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Also refactor so that TLS and DTLS can have common functions when possible.
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Avoid unneccessary conversion as the input format is an oid (according
to ASN1 spec) we do not need to handle it as an atom in ssl.
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Use the functions in crypto that we want to keep in the API.
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with TLS 1.2 the hash and signature on a certify message can
differ from the defaults. So we have to make sure to always
use the hash and signature algorithm indicated in the
handshake message
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TLS 1.2 introduces changes on how signatures
are calculate and encoded. This makes the
signature handling version aware
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TLS 1.2 allows to negotiate the used PRF,
additional the default PRF uses a different
hash. This change make the PRF selectable
and hardwires the PRF for TLS < 1.2
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TLS/SSL version before 1.2 always used a MD5/SHA combination
for the handshake hashes. With TLS 1.2 the default hash is
SHA256 and it is possible to negotiate a different hash.
This change delays the calculation of the handshake
hashes until they are really needed. At that point the hash
to use should be known.
For now MD5/SHA is still hard coded.
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transport layer need to generate additional application specific
key material. One way to generate such material is to use the TLS
PRF and key material from the TLS session itself.
This change makes it possible to use a TLS sessions PRF either with
the session internal or caller supplied key material to generate
additional key material.
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Data to sign and verify should be inputed as binaries.
Also cleaned up and moved some dialyzer specs.
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Also changed alert to BAD_RECORD_MAC as:
"differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed alerts
may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in TLS
[CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the bad_record_mac
alert to hide the specific type of the error."
Also cleaned up the code and changed a few other alert reasons in
according to alert descriptions in the TLS RFC 4346. And added function
terminate_alert/3 so that we can differentiate between a crash
in ssl (a bug in our code) and a crash in the application using ssl.
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When checking the client certificate verify message the server used
the wrong algorithm identifier to determine the signing algorithm,
causing a function clause error in the public_key application when the
key-exchange algorithm and the public key algorithm of the client
certificate happen to differ.
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Started to improve code documentation by using -spec directive, and
some small refactorings to avoid ugly code.
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New ssl now support client/server-certificates signed by dsa keys.
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