| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a timing related bug that alas is hard to test
|
|
|
|
|
|
* ingela/ssl/empty-sni/OTP-15168:
ssl: Correct handling of empty server SNI extension
|
|
The keyexchange ECDHE-RSA requires an RSA-keyed server cert
(corresponding for ECDHE-ECDSA), the code did not assert this
resulting in that a incorrect cipher suite could be selected.
Alas test code was also wrong hiding the error.
|
|
|
|
* ingela/ssl/engine-vs-certfile/ERLERL-211/OTP-15193:
ssl: Engine key trumps certfile option
|
|
|
|
|
|
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_basic_SUITE.erl
|
|
|
|
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
|
|
Failing to recognize psk as an anonymous key exchange would fail the connection
when trying to decode an undefined certificate.
|
|
|
|
The Key Usage extension is described in section 4.2.1.3 of X.509, with the following possible flags:
KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING {
digitalSignature (0),
nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have
-- renamed this bit to contentCommitment
keyEncipherment (2),
dataEncipherment (3),
keyAgreement (4),
keyCertSign (5),
cRLSign (6),
encipherOnly (7),
decipherOnly (8) }
In SSL/TLS, when the server certificate contains a RSA key, then:
either a DHE or ECDHE cipher suite is used, in which case the RSA key
is used for a signature (see section 7.4.3 of RFC 5246: the "Server
Key Exchange" message); this exercises the digitalSignature key usage;
or "plain RSA" is used, with a random value (the 48-byte pre-master
secret) being encrypted by the client with the server's public key
(see section 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246); this is right in the definition of
the keyEncipherment key usage flag.
dataEncipherment does not apply, because what is encrypted is not
directly meaningful data, but a value which is mostly generated
randomly and used to derive symmetric keys. keyAgreement does not
apply either, because that one is for key agreement algorithms which
are not a case of asymmetric encryption (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). The
keyAgreement usage flag would appear in a certificate which contains a
DH key, not a RSA key. nonRepudiation is not used, because whatever is
signed as part of a SSL/TLS key exchange cannot be used as proof for a
third party (there is nothing in a SSL/TLS tunnel that the client
could record and then use to convince a judge when tring to sue the
server itself; the data which is exchanged within the tunnel is not
signed by the server).
When a ECDSA key is used then "keyAgreement" flag is needed for beeing
ECDH "capable" (as opposed to ephemeral ECDHE)
|
|
|
|
ECDH suite handling did not use the EC parameters form the certs
as expected.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl_cipher.erl
|
|
Fix test case code to use keyAgreement for ECDH_ECDSA
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_to_openssl_SUITE.erl
|
|
When test handling was corrected it was obvious that DTLS ECC handling
was not compleated.
Conflicts:
lib/ssl/src/ssl.erl
lib/ssl/test/Makefile
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_SUITE.erl
lib/ssl/test/ssl_ECC_openssl_SUITE.erl
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
answer to a certificate request
Solves ERL-599
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Anonymous cipher suites were broken altogether, and
there was an earlier issue where the server would send a signature
in the server key exchange if a certificate was configured, even
if an anonymous suite was actually negotiated.
Backport of PR-1729
|
|
|
|
Cipher suite handling improvments missed to make a few changes
for AEAD to be handled correctly see ERL-568
|
|
* maint-19:
Updated OTP version
Prepare release
ssl: Prepare for release
ssl: Backport PR-1709
ssh: Fix cli
ssh: Test for disabled shell
Conflicts:
OTP_VERSION
lib/ssh/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/ssh/src/ssh.erl
lib/ssh/vsn.mk
lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
lib/ssl/vsn.mk
otp_versions.table
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dumbbell/dumbbell/ssl/fix-active-once-dropped-when-handling-alert/ERL-562
ssl: Fix alert handling so that unexpected messages are logged and alerted correctly
|
|
... in handle_common_event(), instead of passing it to
handle_own_alert() after wrapping it in a tuple with `StateName` (i.e.
`{StateName, Msg}`).
The `StateName` is passed to handle_normal_shutdown() and to
alert_user(). The latter has a clause matching it against `connection`.
Unfortunately, when the argument was in fact `{StateName, Msg}`, another
clause was executed which dropped the `active` flag value and forced it
to `false`, even if the state was actually `connection`. It meant that
later in send_or_reply(), the alert was not propagated to the user, even
though it should (`active` set to `true` or `once`).
Now that handle_common_event() always passes the actual `StateName`, the
problem is fixed.
ERL-562
|
|
Preferably customized cipher suites will be based on the default value.
But all may be used as base and hence it will be good to
handle anonymous suites separately as they are intended for testing purposes.
|
|
|
|
Authenticated encryption (AE) and authenticated encryption with
associated data (AEAD, variant of AE) is a form of encryption which
simultaneously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
assurances on the data.
This is more logical value then null that was used, this happened to
work as the AEAD property was derived form other data, but it is confusing!
|
|
|
|
LibreSSL-2.6.3 dropped DSS (DSA) support
|
|
|
|
* ingela/ssl/test-cuddle:
ssl: Call clean version function
|
|
Make sure tests are run with intended version settings.
|
|
|
