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authorLoïc Hoguin <[email protected]>2018-06-26 14:30:24 +0200
committerLoïc Hoguin <[email protected]>2018-06-26 14:30:24 +0200
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Add release notes for OTP-18.0+
The version 18.3.4.3 is missing and seems to have had no announcement or README, I do not know why.
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+Patch Package: OTP 20.1.7
+Git Tag: OTP-20.1.7
+Date: 2017-11-22
+Trouble Report Id: OTP-14632, OTP-14653, OTP-14655, OTP-14748,
+ OTP-14766
+Seq num:
+System: OTP
+Release: 20
+Application: public_key-1.5.1, ssl-8.2.2
+Predecessor: OTP 20.1.6
+
+ Check out the git tag OTP-20.1.7, and build a full OTP system
+ including documentation. Apply one or more applications from this
+ build as patches to your installation using the 'otp_patch_apply'
+ tool. For information on install requirements, see descriptions for
+ each application version below.
+
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ --- public_key-1.5.1 ------------------------------------------------
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+ The public_key-1.5.1 application can be applied independently of
+ other applications on a full OTP 20 installation.
+
+ --- Improvements and New Features ---
+
+ OTP-14653 Application(s): public_key
+
+ Hostname verification: Add handling of the general name
+ iPAddress in certificate's subject alternative name
+ extension (subjAltName).
+
+
+ OTP-14766 Application(s): public_key
+
+ Correct key handling in pkix_test_data/1 and use a
+ generic example mail address instead of an existing
+ one.
+
+
+ Full runtime dependencies of public_key-1.5.1: asn1-3.0, crypto-3.8,
+ erts-6.0, kernel-3.0, stdlib-2.0
+
+
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ --- ssl-8.2.2 -------------------------------------------------------
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+ Note! The ssl-8.2.2 application can *not* be applied independently of
+ other applications on an arbitrary OTP 20 installation.
+
+ On a full OTP 20 installation, also the following runtime
+ dependency has to be satisfied:
+ -- public_key-1.5 (first satisfied in OTP 20.1)
+
+
+ --- Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions ---
+
+ OTP-14632 Application(s): ssl
+
+ TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided,
+ so that sessions where client hostname verification
+ would fail can not connect reusing a session created
+ when the server name verification succeeded.
+
+ Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.
+
+
+ OTP-14748 Application(s): ssl
+
+ An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
+ using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an
+ Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher
+ attack) against RSA, which when exploited, may result
+ in plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
+ Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker
+ not having gained access to the server’s private key
+ itself. CVE-2017-1000385
+
+ Exploiting this vulnerability to perform plaintext
+ recovery of encrypted messages will, in most practical
+ cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext only
+ after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
+ established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to
+ this attack.
+
+ Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct a MiTM attack
+ requires the attacker to complete the initial attack,
+ which may require thousands of server requests, during
+ the handshake phase of the targeted session within the
+ window of the configured handshake timeout. This attack
+ may be conducted against any TLS session using RSA
+ signatures, but only if cipher suites using RSA key
+ exchange are also enabled on the server. The limited
+ window of opportunity, limitations in bandwidth, and
+ latency make this attack significantly more difficult
+ to execute.
+
+ RSA key exchange is enabled by default although least
+ prioritized if server order is honored. For such a
+ cipher suite to be chosen it must also be supported by
+ the client and probably the only shared cipher suite.
+
+ Captured TLS sessions encrypted with ephemeral cipher
+ suites (DHE or ECDHE) are not at risk for subsequent
+ decryption due to this vulnerability.
+
+ As a workaround if default cipher suite configuration
+ was used you can configure the server to not use
+ vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like this:
+
+ {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- ssl:cipher_suites(),
+ element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]}
+
+ that is your code will look somethingh like this:
+
+ ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <-
+ ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} |
+ Options]).
+
+ Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and Craig Young
+ for reporting this vulnerability.
+
+
+ --- Improvements and New Features ---
+
+ OTP-14655 Application(s): ssl
+
+ If no SNI is available and the hostname is an
+ IP-address also check for IP-address match. This check
+ is not as good as a DNS hostname check and certificates
+ using IP-address are not recommended.
+
+ Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.
+
+
+ Full runtime dependencies of ssl-8.2.2: crypto-3.3, erts-7.0,
+ inets-5.10.7, kernel-3.0, public_key-1.5, stdlib-3.2
+
+
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+