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authorMagnus Henoch <[email protected]>2016-01-22 12:31:36 +0000
committerMagnus Henoch <[email protected]>2016-02-17 10:24:11 +0000
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parent56b40d01c47170fea0d798dcc46fbde7ffc853dc (diff)
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Be suspicious of certificates without CRL DPs
Previously, if certificate revocation checking was turned on, and a certificate didn't contain a CRL Distribution Points extension, and there was no relevant CRL in the cache, then ssl_handshake:crl_check would accept the certificate even if the crl_check option was set to reject certificates for which the revocation status could not be determined. With this change, such certificates will only be accepted if the crl_check option was set to best_effort. The process for CRL validation is described in section 6.3 of RFC 5280. The text doesn't mention any special treatment to be given to certificates without distribution points: it just says "For each distribution point..." (section 6.3.3), which would leave the revocation status undetermined, unless there were "any available CRLs not specified in a distribution point but issued by the certificate issuer". Thus the result of this algorithm should be UNDETERMINED in this case, not UNREVOKED, and the crl_check option should govern how the implementation reacts to this result.
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