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* legoscia/ssl_crl_hash_dir-bis/PR-982/OTP-13530:
Skip crl_hash_dir_expired test for LibreSSL
Add ssl_crl_hash_dir module
Function for generating OpenSSL-style name hashes
Add public_key:pkix_match_dist_point
Improve formatting for crl_{check,cache} options
Add issuer arg to ssl_crl_cache_api lookup callback
Conflicts:
lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
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This reverts commit e020f75c10410a6943cd055bfa072a2641eab7da.
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This reverts commit bd64ad8e15d66e48b36dbe3584315dd5cfc8b59a.
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public_key use cases are cryptographical so use
crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 instead.
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* henrik/update-copyrightyear:
update copyright-year
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OpenSSL has functions to generate short (eight hex digits) hashes of
issuers of certificates and CRLs. These hashes are used by the
"c_rehash" script to populate directories of CA certificates and CRLs,
e.g. in the Apache web server. Adding this function lets an Erlang
program find the right CRL for a given certificate in such a
directory.
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* ia/public_key/EC-public_key/OTP-13408:
public_key: Handle PEM encoded EC public keys
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Also add missing test for PEM encoded private EC keys.
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Also tool (public_key:gen_moduli_hrl) to convert an openssh moduli file to erlang format.
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Line number references are with respect to sources
in public_key.erl
Changes:
- pkix_sign replaced public with private (L510)
(Certificates are signed by private keys)
- pki_asn1_type() added 'CertificateList' (L73)
- pkix_sign_types added ecdsa (L404)
- pkix_verify added ec_public_key() (L530)
- pkix_is_issuer added 'CertificateList' (L569)
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This reverts commit e09dd66dc4d89c62ddfd8c19791f9678d5d787c6.
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Make sure that links from ssl to public_key work.
OTP-12670 - Ignoring 1.2 extension in 1.0 or TLS-1.1
solved by 5edda23ee854038c9d4bcddd0d676ee0ffd20da5
is mentioned here to make the release scripts happy,
as the branch solving this accidently had a name ending 1267
instead of 12670
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* E.I bitstrings will not be decode as {Unused, Binary}, they are now
Erlang bitstrings.
* Also the compact_bit_string implies the legacy_erlang_types switch
- So removing the switch will also make OCTET STRING values be represented
as binaries.
- Undecoded open type will now be wrapped in a asn1_OPENTYPE tuple.
We need to handle this in pubkey_pbe.erl, maybe this can be eliminated
later by updating/refreshing ASN1-specs.
This will change some values in records returned by the public_key API
making this change a potentiall incompatibility.
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* mururu/fix-type:
Fix typos in the public_key doc
OTP-12549
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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