aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/lib
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2017-11-23 16:50:10 +0100
committerIngela Anderton Andin <[email protected]>2017-11-23 16:50:10 +0100
commita453532fe31eecd8c39b5035702ee20b402fd687 (patch)
tree68ad1f9247963c5fb049315efeb0cad7fd3aaa13 /lib
parent8a2e432f92f621a8048ea8e92c2801f323c51280 (diff)
parent2302ea8ca97b8a9075e9234d15430c47d3a115c8 (diff)
downloadotp-a453532fe31eecd8c39b5035702ee20b402fd687.tar.gz
otp-a453532fe31eecd8c39b5035702ee20b402fd687.tar.bz2
otp-a453532fe31eecd8c39b5035702ee20b402fd687.zip
Merge branch 'maint-20' into maint
* maint-20: Updated OTP version Update release notes Update version numbers public_key: verify ip (both v4 and v6) public_key: Added IP4 address checks to hostname_verification tests ssl: Fix test cases to work on all test platforms public_key: Fix dialyzer spec ssl: Sessions must be registered with SNI if exists ssl: Extend hostname check to fallback to checking IP-address public_key, ssl: Handles keys so that APIs are preserved correctly ssl: Use ?FUNCTION_NAME ssl: Prepare for release ssl: Countermeasurements for Bleichenbacher attack Conflicts: lib/public_key/doc/src/public_key.xml lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml24
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl2
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem14
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf8
-rw-r--r--lib/public_key/vsn.mk2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml78
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl2
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl21
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl1
-rw-r--r--lib/ssl/vsn.mk2
12 files changed, 148 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
index 7a7c828760..a4c0194328 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/public_key/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -35,6 +35,30 @@
<file>notes.xml</file>
</header>
+<section><title>Public_Key 1.5.1</title>
+
+ <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Hostname verification: Add handling of the general name
+ <c>iPAddress</c> in certificate's subject alternative
+ name extension (<c>subjAltName</c>).</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14653</p>
+ </item>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ Correct key handling in pkix_test_data/1 and use a
+ generic example mail address instead of an existing one.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14766</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
<section><title>Public_Key 1.5</title>
<section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
index 38e8f30a25..9e5e288a1a 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE.erl
@@ -1034,8 +1034,6 @@ pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP(Config) ->
true = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {10,67,16,75}}]),
false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {1,2,3,4}}]),
false = public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, [{ip, {10,11,12,13}}]).
-
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
pkix_iso_rsa_oid() ->
[{doc, "Test workaround for supporting certs that use ISO oids"
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem
index 97d12cdadf..dc20285f30 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/pkix_verify_hostname_subjAltName_IP.pem
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+<<<<<<< HEAD
MIICBzCCAXCgAwIBAgIJAJgbo5FL73LuMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCMxCzAJBgNV
BAYTAlNFMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAeFw0xNzEwMTExMDM0NDJaFw0x
NzExMTAxMDM0NDJaMCMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlNFMRQwEgYDVQQDEwtleGFtcGxlLmNv
@@ -10,4 +11,17 @@ S4cQq80A7wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYYTaHR0cHM6Ly8xMC4xMS4xMi4xMzANBgkqhkiG
9w0BAQsFAAOBgQDMn8aqs/5FkkWhspvN2n+D2l87M+33a5My54ZVZhayZ/KRmhCN
Gix/BiVYJ3UlmWmGcnQXb3MLt/LQHaD3S2whDaLN3xJ8BbnX7A4ZTybitdyeFhDw
K3iDVUM3bSsBJ4EcBPWIMnow3ALP5HlGRMlH/87Qt+uVPXuwNh9pmyIhRQ==
+=======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+>>>>>>> maint-20
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf
index 798592e4f6..f27dac07ec 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf
+++ b/lib/public_key/test/public_key_SUITE_data/verify_hostname_ip.conf
@@ -5,13 +5,21 @@ distinguished_name = DN
[DN]
C=SE
CN=example.com
+<<<<<<< HEAD
+=======
+CN=5.6.7.8
+>>>>>>> maint-20
[SAN]
subjectAltName = @alt_names
[alt_names]
DNS = 1.2.3.4
+<<<<<<< HEAD
IP.1 = 10.67.16.75
+=======
+IP.1 = 5.6.7.8
+>>>>>>> maint-20
IP.2 = abcd:ef::1
URI = https://10.11.12.13
diff --git a/lib/public_key/vsn.mk b/lib/public_key/vsn.mk
index bb96c2237d..c01d8820f2 100644
--- a/lib/public_key/vsn.mk
+++ b/lib/public_key/vsn.mk
@@ -1 +1 @@
-PUBLIC_KEY_VSN = 1.5
+PUBLIC_KEY_VSN = 1.5.1
diff --git a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
index 4c6a204e63..a8450c2630 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
+++ b/lib/ssl/doc/src/notes.xml
@@ -28,6 +28,84 @@
<p>This document describes the changes made to the SSL application.</p>
+<section><title>SSL 8.2.2</title>
+
+ <section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided, so
+ that sessions where client hostname verification would
+ fail can not connect reusing a session created when the
+ server name verification succeeded.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14632</p>
+ </item>
+ <item>
+ <p> An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
+ using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an Adaptive
+ Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher attack)
+ against RSA, which when exploited, may result in
+ plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
+ Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker not
+ having gained access to the server’s private key
+ itself. <url
+ href="https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000385">CVE-2017-1000385</url>
+ </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to perform
+ plaintext recovery of encrypted messages will, in most
+ practical cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext
+ only after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
+ established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to this
+ attack. </p> <p> Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct
+ a MiTM attack requires the attacker to complete the
+ initial attack, which may require thousands of server
+ requests, during the handshake phase of the targeted
+ session within the window of the configured handshake
+ timeout. This attack may be conducted against any TLS
+ session using RSA signatures, but only if cipher suites
+ using RSA key exchange are also enabled on the server.
+ The limited window of opportunity, limitations in
+ bandwidth, and latency make this attack significantly
+ more difficult to execute. </p> <p> RSA key exchange is
+ enabled by default although least prioritized if server
+ order is honored. For such a cipher suite to be chosen it
+ must also be supported by the client and probably the
+ only shared cipher suite. </p> <p> Captured TLS sessions
+ encrypted with ephemeral cipher suites (DHE or ECDHE) are
+ not at risk for subsequent decryption due to this
+ vulnerability. </p> <p> As a workaround if default cipher
+ suite configuration was used you can configure the server
+ to not use vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like
+ this: </p> <c> {ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+ ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]} </c> <p>
+ that is your code will look somethingh like this: </p>
+ <c> ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite &lt;-
+ ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} | Options]).
+ </c> <p> Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and
+ Craig Young for reporting this vulnerability. </p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14748</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+
+ <section><title>Improvements and New Features</title>
+ <list>
+ <item>
+ <p>
+ If no SNI is available and the hostname is an IP-address
+ also check for IP-address match. This check is not as
+ good as a DNS hostname check and certificates using
+ IP-address are not recommended.</p>
+ <p>
+ Own Id: OTP-14655</p>
+ </item>
+ </list>
+ </section>
+
+</section>
+
<section><title>SSL 8.2.1</title>
<section><title>Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions</title>
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
index bff35acb0b..0a5720d9ee 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl
@@ -461,7 +461,6 @@ init({call, _} = Type, Event, #state{role = server} = State) ->
ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State#state{flight_state = reliable}, ?MODULE);
init(Type, Event, State) ->
ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
-
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec error(gen_statem:event_type(),
{start, timeout()} | term(), #state{}) ->
@@ -596,6 +595,7 @@ abbreviated(state_timeout, Event, State) ->
handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State);
abbreviated(Type, Event, State) ->
ssl_connection:?FUNCTION_NAME(Type, Event, State, ?MODULE).
+
%%--------------------------------------------------------------------
-spec certify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) ->
gen_statem:state_function_result().
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
index 07df9bc93c..1f77b558ef 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.erl
@@ -1395,8 +1395,25 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) ->
request_client_cert(State2, Connection).
certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS},
- #state{private_key = Key} = State, Connection) ->
- PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key),
+ #state{private_key = Key, client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version} = State, Connection) ->
+
+ %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret
+ %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1.
+ PremasterSecret =
+ try ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(EncPMS, Key) of
+ Secret when erlang:byte_size(Secret) == ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES ->
+ case Secret of
+ <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), _/binary>> -> %% Correct
+ Secret;
+ <<?BYTE(_), ?BYTE(_), Rest/binary>> -> %% Version mismatch
+ <<?BYTE(Major), ?BYTE(Minor), Rest/binary>>
+ end;
+ _ -> %% erlang:byte_size(Secret) =/= ?NUM_OF_PREMASTERSECRET_BYTES
+ make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa)
+ catch
+ #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} ->
+ make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa)
+ end,
calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher);
certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey},
#state{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params,
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
index 3e26f67de1..f9d2149170 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
session_cache_cb :: atom(),
crl_db :: term(),
negotiated_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined',
+ client_hello_version :: ssl_record:ssl_version() | 'undefined',
client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(),
key_algorithm :: ssl_cipher:key_algo(),
hashsign_algorithm = {undefined, undefined},
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
index 560d5a3aaf..17bc407d26 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_handshake.erl
@@ -1198,7 +1198,6 @@ certificate_authorities_from_db(_CertDbHandle, {extracted, CertDbData}) ->
[], CertDbData).
%%-------------Handle handshake messages --------------------------------
-
validation_fun_and_state({Fun, UserState0}, Role, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef,
ServerNameIndication, CRLCheck, CRLDbHandle, CertPath) ->
{fun(OtpCert, {extension, _} = Extension, {SslState, UserState}) ->
diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
index 23ba2ed7dc..96243db4ae 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
+++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ hello(internal, #client_hello{client_version = ClientVersion} = Hello,
gen_handshake(ssl_connection, hello, internal, {common_client_hello, Type, ServerHelloExt},
State#state{connection_states = ConnectionStates,
negotiated_version = Version,
+ client_hello_version = ClientVersion,
hashsign_algorithm = HashSign,
session = Session,
negotiated_protocol = Protocol})
diff --git a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
index bb77326751..cf6481d14c 100644
--- a/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
+++ b/lib/ssl/vsn.mk
@@ -1 +1 @@
-SSL_VSN = 8.2.1
+SSL_VSN = 8.2.2