Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
Also the server should only send ECC point formats extension not ECC curve
extension.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also refactor so that TLS and DTLS can have common functions when possible.
|
|
with proper defaults
Added ssl_ECC_SUITE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some of the PSK and SRP ciphers default to sha384, this enables
hash_size for that cipher. It also adds sha512 and sha224 to be
prepared for further cipher enhancements.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Some certificates may use these OIDs instead of the ones defined by
PKIX/PKCS standard.
Refactor code so that all handling of the "duplicate" oids is done by
public_key.
Update algorithm information in documentation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is also avoids triggering some bugs in OpenSSL.
|
|
As we did not yet support IDEA ciphers and they have now become deprecated we
skip supporting them altogether.
|
|
TLS 1.2 introduces changes on how signatures
are calculate and encoded. This makes the
signature handling version aware
|
|
|
|
|
|
TLS 1.2 allows to negotiate the used PRF,
additional the default PRF uses a different
hash. This change make the PRF selectable
and hardwires the PRF for TLS < 1.2
|
|
|
|
With TLS 1.2 the handling of the IV in cipher blocks
changed. This prepares ssl_cipher:cipher/5 for that
change by passing the TLS version into it and allowing
generic_block_cipher_from_bin/4 to overload the IV.
|
|
|
|
|
|
A wrong decryption key would cause a badmatch in
generic_block_cipher_from_bin/2. The try in block_decipher/5 was
probably intendend to deal with that, but was misplace for this.
Additionaly, generating a failure alert erly, without computing the
record MAC, creates vector for a timing attack on CBC padding (for
details check TLS 1.2 RFC 5246, Sect. 6.2.3.2.). This attach vector
and the counter meassure applies to all SSL/TLS versions.
As a counter messure, compute the MAC even when decryption or padding
checks fail. A invalid padding will force a MAC failure by intentionaly
invalidating the content.
|
|
Data to sign and verify should be inputed as binaries.
Also cleaned up and moved some dialyzer specs.
|
|
Also changed alert to BAD_RECORD_MAC as:
"differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed alerts
may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in TLS
[CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the bad_record_mac
alert to hide the specific type of the error."
Also cleaned up the code and changed a few other alert reasons in
according to alert descriptions in the TLS RFC 4346. And added function
terminate_alert/3 so that we can differentiate between a crash
in ssl (a bug in our code) and a crash in the application using ssl.
|
|
Also fixed incorrect dialyzer spec.
|
|
For testing purposes ssl now also support some anonymous cipher suites
when explicitly configured to do so.
Also moved session cache tests to its own suite, so that timeout
of end_per_testcase when the mnesia is used as session cache will
not affect other test cases.
|
|
* ia/ssl-interop/OTP-8740:
Do not check the padding for TLS 1.0
|
|
Cleaned up and documented the public_key API to
make it useful for general use.
|
|
For interoperability reasons we do not check the padding in TLS 1.0 as
it is not strictly required and breaks interopability with for
instance Google.
|
|
|
|
New ssl now support client/server-certificates signed by dsa keys.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
future.
|
|
|