| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
Transport accepted sockets that are in the error state, was not closed
properly.
|
|
* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
inets: Prepare for release
inets: Improve error handling
|
|
* ingela/ssl/engine-vs-certfile/ERLERL-211/OTP-15193:
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
|
|
|
|
IngelaAndin/ingela/ssl/unexpected-call/ERL-664/OTP-15174
ssl: Improve error handling
|
|
|
|
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
|
|
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
|
|
Failing to recognize psk as an anonymous key exchange would fail the connection
when trying to decode an undefined certificate.
|
|
|
|
The Key Usage extension is described in section 4.2.1.3 of X.509, with the following possible flags:
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
In SSL/TLS, when the server certificate contains a RSA key, then:
either a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite is used, in which case the RSA key
is used for a signature (see section 7.4.3 of RFC 5246: the "Server
Key Exchange" message); this exercises the digitalSignature key usage;
or "plain RSA" is used, with a random value (the 48-byte pre-master
secret) being encrypted by the client with the server's public key
(see section 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246); this is right in the definition of
the keyEncipherment key usage flag.
dataEncipherment does not apply, because what is encrypted is not
directly meaningful data, but a value which is mostly generated
randomly and used to derive symmetric keys. keyAgreement does not
apply either, because that one is for key agreement algorithms which
are not a case of asymmetric encryption (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). The
keyAgreement usage flag would appear in a certificate which contains a
DH key, not a RSA key. nonRepudiation is not used, because whatever is
signed as part of a SSL/TLS key exchange cannot be used as proof for a
third party (there is nothing in a SSL/TLS tunnel that the client
could record and then use to convince a judge when tring to sue the
server itself; the data which is exchanged within the tunnel is not
signed by the server).
When a ECDSA key is used then "keyAgreement" flag is needed for beeing
ECDH "capable" (as opposed to ephemeral ECDHE)
|
|
ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
|
|
Fix test case code to use keyAgreement for ECDH_ECDSA
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl
|
|
When test handling was corrected it was obvious that DTLS ECC handling
was not compleated.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/test/Makefile
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
|
|
When doing ssl:controlling_process on a ssl socket that has not
performed the TLS/DTLS handshake that call will succeed even though
the documentation stated otherwise. However if some other ssl option
was incorrect the call would hang. Now {error, closed} will be
returned in the latter case, which is logical independent on if it
should succeed or not in the former case. The former case will continue
to succeed, as it is not dependent of the TLS/DTLS connection being
established, and the documentation is altered slightly to not
explicitly disallow it. If the TLS/DTLS connection later fails and
the socket mode is active, the new controlling process will be
notified as expected.
|
|
IngelaAndin/ingela/ssl/no-ca-sign-restriction-TLS-1.2/ERL-381/OTP-15173
Ingela/ssl/no ca sign restriction tls 1.2/erl 381/otp 15173
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* ingela/ssl/21-enhanchment:
ssl: Add handle_continue/2 and document enhancements
|
|
* deprecation of ssl:ssl_accept/[1,2,3]
* deprecation of ssl:cipher_suites/[0,1]
* More consistent naming
|
|
* ingela/ssl/test-ecdh-check:
ssl: Update interop conditions
|
|
|
|
* peterdmv/ssl/suite_to_str/ERL-600/OTP-15106:
ssl: Add new API function suite_to_str/1
Change-Id: Icf214ece4e1d281da12b02dadc63d4a2ca346563
|
|
Add new API function for converting cipher suite maps
to their textual representation.
Change-Id: I43681930b38e0f3bdb4dfccbf9e8895aa2d6a281
|
|
* raimo/better-TLS-distribution/OTP-15058:
Test nodename whitelist
Use public_key to verify client hostname
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Key Usage extension is described in section 4.2.1.3 of X.509, with the following possible flags:
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
In SSL/TLS, when the server certificate contains a RSA key, then:
either a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite is used, in which case the RSA key
is used for a signature (see section 7.4.3 of RFC 5246: the "Server
Key Exchange" message); this exercises the digitalSignature key usage;
or "plain RSA" is used, with a random value (the 48-byte pre-master
secret) being encrypted by the client with the server's public key
(see section 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246); this is right in the definition of
the keyEncipherment key usage flag.
dataEncipherment does not apply, because what is encrypted is not
directly meaningful data, but a value which is mostly generated
randomly and used to derive symmetric keys. keyAgreement does not
apply either, because that one is for key agreement algorithms which
are not a case of asymmetric encryption (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). The
keyAgreement usage flag would appear in a certificate which contains a
DH key, not a RSA key. nonRepudiation is not used, because whatever is
signed as part of a SSL/TLS key exchange cannot be used as proof for a
third party (there is nothing in a SSL/TLS tunnel that the client
could record and then use to convince a judge when tring to sue the
server itself; the data which is exchanged within the tunnel is not
signed by the server).
When a ECDSA key is used then "keyAgreement" flag is needed for beeing
ECDH "capable" (as opposed to ephemeral ECDHE)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Depending on context trap_exit flag may be set or not.
So always set trap_exit and consume the EXIT signal and then set it back.
|
|
ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.
|
|
Fix test case code to use keyAgreement for ECDH_ECDSA
|
|
|
|
* raimo/better-TLS-distribution/OTP-14969:
Fix distro CRL test cases short vs long names
Allow check for node name
Move check ip to before SSL handshake
Check client IP from server
Parse cert primarily for host names
Open for host and node allow list
Create plug-in for distro cert nodes
Rewrite TLS dist to handle node names in certs
Improve node allowed check
|
|
* ingela/ssl/test-cuddle:
ssl: Handle EXIT messages from test code correctly
|
|
|
|
answer to a certificate request
Solves ERL-599
|
|
answer to a certificate request
Solves ERL-599
|
|
|
|
|
