Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Older SSL/TLS versions have cipher suites
that look like {key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash()}
and the hash function used by the PRF (Pseudo Random function)
is implicit and always the same for that protocol version.
In TLS 1.2 a cipher suite is
{key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash(), PRF::hash()}.
Internally a cipher suite is always a four tuple but
for backwards compatibility older cipher suites
will be presented as a three tuples, however new cipher suites
should be presented as four tuples.
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Make sure that options only relevant for one role (client|server) is set
to undefined when the other role is invoked. As there are many options to
ssl, and many are optional, we choose to filter out all undefined options
to avoid overwhelming the user with not relevant information.
This way there is no need for any special handling of the role specific options
which is also nice.
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TLS hash_sign algorithms may have proprietary values see
http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml
We should add callbacks to let applications handle them.
But for now we do not want to crash if they are present and
let other algorithms be negotiated.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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disable option
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disable option
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
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When selecting the available cipher suites for the server all cipher suites
for the highest supported SSL/TLS-version would be selected, and not
all supported for the negotiated SSL/TLS-version. This could lead
to that faulty clients could negotiate cipher suites that they
can not support. This change will enable the faulty client to negotiate
another cipher suite that it can support.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
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Also the server should only send ECC point formats extension not ECC curve
extension.
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Also refactor so that TLS and DTLS can have common functions when possible.
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with proper defaults
Added ssl_ECC_SUITE
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Some of the PSK and SRP ciphers default to sha384, this enables
hash_size for that cipher. It also adds sha512 and sha224 to be
prepared for further cipher enhancements.
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Some certificates may use these OIDs instead of the ones defined by
PKIX/PKCS standard.
Refactor code so that all handling of the "duplicate" oids is done by
public_key.
Update algorithm information in documentation.
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This is also avoids triggering some bugs in OpenSSL.
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As we did not yet support IDEA ciphers and they have now become deprecated we
skip supporting them altogether.
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TLS 1.2 introduces changes on how signatures
are calculate and encoded. This makes the
signature handling version aware
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TLS 1.2 allows to negotiate the used PRF,
additional the default PRF uses a different
hash. This change make the PRF selectable
and hardwires the PRF for TLS < 1.2
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With TLS 1.2 the handling of the IV in cipher blocks
changed. This prepares ssl_cipher:cipher/5 for that
change by passing the TLS version into it and allowing
generic_block_cipher_from_bin/4 to overload the IV.
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A wrong decryption key would cause a badmatch in
generic_block_cipher_from_bin/2. The try in block_decipher/5 was
probably intendend to deal with that, but was misplace for this.
Additionaly, generating a failure alert erly, without computing the
record MAC, creates vector for a timing attack on CBC padding (for
details check TLS 1.2 RFC 5246, Sect. 6.2.3.2.). This attach vector
and the counter meassure applies to all SSL/TLS versions.
As a counter messure, compute the MAC even when decryption or padding
checks fail. A invalid padding will force a MAC failure by intentionaly
invalidating the content.
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Data to sign and verify should be inputed as binaries.
Also cleaned up and moved some dialyzer specs.
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Also changed alert to BAD_RECORD_MAC as:
"differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed alerts
may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in TLS
[CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the bad_record_mac
alert to hide the specific type of the error."
Also cleaned up the code and changed a few other alert reasons in
according to alert descriptions in the TLS RFC 4346. And added function
terminate_alert/3 so that we can differentiate between a crash
in ssl (a bug in our code) and a crash in the application using ssl.
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