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This commit adds a new function, ssl:connection_information/[1,2]
to retrive the connection information from a SSLSocket.
And also, this deprecates a function ssl:connection_info/1, and
reimplements connection_info/1 with the new function.
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pre TLS 1.2 server should ignore the signature_algorithms extension.
The server code would attempt to select the signature/hash algorithm
even when using TLS 1.0 or 1.1. Instead it should simply use the default
algorithm on those versions.
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4e0a5e36b38e3f15ed8f7d700d26f2424a47111c
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This commit adds support for RFC7301, application-layer protocol
negotiation. ALPN is the standard based approach to the NPN
extension, and is required for HTTP/2.
ALPN lives side by side with NPN and provides an equivalent
feature but in this case it is the server that decides what
protocol to use, not the client.
When both ALPN and NPN are sent by a client, and the server is
configured with both ALPN and NPN options, ALPN will always
take precedence. This behavior can also be found in the OpenSSL
implementation of ALPN.
ALPN and NPN share the ssl:negotiated_protocol/1 function for
retrieving the negotiated protocol. The previously existing
function ssl:negotiated_next_protocol/1 still exists, but has
been deprecated and removed from the documentation.
The tests against OpenSSL require OpenSSL version 1.0.2+.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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Correct mistake
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For comparison with file time stamps os:timestamp makes more sense
and is present in 17 as well as 18.
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/doc/src/ssl_app.xml
lib/ssl/src/ssl_manager.erl
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The PEM cache is now validated by a background process, instead of
always keeping it if it is small enough and clearing it otherwhiss.
That strategy required that small caches where cleared by API function
if a file changes on disk.
However document the clearing API function as it can still be usefull.
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A selfsigned trusted anchor should not be in the certifcate chain passed to
the certificate path validation.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_certificate.erl
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disable option
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disable option
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
lib/ssl/src/ssl_record.erl
lib/ssl/src/tls_record.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_cipher_SUITE.erl
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Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
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* ia/ssl/seperate-clinet-server-session-table/OTP-11365:
ssl: Separate session cache for client and server
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Even though in the most common case an erlang node will not be both client
and server, it may happen (for instance when running the erlang ditribution
over TLS).
Also try to mitigate the affect of dumb clients that could cause a
very lagre session cache on the client side that can cause long delays
in the client. The server will have other means to handle a large
session table and will not do any select operations on it anyhow.
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OTP-12200
* matwey/makefile:
Cleanup parse_transform modules in eunit
Cleanup behaviour modules in ssl
Cleanup behaviour modules in ssh
Fix a typo in clean section of otp_mibs makefile
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Check that the certificate chain ends with a trusted ROOT CA e.i. a
self-signed certificate, but provide an option partial_chain to
enable the application to define an intermediat CA as trusted.
TLS RFC says:
"unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal."
and also states:
"certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of certificates. The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case."
X509 RFC says:
"The selection of a trust anchor is a matter of policy: it could be
the top CA in a hierarchical PKI, the CA that issued the verifier's
own certificate(s), or any other CA in a network PKI. The path
validation procedure is the same regardless of the choice of trust
anchor. In addition, different applications may rely on different
trust anchors, or may accept paths that begin with any of a set of
trust anchors."
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When dealing with older certificates that does not indicate its signer
with a certificate extension, we must search the database for the issure.
Finding the issuer is not enough, we need to verify the signature
with the key in the found issuer cert.
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FROM TLS 1.2 RFC:
The interaction of the certificate_types and
supported_signature_algorithms fields is somewhat complicated.
certificate_types has been present in TLS since SSLv3, but was
somewhat underspecified. Much of its functionality is superseded by
supported_signature_algorithms. The following rules apply:
- Any certificates provided by the client MUST be signed using a
hash/signature algorithm pair found in
supported_signature_algorithms.
- The end-entity certificate provided by the client MUST contain a
key that is compatible with certificate_types. If the key is a
signature key, it MUST be usable with some hash/signature
algorithm pair in supported_signature_algorithms.
- For historical reasons, the names of some client certificate types
include the algorithm used to sign the certificate. For example,
in earlier versions of TLS, rsa_fixed_dh meant a certificate
signed with RSA and containing a static DH key. In TLS 1.2, this
functionality has been obsoleted by the
supported_signature_algorithms, and the certificate type no longer
restricts the algorithm used to sign the certificate. For
example, if the server sends dss_fixed_dh certificate type and
{{sha1, dsa}, {sha1, rsa}} signature types, the client MAY reply
with a certificate containing a static DH key, signed with RSA-
SHA1.
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