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We need to test the Engine interface not only for loading, key retrieval and hashing,
so it is complemented with a fake rsa method to check sign/verify also.
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with handshake
Fix of commit 68d9244ae33e5eea36250c3bb9ffe046a4db5647
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other purposes than handshaking
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If the socket option is set to {packet, 1|2|3|4} sender process needs to
add a packet length header. If packet is changed with ssl:setopts/2 this needs
to be communicated to tls_sender.
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With the new TLS sender process, solving ERL-622, TLS ALERTs sent in
the connection state must be encrypted and sent by the TLS sender
process. This to make sure that the correct encryption state is used
to encode the ALERTS. Care must also be taken to ensure a graceful
close down behavior both for normal shutdown and downgrading from TLS
to TCP.
The original TR ERL-738 is verified by cowboy tests, and close down
behavior by our tests. However we alas have not been able to yet
create a minimal test case for the originating problem.
Also it seems it has become less likely that we run in to the TCP
delivery problem, that is the guarantee is only on transport level,
not application level. Keep work around function in ssl_test_lib but
we can have better test as long as we do not get to much wobbling
tests.
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If the peer sends an incomplete chain that we can reconstruct with
our known CA-certs it will be accepted.
We will assume that the peer honors the protocol and sends an orded
chain, however if validation fails we will try to order the chain in
case it was unorded. Will also handle that extraneous cert where present.
See Note form RFC 8446
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however,
some implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes
send both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional
purposes, and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these
cases can nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum
compatibility, all implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle
potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any
TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which
MUST be first.
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Before only some PSK suites would be correctly negotiated and most PSK
ciphers suites would fail the connection.
PSK cipher suites are anonymous in the sense that they do not use
certificates except for rsa_psk.
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Separate sending and receiving when using TCP as transport
as prim_inet:send may block which in turn may result
in a deadlock between two Erlang processes communicating over
TLS, this is especially likely to happen when running Erlang distribution
over TLS.
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The conversion code for different representations of cipher suites
is long an repetitive. We want to hide it in a module that does not
have other functions that we like to look at.
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* ingela/ssl/ERL-686/OTP-15224:
ssl: Error handling improvment
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Update release notes
Update version numbers
crypto: Fix crash in compute_key(ecdh, ...) on badarg
Relax add_table_copy restriction
Fixed #Ref ordering bug
Test #Ref ordering in lists and ets
Do NOT disc_load from ram_copies when master_node is set
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
ssl: Correct handling of empty server SNI extension
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* ingela/ssl/empty-sni/OTP-15168:
ssl: Correct handling of empty server SNI extension
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* ingela/maint/ssl/ECC/ERIERL-210/OTP-15203:
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
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The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
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Transport accepted sockets that are in the error state, was not closed
properly.
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The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
inets: Prepare for release
inets: Improve error handling
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* ingela/ssl/engine-vs-certfile/ERLERL-211/OTP-15193:
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
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IngelaAndin/ingela/ssl/unexpected-call/ERL-664/OTP-15174
ssl: Improve error handling
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
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Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
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Failing to recognize psk as an anonymous key exchange would fail the connection
when trying to decode an undefined certificate.
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The Key Usage extension is described in section 4.2.1.3 of X.509, with the following possible flags:
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
In SSL/TLS, when the server certificate contains a RSA key, then:
either a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite is used, in which case the RSA key
is used for a signature (see section 7.4.3 of RFC 5246: the "Server
Key Exchange" message); this exercises the digitalSignature key usage;
or "plain RSA" is used, with a random value (the 48-byte pre-master
secret) being encrypted by the client with the server's public key
(see section 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246); this is right in the definition of
the keyEncipherment key usage flag.
dataEncipherment does not apply, because what is encrypted is not
directly meaningful data, but a value which is mostly generated
randomly and used to derive symmetric keys. keyAgreement does not
apply either, because that one is for key agreement algorithms which
are not a case of asymmetric encryption (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). The
keyAgreement usage flag would appear in a certificate which contains a
DH key, not a RSA key. nonRepudiation is not used, because whatever is
signed as part of a SSL/TLS key exchange cannot be used as proof for a
third party (there is nothing in a SSL/TLS tunnel that the client
could record and then use to convince a judge when tring to sue the
server itself; the data which is exchanged within the tunnel is not
signed by the server).
When a ECDSA key is used then "keyAgreement" flag is needed for beeing
ECDH "capable" (as opposed to ephemeral ECDHE)
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ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
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Fix test case code to use keyAgreement for ECDH_ECDSA
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl
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When test handling was corrected it was obvious that DTLS ECC handling
was not compleated.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/test/Makefile
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
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When doing ssl:controlling_process on a ssl socket that has not
performed the TLS/DTLS handshake that call will succeed even though
the documentation stated otherwise. However if some other ssl option
was incorrect the call would hang. Now {error, closed} will be
returned in the latter case, which is logical independent on if it
should succeed or not in the former case. The former case will continue
to succeed, as it is not dependent of the TLS/DTLS connection being
established, and the documentation is altered slightly to not
explicitly disallow it. If the TLS/DTLS connection later fails and
the socket mode is active, the new controlling process will be
notified as expected.
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IngelaAndin/ingela/ssl/no-ca-sign-restriction-TLS-1.2/ERL-381/OTP-15173
Ingela/ssl/no ca sign restriction tls 1.2/erl 381/otp 15173
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* ingela/ssl/21-enhanchment:
ssl: Add handle_continue/2 and document enhancements
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* deprecation of ssl:ssl_accept/[1,2,3]
* deprecation of ssl:cipher_suites/[0,1]
* More consistent naming
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* ingela/ssl/test-ecdh-check:
ssl: Update interop conditions
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* peterdmv/ssl/suite_to_str/ERL-600/OTP-15106:
ssl: Add new API function suite_to_str/1
Change-Id: Icf214ece4e1d281da12b02dadc63d4a2ca346563
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Add new API function for converting cipher suite maps
to their textual representation.
Change-Id: I43681930b38e0f3bdb4dfccbf9e8895aa2d6a281
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