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This commit adds a new function, ssl:connection_information/[1,2]
to retrive the connection information from a SSLSocket.
And also, this deprecates a function ssl:connection_info/1, and
reimplements connection_info/1 with the new function.
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This commit adds support for RFC7301, application-layer protocol
negotiation. ALPN is the standard based approach to the NPN
extension, and is required for HTTP/2.
ALPN lives side by side with NPN and provides an equivalent
feature but in this case it is the server that decides what
protocol to use, not the client.
When both ALPN and NPN are sent by a client, and the server is
configured with both ALPN and NPN options, ALPN will always
take precedence. This behavior can also be found in the OpenSSL
implementation of ALPN.
ALPN and NPN share the ssl:negotiated_protocol/1 function for
retrieving the negotiated protocol. The previously existing
function ssl:negotiated_next_protocol/1 still exists, but has
been deprecated and removed from the documentation.
The tests against OpenSSL require OpenSSL version 1.0.2+.
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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Also fix DTLS call to supply its corresponding TLS version
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Negotiated version is now always passed to ssl_handshake:select_hashsign
because ssl_handshake:select_cert_hashsign has different rsa defaults on
tlsv1.2 and older versions.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_record.erl
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in pure DER format.
The incorrect code could cause a memory leek when certs where inputed
in DER.
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The server code erroneously took the list of curves supported by the
client from it's own hello extension, effectively breaking curve
selection all together.
Also the default fallback secp256k1 curve is not supported by
all clients. secp256r1 is recommended as part of the NIST Suite B
cryptographic suites. The chances are much better that all clients
support it, so use that as fallback.
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Also phase in tls module as main API instead of ssl. To
make API clearer. As TLS is the new protocol name.
Maybe keep some API functions in ssl
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
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As the file 'lib/ssl/src/ssl_srp_primes.hrl' only contains a
specification of a `srp_parameters` type that isn't exported and also
isn't referenced anywhere (neither in the code nor in the
documentation), the type specification (and hence the file as well) can
be removed.
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Change API so public_key:generate_key/compute_key are
only called with "public_key arguments" otherwhise crypto functions
can be called explicitly.
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Avoid unneccessary conversion as the input format is an oid (according
to ASN1 spec) we do not need to handle it as an atom in ssl.
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This problem was not caught by the test suites since all PSK and SRP
suites where always tested with certificates. Split those tests into
test with and without certificates.
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follow up enhancments done in commit
e56167dd6ca8d37d26ea7f19933691a3bda41113
Make sure format_error return good strings. Replace confusing legacy atoms
with more descriptive atoms.
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