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* origin/peppe/common_test/ct_hooks_errors:
Fix IO printout crash caused by hook function
Fix timetrap error in pre-hooks
Conflicts:
lib/common_test/src/cth_surefire.erl
OTP-10050
OTP-10069
OTP-10072
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* ia/odbc/test-suite-maint:
odbc: remove "-" in hostname from generated unique table name
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* sverk/hipe-ppc-assembler-comment:
Fix assembler comments for hipe on ppc
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* 'maint' of super:otp:
Revert "Merge branch 'nox/compile-column-numbers' into maint"
compiler: Warn if the size of a binary segment is invalid
Allow non-ASCII characters in Xref filanmes
Add powerpc dso xcomp file
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* bjorn/compiler/illegal-size/OTP-10197:
compiler: Warn if the size of a binary segment is invalid
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* hb/tools/xref_filenames/OTP-10192:
Allow non-ASCII characters in Xref filanmes
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* lukas/erts/xcomp-ppc/OTP-10198:
Add powerpc dso xcomp file
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Column numbers was merged without understanding all the whole
story. See mail on erlang-patches for details.
This reverts commit df8e67e203b83f95d1e098fec88ad5d0ad840069, reversing
changes made to 0c9d90f314f364e5b1301ec89d762baabc57c7aa.
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Change to preprocessor comments to work on all OS.
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The compiler would silently accept and Dialyzer would crash on
code like:
<<X:(2.5)>>
It is never acceptable for Dialyzer to crash. The compiler should
at least generate a warning for such code. It is tempting to let
the compiler generate an error, but that would mean that code like:
Sz = 42.0,
<<X:Sz>>.
would be possible to compile with optimizations disabled, but not
with optimizations enabled.
Dialyzer crashes because it calls cerl:bitstr_bitsize/1, which
crashes if the type of size for the segment is invalid. The easiest
way to avoid that crash is to extend the sanity checks in v3_core
to also include the size field of binary segments. That will cause
the compiler to issue a warning and to replace the bad binary
construction with a call to erlang:error/1. (It also means that
Dialyzer will not issue a warning for bad size fields.)
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Tickets solved by this branch: OTP-8871, OTP-8872 and OTP-9908
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This options is useless and should be deprecated. But we behave
as inet does for now!
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with TLS 1.2 the hash and signature on a certify message can
differ from the defaults. So we have to make sure to always
use the hash and signature algorithm indicated in the
handshake message
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combinations
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This is also avoids triggering some bugs in OpenSSL.
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The Rizzo tests ran both SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 tests in the same test
case but the new group structure that run all relevant test for all
relevant SSL/TLS versions we need to change that to run the protocol version
of the group the we are currently running.
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As we did not yet support IDEA ciphers and they have now become deprecated we
skip supporting them altogether.
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TLS 1.2 introduces changes on how signatures
are calculate and encoded. This makes the
signature handling version aware
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TLS 1.2 allows to negotiate the used PRF,
additional the default PRF uses a different
hash. This change make the PRF selectable
and hardwires the PRF for TLS < 1.2
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dh parameter verification is done differently with TLS 1.2.
Prepare for that by passing the verion to verify_dh_params.
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TLS 1.2 changes the layout of several handshake
records. This adds the TLS version to dec_hs/2
so it can decode those.
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TLS 1.2 changed the way digital signatures are
done. key_exchange/3 needs to pass the version
to it.
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now that we handle TLS 1.1+ records correctly, the test suite
have to take that into account.
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With TLS 1.2 the handling of the IV in cipher blocks
changed. This prepares ssl_cipher:cipher/5 for that
change by passing the TLS version into it and allowing
generic_block_cipher_from_bin/4 to overload the IV.
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TLS/SSL version before 1.2 always used a MD5/SHA combination
for the handshake hashes. With TLS 1.2 the default hash is
SHA256 and it is possible to negotiate a different hash.
This change delays the calculation of the handshake
hashes until they are really needed. At that point the hash
to use should be known.
For now MD5/SHA is still hard coded.
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dsa -> dss
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