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The possibility of configuring an MFA as spawn_opt was added in commit
fd285079, the callback being passed an arity-0 fun to be applied in an
appropriate handler process. Replace the fun by a tuple to be passed to
diameter_traffic:request/1, to avoid passing funs between nodes when
handler processes are remote.
A list-valued spawn_opt is now equivalent to the following configured as
{spawn_opt, {Mod, spawn_local, [Opts]}}.
spawn_local(ReqT, Opts) ->
spawn_opt(diameter_traffic, request, [ReqT], Opts).
ReqT is passed by diameter and contains information that the callback
may want to decide where to handle the request in question (which wasn't
accessible with a fun), but this information isn't exposed in a
documented way. The intention is instead to add an own callback
implementation to make use of the information.
Note that application lookup now takes place in the watchdog process in
both the list-valued (or no configuration) and mfa-valued cases. Whether
this is good, bad, or (probably) inconsequential remains to be seen.
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To support specifications like RFC 7683 DOIC, that only define AVPs, not
applications. AVPs that aren't known to the application dictionary in
question could previously not be decoded. Configuring alternate
dictionaries with the new transport/service option avp_dictionaries
changes this, so that AVPs like DOIC's Grouped OC-OLR can presented in
their fully decoded glory. Encode is also extended, allowing things like
the following to be encoded in an outgoing message:
'AVP' => [{'OC-OLR', #{'OC-Sequence-Number' => 1,
'OC-Report-Type' => 0,
'OC-Reduction-Percentage' => [25]}}]
A diameter_gen_doic_rfc7683 dictionary is installed, but
avp_dictionaries isn't specific to DOIC.
This commit also solves the problem demonstrated a few commits back,
that application AVPs aren't decoded in answers setting the E-bit. Test
coverage will come in a subsequent commit.
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Which reads better and makes it easier to distinguish this false from
others.
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Since these can make sense per peer. The remaining service-only options
either belong there or make little sense being configured per transport.
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Only a default spawn_opt has been possible to configure, but there's
no reason why most others should need to be configured per transport.
Those options that still only make sense on a transport are
transport_module/config (because of the semantics of multiple values),
applications/capabilities (since these override service options), and
private (since it's only to allow user-specific options in a backwards
compatible way).
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Export the old type as a synonym for backwards compatability. The name
evaluable is a bit too awkward.
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To follow the naming of options like strict_mbit and more. Still accept
capx_strictness since this is known to be used.
Introduced in commit e4f28f3b.
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To be able to disable the counting of messages for which application
callbacks take place. Messages sent/handled by diameter itself are
always counted.
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To be able to disable the relatively expensive check that the number of
AVPs received in a message or grouped AVP agrees with the dictionary in
question. The may well be easier for the user in handle_request/answer
callbacks, when digesting the received message, and in some cases may
not be important.
The check at encode can also be disabled, allowing messages that don't
agree with the dictionary in question to be sent, which can be useful in
test (at least).
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Undocumented, for transforming a map decode to record.
The record decode becomes more expensive the larger the number of AVPs
in the message definition in question, since the record is recreated
each time an AVP value is set in it. The map decode can potentially do
better.
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{record_decode, map} is a bit too quirky.
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That is, decode to the same format that encode already accepts. Only a
message has its name at the head of the list since AVPs are already
name/value pairs.
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With {record_decode, map}. The option name is arguably a bit misleading
now, but not too objectionable given that the encode/decode in question
has historically only been of records.
One advantage of the map decode is that the map only contains values for
those AVPs existing in the message or grouped AVP in question. The name
of the message or grouped AVP is stored in with key ':name', the leading
colon ensuring that the key isn't a diameter-name.
Decoding to maps makes the hrl files generated from dictionary files
largely irrelevant. There are value defines generated into these, but
they're typically so long as to be unusable.
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To control whether or not messages and grouped AVPs are decoded to
records, in #diameter_packet.msg and #diameter_avp.value respectively.
The decode became unnecessary for diameter's needs in parent commit,
which decoupled it from the checking of AVP arities.
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To solve the problem of being able to send messages to a peer that
hasn't advertised support for the application in question, as discussed
in the parent commit. diameter:call/4 can be passed 'peer' options to
identify candidates, and the only requirement is that an appropriate
dictionary be configured for encode. Filters are applied as if
candidates had been selected by advertised application.
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To allow the Peer State Machine requirement that only the expected
capabilities exchange message be received in the relevant state to be
relaxed. If {capx_strictness, false} is configured then anything bu the
expected CER/CEA is ignored.
This is non-standard behaviour, and thusfar undocumented. Use at your
own risk.
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To return a peer_fsm/transport pair given one of them.
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To return information about a single peer_ref(), to avoid having to
retrieve more than is needed with service_info/2.
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* anders/diameter/M-bit/OTP-12947:
Add service_opt() strict_mbit
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There are differing opinions on whether or not reception of an arbitrary
AVP setting the M-bit is an error. 1.3.4 of RFC 6733 says this about
how an existing Diameter application may be modified:
o The M-bit allows the sender to indicate to the receiver whether or
not understanding the semantics of an AVP and its content is
mandatory. If the M-bit is set by the sender and the receiver
does not understand the AVP or the values carried within that AVP,
then a failure is generated (see Section 7).
It is the decision of the protocol designer when to develop a new
Diameter application rather than extending Diameter in other ways.
However, a new Diameter application MUST be created when one or more
of the following criteria are met:
M-bit Setting
An AVP with the M-bit in the MUST column of the AVP flag table is
added to an existing Command/Application. An AVP with the M-bit
in the MAY column of the AVP flag table is added to an existing
Command/Application.
The point here is presumably interoperability: that the command grammar
should specify explicitly what mandatory AVPs much be understood, and
that anything more is an error.
On the other hand, 3.2 says thus about command grammars:
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary AVP
; Name, not otherwise listed in that Command Code
; definition. The inclusion of this string
; is recommended for all CCFs to allow for
; extensibility.
This renders 1.3.4 pointless unless "*any* AVP" is qualified by "not
setting the M-bit", since the sender can effectively violate 1.3.4
without this necessitating an error at the receiver. If clients add
arbitrary AVPs setting the M-bit then request handling becomes more
implementation-dependent.
The current interpretation in diameter is strict: if a command grammar
doesn't explicitly allow an AVP setting the M-bit then reception of such
an AVP is regarded as an error. The strict_mbit option now allows this
behaviour to be changed, false turning all responsibility for the M-bit
over to the user.
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To bound the length of incoming messages that will be decoded. A message
longer than the specified number of bytes is discarded. An
incoming_maxlen_exceeded counter is incremented to make note of the
occurrence.
The motivation is to prevent a sufficiently malicious peer from
generating significant load by sending long messages with many AVPs for
diameter to decode. The 24-bit message length header accomodates
(16#FFFFFF - 20) div 12 = 1398099
Unsigned32 AVPs for example, which the current record-valued decode is
too slow with in practice. A bound of 16#FFFF bytes allows for 5461
small AVPs, which is probably more than enough for the majority of
applications, but the default is the full 16#FFFFFF.
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* anders/diameter/dpr/OTP-12609:
Discard incoming/outgoing requests after incoming DPR
Add transport_opt() dpr_timeout
Be lenient with errors in incoming DPR
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* anders/diameter/string_decode/OTP-11952:
Let examples override default service options
Set {restrict_connections, false} in example server
Set {string_decode, false} in examples
Test {string_decode, false} in traffic suite
Add service_opt() string_decode
Strip potentially large terms when sending outgoing Diameter messages
Improve language consistency in diameter(1)
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To control whether stringish Diameter types are decoded to string or
left as binary. The motivation is the same as in the parent commit: to
avoid large strings being copied when incoming Diameter messages are
passed between processes; or *if* in the case of messages destined for
handle_request and handle_answer callbacks, since these are decoded in
the dedicated processes that the callbacks take place in. It would be
possible to do something about other messages without requiring an
option, but disabling the decode is the most effective.
The value is a boolean(), true being the default for backwards
compatibility. Setting false causes both diameter_caps records and
decoded messages to contain binary() in relevant places that previously
had string(): diameter_app(3) callbacks need to be prepared for the
change.
The Diameter types affected are OctetString and the derived types that
can contain arbitrarily large values: OctetString, UTF8String,
DiameterIdentity, DiameterURI, IPFilterRule, and QoSFilterRule. Time and
Address are unaffected.
The DiameterURI decode has been redone using re(3), which both
simplifies and does away with a vulnerability resulting from the
conversion of arbitrary strings to atom.
The solution continues the use and abuse of the process dictionary for
encode/decode purposes, last seen in commit 0f9cdba.
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To cause a peer connection to be closed following an outgoing DPA, in
case the peer fails to do so. It is the recipient of DPA that should
close the connection according to RFC 6733.
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* anders/diameter/dpr/OTP-12542:
Discard CER or DWR sent with diameter:call/4
Allow DPR to be sent with diameter:call/4
Add transport_opt() dpa_timeout
Add testcase for sending DPR with diameter:call/4
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To make the default DPA timeout configurable. The timeout say how many
milliseconds to wait for DPA in response to an outgoing DPR before
terminating the transport process regardless.
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Transport processes are started by diameter one at a time. In the
listening case, a transport process accepts a connection, tells the
peer_fsm process, which tells its watchdog process, which tells its
service process, which then starts a new watchdog, which starts a new
peer_fsm, which starts a new transport process, which (finally) goes
about accepting another connection. In other words, not particularly
aggressive in accepting new connections. This behaviour doesn't do
particularly well with a large number of concurrent connections: with
TCP and 250 connecting peers we see connections being refused.
This commit adds the possibilty of configuring a pool of accepting
processes, by way of a new transport option, pool_size. Instead of
diameter:add_transport/2 starting just a single process, it now starts
the configured number, so that instead of a single process waiting for a
connection there's now a pool.
The option is even available for connecting processes, which provides an
alternate to adding multiple transports when multiple connections to the
same peer are required. In practice this also means configuring
{restrict_connections, false}: this is not implicit.
For backwards compatibility, the form of
diameter:service_info(_,transport) differs in the connecting case,
depending on whether or not pool_size is configured.
Note that transport processes for the same transport_ref() can be
started concurrently when pool_size > 1. This places additional
requirements on diameter_{tcp,sctp}, that will be dealt with in a
subsequent commit.
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The former was misleading since the timer only applies to initial
connection attempts, reconnection attempts being governed by
watchdog_timer. The name is a historic remnant from a (dark, pre-OTP)
time in which RFC 3539 was followed less slavishly than it is now, and
the timer actually did apply to reconnection attempts.
Note that connect_timer corresponds to RFC 6733 Tc, while watchdog_timer
corresponds to RFC 3539 TwInit. The latter RFC makes clear that TwInit
should apply to reconnection attempts. It's less clear if only RFC 6733
is read.
Note also that reconnect_timer is still accepted for backwards
compatibility. It would be possible to add an option to make
reconnect_timer behave strictly as the name suggests (ie. ignore RFC 3539
and interpret RFC 6733 at face value; something that has some value for
testing at least) but no such option is implemented in this commit.
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That is, for the process that's spawned for each incoming Diameter
request message.
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'infinity' is a valid transport_config timeout.
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Allow both share_peers and use_shared_peers to be a list of nodes, or a
function that returns a list of nodes.
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This is the functionality that allows transports to be shared between
identically-named services on different nodes, which has been neither
documented nor tested (until now).
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To make the number of watchdogs sent before the transitions REOPEN ->
OKAY and OKAY -> SUSPECT configurable. Using anything other then the
default config is non-standard and should only be used for test.
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RFC 3588 allowed only 3xxx result codes in an answer-message (that is,
an answer that sets the E-bit) while RFC 6733 also allows 5xxx result
codes. Setting request_errors = answer tells diameter to answer 5xxx
errors itself. Returning {answer_message, integer()} from a
handle_request callback allows both 3xxx and 5xxx result codes to be
set. {protocol_error, integer()} is retained for 3xxx result codes.
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Configuring the value 'callback' all errors detected in incoming
requests to result in a handle_request callback. The default value
'answer_3xxx' is the previous behaviour in which diameter answers
protocol errors without a callback.
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The value determines whether or not an unexpected message length in the
header of an incoming messages causes the peer process to exit, the
message to be discarded or handled as usual. The latter may only be
appropriate for message-oriented transport (eg. SCTP) since
stream-oriented transport (eg. TCP) may not be able to recover the
message boundary once a length error has occurred.
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Traffic handling is connected to the service implementation through the
pick_peer callback and failover but diameter_service was getting
unwieldy as home to both the service process and traffic handling.
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Code should be loaded in this order:
diameter_session (sequence/1)
diameter_peer_fsm (calls to sequence/1)
diameter_service (sequence config, mask in receive_message/3)
diameter_watchdog (mask in peer start and receive_message/3)
diameter_config (accept sequence config)
Order of diameter and diameter_peer doesn't matter.
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* anders/diameter/R15B02_release:
Dialyzer spec fix
OTP-10243
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Transports are started one after the other if a connection is
not established with the timeout that can now be specified
with transport_config. For example, try an SCTP connect first,
a TCP connect if it doesn't succeed.
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The module was originally just intended as a minimal callback
implementation that could be used as a template. Being able to order
just a subset of callbacks (with reasonable defaults) makes for
simpler code in many cases however so ready support for this can be
useful.
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