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The actual user of this API is the UDP socket multiplexer which will
be added later.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
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The MSS might change between sending the a flight and possible
resend. We therefore have to be able to fragment the records
differently for resent.
Encoding and fragmenting of handshake record therefor needs to
be done independently.
With this change the handshake is encoded to it's full length
first, then queued to a flight. The fragmentation is handled
during assembly of the flights datagram.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
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Sync initial_state overall functionality with TLS and
add a few DTLS specific initalizers.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
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The flight concept was introduced by DTLS (RFC 4347) to optimize
the packing of DTLS records into UDP packets. This change
implments the flight concept in the the generic SSL connection
logic and add the queue logic to the TLS and DTLS stack.
The DTLS required resend handling is not implemented yet.
While the flight handling is only required for DTSL, it turns
out that the same mechanism can be usefull to TCP based TLS as
well.
With the current scheme each TLS record will be mapped into a
separate TCP frame. This causes more TCP frames to be generate
that necessary. On fast network this will have no impact, but
reducing the number of frames and thereby the number of
round trips can result in significant speedups on slow and
unreliable networks.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
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available_signature_algs is also needed for DTLS, move it
into a shared place and export it.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake.erl
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* ingela/ssl/crl-find-issuer/OTP-13656:
ssl: Propagate error so that public_key crl validation process continues correctly and determines what should happen.
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correctly and determines what should happen.
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These functions call getstat on the underlying TCP socket.
The only way to do this before now was to use a hack, either
by looking inside the #sslsocket{} record directly, or by
not using the SSL listen/accept functions and upgrading
from a TCP socket that is kept around for the purpose of
calling getstat later on.
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* ingela/ssl/unexpected-client-cert/OTP-13651:
ssl: Reject unrequested client cert
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* ingela/ssl/max-session-table/OTP-13490:
ssl: Mitigate load increase when the whole session table is invalidated
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ssl servers can recognize sslv2 client hellos to interop with clients
that support higher version of SSL/TLS but also offers sslv2
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
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* ingela/ssl/DH/OTP-13636:
ssl: Stronger default DH prime
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* legoscia/ssl/tls-dist-more-opts/PR-956/OTP-13429:
Quote curly brackets in command line options
Avoid disappearing ETS tables in ssl_dist_SUITE
Fix db handle for TLS distribution crl_cache opts
Fix ssl_dist_SUITE logging on Windows
More logging in ssl_dist_SUITE
TLS distribution: crl_check and crl_cache options
Allow passing verify_fun for TLS distribution
More informative malformed_ssl_dist_opt error
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gen_tcp:recv allows this, and if you're doing something like
Transport:recv(Socket, 0, 0), TCP will work and SSL will exit with
function_clause
There were other cases of this throughout the module. This PR cleans
them all up.
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We do not want error reports that can leek secret information
into the logs.
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There are a lot of cases where `ssl` application just returns unhelpful
`handshake failure` or `internal error`. This patch tries to provide
better diagnostics so operator can debug his SSL misconfiguration
without doing hardcore erlang debugging.
Here is an example escript that incorrectly uses server certificate as a
client one:
https://gist.github.com/binarin/35c34c2df7556bf04c8a878682ef3d67
With the patch it is properly reported as an error in "extended key
usage".
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* kennethlakin/beast-mitigation-options/PR-1041/OTP-13629:
ssl: Add BEAST mitigation selection option
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Some legacy TLS 1.0 software does not tolerate the 1/n-1 content
split BEAST mitigation technique. This commit adds a beast_mitigation
SSL option (defaulting to one_n_minus_one) to select or disable the
BEAST mitigation technique.
Valid option values are (one_n_minus_one | zero_n | disabled).
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If the -epmd_module flag has been specified on the command line, use
that module to register and look up node names instead of the default,
erl_epmd.
Also document this option.
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Turns out we can not count on the "hashsigns" sent by the client and
the supported "hashigns" sets to have required properties of ordsets.
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* kennethlakin/tls-use-negotiated-prf/PR-1042/OTP-13546:
ssl: Use cipher suite's PRF in prf/5
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Use the negotiated cipher suite's PRF algorithm in calls to
ssl:prf/5, rather than a hard-coded one.
For TLS 1.0 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to MD5/SHA1. This
was correct 100% of the time.
For TLS 1.1 and 1.2 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to SHA256.
This was correct only some of the time for TLS 1.2 and none of the
time for TLS 1.1. Because the TLS handshake code calls tls_v1:prf/5
through another path, the handshaking process used the negotiated
PRF and did not encounter this bug.
A new test (prf) has been added to ssl_basic_SUITE to guard against future
breakage.
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DTLS is not in working mode yet, but the gen_statem rewrite should make
completion easier.
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Also reduce timing issues in tests
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* ingela/ssl-max-session-table/OTP-13490:
ssl: Adjust max table to work as expected from documentation
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* ingela/ssl/signature_algs_bug:
ssl: Correct guard expression
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* ingela/ssl/cipher_suites:
ssl: Correct cipher suites conversion
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The guard should check that the TLS version is at least TLS-1.2.
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Correct conversion errors form commit d2381e1a8d7cd54f7dc0a5105d172460b005a8fb
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Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_v1.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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* ingela/ssl/config-signature-algs/OTP-13261:
ssl: Prepare for release
ssl: Add option signature_algs
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It was not possible to mix ssl 3 and 4 tuple cipher suites in the
ciphers option.
Some ssl_cipher:suite/1 clauses wrongly returned 3-tuples that
should have been 4 tuples
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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ssl already used crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 for most operations as
its use cases are mostly cryptographical. Now crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1
will be used everywhere.
However crypto:rand_bytes/1 was used as fallback if
crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 throws low_entropy, this
will no longer be the case. This is a potential incompatibility.
The fallback was introduced a long time ago for interoperability reasons.
Now days this should not be a problem, and if it is, the security
compromise is not acceptable anyway.
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It was not possible to mix ssl 3 and 4 tuple cipher suites in the
ciphers option.
Some ssl_cipher:suite/1 clauses wrongly returned 3-tuples that
should have been 4 tuples
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The session table max size should be the configurable value Max and
not Max + 1.
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* henrik/update-copyrightyear:
update copyright-year
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