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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
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This change adds the capability to the TLS 1.3 server to process
ClientHello messages and answer with ServerHello.
Change-Id: I13f6cfac932574300338e7301c6162252a591c70
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Change-Id: Ie7409675dd7a35825f32822df259286bbb95fd62
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TLS-1.3 needs to handle AEAD inputs diffrently than previous versions.
Refactor code to facilitate TLS-1.3 additions.
Change CHACHA20_POLY1305 NONCE to match RFC 7905. This will be
important later when we fix interop with TLS compatible crypto
invocation.
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Implementations of TLS 1.3 which choose to support prior versions of
TLS SHOULD support TLS 1.2. That is, a TLS 1.3 ClientHello shall
advertise support for TLS 1.2 ciphers in order to be able to connect
to TLS 1.2 servers.
This commit changes the list of the advertised cipher suites to
include old TLS 1.2 ciphers.
Change-Id: Iaece3ac4b66a59dfbe97068b682d6010d74522b8
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Change-Id: I8a5c11b3503b44cfc6cbd6e4fd8ff3005a8669dd
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This commit filters out cipher suites not to be used in TLS-1.3
We still need to add new cipher suites for TLS-1.3 and possible
add new information to the suite data structure.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
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The conversion code for different representations of cipher suites
is long an repetitive. We want to hide it in a module that does not
have other functions that we like to look at.
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The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
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- Add 'tlsv1.3' to the available versions. It can be used to
trigger experimental behavior while implementing TLS 1.3.
- Add dummy clauses for handling version {3,4} of TLS.
- Update ssl_logger to handle unknown versions of TLS.
Change-Id: I564ffa47dca18b59f0dc16c9809dfd7adaf2d333
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Add new API function for converting cipher suite maps
to their textual representation.
Change-Id: I43681930b38e0f3bdb4dfccbf9e8895aa2d6a281
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The Key Usage extension is described in section 4.2.1.3 of X.509, with the following possible flags:
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
In SSL/TLS, when the server certificate contains a RSA key, then:
either a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite is used, in which case the RSA key
is used for a signature (see section 7.4.3 of RFC 5246: the "Server
Key Exchange" message); this exercises the digitalSignature key usage;
or "plain RSA" is used, with a random value (the 48-byte pre-master
secret) being encrypted by the client with the server's public key
(see section 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246); this is right in the definition of
the keyEncipherment key usage flag.
dataEncipherment does not apply, because what is encrypted is not
directly meaningful data, but a value which is mostly generated
randomly and used to derive symmetric keys. keyAgreement does not
apply either, because that one is for key agreement algorithms which
are not a case of asymmetric encryption (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). The
keyAgreement usage flag would appear in a certificate which contains a
DH key, not a RSA key. nonRepudiation is not used, because whatever is
signed as part of a SSL/TLS key exchange cannot be used as proof for a
third party (there is nothing in a SSL/TLS tunnel that the client
could record and then use to convince a judge when tring to sue the
server itself; the data which is exchanged within the tunnel is not
signed by the server).
When a ECDSA key is used then "keyAgreement" flag is needed for beeing
ECDH "capable" (as opposed to ephemeral ECDHE)
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ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.
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* maint:
Updated OTP version
Update release notes
ssl: Prepare for release
ssl: Remove duplicate release note
ssl: Fix filter function to not discard AEAD cipher suites
Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
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* hasse/dialyzer/extra-range/OTP-14970:
ssl: Correct some specs
os_mon: Correct a spec
Fix broken spec in beam_asm
Dialyzer should not throw away spec information because of overspec
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Cipher suite handling improvments missed to make a few changes
for AEAD to be handled correctly see ERL-568
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_test_lib.erl
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Preferably customized cipher suites will be based on the default value.
But all may be used as base and hence it will be good to
handle anonymous suites separately as they are intended for testing purposes.
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Authenticated encryption (AE) and authenticated encryption with
associated data (AEAD, variant of AE) is a form of encryption which
simultaneously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
assurances on the data.
This is more logical value then null that was used, this happened to
work as the AEAD property was derived form other data, but it is confusing!
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* ingela/ssl/no-chacha-default-for-now/ERL-538/OTP-14882:
ssl: Remove chacha ciphers form default for now
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We have discovered interoperability problems, ERL-538, that we
believe needs to be solved in crypto.
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Stream ciphers are not valid fro DTLS
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
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This is a preparation for improvements to come in option handling and
support for TLS-1.3
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RFC: ecdhe_psk cipher suites
OTP-14547
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This is mainly fixing the test suites so that they test the intended cipher
suites, issue reported in ERL-460.
Also ssl_cipher:anonymous_suites was corrected for DTLS.
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Add the GCM ciphers from draft-mattsson-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead and the
specification for the CCM cipher (but leave them commented out as
we don't support CCM yet).
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AEAD handling
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DTLS does not support stream ciphers and needs diffrent
handling of the "#ssl_socket{}" handle .
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