Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Modernize test case option handling
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No need for this test case to set a specific cipher suite. An appropriate cipher suite
will be negotiated and it will of course be the same for clients with the same configuration.
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* peterdmv/ssl/fix-crl-suite:
ssl: Fix CRL suite with openssl-1.1.1a
Change-Id: I2847107b6cf0210c3002c016a6ba49288505d06f
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Remove rizzo rests that made incorrect assumptions
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Later versions of openssl do not support negative integers for
CRL due time (used for negative testing).
As a workaround this commit implements a function that can set
CRL due time in seconds and makes the testcase
'crl_hash_dir_expired' sleep for one second.
Change-Id: I2ef8b3c6ee545bd09170fa6027cb9ca38cfb42c0
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* peterdmv/ssl/fix-srp-encode-decode/ERL-790/OTP-15477:
ssl: Fix encoding/decoding of the SRP extension
Change-Id: Iee3276a60041a2c04c89385b2de2edb1cd81babd
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The encoded value of the SRP extension length was bigger than the
actual length of the extension. This could cause interoperability
problems with third party SSL implementations.
This commit corrects the encoding and decoding of the SRP extension
length.
Change-Id: I78d118faab7f5d02b755a7d1e2e8561b86f5a15c
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New internal active N changed timing, and
new check is needed.
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Both test case and code needed updates to work as intended. Code needed update due to
new tls_sender process and the test case gave false positive reusult erarlier probably
due to beeing to sloopy in order to avoid timeouts.
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State values created at init
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Cipher test case also needed updating to handle streams correctly
We should not rizzo test chacha20_poly1305
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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packet raw is a stream, test code manged it packet oriented in
the function active_raw.
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Both test case and code needed updates to work as intended. Code needed update due to
new tls_sender process and the test case gave false positive reusult erarlier probably
due to beeing to sloopy in order to avoid timeouts.
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State values created at init
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* raimo/ssl/tls_dist-profiling:
Improve benchmark
Implement print on other node
Fix compiler warnings
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* ingela/ssl/test-cuddle-ssl_basic_SUITE:
ssl: Correct test case
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When internaly using active N, bugs in shutdown implementation where reveled.
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Make next_record an internal help function to next_event and avoid
duplicate calls to tls_socket:setopts for setting the active option.
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We need to test the Engine interface not only for loading, key retrieval and hashing,
so it is complemented with a fake rsa method to check sign/verify also.
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with handshake
Fix of commit 68d9244ae33e5eea36250c3bb9ffe046a4db5647
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other purposes than handshaking
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If the socket option is set to {packet, 1|2|3|4} sender process needs to
add a packet length header. If packet is changed with ssl:setopts/2 this needs
to be communicated to tls_sender.
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With the new TLS sender process, solving ERL-622, TLS ALERTs sent in
the connection state must be encrypted and sent by the TLS sender
process. This to make sure that the correct encryption state is used
to encode the ALERTS. Care must also be taken to ensure a graceful
close down behavior both for normal shutdown and downgrading from TLS
to TCP.
The original TR ERL-738 is verified by cowboy tests, and close down
behavior by our tests. However we alas have not been able to yet
create a minimal test case for the originating problem.
Also it seems it has become less likely that we run in to the TCP
delivery problem, that is the guarantee is only on transport level,
not application level. Keep work around function in ssl_test_lib but
we can have better test as long as we do not get to much wobbling
tests.
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If the peer sends an incomplete chain that we can reconstruct with
our known CA-certs it will be accepted.
We will assume that the peer honors the protocol and sends an orded
chain, however if validation fails we will try to order the chain in
case it was unorded. Will also handle that extraneous cert where present.
See Note form RFC 8446
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however,
some implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes
send both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional
purposes, and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these
cases can nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum
compatibility, all implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle
potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any
TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which
MUST be first.
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Before only some PSK suites would be correctly negotiated and most PSK
ciphers suites would fail the connection.
PSK cipher suites are anonymous in the sense that they do not use
certificates except for rsa_psk.
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Separate sending and receiving when using TCP as transport
as prim_inet:send may block which in turn may result
in a deadlock between two Erlang processes communicating over
TLS, this is especially likely to happen when running Erlang distribution
over TLS.
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The conversion code for different representations of cipher suites
is long an repetitive. We want to hide it in a module that does not
have other functions that we like to look at.
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* ingela/ssl/ERL-686/OTP-15224:
ssl: Error handling improvment
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Update release notes
Update version numbers
crypto: Fix crash in compute_key(ecdh, ...) on badarg
Relax add_table_copy restriction
Fixed #Ref ordering bug
Test #Ref ordering in lists and ets
Do NOT disc_load from ram_copies when master_node is set
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
ssl: Correct handling of empty server SNI extension
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* ingela/ssl/empty-sni/OTP-15168:
ssl: Correct handling of empty server SNI extension
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* ingela/maint/ssl/ECC/ERIERL-210/OTP-15203:
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
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The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
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Transport accepted sockets that are in the error state, was not closed
properly.
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The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
inets: Prepare for release
inets: Improve error handling
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