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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
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The PEM cache is now validated by a background process, instead of
always keeping it if it is small enough and clearing it otherwhiss.
That strategy required that small caches where cleared by API function
if a file changes on disk.
However document the clearing API function as it can still be usefull.
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disable option
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disable option
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
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=== OTP-17.4 ===
Changed Applications:
- asn1-3.0.3
- common_test-1.9
- compiler-5.0.3
- crypto-3.4.2
- debugger-4.0.2
- dialyzer-2.7.3
- diameter-1.8
- edoc-0.7.16
- eldap-1.1
- erl_docgen-0.3.7
- erl_interface-3.7.20
- erts-6.3
- eunit-2.2.9
- hipe-3.11.2
- inets-5.10.4
- jinterface-1.5.12
- kernel-3.1
- megaco-3.17.3
- mnesia-4.12.4
- observer-2.0.3
- odbc-2.10.22
- otp_mibs-1.0.10
- parsetools-2.0.12
- percept-0.8.10
- runtime_tools-1.8.15
- snmp-5.1.1
- ssh-3.1
- ssl-5.3.8
- stdlib-2.3
- syntax_tools-1.6.17
- test_server-3.7.2
- tools-2.7.1
- wx-1.3.2
Unchanged Applications:
- cosEvent-2.1.15
- cosEventDomain-1.1.14
- cosFileTransfer-1.1.16
- cosNotification-1.1.21
- cosProperty-1.1.17
- cosTime-1.1.14
- cosTransactions-1.2.14
- et-1.5
- gs-1.5.16
- ic-4.3.6
- orber-3.7.1
- os_mon-2.3
- ose-1.0.2
- public_key-0.22.1
- reltool-0.6.6
- sasl-2.4.1
- typer-0.9.8
- webtool-0.8.10
- xmerl-1.3.7
Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
erts/vsn.mk
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Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
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* ia/ssl/seperate-clinet-server-session-table/OTP-11365:
ssl: Separate session cache for client and server
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Even though in the most common case an erlang node will not be both client
and server, it may happen (for instance when running the erlang ditribution
over TLS).
Also try to mitigate the affect of dumb clients that could cause a
very lagre session cache on the client side that can cause long delays
in the client. The server will have other means to handle a large
session table and will not do any select operations on it anyhow.
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=== OTP-17.3 ===
Changed Applications:
- asn1-3.0.2
- common_test-1.8.2
- compiler-5.0.2
- crypto-3.4.1
- dialyzer-2.7.2
- diameter-1.7.1
- edoc-0.7.15
- erl_docgen-0.3.6
- erl_interface-3.7.18
- erts-6.2
- eunit-2.2.8
- hipe-3.11.1
- ic-4.3.6
- inets-5.10.3
- jinterface-1.5.10
- kernel-3.0.3
- megaco-3.17.2
- mnesia-4.12.3
- observer-2.0.2
- odbc-2.10.21
- os_mon-2.3
- ose-1.0.1
- public_key-0.22.1
- sasl-2.4.1
- snmp-5.1
- ssh-3.0.5
- ssl-5.3.6
- stdlib-2.2
- tools-2.7
- wx-1.3.1
Unchanged Applications:
- cosEvent-2.1.15
- cosEventDomain-1.1.14
- cosFileTransfer-1.1.16
- cosNotification-1.1.21
- cosProperty-1.1.17
- cosTime-1.1.14
- cosTransactions-1.2.14
- debugger-4.0.1
- eldap-1.0.3
- et-1.5
- gs-1.5.16
- orber-3.7
- otp_mibs-1.0.9
- parsetools-2.0.11
- percept-0.8.9
- reltool-0.6.6
- runtime_tools-1.8.14
- syntax_tools-1.6.16
- test_server-3.7.1
- typer-0.9.8
- webtool-0.8.10
- xmerl-1.3.7
Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
erts/vsn.mk
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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* ia/Vagabond/adt-honor-cipher-order/OTP-11621:
Implement 'honor_cipher_order' SSL server-side option
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The R16B03-1 release
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HonorCipherOrder as implemented in Apache, nginx, lighttpd, etc. This
instructs the server to prefer its own cipher ordering rather than the
client's and can help protect against things like BEAST while
maintaining compatability with clients which only support older ciphers.
This code is mostly written by Andrew Thompson, only the test case was
added by Andreas Schultz.
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The R16B03 release
Conflicts:
lib/sasl/vsn.mk
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- Set to disable to explicitly disable SNI support.
- Set to a hostname when upgrading from TCP to TLS.
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See RFC 6066 section 3
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The R16B02 release
Conflicts:
lib/sasl/vsn.mk
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Conflicts:
lib/inets/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/inets/src/http_lib/http_transport.erl
lib/inets/src/inets_app/inets.appup.src
lib/inets/vsn.mk
lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl.appup.src
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_internal.hrl
lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
lib/ssl/vsn.mk
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The R16B01 release
Conflicts:
lib/sasl/vsn.mk
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