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* anders/diameter/5014/OTP-12074:
Don't leave extra bit in decoded AVP data
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* anders/diameter/Failed-AVP/OTP-12094:
Fix best effort decode of Failed-AVP
Fix decode of Failed-AVP in RFC 3588 answer-message
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* anders/diameter/counters/OTP-12080:
Fix counters for answer-message
Count relayed messages on {relay, Rbit}
Count request retransmissions
Fix counting of outgoing requests
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* anders/diameter/info/OTP-12069:
Map binary process info to a reference/byte count
Add info item for diameter:service_info/2
Add (process) info tuple to diameter:service_info/2
Add diameter_dbg:sizes/0
Tweak comments
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* sverk/crypto-check-version/OTP-12146:
crypto: Verify OpenSSL library major version at load
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* fishcakez/dialyzer_beam_opts:
Use compile options when dialyzing beam files
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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* hans/common_test/prop_test:
ssh: update for triq tests
common_test: ct_property_test call correct Triq function.
ct_property_test: add Triq support
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Also, ensure that the right module's counterexample/0 is called.
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The bit is added in diameter_codec to induce a decode error in the case
of 5014 errors, but was not removed before returning the decoded result.
Code examining the binary data in a diameter_avp record would then see
the extra bit.
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diameter_codec must be loaded before diameter_traffic.
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Commit c2c00fdd didn't get it quite right: it only decoded failed AVPs
in the common dictionary since it's this dictionary an answer-message is
decoded in. An extra dictionary isn't something that's easily passed
through the decode without rewriting dictionary compilation however, and
that's no small job, so continue with the use/abuse of the process
dictionary by storing the dictionary module for the decode to retrieve.
This is one step worse than previous uses since the dictionary is put in
one module (diameter_codec) and got in another (the dictionary module),
but it's the lesser of two evils.
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Commit 066544fa had the unintended consequence of breaking the decode of
Failed-AVP in answer-message as defined in the RFC 3588, since the
grammar doesn't list Failed-AVP as an explicit component AVP, in
contrast to the RFC 6733 grammar, which does. Handle this case
explicitly, as an exception, just as with Failed-AVP as parent AVP.
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An answer message that sets the E-bit is encoded/decoded with Diameter
common dictionary, using the answer-message grammar specified in the
RFC. However, the dictionary of the application in question is the one
that knows the command code of the message. Commit df19c272 didn't make
this distinction when incrementing counters for an answer-message, using
the common dictionary for both purposes, causing the message to be
counted as unknown. This commit remedies that.
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to prevent strange memory corruption crashes due to
mismatch between header and library versions.
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* bjorn/asn1/misc-bug-fixes/OTP-12125:
Workaround for combining two object sets separated by extension
Clean up and correct handling of parameters for parameterized types
Check the formal parameter for parameterized type definitions
Report errors also for unused parameterized types
Remove unused code for ABSTRACT-SYNTAX and TYPE-IDENTIFIER
Correct expansion of parameterized types
Add the module name to the #classdef{} record
Eliminate the use of #identifier{} outside the tokeniser and parser
Fix problem with object identifiers in external modules
Rewrite get_referenced_type/2
Teach the ASN.1 compiler to handle objects in field names
Teach the ASN.1 compiler to understand "EXPORTS ALL"
Teach the ASN.1 compiler the parse option
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* bjorn/asn1/decoding-robustness/OTP-12145:
BER decoding: Improve error checking for indefinite length
BER: Test decoding of indefinite lengths
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maint
* lucafavatella/improve-cpu_sup-error-when-slow-port-init:
Clarify error for slow `cpu_sup` port init
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* rickard/memory_consuming_tuple_tests:
Only run upper boundry tuple test with lots of memory
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OTP-12128
* vinoski/enif-schedule-nif:
Fix leak of NIF exports
Use separate allocation type for NIF export
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* hans/common_test/Makefile_fix:
common_test: update Makefile for ct_property_test module.
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* ia/public_key/utf8-doc:
public_key: Correct documentation of ASN-1 type utf8String
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* sverk/term_to_binary-realloc-size/OTP-12141:
erts: Fix bug in term_to_binary that reallocates binary with wrong size
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* sverk/MIN_SMALL-to-integer:
erts: Correct conversion of MIN_SMALL numeral to fixnum
OTP-12140
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list_to_integer and binary_to_integer returned un-normalized bignum for
-134217728 on 32-bit and -576460752303423488 on 64-bit.
Thanks to Jesper Louis Andersen, Mikael Pettersson
and Anthony Ramine for report, initial patch and optimization suggestion.
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* sverk/nif-inspect-copy-bug/OTP-9828:
erts: Fix bug with enif_make_copy reallocating writable binary
Conflicts:
erts/emulator/test/nif_SUITE.erl
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* egil/fix-llvm-cc-warnings/OTP-12138:
odbc: Suppress signedness warnings for 'char *'
ic: Suppress unused-value warning
erts: Fix tentative-definition-incomplete-type
erts: Don't redefine '_XOPEN_SOURCE'
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* egil/maps-with-doc-tests/OTP-12137:
stdlib: Test maps:with/2
stdlib: Document maps:with/2
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that could invalidate a pointer received from an earlier
call to enif_inspect_binary.
Solution: Emasculate writable binary at enif_inspect_binary. There are
room for optimizations here as we now do an unconditional emasculation
even though enif_make_copy is not called later in the NIF.
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* arekinath/ssh/aes-ctr:
ssh: check if ssh client supports newer cipher- and MAC-algorithms
SSH: only enable ciphers/MACs when they are available in crypto
SSH: add ssh_to_openssh test for ciphers and macs
SSH: documentation update for new algos
SSH: add support for aes128-ctr and hmac-sha2-256
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