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These functions call getstat on the underlying TCP socket.
The only way to do this before now was to use a hack, either
by looking inside the #sslsocket{} record directly, or by
not using the SSL listen/accept functions and upgrading
from a TCP socket that is kept around for the purpose of
calling getstat later on.
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ssl servers can recognize sslv2 client hellos to interop with clients
that support higher version of SSL/TLS but also offers sslv2
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
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gen_tcp:recv allows this, and if you're doing something like
Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0), TCP will work and SSL will exit with
function_clause
There were other cases of this throughout the module. This PR cleans
them all up.
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Some legacy TLS 1.0 software does not tolerate the 1/n-1 content
split BEAST mitigation technique. This commit adds a beast_mitigation
SSL option (defaulting to one_n_minus_one) to select or disable the
BEAST mitigation technique.
Valid option values are (one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled).
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Also reduce timing issues in tests
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It was not possible to mix ssl 3 and 4 tuple cipher suites in the
ciphers option.
Some ssl_cipher:suite/1 clauses wrongly returned 3-tuples that
should have been 4 tuples
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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ssl already used crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 for most operations as
its use cases are mostly cryptographical. Now crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1
will be used everywhere.
However crypto:rand_bytes/1 was used as fallback if
crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 throws low_entropy, this
will no longer be the case. This is a potential incompatibility.
The fallback was introduced a long time ago for interoperability reasons.
Now days this should not be a problem, and if it is, the security
compromise is not acceptable anyway.
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* henrik/update-copyrightyear:
update copyright-year
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In TLS-1.2 The signature algorithm and the hash function algorithm
used to produce the digest that is used when creating the digital signature
may be negotiated through the signature algorithm extension RFC 5246.
We want to make these algorithm pairs configurable.
In connections using lower versions of TLS these algorithms are
implicit defined and can not be negotiated or configured.
DTLS is updated to not cause dialyzer errors, but needs to get a real
implementation later.
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* legoscia/fix-ssl-example/PR-976/OTP-13363:
ssl: Modernize utility function
Fix ssl example
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* legoscia/critical-extension-verify-none:
ssl: with verify_none, accept critical extensions
OTP-13377
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Use application:ensure_all_started/2 instead of hard coding dependencies
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Make sure that options only relevant for one role (client|server) is set
to undefined when the other role is invoked. As there are many options to
ssl, and many are optional, we choose to filter out all undefined options
to avoid overwhelming the user with not relevant information.
This way there is no need for any special handling of the role specific options
which is also nice.
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When establishing a TLS connection with {verify, verify_none}, if the
server has a certificate with a critical extension, for example a
"Netscape Cert Type" extension, certificate verification would fail,
which is surprising given that the name of the option suggests that no
verification would be performed.
With this change, certificate extensions marked as critical are
ignored when using verify_none.
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* rlipscombe/rl-ssl-options:
Ensure single 'raw' option is handled correctly
Pass 'raw' options through
OTP-13166
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In Erlang R16B03-1, I've been passing raw options to ssl:listen as
follows, and it's been working fine:
% The constants are defined elsewhere.
LOpts = [{raw, ?IPPROTO_TCP, ?TCP_MAXSEG, <<MSS:32/native>>} | ...],
{ok, LSocket} = ssl:listen(0, LOpts)
In Erlang 17.3, this fails with
{option_not_a_key_value_tuple,{raw,6,2,<<64,2,0,0>>}}
I originally reported this in
http://erlang.org/pipermail/erlang-questions/2014-October/081226.html
I need to pass this particular raw option to ssl:listen, because it
needs to be applied when the socket is first opened -- between inet:open
and prim_inet:listen -- it cannot be applied later by setopts. This
means that it needs to be done by inet_tcp:listen/2 -- well, actually by
inet:open/8, but...
Otherwise it's racey -- a client could connect between prim_inet:listen
and the setopts call. The MSS option is advertised in the SYN,ACK
packet, and can't be changed later.
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Add possibility to downgrade an SSL/TLS connection to a tcp connection,
and give back the socket control to a user process.
Add application setting to be able to change fatal alert shutdown
timeout, also shorten the default timeout. The fatal alert timeout is
the number of milliseconds between sending of a fatal alert and
closing the connection. Waiting a little while improves the
peers chances to properly receiving the alert so it may
shutdown gracefully.
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* ferd/deny-client-renegotiation:
Add disable client-initiated renegotiation option
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
OTP-12815
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Client-initiated renegotiation is more costly for the server than the
client, and this feature can be abused in denial of service attempts.
Although the ssl application already takes counter-measure for these
(via cooldown periods between renegotiations), it can be useful to
disable the feature entirely.
This patch adds the `{client_renegotiation, boolean()}' option to the
server-side of the SSL application (defaulting to `true' to be
compatible with the current behaviour).
The option disables the ability to do any renegotiation at all in the
protocol's state, reusing the existing denial code, but without opening
the code path that sets up a timed message to eventually reopen it up.
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Dialyzer warned about the incorrect match of Packets. Code
was refactored and the problem avoided in the process.
Dialyzer warned that the empty tuple is not a function as the contract
said it should be. Changed the handling of the sni_fun default value to be
undefined and added it to the contract.
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The newly added function sni_fun allows dynamic update of SSL options
like keys and certificates depending on different SNI hostname, rather
than a predefined rules of SSL options.
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This commit adds a new function, ssl:connection_information/[1,2]
to retrive the connection information from a SSLSocket.
And also, this deprecates a function ssl:connection_info/1, and
reimplements connection_info/1 with the new function.
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This commit adds support for RFC7301, application-layer protocol
negotiation. ALPN is the standard based approach to the NPN
extension, and is required for HTTP/2.
ALPN lives side by side with NPN and provides an equivalent
feature but in this case it is the server that decides what
protocol to use, not the client.
When both ALPN and NPN are sent by a client, and the server is
configured with both ALPN and NPN options, ALPN will always
take precedence. This behavior can also be found in the OpenSSL
implementation of ALPN.
ALPN and NPN share the ssl:negotiated_protocol/1 function for
retrieving the negotiated protocol. The previously existing
function ssl:negotiated_next_protocol/1 still exists, but has
been deprecated and removed from the documentation.
The tests against OpenSSL require OpenSSL version 1.0.2+.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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disable option
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disable option
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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algorithms
With the addition of more ciphers that are not supported in all
configurations, using a manually prefiltered cipher list (e.g. EC vs.
non-EC ciphers) becomes to complex. Replace the manual split with
ssl_cipher:filter_suites/1 in all places.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
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* ia/ssl/inherit/OTP-11897:
ssl: Handle socket option inheritance when pooling of accept sockets is used
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Implement a listen socket tracker process that holds the emulated socket
options so that it is possible to implement a destructive ssl:setopts
on SSL/TLS listen sockets without changing the options of the internal
socket as we want that socket to have the internal socket option values.
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When selecting the available cipher suites for the server all cipher suites
for the highest supported SSL/TLS-version would be selected, and not
all supported for the negotiated SSL/TLS-version. This could lead
to that faulty clients could negotiate cipher suites that they
can not support. This change will enable the faulty client to negotiate
another cipher suite that it can support.
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