, ?AVP_UNSUPPORTED, - ?UNSUPPORTED_VERSION}. + ?UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, + ?INVALID_AVP_LENGTH}. %% Send an ACR and expect success. send_ok(Config) -> Req = ['ACR', {'Accounting-Record-Type', ?EVENT_RECORD}, {'Accounting-Record-Number', 1}], - + #diameter_base_accounting_ACA{'Result-Code' = ?SUCCESS} = call(Config, Req). @@ -311,7 +336,7 @@ send_ok(Config) -> send_nok(Config) -> Req = ['ACR', {'Accounting-Record-Type', ?EVENT_RECORD}, {'Accounting-Record-Number', 0}], - + #'diameter_base_answer-message'{'Result-Code' = ?INVALID_AVP_BITS} = call(Config, Req). @@ -331,6 +356,15 @@ send_bad_answer(Config) -> {'Accounting-Record-Number', 2}], {error, timeout} = call(Config, Req). +%% Send an ACR that the server callback answers explicitly with a +%% protocol error. +send_protocol_error(Config) -> + Req = ['ACR', {'Accounting-Record-Type', ?EVENT_RECORD}, + {'Accounting-Record-Number', 4}], + + #'diameter_base_answer-message'{'Result-Code' = ?TOO_BUSY} + = call(Config, Req). + %% Send an ASR with an arbitrary AVP and expect success and the same %% AVP in the reply. send_arbitrary(Config) -> @@ -398,6 +432,29 @@ send_unsupported_version(Config) -> #diameter_base_STA{'Result-Code' = ?UNSUPPORTED_VERSION} = call(Config, Req). +%% Send a request containing an incorrect AVP length. +send_invalid_avp_bits(Config) -> + Req = ['STR', {'Termination-Cause', ?LOGOUT}], + + #'diameter_base_answer-message'{'Result-Code' = ?INVALID_AVP_BITS} + = call(Config, Req). + +%% Send a request containing an AVP length that doesn't match the +%% AVP's type. +send_invalid_avp_length(Config) -> + Req = ['STR', {'Termination-Cause', ?LOGOUT}], + + #'diameter_base_STA'{'Result-Code' = ?INVALID_AVP_LENGTH} + = call(Config, Req). + +%% Send a request containing 5xxx errors that the server rejects with +%% 3xxx. +send_invalid_reject(Config) -> + Req = ['STR', {'Termination-Cause', ?USER_MOVED}], + + #'diameter_base_answer-message'{'Result-Code' = ?TOO_BUSY} + = call(Config, Req). + %% Send something long that will be fragmented by TCP. send_long(Config) -> Req = ['STR', {'Termination-Cause', ?LOGOUT}, @@ -572,17 +629,38 @@ call(Config, Req) -> call(Config, Req, Opts) -> Name = proplists:get_value(testcase, Config), - [Encoding, Client] = ?util:name(proplists:get_value(group, Config)), + [Encoding, C, E] = ?util:name(proplists:get_value(group, Config)), diameter:call(?CLIENT, dict(Req), - req(Req, Encoding), - [{extra, [Name, Client]} | Opts]). + msg(Req, Encoding), + [{extra, [Name, client(E,C)]} | Opts]). + +client(E, C) -> + list_to_atom([$c, $0 + 2*codec(E) + container(C)]). + +client(N) -> + {codec(N bsr 1), container(N rem 2)}. + +codec(record) -> 0; +codec(list) -> 1; +codec(0) -> record; +codec(1) -> list. -req(['ACR' = H | T], record) -> +%% Here we're just mapping booleans but the readable atoms are part of +%% (constructed) group names, so it's good that they're readable. + +container(pkt) -> 0; +container(msg) -> 1; +container(0) -> pkt; +container(1) -> msg. + +msg([H|T], record) + when H == 'ACR'; + H == 'ACA' -> ?ACCT:'#new-'(?ACCT:msg2rec(H), T); -req([H|T], record) -> +msg([H|T], record) -> ?BASE:'#new-'(?BASE:msg2rec(H), T); -req(T, _) -> +msg(T, _) -> T. dict(['ACR' | _]) -> @@ -662,6 +740,40 @@ prepare_request(Pkt, ?CLIENT, {_Ref, Caps}, send_detach, _, _) -> log(#diameter_packet{} = P, T) -> io:format("~p: ~p~n", [T,P]). +%% prepare/3 + +prepare(Pkt, Caps, send_invalid_avp_bits) -> + Req = prepare(Pkt, Caps), + %% Last AVP in our STR is Termination-Cause of type Unsigned32: + %% set its length improperly. + #diameter_packet{header = #diameter_header{length = L}, + bin = B} + = E + = diameter_codec:encode(?BASE, Pkt#diameter_packet{msg = Req}), + Offset = L - 7, %% to AVP Length + <<H:Offset/binary, 12:24/integer, T:4/binary>> = B, + E#diameter_packet{bin = <<H/binary, 13:24/integer, T/binary>>}; + +prepare(Pkt, Caps, N) + when N == send_invalid_avp_length; + N == send_invalid_reject -> + Req = prepare(Pkt, Caps), + %% Second last AVP in our STR is Auth-Application-Id of type + %% Unsigned32: Send a value of length 8. + #diameter_packet{header = #diameter_header{length = L}, + bin = B0} + = E + = diameter_codec:encode(?BASE, Pkt#diameter_packet{msg = Req}), + Offset = L - 7 - 12, %% to AVP Length + <<H0:Offset/binary, 12:24/integer, T:16/binary>> = B0, + <<V, L:24/integer, H/binary>> = H0, %% assert + E#diameter_packet{bin = <<V, + (L+4):24/integer, + H/binary, + 16:24/integer, + 0:32/integer, + T/binary>>}; + prepare(Pkt, Caps, send_unsupported) -> Req = prepare(Pkt, Caps), #diameter_packet{bin = <<H:5/binary, _CmdCode:3/binary, T/binary>>} @@ -693,6 +805,8 @@ prepare(Pkt, Caps, send_anything) -> prepare(Pkt, Caps, _Name) -> prepare(Pkt, Caps). +%% prepare/2 + prepare(#diameter_packet{msg = Req}, Caps) when is_record(Req, diameter_base_accounting_ACR); 'ACR' == hd(Req) -> @@ -757,10 +871,17 @@ handle_answer(Pkt, _Req, ?CLIENT, _Peer, send_detach, _Id, {Pid, Ref}) -> Pid ! {Ref, Pkt}. answer(Pkt, Req, _Peer, Name) -> - #diameter_packet{header = H, msg = Rec, errors = []} = Pkt, + #diameter_packet{header = H, msg = Rec, errors = Es} = Pkt, ApplId = app(Req, Name), #diameter_header{application_id = ApplId} = H, %% assert - + answer(Rec, Es, Name). + +answer(Rec, [_|_], N) + when N == send_invalid_avp_bits; + N == send_invalid_avp_length; + N == send_invalid_reject -> + Rec; +answer(Rec, [], _) -> Rec. app(_, send_unsupported_app) -> @@ -786,7 +907,17 @@ handle_request(#diameter_packet{header = H, msg = M}, ?SERVER, {_Ref, Caps}) -> {V,B} = ?CLIENT_MASK, V = EI bsr B, %% assert V = HI bsr B, %% - request(M, Caps). + #diameter_caps{origin_state_id = {_,[N]}} = Caps, + answer(client(N), request(M, Caps)). + +answer(T, {Tag, Action, Post}) -> + {Tag, answer(T, Action), Post}; +answer({E,C}, {reply, Ans}) -> + answer(C, {reply, msg(Ans, E)}); +answer(pkt, {reply, Ans}) -> + {reply, #diameter_packet{msg = Ans}}; +answer(_, T) -> + T. %% send_nok request(#diameter_base_accounting_ACR{'Accounting-Record-Number' = 0}, @@ -806,7 +937,7 @@ request(#diameter_base_accounting_ACR{'Session-Id' = SId, {'Accounting-Record-Type', RT}, {'Accounting-Record-Number', RN}], - {reply, #diameter_packet{header = #diameter_header{is_error = true},%% not + {reply, #diameter_packet{header = #diameter_header{is_error = true},%% NOT msg = Ans}}; %% send_eval @@ -836,15 +967,28 @@ request(#diameter_base_accounting_ACR{'Session-Id' = SId, {'Accounting-Record-Type', RT}, {'Accounting-Record-Number', RN}]}; +%% send_protocol_error +request(#diameter_base_accounting_ACR{'Accounting-Record-Number' = 4}, + #diameter_caps{origin_host = {OH, _}, + origin_realm = {OR, _}}) -> + Ans = ['answer-message', {'Result-Code', ?TOO_BUSY}, + {'Origin-Host', OH}, + {'Origin-Realm', OR}], + {reply, Ans}; + request(#diameter_base_ASR{'Session-Id' = SId, 'AVP' = Avps}, #diameter_caps{origin_host = {OH, _}, origin_realm = {OR, _}}) -> - {reply, #diameter_base_ASA{'Result-Code' = ?SUCCESS, - 'Session-Id' = SId, - 'Origin-Host' = OH, - 'Origin-Realm' = OR, - 'AVP' = Avps}}; + {reply, ['ASA', {'Result-Code', ?SUCCESS}, + {'Session-Id', SId}, + {'Origin-Host', OH}, + {'Origin-Realm', OR}, + {'AVP', Avps}]}; + +%% send_invalid_reject +request(#diameter_base_STR{'Termination-Cause' = ?USER_MOVED}, _Caps) -> + {protocol_error, ?TOO_BUSY}; %% send_noreply request(#diameter_base_STR{'Termination-Cause' = T}, @@ -867,10 +1011,10 @@ request(#diameter_base_STR{'Destination-Host'= [H]}, request(#diameter_base_STR{'Session-Id' = SId}, #diameter_caps{origin_host = {OH, _}, origin_realm = {OR, _}}) -> - {reply, #diameter_base_STA{'Result-Code' = ?SUCCESS, - 'Session-Id' = SId, - 'Origin-Host' = OH, - 'Origin-Realm' = OR}}; + {reply, ['STA', {'Result-Code', ?SUCCESS}, + {'Session-Id', SId}, + {'Origin-Host', OH}, + {'Origin-Realm', OR}]}; %% send_error request(#diameter_base_RAR{}, _Caps) -> diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl index cde13069b5..94f76e0606 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl @@ -1628,78 +1628,49 @@ save_verify_data(client, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbrev save_verify_data(server, #finished{verify_data = Data}, ConnectionStates, abbreviated) -> ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_write, Data, ConnectionStates). -handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{params = - #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, - dh_g = G, - dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}, - signed_params = <<>>}, - #state{key_algorithm = dh_anon} = State) -> - dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State); - -handle_server_key( - #server_key_exchange{params = - #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, - dh_g = G, - dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}, - signed_params = Signed, - hashsign = HashSign}, - #state{negotiated_version = Version, - public_key_info = PubKeyInfo, - connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> - - PLen = size(P), - GLen = size(G), - YLen = size(ServerPublicDhKey), - HashAlgo = connection_hash_algo(HashSign, State), +handle_server_key(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, + #state{key_algorithm = KeyAlg, + negotiated_version = Version} = State) -> + Params = ssl_handshake:decode_server_key(Keys, KeyAlg, Version), + HashSign = connection_hashsign(Params#server_key_params.hashsign, State), + case HashSign of + {_, anon} -> + server_master_secret(Params#server_key_params.params, State); + _ -> + verify_server_key(Params, HashSign, State) + end. - ConnectionState = +verify_server_key(#server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + signature = Signature}, + HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, + #state{negotiated_version = Version, + public_key_info = PubKeyInfo, + connection_states = ConnectionStates} = State) -> + ConnectionState = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(ConnectionStates, read), SecParams = ConnectionState#connection_state.security_parameters, #security_parameters{client_random = ClientRandom, server_random = ServerRandom} = SecParams, Hash = ssl_handshake:server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, - <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - ?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), - ServerPublicDhKey/binary>>), - - case verify_dh_params(Version, Signed, Hash, HashAlgo, PubKeyInfo) of + <<ClientRandom/binary, + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + case ssl_handshake:verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PubKeyInfo) of true -> - dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State); + server_master_secret(Params, State); false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECRYPT_ERROR) end. -verify_dh_params({3, Minor}, Signed, Hashes, HashAlgo, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) - when Minor >= 3 -> - public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, HashAlgo, Signed, PubKey); -verify_dh_params(_Version, Signed, Hashes, _HashAlgo, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) -> - case public_key:decrypt_public(Signed, PubKey, - [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of - Hashes -> - true; - _ -> - false - end; -verify_dh_params(_Version, Signed, Hash, HashAlgo, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> - public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signed, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). - -dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) -> - PMpint = mpint_binary(Prime), - GMpint = mpint_binary(Base), - Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = - crypto:dh_generate_key([PMpint,GMpint]), - dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}); +server_master_secret(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = ServerPublicDhKey}, + State) -> + dh_master_secret(P, G, ServerPublicDhKey, undefined, State). -dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, - #state{session = Session, - negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, - connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> - PremasterSecret = - crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(PublicDhKey), PrivateDhKey, - [PMpint, GMpint]), +master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, + #state{session = Session, + negotiated_version = Version, role = Role, + connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> case ssl_handshake:master_secret(Version, PremasterSecret, ConnectionStates0, Role) of {MasterSecret, ConnectionStates} -> @@ -1711,6 +1682,19 @@ dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, Alert end. +dh_master_secret(Prime, Base, PublicDhKey, undefined, State) -> + PMpint = mpint_binary(Prime), + GMpint = mpint_binary(Base), + Keys = {_, PrivateDhKey} = + crypto:dh_generate_key([PMpint,GMpint]), + dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State#state{diffie_hellman_keys = Keys}); + +dh_master_secret(PMpint, GMpint, PublicDhKey, PrivateDhKey, State) -> + PremasterSecret = + crypto:dh_compute_key(mpint_binary(PublicDhKey), PrivateDhKey, + [PMpint, GMpint]), + master_from_premaster_secret(PremasterSecret, State). + cipher_role(client, Data, Session, #state{connection_states = ConnectionStates0} = State) -> ConnectionStates = ssl_record:set_server_verify_data(current_both, Data, ConnectionStates0), next_state_connection(cipher, ack_connection(State#state{session = Session, @@ -2485,10 +2469,10 @@ get_pending_connection_state_prf(CStates, Direction) -> CS = ssl_record:pending_connection_state(CStates, Direction), CS#connection_state.security_parameters#security_parameters.prf_algorithm. -connection_hash_algo({HashAlgo, _}, _State) -> - HashAlgo; -connection_hash_algo(_, #state{hashsign_algorithm = {HashAlgo, _}}) -> - HashAlgo. +connection_hashsign(HashSign = {_, _}, _State) -> + HashSign; +connection_hashsign(_, #state{hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}) -> + HashSign. %% RFC 5246, Sect. 7.4.1.4.1. Signature Algorithms %% If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl index db21dac942..1929370991 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ -export([master_secret/4, client_hello/8, server_hello/5, hello/4, hello_request/0, certify/7, certificate/4, - client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, + client_certificate_verify/6, certificate_verify/6, verify_signature/5, certificate_request/3, key_exchange/3, server_key_exchange_hash/2, finished/5, verify_connection/6, get_tls_handshake/3, - decode_client_key/3, server_hello_done/0, + decode_client_key/3, decode_server_key/3, server_hello_done/0, encode_handshake/2, init_handshake_history/0, update_handshake_history/2, decrypt_premaster_secret/2, prf/5, next_protocol/1]). @@ -320,25 +320,36 @@ client_certificate_verify(OwnCert, MasterSecret, Version, %% %% Description: Checks that the certificate_verify message is valid. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -certificate_verify(Signature, {?'rsaEncryption', PublicKey, _}, Version, - {HashAlgo, _SignAlgo}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> - Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), - case certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, Version) of +certificate_verify(Signature, PublicKeyInfo, Version, + HashSign = {HashAlgo, _}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> + Hash = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), + case verify_signature(Version, Hash, HashSign, Signature, PublicKeyInfo) of true -> valid; _ -> - ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE) - end; -certificate_verify(Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}, Version, - {HashAlgo, _SignAlgo}, MasterSecret, {_, Handshake}) -> - Hashes = calc_certificate_verify(Version, HashAlgo, MasterSecret, Handshake), - case public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, sha, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) of - true -> - valid; - false -> ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_CERTIFICATE) end. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec verify_signature(tls_version(), binary(), {term(), term()}, binary(), + public_key_info()) -> true | false. +%% +%% Description: Checks that a public_key signature is valid. +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +verify_signature(_Version, _Hash, {_HashAlgo, anon}, _Signature, _) -> + true; +verify_signature({3, Minor}, Hash, {HashAlgo, rsa}, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) + when Minor >= 3 -> + public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, PubKey); +verify_signature(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, Signature, {?rsaEncryption, PubKey, _PubKeyParams}) -> + case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PubKey, + [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of + Hash -> true; + _ -> false + end; +verify_signature(_Version, Hash, {HashAlgo, dsa}, Signature, {?'id-dsa', PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}) -> + public_key:verify({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Signature, {PublicKey, PublicKeyParams}). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec certificate_request(#connection_states{}, db_handle(), certdb_ref()) -> @@ -382,31 +393,33 @@ key_exchange(client, _Version, {dh, <<?UINT32(Len), PublicKey:Len/binary>>}) -> key_exchange(server, Version, {dh, {<<?UINT32(Len), PublicKey:Len/binary>>, _}, #'DHParameter'{prime = P, base = G}, - {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> + HashSign, ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey}) -> <<?UINT32(_), PBin/binary>> = crypto:mpint(P), <<?UINT32(_), GBin/binary>> = crypto:mpint(G), - PLen = byte_size(PBin), - GLen = byte_size(GBin), - YLen = byte_size(PublicKey), ServerDHParams = #server_dh_params{dh_p = PBin, dh_g = GBin, dh_y = PublicKey}, + enc_server_key_exchange(Version, ServerDHParams, HashSign, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey). +enc_server_key_exchange(Version, Params, {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + ClientRandom, ServerRandom, PrivateKey) -> + EncParams = enc_server_key(Params), case HashAlgo of null -> - #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams, - signed_params = <<>>, - hashsign = {null, anon}}; + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {null, anon}, + signature = <<>>}; _ -> Hash = server_key_exchange_hash(HashAlgo, <<ClientRandom/binary, - ServerRandom/binary, - ?UINT16(PLen), PBin/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), GBin/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), PublicKey/binary>>), - Signed = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), - #server_key_exchange{params = ServerDHParams, - signed_params = Signed, - hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}} + ServerRandom/binary, + EncParams/binary>>), + Signature = digitally_signed(Version, Hash, HashAlgo, PrivateKey), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = EncParams, + hashsign = {HashAlgo, SignAlgo}, + signature = Signature} end. %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -523,6 +536,15 @@ decode_client_key(ClientKey, Type, Version) -> dec_client_key(ClientKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-spec decode_server_key(binary(), key_algo(), tls_version()) -> + #server_key_params{}. +%% +%% Description: Decode server_key data and return appropriate type +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +decode_server_key(ServerKey, Type, Version) -> + dec_server_key(ServerKey, key_exchange_alg(Type), Version). + +%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- -spec init_handshake_history() -> tls_handshake_history(). %% @@ -975,31 +997,8 @@ dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_HELLO, <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Random:32/binary, next_protocol_negotiation = NextProtocolNegotiation}; dec_hs(_Version, ?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>) -> #certificate{asn1_certificates = certs_to_list(ASN1Certs)}; - -dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, - ?UINT16(0)>>) -> %% May happen if key_algorithm is dh_anon - #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, - dh_y = Y}, - signed_params = <<>>, hashsign = {null, anon}}; -dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, - ?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo), - ?UINT16(Len), Sig:Len/binary>>) - when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> - #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, - dh_y = Y}, - signed_params = Sig, - hashsign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}}; -dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, - ?UINT16(Len), Sig:Len/binary>>) -> - #server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P,dh_g = G, - dh_y = Y}, - signed_params = Sig, hashsign = undefined}; +dec_hs(_Version, ?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys) -> + #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}; dec_hs({Major, Minor}, ?CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, <<?BYTE(CertTypesLen), CertTypes:CertTypesLen/binary, ?UINT16(HashSignsLen), HashSigns:HashSignsLen/binary, @@ -1039,6 +1038,42 @@ dec_client_key(<<?UINT16(DH_YLen), DH_Y:DH_YLen/binary>>, ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, _) -> #client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DH_Y}. +dec_ske_params(Len, Keys, Version) -> + <<Params:Len/bytes, Signature/binary>> = Keys, + dec_ske_signature(Params, Signature, Version). + +dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo), + ?UINT16(0)>>, {Major, Minor}) + when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> + HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}, + {Params, HashSign, <<>>}; +dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?BYTE(HashAlgo), ?BYTE(SignAlgo), + ?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, {Major, Minor}) + when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> + HashSign = {ssl_cipher:hash_algorithm(HashAlgo), ssl_cipher:sign_algorithm(SignAlgo)}, + {Params, HashSign, Signature}; +dec_ske_signature(Params, <<>>, _) -> + {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>}; +dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(0)>>, _) -> + {Params, {null, anon}, <<>>}; +dec_ske_signature(Params, <<?UINT16(Len), Signature:Len/binary>>, _) -> + {Params, undefined, Signature}; +dec_ske_signature(_, _, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). + +dec_server_key(<<?UINT16(PLen), P:PLen/binary, + ?UINT16(GLen), G:GLen/binary, + ?UINT16(YLen), Y:YLen/binary, _/binary>> = KeyStruct, + ?KEY_EXCHANGE_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, Version) -> + Params = #server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, + {BinMsg, HashSign, Signature} = dec_ske_params(PLen + GLen + YLen + 6, KeyStruct, Version), + #server_key_params{params = Params, + params_bin = BinMsg, + hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}; +dec_server_key(_, _, _) -> + throw(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE)). + dec_hello_extensions(<<>>) -> []; dec_hello_extensions(<<?UINT16(ExtLen), Extensions:ExtLen/binary>>) -> @@ -1156,18 +1191,12 @@ enc_hs(#certificate{asn1_certificates = ASN1CertList}, _Version) -> ASN1Certs = certs_from_list(ASN1CertList), ACLen = erlang:iolist_size(ASN1Certs), {?CERTIFICATE, <<?UINT24(ACLen), ASN1Certs:ACLen/binary>>}; -enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{params = #server_dh_params{ - dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}, - signed_params = SignedParams, hashsign = HashSign}, Version) -> - PLen = byte_size(P), - GLen = byte_size(G), - YLen = byte_size(Y), - Signature = enc_sign(HashSign, SignedParams, Version), - {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, - ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, - ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary, - Signature/binary>> - }; +enc_hs(#server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, _Version) -> + {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, Keys}; +enc_hs(#server_key_params{params_bin = Keys, hashsign = HashSign, + signature = Signature}, Version) -> + EncSign = enc_sign(HashSign, Signature, Version), + {?SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, <<Keys/binary, EncSign/binary>>}; enc_hs(#certificate_request{certificate_types = CertTypes, hashsign_algorithms = #hash_sign_algos{hash_sign_algos = HashSignAlgos}, certificate_authorities = CertAuths}, @@ -1211,6 +1240,14 @@ enc_cke(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = DHPublic}, _) -> Len = byte_size(DHPublic), <<?UINT16(Len), DHPublic/binary>>. +enc_server_key(#server_dh_params{dh_p = P, dh_g = G, dh_y = Y}) -> + PLen = byte_size(P), + GLen = byte_size(G), + YLen = byte_size(Y), + <<?UINT16(PLen), P/binary, ?UINT16(GLen), G/binary, ?UINT16(YLen), Y/binary>>. + +enc_sign({_, anon}, _Sign, _Version) -> + <<>>; enc_sign({HashAlg, SignAlg}, Signature, _Version = {Major, Minor}) when Major == 3, Minor >= 3-> SignLen = byte_size(Signature), @@ -1328,8 +1365,8 @@ certificate_authorities_from_db(CertDbHandle, CertDbRef) -> digitally_signed({3, Minor}, Hash, HashAlgo, Key) when Minor >= 3 -> public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key); -digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> - public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, sha, Key); +digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, HashAlgo, #'DSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> + public_key:sign({digest, Hash}, HashAlgo, Key); digitally_signed(_Version, Hash, _HashAlgo, #'RSAPrivateKey'{} = Key) -> public_key:encrypt_private(Hash, Key, [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]). @@ -1378,19 +1415,6 @@ apply_user_fun(Fun, OtpCert, ExtensionOrError, UserState0, SslState) -> {unknown, {SslState, UserState}} end. -certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, sha, Signature, PublicKey, {Major, Minor}) - when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> - public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, sha, Signature, PublicKey); -certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, {Major, Minor}) - when Major == 3, Minor >= 3 -> - public_key:verify({digest, Hashes}, HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey); -certificate_verify_rsa(Hashes, _HashAlgo, Signature, PublicKey, _Version) -> - case public_key:decrypt_public(Signature, PublicKey, - [{rsa_pad, rsa_pkcs1_padding}]) of - Hashes -> true; - _ -> false - end. - -define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_RSA(MD), {MD, rsa}). -define(TLSEXT_SIGALG_DSA(MD), {MD, dsa}). diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl index 9af6511d68..2414d5b666 100644 --- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl +++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.hrl @@ -141,9 +141,14 @@ }). -record(server_key_exchange, { + exchange_keys + }). + +-record(server_key_params, { params, %% #server_rsa_params{} | #server_dh_params{} - signed_params, %% #signature{} - hashsign %% term(atom(), atom()) + params_bin, + hashsign, %% term(atom(), atom()) + signature %% #signature{} }). %% enum { anonymous, rsa, dsa } SignatureAlgorithm; |