| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
Use the negotiated cipher suite's PRF algorithm in calls to
ssl:prf/5, rather than a hard-coded one.
For TLS 1.0 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to MD5/SHA1. This
was correct 100% of the time.
For TLS 1.1 and 1.2 the PRF algorithm was hard-coded to SHA256.
This was correct only some of the time for TLS 1.2 and none of the
time for TLS 1.1. Because the TLS handshake code calls tls_v1:prf/5
through another path, the handshaking process used the negotiated
PRF and did not encounter this bug.
A new test (prf) has been added to ssl_basic_SUITE to guard against future
breakage.
|
|
* ingela/ssl-gen-statem/OTP-13464:
ssl: Adapt DTLS to gen_statem
ssl: Use gen_statem instead of gen_fsm
|
|
Active option was not handled correctly in all places. Dead code has
been removed.
|
|
Also reduce timing issues in tests
|
|
Correct conversion errors form commit d2381e1a8d7cd54f7dc0a5105d172460b005a8fb
|
|
It was not possible to mix ssl 3 and 4 tuple cipher suites in the
ciphers option.
Some ssl_cipher:suite/1 clauses wrongly returned 3-tuples that
should have been 4 tuples
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
|
|
ssl already used crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 for most operations as
its use cases are mostly cryptographical. Now crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1
will be used everywhere.
However crypto:rand_bytes/1 was used as fallback if
crypto:strong_rand_bytes/1 throws low_entropy, this
will no longer be the case. This is a potential incompatibility.
The fallback was introduced a long time ago for interoperability reasons.
Now days this should not be a problem, and if it is, the security
compromise is not acceptable anyway.
|
|
* henrik/update-copyrightyear:
update copyright-year
|
|
In TLS-1.2 The signature algorithm and the hash function algorithm
used to produce the digest that is used when creating the digital signature
may be negotiated through the signature algorithm extension RFC 5246.
We want to make these algorithm pairs configurable.
In connections using lower versions of TLS these algorithms are
implicit defined and can not be negotiated or configured.
DTLS is updated to not cause dialyzer errors, but needs to get a real
implementation later.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* legoscia/crl-check-without-dp:
Be suspicious of certificates without CRL DPs
Refactor ssl_crl_SUITE: extract crl_verify_error/6
OTP-13378
|
|
* legoscia/critical-extension-verify-none:
ssl: with verify_none, accept critical extensions
OTP-13377
|
|
|
|
Older SSL/TLS versions have cipher suites
that look like {key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash()}
and the hash function used by the PRF (Pseudo Random function)
is implicit and always the same for that protocol version.
In TLS 1.2 a cipher suite is
{key_exchange(), cipher(), MAC::hash(), PRF::hash()}.
Internally a cipher suite is always a four tuple but
for backwards compatibility older cipher suites
will be presented as a three tuples, however new cipher suites
should be presented as four tuples.
|
|
Make sure that options only relevant for one role (client|server) is set
to undefined when the other role is invoked. As there are many options to
ssl, and many are optional, we choose to filter out all undefined options
to avoid overwhelming the user with not relevant information.
This way there is no need for any special handling of the role specific options
which is also nice.
|
|
* ia/ssl/remove-default-DES/OTP-13195:
ssl: Remove DES ciphers from default configuration
|
|
DES is not considered secure.
Also correct 'Server Name Indication' support description.
|
|
* bjorn/remove-test_server/OTP-12705:
Remove test_server as a standalone application
Erlang mode for Emacs: Include ct.hrl instead test_server.hrl
Remove out-commented references to the test_server applications
Makefiles: Remove test_server from include path and code path
Eliminate use of test_server.hrl and test_server_line.hrl
|
|
Previously, if certificate revocation checking was turned on, and a
certificate didn't contain a CRL Distribution Points extension, and
there was no relevant CRL in the cache, then ssl_handshake:crl_check
would accept the certificate even if the crl_check option was set to
reject certificates for which the revocation status could not be
determined. With this change, such certificates will only be accepted
if the crl_check option was set to best_effort.
The process for CRL validation is described in section 6.3 of RFC
5280. The text doesn't mention any special treatment to be given to
certificates without distribution points: it just says "For each
distribution point..." (section 6.3.3), which would leave the
revocation status undetermined, unless there were "any available CRLs
not specified in a distribution point but issued by the certificate
issuer". Thus the result of this algorithm should be UNDETERMINED in
this case, not UNREVOKED, and the crl_check option should govern how
the implementation reacts to this result.
|
|
When establishing a TLS connection with {verify, verify_none}, if the
server has a certificate with a critical extension, for example a
"Netscape Cert Type" extension, certificate verification would fail,
which is surprising given that the name of the option suggests that no
verification would be performed.
With this change, certificate extensions marked as critical are
ignored when using verify_none.
|
|
Since no test suites includede test_server.hrl, there is no need
to have test_server in the include path or code path.
|
|
|
|
* ia/pr/958/OTP-13334:
ssl: verify cert signature against original cert binary
|
|
|
|
OTP-13311
* sverk/ecc-fixes:
Ensure testing ssl with supported ciphers only
Only use supported EC curves in crypto tests
Check the result of EC_GROUP_new_curve_* calls
|
|
When searching for a certificate's issuer in the `CertDB`, verify the signature
against the original DER certificate from the handshake instead of a re-encoding
of the parsed certificate. This avoids false negatives due to differences
between DER encoding implementations of OTP and other platforms.
|
|
|
|
* legoscia/tls-dist-connect-options:
ssl_dist_SUITE: don't use deprecated functions
TLS distribution: support inet_dist_connect_options
OTP-13285
|
|
There are two problematic areas: EC curve selection and
interoperability tests with OpenSSL.
The tests shouldn't assume any particular EC curve is available, but
should always check the list of curves reported by
tls_v1:ecc_curves/1.
And during interoperability tests the tests shouldn't assume that any
cipher suite supported by Erlang is also supported by OpenSSL. There
are OpenSSL packages where the command line openssl tool only supports
a subset of the ciphers available in libcrypto. The actual list of
supported cipher suites thus shall be queried from OpenSSL.
|
|
Just like crl_verify_valid/5 checks for a positive result given
certain options, crl_verify_error/6 checks for a negative result.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As sslv3 is being faced out we need to test for old version support as well as
newer versions.
|
|
Use erlang:unique_integer/1 instead of erlang:now/0 to generate a
unique node name.
Use rand:uniform/1 instead of random:uniform/1, so we don't need to
generate a seed ourselves.
|
|
Allow adding extra options for outgoing TLS distribution connnections,
as supported for plain TCP connections.
|
|
|
|
* ia/libressl:
ssl: Print openssl version string
ssl: Do not use environment variables in openSSL config file
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LibreSSL does not allow it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
