| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also refactor so that TLS and DTLS can have common functions when possible.
|
|
Common functions will be located in ssl_handshake.erl while
specific functions will be located in tls_handshake.erl and dtls_handshake.erl
|
|
Also phase in tls module as main API instead of ssl. To
make API clearer. As TLS is the new protocol name.
Maybe keep some API functions in ssl
|
|
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.app.src
lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Avoid unneccessary conversion as the input format is an oid (according
to ASN1 spec) we do not need to handle it as an atom in ssl.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use the functions in crypto that we want to keep in the API.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
server key encoding depends to the negotiated key exchange. Before
the encoding was limited to diffie-hellman keys. This changes allows
to select the key structure to decode and verify. It also consolidates
the transport encoding of the parameters into one place.
|
|
ssl_handshake and ssl_connection where doing essentially the same when
checking a public key signature. This unify both into a single function
|
|
SHA-224 is still better than SHA-1, so let the world know we support it
|
|
Types in a record where wrongly type specified, did not include
undefined. Make them comments for now, maybe we will specify internal
records with dialyzer types later, but as the other record fields are
not specified at the moment, with dialyzer types, make the code
consistent.
|
|
more "sense" (be true to the specification).
|
|
* http://technotes.googlecode.com/git/nextprotoneg.html
|
|
utf8 and close down gracefully if other ASN-1 errors occur.
The reason certificate_unknown that is used as ALERT for ASN-1 encoding failure is described as:
Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the
certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
|
|
|
|
|
|
with TLS 1.2 the hash and signature on a certify message can
differ from the defaults. So we have to make sure to always
use the hash and signature algorithm indicated in the
handshake message
|
|
combinations
|
|
This is also avoids triggering some bugs in OpenSSL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TLS 1.2 introduces changes on how signatures
are calculate and encoded. This makes the
signature handling version aware
|
|
|
|
|
|
TLS 1.2 allows to negotiate the used PRF,
additional the default PRF uses a different
hash. This change make the PRF selectable
and hardwires the PRF for TLS < 1.2
|
|
TLS 1.2 changes the layout of several handshake
records. This adds the TLS version to dec_hs/2
so it can decode those.
|
|
TLS 1.2 changed the way digital signatures are
done. key_exchange/3 needs to pass the version
to it.
|
|
TLS/SSL version before 1.2 always used a MD5/SHA combination
for the handshake hashes. With TLS 1.2 the default hash is
SHA256 and it is possible to negotiate a different hash.
This change delays the calculation of the handshake
hashes until they are really needed. At that point the hash
to use should be known.
For now MD5/SHA is still hard coded.
|
|
Only use ssl_manager for selecting new ids to guarantee uniqueness,
but reuse check does not need to be performed by the manager.
|
|
Do not use ssl_manager process for selecting an id. It's unnecessary
to involve the manager process at all on the client side.
|
|
|
|
transport layer need to generate additional application specific
key material. One way to generate such material is to use the TLS
PRF and key material from the TLS session itself.
This change makes it possible to use a TLS sessions PRF either with
the session internal or caller supplied key material to generate
additional key material.
|
|
Background from erlang-questions:
> We use this test suite to verify our PKIX-path-validation code,
> granted we do not yet support CRL-handling but that is on its
> way. Our verify_fun will let you work around the problem that it
> is not yet supported. (Not so fun for you perhaps but a possible
> solution for now).
this is unfortunately not the case since for versions that contain
commit 4dbf3c9e4ae7cfd19b247353369166d31b8f15e5 (it is in R14B04 and
R15B) the documented behaviour (verify_fun will be called for every
certificate) is broken: the verify_fun will only be called, if the
certificate contains unknown extensions.
it is therefore not useful as a CRL workaround (anymore).
best regards
Stefan Grundmann
|
|
The code is refactored and improved to make it easier to insert the
1/n-1 splitting countermeasure Rizzo/Duong-Beast that is really done
in one function clause in ssl:record_split_bin/3
|
|
ets:next needs an explicit safe_fixtable call to be safe, we
rather use ets:foldl and throw to get out of it when we find the
correct entry.
|
