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|
%
%% %CopyrightBegin%
%%
%% Copyright Ericsson AB 2007-2018. All Rights Reserved.
%%
%% Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
%% you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
%% You may obtain a copy of the License at
%%
%% http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
%%
%% Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
%% distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
%% WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
%% See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
%% limitations under the License.
%%
%% %CopyrightEnd%
%%
%%
%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
%% Purpose: Help functions for handling the SSL ciphers
%%
%%----------------------------------------------------------------------
-module(ssl_cipher).
-include("ssl_internal.hrl").
-include("ssl_record.hrl").
-include("ssl_cipher.hrl").
-include("ssl_handshake.hrl").
-include("ssl_alert.hrl").
-include("tls_handshake_1_3.hrl").
-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").
-export([security_parameters/2, security_parameters/3, security_parameters_1_3/2,
cipher_init/3, nonce_seed/2, decipher/6, cipher/5, aead_encrypt/5, aead_decrypt/6,
suites/1, all_suites/1, crypto_support_filters/0,
chacha_suites/1, anonymous_suites/1, psk_suites/1, psk_suites_anon/1,
srp_suites/0, srp_suites_anon/0,
rc4_suites/1, des_suites/1, rsa_suites/1,
filter/3, filter_suites/1, filter_suites/2,
hash_algorithm/1, sign_algorithm/1, is_acceptable_hash/2, is_fallback/1,
random_bytes/1, calc_mac_hash/4,
is_stream_ciphersuite/1, signature_scheme/1,
scheme_to_components/1, hash_size/1, effective_key_bits/1]).
%% RFC 8446 TLS 1.3
-export([generate_client_shares/1, generate_server_share/1, add_zero_padding/2]).
-compile(inline).
-type cipher_enum() :: integer().
-export_type([cipher_enum/0]).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec security_parameters(ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
#security_parameters{}.
%% Only security_parameters/2 should call security_parameters/3 with undefined as
%% first argument.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
security_parameters(?TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL = CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
security_parameters(undefined, CipherSuite, SecParams).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec security_parameters(ssl_record:ssl_version() | undefined,
ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite(), #security_parameters{}) ->
#security_parameters{}.
%%
%% Description: Returns a security parameters record where the
%% cipher values has been updated according to <CipherSuite>
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
security_parameters(Version, CipherSuite, SecParams) ->
#{cipher := Cipher, mac := Hash,
prf := PrfHashAlg} = ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
SecParams#security_parameters{
cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher),
cipher_type = type(Cipher),
key_size = effective_key_bits(Cipher),
expanded_key_material_length = expanded_key_material(Cipher),
key_material_length = key_material(Cipher),
iv_size = iv_size(Cipher),
mac_algorithm = mac_algorithm(Hash),
prf_algorithm = prf_algorithm(PrfHashAlg, Version),
hash_size = hash_size(Hash)}.
security_parameters_1_3(SecParams, CipherSuite) ->
#{cipher := Cipher, prf := PrfHashAlg} =
ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(CipherSuite),
SecParams#security_parameters{
cipher_suite = CipherSuite,
bulk_cipher_algorithm = bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher),
prf_algorithm = PrfHashAlg, %% HKDF hash algorithm
cipher_type = ?AEAD}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec cipher_init(cipher_enum(), binary(), binary()) -> #cipher_state{}.
%%
%% Description: Initializes the #cipher_state according to BCA
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
cipher_init(?RC4, IV, Key) ->
State = crypto:stream_init(rc4, Key),
#cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, state = State};
cipher_init(?AES_GCM, IV, Key) ->
<<Nonce:64>> = random_bytes(8),
#cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, nonce = Nonce, tag_len = 16};
cipher_init(?CHACHA20_POLY1305, IV, Key) ->
#cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key, tag_len = 16};
cipher_init(_BCA, IV, Key) ->
#cipher_state{iv = IV, key = Key}.
nonce_seed(Seed, CipherState) ->
CipherState#cipher_state{nonce = Seed}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec cipher(cipher_enum(), #cipher_state{}, binary(), iodata(), ssl_record:ssl_version()) ->
{binary(), #cipher_state{}}.
%%
%% Description: Encrypts the data and the MAC using chipher described
%% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state
%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first an HMAC of the
%% data is calculated and the data plus the HMAC is ecncrypted.
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
cipher(?NULL, CipherState, <<>>, Fragment, _Version) ->
GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, <<>>],
{GenStreamCipherList, CipherState};
cipher(?RC4, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Mac, Fragment, _Version) ->
GenStreamCipherList = [Fragment, Mac],
{State1, T} = crypto:stream_encrypt(State0, GenStreamCipherList),
{T, CipherState#cipher_state{state = State1}};
cipher(?DES, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
block_cipher(fun(Key, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_encrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T)
end, block_size(des_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version);
cipher(?'3DES', CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
block_cipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_encrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
end, block_size(des_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version);
cipher(?AES_CBC, CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version) ->
block_cipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
crypto:block_encrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
end, block_size(aes_128_cbc), CipherState, Mac, Fragment, Version).
aead_encrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, Fragment, AdditionalData) ->
crypto:block_encrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, Fragment}).
aead_decrypt(Type, Key, Nonce, CipherText, CipherTag, AdditionalData) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aead_type(Type), Key, Nonce, {AdditionalData, CipherText, CipherTag}).
aead_type(?AES_GCM) ->
aes_gcm;
aead_type(?CHACHA20_POLY1305) ->
chacha20_poly1305.
build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment) ->
TotSz = byte_size(Mac) + erlang:iolist_size(Fragment) + 1,
{PaddingLength, Padding} = get_padding(TotSz, BlockSz),
[Fragment, Mac, PaddingLength, Padding].
block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
Mac, Fragment, {3, N})
when N == 0; N == 1 ->
L = build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment),
T = Fun(Key, IV, L),
NextIV = next_iv(T, IV),
{T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}};
block_cipher(Fun, BlockSz, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CS0,
Mac, Fragment, {3, N})
when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 ->
NextIV = random_iv(IV),
L0 = build_cipher_block(BlockSz, Mac, Fragment),
L = [NextIV|L0],
T = Fun(Key, IV, L),
{T, CS0#cipher_state{iv=NextIV}}.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec decipher(cipher_enum(), integer(), #cipher_state{}, binary(),
ssl_record:ssl_version(), boolean()) ->
{binary(), binary(), #cipher_state{}} | #alert{}.
%%
%% Description: Decrypts the data and the MAC using cipher described
%% by cipher_enum() and updating the cipher state.
%% Used for "MAC then Cipher" suites where first the data is decrypted
%% and the an HMAC of the decrypted data is checked
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
decipher(?NULL, _HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, _, _) ->
{Fragment, <<>>, CipherState};
decipher(?RC4, HashSz, CipherState = #cipher_state{state = State0}, Fragment, _, _) ->
try crypto:stream_decrypt(State0, Fragment) of
{State, Text} ->
GSC = generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(Text, HashSz),
#generic_stream_cipher{content = Content, mac = Mac} = GSC,
{Content, Mac, CipherState#cipher_state{state = State}}
catch
_:_ ->
%% This is a DECRYPTION_FAILED but
%% "differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed
%% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
%% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the
%% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end;
decipher(?DES, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(des_cbc, Key, IV, T)
end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
decipher(?'3DES', HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(<<K1:8/binary, K2:8/binary, K3:8/binary>>, IV, T) ->
crypto:block_decrypt(des3_cbc, [K1, K2, K3], IV, T)
end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck);
decipher(?AES_CBC, HashSz, CipherState, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
block_decipher(fun(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 16 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc128, Key, IV, T);
(Key, IV, T) when byte_size(Key) =:= 32 ->
crypto:block_decrypt(aes_cbc256, Key, IV, T)
end, CipherState, HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck).
block_decipher(Fun, #cipher_state{key=Key, iv=IV} = CipherState0,
HashSz, Fragment, Version, PaddingCheck) ->
try
Text = Fun(Key, IV, Fragment),
NextIV = next_iv(Fragment, IV),
GBC = generic_block_cipher_from_bin(Version, Text, NextIV, HashSz),
Content = GBC#generic_block_cipher.content,
Mac = GBC#generic_block_cipher.mac,
CipherState1 = CipherState0#cipher_state{iv=GBC#generic_block_cipher.next_iv},
case is_correct_padding(GBC, Version, PaddingCheck) of
true ->
{Content, Mac, CipherState1};
false ->
%% decryption failed or invalid padding,
%% intentionally break Content to make
%% sure a packet with invalid padding
%% but otherwise correct data will fail
%% the MAC test later
{<<16#F0, Content/binary>>, Mac, CipherState1}
end
catch
_:_ ->
%% This is a DECRYPTION_FAILED but
%% "differentiating between bad_record_mac and decryption_failed
%% alerts may permit certain attacks against CBC mode as used in
%% TLS [CBCATT]. It is preferable to uniformly use the
%% bad_record_mac alert to hide the specific type of the error."
?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?BAD_RECORD_MAC, decryption_failed)
end.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec suites(ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of supported cipher suites.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
suites({3, 0}) ->
ssl_v3:suites();
suites({3, Minor}) ->
tls_v1:suites(Minor);
suites({_, Minor}) ->
dtls_v1:suites(Minor).
all_suites({3, _} = Version) ->
suites(Version)
++ chacha_suites(Version)
++ psk_suites(Version)
++ srp_suites()
++ rc4_suites(Version)
++ des_suites(Version)
++ rsa_suites(Version);
all_suites(Version) ->
dtls_v1:all_suites(Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec chacha_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) ->
[ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns list of the chacha cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user for now due to interop problems, proably need
%% to be fixed in crypto.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
chacha_suites({3, _}) ->
[?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256];
chacha_suites(_) ->
[].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec anonymous_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) ->
[ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user. Intended only for testing.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
anonymous_suites({3, N}) ->
srp_suites_anon() ++ anonymous_suites(N);
anonymous_suites({254, _} = Version) ->
dtls_v1:anonymous_suites(Version);
anonymous_suites(4) ->
[]; %% Raw public key negotiation may be used instead
anonymous_suites(N)
when N >= 3 ->
psk_suites_anon(N) ++
[?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5];
anonymous_suites(2 = N) ->
psk_suites_anon(N) ++
[?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5];
anonymous_suites(N) when N == 0;
N == 1 ->
psk_suites_anon(N) ++
[?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec psk_suites(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the PSK cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
psk_suites({3, N}) ->
psk_suites(N);
psk_suites(4) ->
[]; %% TODO Add new PSK, PSK_(EC)DHE suites
psk_suites(N)
when N >= 3 ->
[
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
] ++ psk_suites(0);
psk_suites(_) ->
[?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec psk_suites_anon(ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the anonymous PSK cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
psk_suites_anon({3, N}) ->
psk_suites_anon(N);
psk_suites_anon(N)
when N >= 3 ->
[
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
] ++ psk_suites_anon(0);
psk_suites_anon(_) ->
[?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec srp_suites() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the SRP cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
srp_suites() ->
[?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec srp_suites_anon() -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the SRP anonymous cipher suites, only supported
%% if explicitly set by user.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
srp_suites_anon() ->
[?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec rc4_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) ->
[ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the RSA|(ECDH/RSA)| (ECDH/ECDSA)
%% with RC4 cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user.
%% Are not considered secure any more. Other RC4 suites already
%% belonged to the user configured only category.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
rc4_suites({3, 0}) ->
rc4_suites(0);
rc4_suites({3, Minor}) ->
rc4_suites(Minor) ++ rc4_suites(0);
rc4_suites(0) ->
[?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5];
rc4_suites(N) when N =< 4 ->
[?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec des_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the cipher suites
%% with DES cipher, only supported if explicitly set by user.
%% Are not considered secure any more.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
des_suites(_)->
[?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec rsa_suites(Version::ssl_record:ssl_version() | integer()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Returns a list of the RSA key exchange
%% cipher suites, only supported if explicitly set by user.
%% Are not considered secure any more.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
rsa_suites({3, 0}) ->
rsa_suites(0);
rsa_suites({3, Minor}) ->
rsa_suites(Minor) ++ rsa_suites(0);
rsa_suites(0) ->
[?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
];
rsa_suites(N) when N =< 4 ->
[
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
?TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
].
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec filter(undefined | binary(), [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()],
ssl_record:ssl_version()) -> [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Select the cipher suites that can be used together with the
%% supplied certificate. (Server side functionality)
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
filter(undefined, Ciphers, _) ->
Ciphers;
filter(DerCert, Ciphers0, Version) ->
OtpCert = public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, otp),
SigAlg = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.signatureAlgorithm,
PubKeyInfo = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate#'OTPTBSCertificate'.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
PubKeyAlg = PubKeyInfo#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'.algorithm,
Ciphers = filter_suites_pubkey(
ssl_certificate:public_key_type(PubKeyAlg#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'.algorithm),
Ciphers0, Version, OtpCert),
{_, Sign} = public_key:pkix_sign_types(SigAlg#'SignatureAlgorithm'.algorithm),
filter_suites_signature(Sign, Ciphers, Version).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec filter_suites([ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()], map()) ->
[ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Filter suites using supplied filter funs
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
filter_suites(Suites, Filters) ->
ApplyFilters = fun(Suite) ->
filter_suite(Suite, Filters)
end,
lists:filter(ApplyFilters, Suites).
filter_suite(#{key_exchange := KeyExchange,
cipher := Cipher,
mac := Hash,
prf := Prf},
#{key_exchange_filters := KeyFilters,
cipher_filters := CipherFilters,
mac_filters := HashFilters,
prf_filters := PrfFilters}) ->
all_filters(KeyExchange, KeyFilters) andalso
all_filters(Cipher, CipherFilters) andalso
all_filters(Hash, HashFilters) andalso
all_filters(Prf, PrfFilters);
filter_suite(Suite, Filters) ->
filter_suite(ssl_cipher_format:suite_definition(Suite), Filters).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec filter_suites([ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()]) ->
[ssl_cipher_format:erl_cipher_suite()] | [ssl_cipher_format:cipher_suite()].
%%
%% Description: Filter suites for algorithms supported by crypto.
%%-------------------------------------------------------------------
filter_suites(Suites) ->
Filters = crypto_support_filters(),
filter_suites(Suites, Filters).
all_filters(_, []) ->
true;
all_filters(Value, [Filter| Rest]) ->
case Filter(Value) of
true ->
all_filters(Value, Rest);
false ->
false
end.
crypto_support_filters() ->
Algos = crypto:supports(),
Hashs = proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos),
#{key_exchange_filters =>
[fun(KeyExchange) ->
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange,
proplists:get_value(public_keys, Algos))
end],
cipher_filters =>
[fun(Cipher) ->
is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher,
proplists:get_value(ciphers, Algos))
end],
mac_filters =>
[fun(Hash) ->
is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Hashs)
end],
prf_filters =>
[fun(Prf) ->
is_acceptable_prf(Prf,
proplists:get_value(hashs, Algos))
end]}.
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, _Algos) when KeyExchange == psk;
KeyExchange == null;
KeyExchange == any ->
true;
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == dh_anon;
KeyExchange == dhe_psk ->
proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_dss, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(dss, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(dhe_rsa, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(dh, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_anon;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_psk ->
proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_ecdsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_ecdsa ->
proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(ecdsa, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == ecdh_rsa;
KeyExchange == ecdhe_rsa ->
proplists:get_bool(ecdh, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(KeyExchange, Algos) when KeyExchange == rsa;
KeyExchange == rsa_psk ->
proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_anon, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_dss, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(dss, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(srp_rsa, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(srp, Algos) andalso
proplists:get_bool(rsa, Algos);
is_acceptable_keyexchange(_KeyExchange, _Algos) ->
false.
is_acceptable_cipher(null, _Algos) ->
true;
is_acceptable_cipher(rc4_128, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(rc4, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(des_cbc, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(des_cbc, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher('3des_ede_cbc', Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(des3_cbc, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(aes_128_cbc, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(aes_cbc128, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(aes_256_cbc, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(aes_cbc256, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos)
when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
proplists:get_bool(aes_gcm, Algos);
is_acceptable_cipher(Cipher, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(Cipher, Algos).
is_acceptable_hash(null, _Algos) ->
true;
is_acceptable_hash(aead, _Algos) ->
true;
is_acceptable_hash(Hash, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(Hash, Algos).
is_acceptable_prf(default_prf, _) ->
true;
is_acceptable_prf(Prf, Algos) ->
proplists:get_bool(Prf, Algos).
is_fallback(CipherSuites)->
lists:member(?TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, CipherSuites).
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec random_bytes(integer()) -> binary().
%%
%% Description: Generates cryptographically secure random sequence
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
random_bytes(N) ->
crypto:strong_rand_bytes(N).
calc_mac_hash(Type, Version,
PlainFragment, #{sequence_number := SeqNo,
mac_secret := MacSecret,
security_parameters:=
SecPars}) ->
Length = erlang:iolist_size(PlainFragment),
mac_hash(Version, SecPars#security_parameters.mac_algorithm,
MacSecret, SeqNo, Type,
Length, PlainFragment).
is_stream_ciphersuite(#{cipher := rc4_128}) ->
true;
is_stream_ciphersuite(_) ->
false.
-spec hash_size(atom()) -> integer().
hash_size(null) ->
0;
%% The AEAD MAC hash size is not used in the context
%% of calculating the master secret. See RFC 5246 Section 6.2.3.3.
hash_size(aead) ->
0;
hash_size(md5) ->
16;
hash_size(sha) ->
20;
%% Uncomment when adding cipher suite that needs it
%hash_size(sha224) ->
% 28;
hash_size(sha256) ->
32;
hash_size(sha384) ->
48;
hash_size(sha512) ->
64.
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
%%% Internal functions
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
mac_hash({_,_}, ?NULL, _MacSecret, _SeqNo, _Type,
_Length, _Fragment) ->
<<>>;
mac_hash({3, 0}, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment) ->
ssl_v3:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment);
mac_hash({3, N} = Version, MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Length, Fragment)
when N =:= 1; N =:= 2; N =:= 3; N =:= 4 ->
tls_v1:mac_hash(MacAlg, MacSecret, SeqNo, Type, Version,
Length, Fragment).
bulk_cipher_algorithm(null) ->
?NULL;
bulk_cipher_algorithm(rc4_128) ->
?RC4;
bulk_cipher_algorithm(des_cbc) ->
?DES;
bulk_cipher_algorithm('3des_ede_cbc') ->
?'3DES';
bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
?AES_CBC;
bulk_cipher_algorithm(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
?AES_GCM;
bulk_cipher_algorithm(chacha20_poly1305) ->
?CHACHA20_POLY1305.
type(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
Cipher == rc4_128 ->
?STREAM;
type(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
Cipher == '3des_ede_cbc';
Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc ->
?BLOCK;
type(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
?AEAD.
key_material(null) ->
0;
key_material(rc4_128) ->
16;
key_material(des_cbc) ->
8;
key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
24;
key_material(aes_128_cbc) ->
16;
key_material(aes_256_cbc) ->
32;
key_material(aes_128_gcm) ->
16;
key_material(aes_256_gcm) ->
32;
key_material(chacha20_poly1305) ->
32.
expanded_key_material(null) ->
0;
expanded_key_material(rc4_128) ->
16;
expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc ->
8;
expanded_key_material('3des_ede_cbc') ->
24;
expanded_key_material(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
unknown.
effective_key_bits(null) ->
0;
effective_key_bits(des_cbc) ->
56;
effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == rc4_128;
Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_128_gcm ->
128;
effective_key_bits('3des_ede_cbc') ->
168;
effective_key_bits(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
256.
iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == null;
Cipher == rc4_128;
Cipher == chacha20_poly1305->
0;
iv_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm ->
4;
iv_size(Cipher) ->
block_size(Cipher).
block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == des_cbc;
Cipher == '3des_ede_cbc' ->
8;
block_size(Cipher) when Cipher == aes_128_cbc;
Cipher == aes_256_cbc;
Cipher == aes_128_gcm;
Cipher == aes_256_gcm;
Cipher == chacha20_poly1305 ->
16.
prf_algorithm(default_prf, {3, N}) when N >= 3 ->
?SHA256;
prf_algorithm(default_prf, {3, _}) ->
?MD5SHA;
prf_algorithm(Algo, _) ->
hash_algorithm(Algo).
mac_algorithm(aead) ->
aead;
mac_algorithm(Algo) ->
hash_algorithm(Algo).
hash_algorithm(null) -> ?NULL;
hash_algorithm(md5) -> ?MD5;
hash_algorithm(sha) -> ?SHA; %% Only sha always refers to "SHA-1"
hash_algorithm(sha224) -> ?SHA224;
hash_algorithm(sha256) -> ?SHA256;
hash_algorithm(sha384) -> ?SHA384;
hash_algorithm(sha512) -> ?SHA512;
hash_algorithm(?NULL) -> null;
hash_algorithm(?MD5) -> md5;
hash_algorithm(?SHA) -> sha;
hash_algorithm(?SHA224) -> sha224;
hash_algorithm(?SHA256) -> sha256;
hash_algorithm(?SHA384) -> sha384;
hash_algorithm(?SHA512) -> sha512;
hash_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 7) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned;
hash_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other.
sign_algorithm(anon) -> ?ANON;
sign_algorithm(rsa) -> ?RSA;
sign_algorithm(dsa) -> ?DSA;
sign_algorithm(ecdsa) -> ?ECDSA;
sign_algorithm(?ANON) -> anon;
sign_algorithm(?RSA) -> rsa;
sign_algorithm(?DSA) -> dsa;
sign_algorithm(?ECDSA) -> ecdsa;
sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 4) and (Other =< 223)) -> unassigned;
sign_algorithm(Other) when is_integer(Other) andalso ((Other >= 224) and (Other =< 255)) -> Other.
signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> ?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> ?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
signature_scheme(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> ?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512;
signature_scheme(ed25519) -> ?ED25519;
signature_scheme(ed448) -> ?ED448;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384;
signature_scheme(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> ?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512;
signature_scheme(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> ?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
signature_scheme(ecdsa_sha1) -> ?ECDSA_SHA1;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA256) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha256;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA384) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha384;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA512) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha512;
signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256) -> ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256;
signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384) -> ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384;
signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512) -> ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha256;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha384;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_rsae_sha512;
signature_scheme(?ED25519) -> ed25519;
signature_scheme(?ED448) -> ed448;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha256;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha384;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512) -> rsa_pss_pss_sha512;
signature_scheme(?RSA_PKCS1_SHA1) -> rsa_pkcs1_sha1;
signature_scheme(?ECDSA_SHA1) -> ecdsa_sha1;
signature_scheme(_) -> unassigned.
%% TODO: reserved code points?
scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pkcs1, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pkcs1, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pkcs1, undefined};
scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) -> {sha256, ecdsa, secp256r1};
scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) -> {sha384, ecdsa, secp384r1};
scheme_to_components(ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512) -> {sha512, ecdsa, secp521r1};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_rsae, undefined};
scheme_to_components(ed25519) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined};
scheme_to_components(ed448) -> {undefined, undefined, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha256) -> {sha256, rsa_pss_pss, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha384) -> {sha384, rsa_pss_pss, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pss_pss_sha512) -> {sha512, rsa_pss_pss, undefined};
scheme_to_components(rsa_pkcs1_sha1) -> {sha1, rsa_pkcs1, undefined};
scheme_to_components(ecdsa_sha1) -> {sha1, ecdsa, undefined}.
%% RFC 5246: 6.2.3.2. CBC Block Cipher
%%
%% Implementation note: Canvel et al. [CBCTIME] have demonstrated a
%% timing attack on CBC padding based on the time required to compute
%% the MAC. In order to defend against this attack, implementations
%% MUST ensure that record processing time is essentially the same
%% whether or not the padding is correct. In general, the best way to
%% do this is to compute the MAC even if the padding is incorrect, and
%% only then reject the packet. For instance, if the pad appears to be
%% incorrect, the implementation might assume a zero-length pad and then
%% compute the MAC. This leaves a small timing channel, since MAC
%% performance depends to some extent on the size of the data fragment,
%% but it is not believed to be large enough to be exploitable, due to
%% the large block size of existing MACs and the small size of the
%% timing signal.
%%
%% implementation note:
%% We return the original (possibly invalid) PadLength in any case.
%% An invalid PadLength will be caught by is_correct_padding/2
%%
generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize)
when N == 0; N == 1 ->
Sz1 = byte_size(T) - 1,
<<_:Sz1/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength0)>> = T,
PadLength = if
PadLength0 >= Sz1 -> 0;
true -> PadLength0
end,
CompressedLength = byte_size(T) - PadLength - 1 - HashSize,
<<Content:CompressedLength/binary, Mac:HashSize/binary,
Padding:PadLength/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength0)>> = T,
#generic_block_cipher{content=Content, mac=Mac,
padding=Padding, padding_length=PadLength0,
next_iv = IV};
generic_block_cipher_from_bin({3, N}, T, IV, HashSize)
when N == 2; N == 3; N == 4 ->
Sz1 = byte_size(T) - 1,
<<_:Sz1/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength)>> = T,
IVLength = byte_size(IV),
CompressedLength = byte_size(T) - IVLength - PadLength - 1 - HashSize,
<<NextIV:IVLength/binary, Content:CompressedLength/binary, Mac:HashSize/binary,
Padding:PadLength/binary, ?BYTE(PadLength)>> = T,
#generic_block_cipher{content=Content, mac=Mac,
padding=Padding, padding_length=PadLength,
next_iv = NextIV}.
generic_stream_cipher_from_bin(T, HashSz) ->
Sz = byte_size(T),
CompressedLength = Sz - HashSz,
<<Content:CompressedLength/binary, Mac:HashSz/binary>> = T,
#generic_stream_cipher{content=Content,
mac=Mac}.
is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
padding = Padding}, {3, 0}, _) ->
Len == byte_size(Padding); %% Only length check is done in SSL 3.0 spec
%% For interoperability reasons it is possible to disable
%% the padding check when using TLS 1.0, as it is not strictly required
%% in the spec (only recommended), howerver this makes TLS 1.0 vunrable to the Poodle attack
%% so by default this clause will not match
is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 1}, false) ->
is_correct_padding(GenBlockCipher, {3, 0}, false);
%% Padding must be checked in TLS 1.1 and after
is_correct_padding(#generic_block_cipher{padding_length = Len,
padding = Padding}, _, _) ->
Len == byte_size(Padding) andalso
binary:copy(?byte(Len), Len) == Padding.
get_padding(Length, BlockSize) ->
get_padding_aux(BlockSize, Length rem BlockSize).
get_padding_aux(_, 0) ->
{0, <<>>};
get_padding_aux(BlockSize, PadLength) ->
N = BlockSize - PadLength,
{N, binary:copy(?byte(N), N)}.
random_iv(IV) ->
IVSz = byte_size(IV),
random_bytes(IVSz).
next_iv(Bin, IV) ->
BinSz = byte_size(Bin),
IVSz = byte_size(IV),
FirstPart = BinSz - IVSz,
<<_:FirstPart/binary, NextIV:IVSz/binary>> = Bin,
NextIV.
filter_suites_pubkey(rsa, CiphersSuites0, _Version, OtpCert) ->
KeyUses = key_uses(OtpCert),
NotECDSAKeyed = (CiphersSuites0 -- ec_keyed_suites(CiphersSuites0))
-- dss_keyed_suites(CiphersSuites0),
CiphersSuites = filter_keyuse_suites(keyEncipherment, KeyUses,
NotECDSAKeyed,
rsa_suites_encipher(CiphersSuites0)),
filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature, KeyUses, CiphersSuites,
rsa_ecdhe_dhe_suites(CiphersSuites));
filter_suites_pubkey(dsa, Ciphers, _, OtpCert) ->
KeyUses = key_uses(OtpCert),
NotECRSAKeyed = (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers)) -- ec_keyed_suites(Ciphers),
filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature, KeyUses, NotECRSAKeyed,
dss_dhe_suites(Ciphers));
filter_suites_pubkey(ec, Ciphers, _, OtpCert) ->
Uses = key_uses(OtpCert),
NotRSADSAKeyed = (Ciphers -- rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers)) -- dss_keyed_suites(Ciphers),
CiphersSuites = filter_keyuse_suites(digitalSignature, Uses, NotRSADSAKeyed,
ec_ecdhe_suites(Ciphers)),
filter_keyuse_suites(keyAgreement, Uses, CiphersSuites, ec_ecdh_suites(Ciphers)).
filter_suites_signature(_, Ciphers, {3, N}) when N >= 3 ->
Ciphers;
filter_suites_signature(rsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
(Ciphers -- ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version)) -- dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version);
filter_suites_signature(dsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
(Ciphers -- ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version)) -- rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version);
filter_suites_signature(ecdsa, Ciphers, Version) ->
(Ciphers -- rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version)) -- dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version).
%% From RFC 5246 - Section 7.4.2. Server Certificate
%% If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
%% certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
%% hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension. Note
%% that this implies that a certificate containing a key for one
%% signature algorithm MAY be signed using a different signature
%% algorithm (for instance, an RSA key signed with a DSA key). This is
%% a departure from TLS 1.1, which required that the algorithms be the
%% same.
%% Note that this also implies that the DH_DSS, DH_RSA,
%% ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA key exchange algorithms do not restrict the
%% algorithm used to sign the certificate. Fixed DH certificates MAY be
%% signed with any hash/signature algorithm pair appearing in the
%% extension. The names DH_DSS, DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, and ECDH_RSA are
%% historical.
%% Note: DH_DSS and DH_RSA is not supported
rsa_signed({3,N}) when N >= 3 ->
fun(rsa) -> true;
(dhe_rsa) -> true;
(ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
(rsa_psk) -> true;
(srp_rsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end;
rsa_signed(_) ->
fun(rsa) -> true;
(dhe_rsa) -> true;
(ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
(ecdh_rsa) -> true;
(rsa_psk) -> true;
(srp_rsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end.
%% Cert should be signed by RSA
rsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [rsa_signed(Version)],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
ecdsa_signed({3,N}) when N >= 3 ->
fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end;
ecdsa_signed(_) ->
fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end.
%% Cert should be signed by ECDSA
ecdsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [ecdsa_signed(Version)],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
rsa_keyed(dhe_rsa) ->
true;
rsa_keyed(ecdhe_rsa) ->
true;
rsa_keyed(rsa) ->
true;
rsa_keyed(rsa_psk) ->
true;
rsa_keyed(srp_rsa) ->
true;
rsa_keyed(_) ->
false.
%% Certs key is an RSA key
rsa_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> rsa_keyed(Kex) end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
%% RSA Certs key can be used for encipherment
rsa_suites_encipher(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(rsa) -> true;
(rsa_psk) -> true;
(_) -> false
end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
dss_keyed(dhe_dss) ->
true;
dss_keyed(spr_dss) ->
true;
dss_keyed(_) ->
false.
%% Cert should be have DSS key (DSA)
dss_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> dss_keyed(Kex) end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
%% Cert should be signed by DSS (DSA)
dsa_signed_suites(Ciphers, Version) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [dsa_signed(Version)],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
dsa_signed(_) ->
fun(dhe_dss) -> true;
(_) -> false
end.
dss_dhe_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(dhe_dss) -> true;
(_) -> false
end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
ec_keyed(ecdh_ecdsa) ->
true;
ec_keyed(ecdh_rsa) ->
true;
ec_keyed(ecdhe_ecdsa) ->
true;
ec_keyed(_) ->
false.
%% Certs key is an ECC key
ec_keyed_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(Kex) -> ec_keyed(Kex) end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
%% EC Certs key usage keyAgreement
ec_ecdh_suites(Ciphers)->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdh_ecdsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
%% EC Certs key usage digitalSignature
ec_ecdhe_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(ecdhe_ecdsa) -> true;
(ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
%% RSA Certs key usage digitalSignature
rsa_ecdhe_dhe_suites(Ciphers) ->
filter_suites(Ciphers, #{key_exchange_filters => [fun(dhe_rsa) -> true;
(ecdhe_rsa) -> true;
(_) -> false
end],
cipher_filters => [],
mac_filters => [],
prf_filters => []}).
key_uses(OtpCert) ->
TBSCert = OtpCert#'OTPCertificate'.tbsCertificate,
TBSExtensions = TBSCert#'OTPTBSCertificate'.extensions,
Extensions = ssl_certificate:extensions_list(TBSExtensions),
case ssl_certificate:select_extension(?'id-ce-keyUsage', Extensions) of
undefined ->
[];
#'Extension'{extnValue = KeyUses} ->
KeyUses
end.
%% If no key-usage extension is defined all key-usages are allowed
filter_keyuse_suites(_, [], CiphersSuites, _) ->
CiphersSuites;
filter_keyuse_suites(Use, KeyUse, CipherSuits, Suites) ->
case ssl_certificate:is_valid_key_usage(KeyUse, Use) of
true ->
CipherSuits;
false ->
CipherSuits -- Suites
end.
generate_server_share(Group) ->
Key = generate_key_exchange(Group),
#key_share_server_hello{
server_share = #key_share_entry{
group = Group,
key_exchange = Key
}}.
generate_client_shares([]) ->
#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = []};
generate_client_shares(Groups) ->
generate_client_shares(Groups, []).
%%
generate_client_shares([], Acc) ->
#key_share_client_hello{client_shares = lists:reverse(Acc)};
generate_client_shares([Group|Groups], Acc) ->
Key = generate_key_exchange(Group),
KeyShareEntry = #key_share_entry{
group = Group,
key_exchange = Key
},
generate_client_shares(Groups, [KeyShareEntry|Acc]).
generate_key_exchange(secp256r1) ->
public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp256r1});
generate_key_exchange(secp384r1) ->
public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp384r1});
generate_key_exchange(secp521r1) ->
public_key:generate_key({namedCurve, secp521r1});
generate_key_exchange(x25519) ->
crypto:generate_key(ecdh, x25519);
generate_key_exchange(x448) ->
crypto:generate_key(ecdh, x448);
generate_key_exchange(FFDHE) ->
public_key:generate_key(ssl_dh_groups:dh_params(FFDHE)).
%% TODO: Move this functionality to crypto!
%% 7.4.1. Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
%%
%% For finite field groups, a conventional Diffie-Hellman [DH76]
%% computation is performed. The negotiated key (Z) is converted to a
%% byte string by encoding in big-endian form and left-padded with zeros
%% up to the size of the prime. This byte string is used as the shared
%% secret in the key schedule as specified above.
add_zero_padding(Bin, PrimeSize)
when byte_size (Bin) =:= PrimeSize ->
Bin;
add_zero_padding(Bin, PrimeSize) ->
add_zero_padding(<<0, Bin/binary>>, PrimeSize).
|