Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
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* ingela/ssl/rsa-kex-engine/ERIERL-268/OTP-15420:
ssl: Add engine handling clause to RSA key exchange
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* maint-20:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
Optimize operator '--' and yield on large inputs
Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
erts/doc/src/notes.xml
erts/emulator/beam/erl_alloc.types
erts/emulator/beam/erl_bif_lists.c
erts/vsn.mk
lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/ssl/vsn.mk
lib/stdlib/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/stdlib/vsn.mk
make/otp_version_tickets
otp_versions.table
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Could cause renegotiation to fail
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with handshake
Fix of commit 68d9244ae33e5eea36250c3bb9ffe046a4db5647
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* ingela/ssl/deliver-all-data-at-close/ERL-731/OTP-15412:
ssl: Extend check for undelivered data at closing
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This is a timing related bug that alas is hard to test
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other purposes than handshaking
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ssl: fix timezone-related bug in ssl_pem_cache
OTP-15402
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Fix the default implementation of address_please
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Caught with unit test in ssl_pem_cache_SUITE.
When local timezone is PST (Pacific Standard Time), PEM cache was not evicting
expired entries due to file time converstion was done using
calendar:now_to_datetime, while file modification time is actually in local time.
Use os:system_time() to align with file_info modified time.
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TLS-1.3 needs to handle AEAD inputs diffrently than previous versions.
Refactor code to facilitate TLS-1.3 additions.
Change CHACHA20_POLY1305 NONCE to match RFC 7905. This will be
important later when we fix interop with TLS compatible crypto
invocation.
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* maint-21:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
erts: Fix UNC path handling on Windows
erts: Fix a compiler warning
eldap: Fix race at socket close
Fix bug for sockopt pktoptions on BSD
erts: Fix memory leak on file read errors
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maint
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/tls_sender.erl
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If the socket option is set to {packet, 1|2|3|4} sender process needs to
add a packet length header. If packet is changed with ssl:setopts/2 this needs
to be communicated to tls_sender.
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With the new TLS sender process, solving ERL-622, TLS ALERTs sent in
the connection state must be encrypted and sent by the TLS sender
process. This to make sure that the correct encryption state is used
to encode the ALERTS. Care must also be taken to ensure a graceful
close down behavior both for normal shutdown and downgrading from TLS
to TCP.
The original TR ERL-738 is verified by cowboy tests, and close down
behavior by our tests. However we alas have not been able to yet
create a minimal test case for the originating problem.
Also it seems it has become less likely that we run in to the TCP
delivery problem, that is the guarantee is only on transport level,
not application level. Keep work around function in ssl_test_lib but
we can have better test as long as we do not get to much wobbling
tests.
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If the socket option is set to {packet, 1|2|3|4} sender process needs to
add a packet length header. If packet is changed with ssl:setopts/2 this needs
to be communicated to tls_sender.
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With the new TLS sender process, solving ERL-622, TLS ALERTs sent in
the connection state must be encrypted and sent by the TLS sender
process. This to make sure that the correct encryption state is used
to encode the ALERTS. Care must also be taken to ensure a graceful
close down behavior both for normal shutdown and downgrading from TLS
to TCP.
The original TR ERL-738 is verified by cowboy tests, and close down
behavior by our tests. However we alas have not been able to yet
create a minimal test case for the originating problem.
Also it seems it has become less likely that we run in to the TCP
delivery problem, that is the guarantee is only on transport level,
not application level. Keep work around function in ssl_test_lib but
we can have better test as long as we do not get to much wobbling
tests.
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The link should be between the connection process and the tls_sender
process. But the start of the tls_sender process needs to be done
by the process that also starts the connection process in order to
correctly create the opaque #ssl_socket{}.
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If the peer sends an incomplete chain that we can reconstruct with
our known CA-certs it will be accepted.
We will assume that the peer honors the protocol and sends an orded
chain, however if validation fails we will try to order the chain in
case it was unorded. Will also handle that extraneous cert where present.
See Note form RFC 8446
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however,
some implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes
send both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional
purposes, and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these
cases can nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum
compatibility, all implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle
potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any
TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which
MUST be first.
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Before only some PSK suites would be correctly negotiated and most PSK
ciphers suites would fail the connection.
PSK cipher suites are anonymous in the sense that they do not use
certificates except for rsa_psk.
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* ingela/ssl/send-recv-dead-lock/ERL-622:
ssl: Improve close handling
ssl: Adopt distribution over TLS to use new sender process
ssl: Add new sender process for TLS state machine
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* hans/ssl/dialyzer_crypto_typed/OTP-15271:
ssl: Fix dialyzer errors detected when crypto.erl is typed
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We want to make sure that the sender process that may get stuck in
prim_inet:send will die if the tls_connection process is
terminated. And we also like to make sure that it terminates as
gracefully as possible. So when the tls_connection process dies it
spawns a killer process that will brutaly kill the sender if it is
unresponsive and does not terminate due to its monitor of the
tls_connetion process triggering.
When the sender process also acts as distribution controller it
may also have other processess that it is linked with that it
should bring down or that could bring the connection down.
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Separate sending and receiving when using TCP as transport
as prim_inet:send may block which in turn may result
in a deadlock between two Erlang processes communicating over
TLS, this is especially likely to happen when running Erlang distribution
over TLS.
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* maint-21:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
Updated the engine load functionality
inets: Prepare for release
inets: Use status code 501 when no mod_* handles the request
ssl: Prepare for release
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
ssl: Make sure that a correct cipher suite is selected
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The conversion code for different representations of cipher suites
is long an repetitive. We want to hide it in a module that does not
have other functions that we like to look at.
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When starting to implement DTLS, it was assumed that the APIs for TLS and
DTLS would differ more. This assumption turned out to be wrong.
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Modernized example
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* ingela/ssl/ERL-668/improve-err-msg/OTP-15234:
ssl: Improve error message
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* ingela/ssl/ERL-686/OTP-15224:
ssl: Error handling improvment
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