| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-03-09 | ssl: Remove interoperability option v2_hello_compatible | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2018-01-23 | ssl: Add record version sanity check | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2017-11-16 | ssl: Align code of TLS/DTLS record handling | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2017-09-30 | dtls: Compleate DTLS renegotiate implementation | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2017-05-16 | dtls: Implement replay protection | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| See RFC 6347 section 3.3 | |||
| 2017-05-04 | Update copyright year | Raimo Niskanen | |
| 2017-04-26 | ssl: Correct DTLS mac handling | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2017-04-21 | ssl: TLS-1.2 clients will now always send hello messages on its own format. | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| Note this is a change form how it works for earlier versions that will send the first hello message on the lowest supported version. From RFC 5246 Appendix E. Backward Compatibility E.1. Compatibility with TLS 1.0/1.1 and SSL 3.0 Since there are various versions of TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and any future versions) and SSL (2.0 and 3.0), means are needed to negotiate the specific protocol version to use. The TLS protocol provides a built-in mechanism for version negotiation so as not to bother other protocol components with the complexities of version selection. TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and SSL 3.0 are very similar, and use compatible ClientHello messages; thus, supporting all of them is relatively easy. Similarly, servers can easily handle clients trying to use future versions of TLS as long as the ClientHello format remains compatible, and the client supports the highest protocol version available in the server. A TLS 1.2 client who wishes to negotiate with such older servers will send a normal TLS 1.2 ClientHello, containing { 3, 3 } (TLS 1.2) in ClientHello.client_version. If the server does not support this version, it will respond with a ServerHello containing an older version number. If the client agrees to use this version, the negotiation will proceed as appropriate for the negotiated protocol. If the version chosen by the server is not supported by the client (or not acceptable), the client MUST send a "protocol_version" alert message and close the connection. If a TLS server receives a ClientHello containing a version number greater than the highest version supported by the server, it MUST reply according to the highest version supported by the server. A TLS server can also receive a ClientHello containing a version number smaller than the highest supported version. If the server wishes to negotiate with old clients, it will proceed as appropriate for the highest version supported by the server that is not greater than ClientHello.client_version. For example, if the server supports TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and client_version is TLS 1.0, the server will proceed with a TLS 1.0 ServerHello. If server supports (or is willing to use) only versions greater than client_version, it MUST send a "protocol_version" alert message and close the connection. Whenever a client already knows the highest protocol version known to a server (for example, when resuming a session), it SHOULD initiate the connection in that native protocol. Note: some server implementations are known to implement version negotiation incorrectly. For example, there are buggy TLS 1.0 servers that simply close the connection when the client offers a version newer than TLS 1.0. Also, it is known that some servers will refuse the connection if any TLS extensions are included in ClientHello. Interoperability with such buggy servers is a complex topic beyond the scope of this document, and may require multiple connection attempts by the client. Earlier versions of the TLS specification were not fully clear on what the record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) should contain when sending ClientHello (i.e., before it is known which version of the protocol will be employed). Thus, TLS servers compliant with this specification MUST accept any value {03,XX} as the record layer version number for ClientHello. TLS clients that wish to negotiate with older servers MAY send any value {03,XX} as the record layer version number. Typical values would be {03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, and the value of ClientHello.client_version. No single value will guarantee interoperability with all old servers, but this is a complex topic beyond the scope of this document. | |||
| 2017-04-13 | ssl, dtls: Refactor so that DTLS records are handled correctly together with ↵ | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| AEAD handling | |||
| 2017-04-13 | ssl, dtls: Correct integer type for sequence number | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2017-02-14 | Fixed typos in lib/ssl | Andrew Dryga | |
| 2016-12-07 | Update copyright-year | Erlang/OTP | |
| 2016-12-05 | ssl: Implement DTLS state machine | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| Beta DTLS, not production ready. Only very basically tested, and not everything in the SPEC is implemented and some things are hard coded that should not be, so this implementation can not be consider secure. Refactor "TLS connection state" and socket handling, to facilitate DTLS implementation. Create dtls "listner" (multiplexor) process that spawns DTLS connection process handlers. Handle DTLS fragmentation. Framework for handling retransmissions. Replay Detection is not implemented yet. Alerts currently always handled as in TLS. | |||
| 2016-09-05 | ssl: Refactor to use maps for the connection states | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2016-06-13 | dtls: sync dtls_record DTLS version and crypto handling with TLS | Andreas Schultz | |
| 2016-06-13 | dtls: rework handshake flight encodeing | Andreas Schultz | |
| The MSS might change between sending the a flight and possible resend. We therefore have to be able to fragment the records differently for resent. Encoding and fragmenting of handshake record therefor needs to be done independently. With this change the handshake is encoded to it's full length first, then queued to a flight. The fragmentation is handled during assembly of the flights datagram. Conflicts: lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl | |||
| 2016-05-03 | ssl: Adapt DTLS to gen_statem | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| DTLS is not in working mode yet, but the gen_statem rewrite should make completion easier. | |||
| 2015-06-18 | Change license text to APLv2 | Bruce Yinhe | |
| 2015-01-23 | ssl: Reenable padding check for TLS-1.0 and provide backwards compatible | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| disable option | |||
| 2014-09-03 | ssl: implement AES128-GCM suites | Andreas Schultz | |
| 2014-03-25 | ssl: Avoid dialyzer warnings in dtls code | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| Even if DTLS is not finished, e.i. not runnable yet we want to phase in the code together with refactoring of TLS code, but without introducing warnings in the release. | |||
| 2014-03-25 | ssl: Refactor and start implementing dtls_connection.erl | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2013-12-02 | ssl, public_key: Dialyzer fixes | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2013-12-02 | ssl: Refactor handshake and record handling | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2013-09-10 | ssl: Refactor TLS/DTLS record handling | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| 2013-09-10 | ssl: DTLS record handling | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| Also refactor so that TLS and DTLS can have common functions when possible. | |||
| 2013-09-10 | ssl: Add DTLS record primitives | Andreas Schultz | |
| This code is to 99 % written by Andreas Schultz only some small changes to start integrating with OTPs DTLS solution. | |||
| 2013-06-04 | ssl: Structural perarparation to support DTLS | Ingela Anderton Andin | |
| Also phase in tls module as main API instead of ssl. To make API clearer. As TLS is the new protocol name. Maybe keep some API functions in ssl | |||
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index : otp.git | |
| Mirror of Erlang/OTP repository. | OTP Team |
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