Patch Package: OTP 20.1.7
Git Tag: OTP-20.1.7
Date: 2017-11-22
Trouble Report Id: OTP-14632, OTP-14653, OTP-14655, OTP-14748,
OTP-14766
Seq num:
System: OTP
Release: 20
Application: public_key-1.5.1, ssl-8.2.2
Predecessor: OTP 20.1.6
Check out the git tag OTP-20.1.7, and build a full OTP system
including documentation. Apply one or more applications from this
build as patches to your installation using the 'otp_patch_apply'
tool. For information on install requirements, see descriptions for
each application version below.
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--- public_key-1.5.1 ------------------------------------------------
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The public_key-1.5.1 application can be applied independently of
other applications on a full OTP 20 installation.
--- Improvements and New Features ---
OTP-14653 Application(s): public_key
Hostname verification: Add handling of the general name
iPAddress in certificate's subject alternative name
extension (subjAltName).
OTP-14766 Application(s): public_key
Correct key handling in pkix_test_data/1 and use a
generic example mail address instead of an existing
one.
Full runtime dependencies of public_key-1.5.1: asn1-3.0, crypto-3.8,
erts-6.0, kernel-3.0, stdlib-2.0
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--- ssl-8.2.2 -------------------------------------------------------
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Note! The ssl-8.2.2 application can *not* be applied independently of
other applications on an arbitrary OTP 20 installation.
On a full OTP 20 installation, also the following runtime
dependency has to be satisfied:
-- public_key-1.5 (first satisfied in OTP 20.1)
--- Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions ---
OTP-14632 Application(s): ssl
TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided,
so that sessions where client hostname verification
would fail can not connect reusing a session created
when the server name verification succeeded.
Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.
OTP-14748 Application(s): ssl
An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an
Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher
attack) against RSA, which when exploited, may result
in plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker
not having gained access to the server’s private key
itself. CVE-2017-1000385
Exploiting this vulnerability to perform plaintext
recovery of encrypted messages will, in most practical
cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext only
after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to
this attack.
Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct a MiTM attack
requires the attacker to complete the initial attack,
which may require thousands of server requests, during
the handshake phase of the targeted session within the
window of the configured handshake timeout. This attack
may be conducted against any TLS session using RSA
signatures, but only if cipher suites using RSA key
exchange are also enabled on the server. The limited
window of opportunity, limitations in bandwidth, and
latency make this attack significantly more difficult
to execute.
RSA key exchange is enabled by default although least
prioritized if server order is honored. For such a
cipher suite to be chosen it must also be supported by
the client and probably the only shared cipher suite.
Captured TLS sessions encrypted with ephemeral cipher
suites (DHE or ECDHE) are not at risk for subsequent
decryption due to this vulnerability.
As a workaround if default cipher suite configuration
was used you can configure the server to not use
vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like this:
{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- ssl:cipher_suites(),
element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]}
that is your code will look somethingh like this:
ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <-
ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} |
Options]).
Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and Craig Young
for reporting this vulnerability.
--- Improvements and New Features ---
OTP-14655 Application(s): ssl
If no SNI is available and the hostname is an
IP-address also check for IP-address match. This check
is not as good as a DNS hostname check and certificates
using IP-address are not recommended.
Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.
Full runtime dependencies of ssl-8.2.2: crypto-3.3, erts-7.0,
inets-5.10.7, kernel-3.0, public_key-1.5, stdlib-3.2
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